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ABSTRACT 
The enactment of tough-on-crime legislation in Canada is questionable given the 
abundance of research rejecting its underlying premises and goals. While there appears to be 
ongoing concern in Canada about the tough-on-crime agenda, there is currently a shortfall in 
information addressing the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and 
legislated by the Conservative Government. As such, there is limited data that informs 
Canadians about the ways in which politicians make meaningful decisions about youth crime 
policy and legislation.    
Consequently, the objective of this dissertation is to provide a better understanding of 
the individual (micro) and governmental (macro) processes associated with the tough-on-crime 
approach in Canada, with a specific focus on responses to youth crime. Using a conflict and 
Marxist/critical perspective (Alvi, 2012; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; DeKeseredy, 2011; 
Garland, 2001; Habermas, 1973, 1985; Hall et al., 2013; Quinney, 1970), this dissertation 
examines the state as a legitimate power and the ways in which it gains and maintains 
legitimacy. Theorists suggest modern laws work as an instrument of power to reflect the 
dominant ideology that is reproduced within the social structural system. Thus, this dissertation 
specifically examines the claim that laws are shaped by a consensus of dominant interests and 
values that are embodied and preserved in the tough-on-crime legislation, and is ultimately 
supported by the public.    
This research investigates three central questions: First, what are the processes through 
which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was legislated? Second, in what way(s) has tough-on-
crime legislation been implemented in Canadian youth courts? Finally, how does Texas 
(United States) differ in their response to youth crime, relative to their model of crime control 
and placement on the tough-on-crime spectrum? To examine the tough-on-crime approach, 
interviews were conducted with twenty-two participants who were either involved in the 
political debates of Bill C-10 (Part 4) or had intimate knowledge of the youth justice system. 
The interview data were cross-referenced and compared to the applicable parliamentary 
records in Hansard. Second, a case law analysis was conducted to determine how the tough-
on-crime mandate has been implemented within Canadian youth courts (2003-2013). Finally, 
an analysis of case law in Texas was carried out in order to understand how more punitive 
jurisdictions respond to youth crime and how their legislation differs from Canada (1996-2013). 
The findings suggest the enactment of the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada was a 
result of a complex interaction between a number of agencies, institutions, and individuals 
after the Conservative’s won a majority government in 2011. Moreover, the findings 
demonstrate the values embodied within the tough-on-crime legislation reflect the dominant 
(conservative) ideology and served as a means of maintaining legitimacy (Habermas, 1985; 
Hall et al., 2013). While the Canadian case law did not indicate that youth in conflict with the 
law were more adversely affected by Bill C-10 (Part 4), there was no evidence to suggest that 
future substantive changes in practice would not occur. However, marginalized Canadian 
youth were noted as most likely to be subject to tough-on-crime measures (Alvi, 2012).  
The results from the case law analysis of Texas suggest the state focuses on diversion 
and rehabilitation, but to a lesser degree than Canada. This is largely due to Texas’ transfer 
laws or ability to impose a determinate sentence. As a result, there appears to be a 
disproportionate use of the tough-on-crime legislation in Texas, often affecting minority youth. 
These findings are not only illustrative of a more punitive model of crime control relative to 
Canada, but point to the potential dangers of enacting tough-on-crime policies. 
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Overall, the implication of the findings from both jurisdictions is that the tough on-
crime movement is a way of deflecting unspecified social problems onto youth as marginal 
political subjects, in an effort to mobilize the political power of the state (Alvi, 2012; 
DeKeseredy, 2011; Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013). In the Canadian context, there is evidence 
to suggest the state employed both “adaptive” and “non-adaptive” strategies to address the 
problem of youth crime (Garland, 1996). In effect, the newly enacted tough-on-crime 
legislation moves Canada further away from a reliance on various collaborative techniques and 
community based programs, and therefore supports a strong state-centric approach to crime 
control. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
There are many people to whom I am indebted, both with regards to their intellectual 
contributions and for their ongoing support throughout the course of this journey. While it is 
impossible to personally thank all those that made this happen, know that your place in my 
heart will never perish.    
First and foremost, I am eternally grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg 
who never, ever gave up on me. Her words of encouragement to forge ahead were, at times, the 
only ray of light in what otherwise seemed like an endless quest. Not only am I thankful for her 
consistent belief in my abilities when I lost faith in myself, but for her devotion to my 
intellectual development as a doctoral student. Had it not been for Jennifer’s guidance and 
perseverance, I do not know where I would be. My gratitude to Jennifer will extend throughout 
the remainder of my life, and it is with great honour that I leave this program with an 
incredibly brilliant friend by my side. Jenn, I could not have done this without you. 
I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Rashmee Singh and Dr. Daniel 
O’Connor, who in their own ways, contributed to my academic achievements. Dr. Singh, your 
ongoing support over the last year meant so much, and I am thankful for the encouraging 
feedback you provided. Dr. O’Connor, were it not for you, I do not think I would have 
succeeded in producing as strong a dissertation. My work genuinely benefited from your 
insight, and I appreciate the time you took to help strengthen my research. Thank you to Dr. 
Peter Carrington for appraising my work and showing me how to think from a perspective that 
differed so much from my own. Finally, thank you to Dr. Shahid Alvi and Dr. Anna Esselment 
for agreeing to serve on my committee and for granting me the opportunity to share and 
discuss my research with you.       
Third, I would like to thank all the individuals that took the time to participate in my 
research. Without your input I would have little to report and none of this would have been 
possible. Your perspectives were invaluable!      
My sincerest gratitude goes to my family for supporting my decision to pursue my 
dreams, despite not knowing where it would take me. Thank you for pushing me when I got 
lazy. Thank you for encouraging me when I lost hope. Thank you for teaching me that a 
woman’s education is just as important as a man’s. Thank you for picking up the slack along 
the way. Thank you for making me face my fears when it was easier to run. Thank you for 
believing in me.  
Finally, I owe the most to my husband who sacrificed so much to support me over the 
last seven years. His optimistic spirit saw me through some of my worst days, but it was his 
unconditional love and devotion that ensured I achieved my goals in the end. For this, I am 
forever indebted.        
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Author Declaration .............................................................................................................. ii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 The Tough-on-Crime Campaign ................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Legislative Summary of Bill C-10 (Part 4): An Act to Amend the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act and the Criminal Code .......................................................... 2 
1.3 Public Policy ................................................................................................................ 3 
1.4 Who Informs the Public of Policy Changes? .............................................................. 4 
1.5 The Debate about Canada’s Crime Statistics .............................................................. 6 
1.6 The Tough-on-Crime Approach as a Solution? .......................................................... 9 
1.7 Research Problem and Approach .............................................................................. 12 
1.8 Chapter Overview ...................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 20 
2.1 Conflict Theory ......................................................................................................... 21 
2.1.1 Conflict of Cultural Rules and Norms .............................................................. 23 
2.1.2 Group Conflict Theory and Social Processes .................................................... 24 
2.1.3 A Theory of Criminalization ............................................................................. 26 
2.1.4 The Social Reality of Crime .............................................................................. 28 
2.2 The Evolution of Marxist/Critical Perspectives and Modern Political Power 
Relations ............................................................................................................... 31 
2.2.1 Marxist/Critical Criminology ............................................................................ 33 
2.2.2 Left Realism ...................................................................................................... 37 
2.3 The Political-Economic Structure and the Complexities of the State in 
Modern Society..................................................................................................... 40 
2.3.1 Disturbances to the System and the Legitimation Crisis................................... 45 
2.3.2 The Need for Legitimation in Modern Society ................................................. 51 
2.3.3 Law as an Instrument of Governing Power ....................................................... 53 
2.4 Theoretical Limitations of Conflict Theory and Critical Theory .............................. 55 
2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 59 
Chapter 3 - The Dynamics of Legislative Change ................................................................... 62 
3.1 The Creation of Laws ................................................................................................ 62 
3.1.1 The Creators of Laws ........................................................................................ 64 
3.2 Media Constructions of Crime .................................................................................. 69 
3.3 Public Views and Attitudes about Youth Crime and the Youth Justice System ....... 73 
3.3.1 The Interconnection of Public Opinion and Politics ......................................... 76 
3.4 Reactions to Youth Crime and the Issue of Hegemony ............................................ 78 
3.5 The Crisis over Penal-Welfarism and Shifts in Youth Crime Governance ............... 81 
3.6 The Social Cost of Getting Tough on Crime ............................................................. 92 
3.7 Was There Really a Need for Change? A Look at Canadian Youth Crime 
Statistics ................................................................................................................ 94 
vi 
3.7.1 Characteristics of Crime Allegedly Committed by Youth Appearing in 
Court .................................................................................................................. 99 
3.7.2 Youth Sentencing Practices ............................................................................. 100 
3.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 105 
Chapter 4 - The Legal Context for Responses to Youth Crime ............................................. 109 
4.1 The Current Canadian Perspective on Youth Crime ............................................... 110 
4.1.1 The Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908 – 1984).................................................. 111 
4.1.2 The Young Offenders Act (1984 – 2003) ....................................................... 113 
4.1.3 The Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003 – ) ...................................................... 117 
4.1.4 The Provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4): What Do They Constitute? .................. 119 
4.1.5 Implications of Bill C-10 (Part 4) in Relation to the YCJA ............................. 127 
4.1.6 Applying Adult Sentences to Young Persons ................................................. 133 
4.2 The Crime Control Model: Juvenile Justice in Texas ............................................. 136 
4.2.1 The Development of a Separate Juvenile Justice System in the United 
States ............................................................................................................... 137 
4.2.2 Minimum and Maximum Ages of Jurisdiction ............................................... 144 
4.2.3 Detentions and Informal Dispositions in the State of Texas ........................... 145 
4.2.4 Adjudicatory Hearings .................................................................................... 147 
4.2.5 Dispositional Alternatives ............................................................................... 148 
4.2.6 Transfer Laws and Mechanisms ...................................................................... 150 
4.2.7 Sentence Structure and Blended Sentences ..................................................... 155 
4.2.8 The Effects of Getting Tough-on-Crime Almost Twenty Years Later ........... 160 
4.3 An Illustration of Similar Processes ........................................................................ 161 
4.4 Areas Identified in the Literature for Future Review .............................................. 167 
4.5    Research Questions .................................................................................................. 170 
Chapter 5 - Methods .............................................................................................................. 172 
5.1 Qualitative Approach to Research ........................................................................... 173 
5.2 Reliability and Validity ........................................................................................... 175 
5.3 Research Methods ................................................................................................... 179 
5.3.1 In-Depth Interviews......................................................................................... 179 
5.3.2 Case Law Studies ............................................................................................ 181 
5.3.3 Legal Analysis ................................................................................................. 184 
5.3.4 Limitations of the Research Methods.............................................................. 190 
5.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Size .................................................................... 193 
5.4.1 Case Law ......................................................................................................... 198 
5.5 Data Collection: Interviews ..................................................................................... 200 
5.5.1 Interview Questions and Procedures ............................................................... 202 
5.5.2 Interview Schedule .......................................................................................... 203 
5.6 Data Collection: Canadian Case Law ...................................................................... 205 
5.7 Data Collection: Legal Analyses of Texas Case Law ............................................. 208 
5.8 Data Analysis: Interview Data ................................................................................ 210 
5.9 Data Analysis: Canadian Case Law ........................................................................ 213 
5.10 Data Analysis: Texas Legislation and Case Law .................................................... 215 
5.11 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................. 217 
5.11.1 Anticipated Risks and Benefits ....................................................................... 219 
5.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 220 
vii 
Chapter 6 - The Canadian Context for Tough-on-Crime Legislation .................................... 222 
6.1 Processes Associated With the Bill C-10 (Part 4) Legislation ................................ 222 
6.1.1 Chronological Development of Tough-on-Crime Measures ........................... 223 
6.1.2 Values That Should Be Embodied In Bill C-10 (Part 4) ................................. 246 
6.2 Power, Ability and Influence in the Process of Legislative Change ....................... 257 
6.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 279 
Chapter 7 – Interpretations of YCJA Legislation and Sentencing Practices in Canada ........ 283 
7.1 The Effects of Tough-on-Crime Policy ................................................................... 284 
7.2 Case Law Findings From 2003 ............................................................................... 285 
7.2.1 Case Law Findings Between 2004 and 2006 .................................................. 287 
7.2.2 Case Law Findings Between 2007 and 2009 .................................................. 296 
7.2.3 Case Law Findings Between 2010 and 2012 .................................................. 301 
7.2.4 Case Law Findings From Early 2013 .............................................................. 307 
7.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 317 
Chapter 8 – Tough-on-Crime Legislation and Responses to Youth Crime in Texas ............ 319 
8.1 Responses to and Management of Youth Crime in Texas ...................................... 320 
8.1.1 Intake and Places of Detention for Alleged Juvenile Delinquents .................. 323 
8.1.2 Delinquency Adjudications ............................................................................. 326 
8.1.3 Dispositions ..................................................................................................... 328 
8.1.4 Determinate Sentencing of Violent or Habitual Offenders ............................. 331 
8.1.5 Discretionary Transfer to Adult Criminal Court ............................................. 335 
8.2 Differing Policies in Response to Youth Crime ...................................................... 342 
8.3 Learning from Other Responses to Youth Crime .................................................... 355 
8.3.1 Informing the Development of Canadian Youth Justice Policies ................... 361 
8.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 367 
Chapter 9 - Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 371 
9.1 Conservative Ideology, “Adaptive” Strategies of the State, and “Non-
Adaptive” Responses .......................................................................................... 373 
9.2 Processes of the Development and Legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4) ..................... 381 
9.3 Impact of the Tough-on-Crime Policy .................................................................... 391 
9.4 Responses to Youth Crime in Texas ....................................................................... 396 
9.5 What Have We Learned About Tough-on-Crime Policies and Legislation? .......... 405 
9.6 Recommendations for Future Research .................................................................. 408 
List of Canadian Cases ...................................................................................................... 414 
List of American Cases ..................................................................................................... 418 
References ......................................................................................................................... 420 
Appendix A: Interview Schedule ...................................................................................... 457 
Appendix B: Recruitment Letter ....................................................................................... 460 
Appendix C: Letter of Information and Informed Consent............................................... 462 
Appendix D: Thank You Letter ........................................................................................ 467 
Appendix E: Informal Responses to Youth Crime in Texas ............................................. 469 
Appendix F: Deferred Prosecution in the State of Texas .................................................. 470 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3.1: Police-Reported Youth Crime Severity Indexes, Canada, 2003 to 2013 .............. 95 
Figure 3.2: Youth Accused of Crime, by Clearance Status, Canada, 2003 to 2013 ................ 96 
Figure 3.3: Ten Most Common Cases Completed in Youth Court, Canada 2011/2012 ....... 100 
Figure 3.4: Proportion of Guilty Youth Cases Sentenced to Probation has Declined since the 
Enactment of the Youth Criminal Justice Act .................................................... 101 
Figure 3.5: Guilty Cases in Youth Court, by Type of Sentence, Canada, 2011/2012 ........... 103 
Figure 3.6: Guilty Cases Completed in Youth Court, by Selected Sentence, 1991/1992 to 
2011/2012 ........................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 3.7: Guilty Cases Completed in Youth Court Sentenced to Custody, by Province and 
Territory, 2011/2012 .......................................................................................... 105 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1: Illustrative Summary of Youth Justice Systems and Mechanisms in Canada and 
Texas .................................................................................................................. 158 
Table 4.2: Areas Identified in the Literature for Future Research ......................................... 169 
Table 5.1: Research Questions and Data Sources.................................................................. 221 
x 
 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 A great deal of research over the past few years attempts to delineate the controversies 
embedded in the tough-on-crime agenda. Of those publishing their findings in this area, it 
would seem that the literature indicates an impasse between advocates for and against this 
approach, with a very strong emphasis on the latter. The tough-on-crime campaign “refers to a 
set of policies that emphasize punishment as a primary, and often sole, response to crime” 
(Shah, 2005, p. 43). Historically, this movement can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 
1970s in the United States, with minimal signs of its manifestation in Canada. At that time, 
Canada’s Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA) emphasized a social welfare approach. Presently, 
however, Canadians are faced with newly enacted amendments to crime legislation with little 
evidence supporting the need. These sanctions are most notably witnessed in relation to adult 
crime, but they are also applicable to youth crimes as per Bill C-10 (Part 4). 
 As an introduction to the study, this chapter addresses the background to the research 
problems in order to frame the rationale for this study. Further, it attends to the methodology 
adopted, and the likely contributions of the results. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief 
synopsis of the chapters within the dissertation.   
1.1  The Tough-on-Crime Campaign 
 The tough-on-crime mandate put forth by the current Canadian Conservative 
government is responsible for creating a great deal of dispute within social and political realms. 
In particular, the deliberation of this campaign is partially due to the contested justification of 
implementing this legislation, especially given that the policy to deliver harsher punishments 
has simply failed at yielding positive results in the United States (Caputo & Vallée, 2007; 
DeKeseredy, 2011; Myers, 2005). Moreover, confusion over the rationalization of this 
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approach has left disapproving politicians and academics baffled, since Statistics Canada has 
reported a general decline in crime rates overall and offence seriousness (Boyce, Cotter & 
Perreault, 2014). In fact, according to police reported crime statistics in 2013, Canada is 
presently at its lowest overall crime rates since 1969, boasting approximately 1.8 million 
Criminal Code police reported incidents (not including traffic), approximately 132,000 fewer 
than 2012 (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). More notably, the police reported rate at which 
youth were accused of an offence in 2013 represents approximately 4,346 youth per 100,000 
between the ages of 12-17, representing a 16% decrease from 2012 (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 
2014). This decrease was observed for both violent and non-violent crimes, and evidence 
suggests that the youth Crime Severity Index has declined by 39% over the last ten years. 
Despite these statistics, however, the Canadian government has introduced new tough-on-
crime legislation.  
1.2 Legislative Summary of Bill C-10 (Part 4): An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act and the Criminal Code  
  As part of the Omnibus Crime Bill C-10, the purpose of Part 4 “is to amend certain 
provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to emphasize the importance of protecting 
society and to facilitate the detention of young persons who reoffend or who pose a threat to 
public safety”1 (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123). More specifically, Part 4 of the Bill:  
 (a) “Establishes specific deterrence and denunciation as sentencing principles similar to 
 the principles provided in the adult criminal justice system (clause 172)” but appear to 
 be contrary to the principles stipulated in Section 3 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act; 
 
1 Bill C-10 (Part 4), also known as “An Act to amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to make consequential 
and related amendments to other Acts” was initially tabled in the House of Commons on 16 March 2010. For 
more information, see the Legislative Summary of Bill C-10: Amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
[Library of Parliament, 2011; Bill C-10 (Part 4), Clauses 167-204 (Formerly Bill C-4)].   
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 (b) “Expands the case law definition of a violent offence to include reckless 
 behaviour endangering public safety (clause 167)”;  
 
 (c) “Amends the rules for pre-sentencing detention (also called pre-trial detention) to 
 facilitate the detention of young persons accused of crimes against property 
 punishable by a maximum term of five years or more and those with a history of 
 outstanding charges or findings of guilt (clause 169)”;  
  
 (d) “Authorizing the court to impose a prison sentence on a young person who has 
 previously been subject to a number of extrajudicial sanctions (clause 173)”; 
  
 (e) “Requires the Crown to consider the possibility of seeking an adult sentence for 
 young offenders 14 to 17 years of age convicted of murder, attempted murder, 
 manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault (clauses 176 and 183)”;  
  
 (f) “Facilitates publication of the name of young offenders convicted of violent 
 offences (clause 185 and 189)”; although in R. v. D.B., (2008) 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 87 it 
 was noted that “losing the protection of a publication ban renders the sentence more 
 severe.” 
  
 (g) “Requires police to keep a record of any extrajudicial measures imposed on young 
 persons so that their criminal tendencies can be documented (clause 190)”; and  
  
 (h) “Prohibits the imprisonment of young persons in adult correctional facilities 
 (clause 186)” (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123)).  
  
 Despite the political appeal put forth by the Conservative government, stricter 
provisions such as those outlined in Bill C-10 (Part 4) have not been effective in reducing 
crime amongst youth. There appears to be a lack of conclusive reports that support the notion 
that the tough-on-crime approach will decrease youth crime (Bala, 2002; Doob & Cesaroni, 
2004; Doob & Webster, 2003; Roberts, 2004).  
1.3 Public Policy 
 The evidence presented by opposing politicians and academics on Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
suggests there is reason to question the basis upon which the Conservative government has 
gone about making changes to public policy. Much of this argument is formed on grounds 
which reject several of the underlying principles of the Bill, such as easing the “publication of 
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names of young offenders convicted of violent offences” and “establishing specific deterrence 
and denunciation as sentencing principles similar to the principles provided in the adult 
criminal justice system” (Library of Parliament, 2011 [Bill C-10 (Part 4), Clauses 167-204 
(Formerly Bill C-4)]). Given the closing of the Law Reform Commissions in Canada in 2006 
and the recent calamity over the decision to cease administration of the long-form Census in 
2010 (which was instrumental in determining where public funding should be spent in order to 
alleviate some of the root causes of social ailments), there is evidence to suggest that majority 
governments may potentially propose public policy, federal funding, and legislative changes to 
the law with limited supporting research or reference to empirical data (Mallea, 2010). In the 
absence of both the Law Reform Commission in Canada and the long-form Census, 
amendments to public policy or legislation are no longer presented on the basis of impartial 
policy views, but rather partisan views. As a result, it can be argued that Canadians are not 
adequately safeguarded against judgements passed on public policy or legislation. In effect, 
this is the very issue of concern that conflict theorists and critical Marxist/social theorists seek 
to explain.  
1.4 Who Informs the Public of Policy Changes?  
 The Law Reform Commission in Canada was traditionally assembled as an 
independent legal research institute. Its main goal at the time was “to inquire into and consider 
any matter relating to (a) reform of the law having regard to the statute law, the common law 
and judicial decisions; (b) the administration of justice; (c) judicial and quasi-judicial 
procedures under any Act; or (d) any subject referred to it by the Attorney General” (Ontario 
Law Reform Commission Final Report, 1996, p. 17). In addition, a benefit of a commission 
such as this included independence from government bureaucracy and influence, as well as 
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access to groups of experts (i.e. the judiciary, the legislative assembly, and legal scholars) in 
the area under scrutiny. While some Canadian jurisdictions currently have provincial Law 
Commissions, their main objective is to recommend law reform measures that are accessible to 
all individuals within that particular province. As such, it is their mandate to simplify or clarify 
the law, but not to amend it. A provincial law commission can make recommendations to 
change or modernize laws, but are not specifically responsible for considering matters that 
pertain to statute laws and judicial decisions. 
 Consequently, abolishment of the Law Reform Commission in Canada, which is 
partially due to revoking federal funding, reinforces the hypothesis that governments 
(especially majority governments) are capable of advocating and implementing changes to 
policies and legislation without sufficient nonpartisan information. With the absence of the 
Law Reform Commission in Canada, Canadians are lacking information on 1) reform in statute 
laws, as per Bill C-10; 2) issues dealing with the administration of justice as per the newly 
enacted principles of Bill C-10 (Part 4); and 3) matters pertaining to the strengthening of 
sentencing provisions for repeat young offenders, pre-trial detention rules, and the 
consideration of adult sentences for youth 14 and older who commit serious violent offences. 
One can argue Canadians may be misinformed about the nature of projected changes to 
policies since they are provided with deficient or distorted information, including fragmentary 
statistics on the matter and skewed perceptions communicated through the media. The heavy 
reliance on the media to convey information regarding what works and what does not in 
relation to crime ultimately contributes to the construction of public perception, which has a 
great deal of influence on politicians to enact tougher legislation (Dowler, Fleming, & 
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Muzzatti, 2006; Ericson, 1991; Fishman, 1980; Habermas, 1975, 1985, 2006; Hall, Critcher, 
Jefferson, Clarke & Roberts, 2013; Schulenberg & Chenier, 2014).  
1.5 The Debate about Canada’s Crime Statistics 
 While youth crime in Canada exists, there appears to be some discrepancy with regards 
to the ways in which Canadian statistics report both on the nature and the extent of youth 
offending patterns. Amongst those claiming that the statistics simply misrepresent the truth 
when it comes to actual crime rates was Scott Newark (2011), a senior policy advisor to the 
Ontario and federal Conservative Ministers of Public Safety. Newark (2011) asserts that a 
defective process of “collection, analysis, and reporting of crime statistics” generated by 
Statistics Canada is what creates the appearance of a declining crime rate (p. 22). Earlier in 
2011, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy2 released a review of police-reported 
crime statistics organized by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), just months 
after the Conservative government’s announcement to terminate the mandatory long-form 
Census. The review made clear that “many of the most common conclusions that are drawn 
about crime in Canada are in fact incorrect or badly distorted” (Newark, 2011, p. 4). 
Accordingly, Newark (2011) argues that the biggest culprit of these problems stems primarily 
from the way the data on crime in Canada is collected by Statistics Canada, followed by a 
flawed interpretation of the information.  
 Newark’s (2011) argument regarding erroneous data collection is based on the notion 
that the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) only compiles information on crimes reported to the 
police. In other words, not all crimes are reported in the UCR because some crimes are never 
2 The Macdonald-Laurier Institute considers itself to be “Canada’s only truly national public policy think tank 
based in Ottawa”. It also asserts that it is “rigorously independent and non-partisan” (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 
2014).  
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identified, and some are never brought forth to the police.3 Consequently, the declining youth 
crime rates was not considered during the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada, yet 
implementing the approach was argued as necessary by the Conservative Party. This was 
especially the case since Prime Minister Stephen Harper believed the YCJA (pre-Bill C-10 
(Part 4) enactment) to be an “unmitigated failure” in that it was unable to hold all youth 
responsible for their crimes (“Prime Minister Stephen Harper delivers remarks,” 2008). 
 Newark’s (2011) report includes numerous examples of how both the collection 
process and the interpretation of the data are erroneous, citing problems with (a) the 
eradication of “historical data that would allow effective comparisons of crime rates over time”; 
(b) “a model that inappropriately minimizes the volume (and thus the rate) of crime”; (c) the 
lack of “data on who is committing what kinds of crimes”; (d) negligence for “data on and 
explanations of unreported and unresolved crimes”; and most importantly, (e) the absence of 
“vital information about how much crime is committed by those who have already had contact 
with the system, including those on probation, bail or conditional release”, which is essential to 
the assessment of “existing rehabilitation and deterrence measures” (p. 4). The report was 
designed to evaluate the deficiencies in the Juristat reports with hopes of better informing 
governmental and legislative decision- and opinion-makers in Canada, as well as the general 
public of more accurate facts upon which meaningful decisions about crime can be made 
(Newark, 2011).           
3 The UCR2, established in the mid-1980s and revised in 1998 and again in 2004, was created in an attempt to 
gather more precise and accurate information on each incident, victims and accused persons, and made known 
certain efficiencies for police services. It also lowered the responsibility of response by eradicating or clarifying 
some of the variables used in the survey, as well as included new variables for violations such as hate crime, cyber 
crime and organized crime (Statistics Canada, 2013). 
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 Alongside this declaration, the review also addresses issues pertaining to youth crime, 
announcing that “the 2009 report is especially obtuse when it comes to youth crime 
information. Most of what is reported is framed on the subjective CSI (Crime Severity Index).” 
(Newark, 2011, p. 18).4 The accusations brought forth by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute for 
Public Policy against the police reported data are not only shared by other Conservative Party 
members, but are used as a justification to support the Conservative government’s agenda 
(Mallea, 2010). However, Newark’s claim that Statistics Canada crime numbers are grossly 
distorted or misrepresented has received criticism for comparing “figures that cannot be 
compared”, “presenting figures that are inaccurate”, and discounting “evidence that crime is, in 
fact, decreasing” (Greenspan & Doob, 2011, p. 1). There is serious disagreement between the 
government’s tough-on-crime agenda (which claims the only way to reduce increasing crime 
rates is by imposing tougher penalties), and opponents who suggest crime rates cannot be 
reduced by implementing tougher laws and harsher sentencing. In essence, there is a gap in the 
literature between the need for and against the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada (as well as 
how to improve the youth justice system). 
 On a broader level, the distortion of the problem of youth crime is not solely grounded 
in the way statistics in Canada are collected. Moving beyond the collection process, it can be 
argued that any misrepresentation or fragmented understanding of the problem of youth crime 
4 The Crime Severity Index is an “analytical tool” for measuring crime in Canada. In measuring the extent of 
crime across the country, the Crime Severity Index evaluates the differing degrees of severity that subsist between 
offence types by assigning weights according to a severity scale. In essence, a comparison of crime trends can be 
carried out in relation to the magnitude of the offences that were reported to the police. The movement towards 
the Crime Severity Index was necessary in order to develop a means through which the types of crimes occurring 
in Canada could be assessed according to the relative seriousness, thus achieving a more simplified measure of 
crime volume. The principle upon which the Crime Severity Index is grounded is that the more serious the crime 
the more punitive sentence received. The Index relies on actual custodial sentences imposed by judges in the five 
most recent years. For more information, see Wallace, Turner, Matarazzo, and Babyak (2009).      
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stems from a combination of the ways in which both youth crime statistics and other amassed 
evidence (such as the testimonies presented as part of the deliberative process of public 
inquiries) are used. Together, these sources of data are used or discounted to problematize 
certain activities (in a way that frames and defines the problem, seriousness and extent of youth 
crime) to either support or reject (or at the very least, minimize) other ways of thinking about 
or acting on the existing problem. Historically, this can be understood in terms of the state’s 
previous attempts at governing under the JDA, YOA, and the implementation of penal-welfare 
strategies more generally. Presently, the gaps in knowledge on how such evidence is 
constituted appear to carry great significance on one’s understanding of the quality and 
quantity of youth crime.     
1.6 The Tough-on-Crime Approach as a Solution?  
 There is considerable evidence against pursuing a tough-on-crime mandate in Canada, 
especially with regards to youth offenders. Studies suggest that implementing harsher 
punishments serve no purpose in the reduction of crime amongst young offenders, and offer 
examples from jurisdictions such as the United States to support their arguments (DeKeseredy, 
2011; Doob & Sprott, 2006; McCaghy, Capron, Jamieson, & Harley Carey, 2007; Myers, 2005; 
Shah, 2005). More specifically, legislation that stipulates “denunciation and specific deterrence” 
is shown to have little effect on youth crime given the nature and broadness of these sentencing 
principles (i.e., principles that resemble those in the adult criminal justice system).  
The argument against tough-on-crime legislation is furthered by the current statistical 
information provided on the youth crime rates in Canada. The steady decline in the number of 
youth involved in a criminal incident is illustrative of a downward trend that has been observed 
over a number of years. This implies that the Canadian youth crime rate has decreased without 
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applying amendments to the YCJA legislation, and thus can be the basis of an argument that the 
legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) are not needed. 
 More notably, international research indicates that “young people who are put behind 
bars are 11 per cent less likely to get a job once they get out, compared with those who don’t 
go to prison, even once researchers account for pre-conviction differences in background and 
upbringing” (Paperny, 2011, p. 2). Why the Conservative government is convinced that the 
political response to youth crime consists of increasing punitive sanctions, as opposed to 
offering programs to help youth reintegrate into the community, remains unanswered. In effect, 
enacting Bill C-10 (Part 4) essentially undermines certain principles of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (YCJA), since Section 3 of the YCJA states its objective is for the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of youth into society within the parameters of meaningful consequences, and fair 
and proportionate accountability, in an attempt to “promote long term protection of the public” 
(Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002, par. 3(1) (a)).5   
 Though current statistics show that youth crime rates are decreasing, it would appear 
that these facts had little influence on Harper’s politically motivated tough-on-crime agenda. 
As it stands, the argument used by those parliamentarians in line with the Conservative 
government is that the amendments to Bill C-10 (Part 4) ultimately lead to Canadians feeling 
more confident in the criminal justice system, while at the same time feel safer from serious 
repeat young offenders. This research, therefore, begins to address the basis upon which these 
phenomena occurred. According to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada 
Rob Nicholson, who supports Bill C-10 in its entirety, this rationale is linked to the belief that 
5 Please note that the most recent amendment to the YCJA occurred on 28 February 2013, and no longer cites the 
promotion of long-term protection of the public as one of its objectives. The above statement is in reference to the 
old version of the YCJA prior to amendments as a result of Bill C-10 (Part 4).  
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Canadians support a tough-on-crime approach (Bill C-4 (Historical) Parliamentary Debates, 6 
March, 2012; Cohen, 2012). However, findings indicate that public opinion polls about harsher 
punishments may not represent an accurate perspective due to the nature of these polls and the 
way people perceive issues related to youth crime (Roberts, 2003; Sprott, 1996; Sprott, 
Webster, & Doob, 2013).  
 Similar findings were also noted during the passing of the JDA, but more notably 
during the enactment of the Young Offenders Act (YOA) when the public voiced a great deal of 
concern about the rising youth crime rates. Like present day, the notion that youth crime rates 
(particularly violent crimes) were increasing represented only a small fraction of the overall 
crime rate (Brode, 1993). In fact, less than 15% of all reported youth crime involved violence 
(Justice Canada, 1993b). Yet, in response to the public’s growing beliefs on the nature and 
extent of youth crime and the need for ongoing protection from victimization by young 
offenders, many of the political parties in the 1993 federal elections proposed reforms to the 
youth criminal justice policy as part of their political platform (Begin, 1993).6 A great majority 
of these findings can be witnessed in the number of amendments made to the YOA over the 
years during its enactment, given the neo-liberal policy propositions that gained popularity 
during the 1980s. Nonetheless, the discrepancy in the debate involving both sides of the 
argument revolves not around a lack of sufficient empirical evidence, but instead around values, 
interests, power, and of course, policy-making.  
 What this suggests then, is that the public is used as a means of gaining and 
maintaining state authority and legitimacy, which is ultimately dependent on continuous 
6 There does not appear to be any academic literature on how political parties in the past dealt with police 
statistics that did not reflect their agendas. Thus, it is difficult to make any comparisons on this with previous 
Canadian governments when developing crime policy.   
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processes to exercise legitimate power (Habermas, 1975). It can be argued that a restructuring 
of the state administration and policy agendas have been influenced by neo-liberal and neo-
conservative rationalities (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; O’Malley, 1999). Such 
ideology, therefore, manifests itself as part of a systematic process that substantiates the ways 
in which the law works as an instrument of legitimacy and power. Essentially, these ideologies 
and laws are implemented through various mechanisms of hegemony (Habermas, 1975; Hall et 
al., 2013).    
1.7 Research Problem and Approach 
 The purpose of this research is to better understand the individual (micro) and 
governmental (macro) processes associated with the tough-on-crime approach in Canada, 
focusing specifically on responses to youth crime. More specifically, this dissertation assesses 
the ways in which evidence (i.e., the problem of youth crime) is constituted (or discounted on 
account of the declining youth crime statistics), and how accountability for the problem is 
delegated onto the youth themselves and is acted upon through various punitive measures 
(such as adult penalties and sentencing principles similar to those found in the adult criminal 
jurisdiction). It may be argued that the tough-on-crime movement in Canada is a way to deflect 
vague or undetermined social problems onto youth (particularly minority youth) as marginal 
political subjects, in an effort to mobilize the political power of the state. These youth represent 
those least capable of marshalling political power (i.e., on account of the fact that they do not 
belong to the dominant group in society) and are most likely unable to participate in 
democratic elections given their age. In an attempt to show that something is being done to 
address the social problems responsible for eliciting such strong emotional reactions (i.e., 
youth crime), specific legislative enactments are therefore implemented.  
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 Using a conflict and Marxist/critical perspective as the theoretical framework, this 
dissertation examines the mobilization of state power, which is achieved through a number of 
processes that aspire to win mass public support and thus reaffirm the political legitimacy of 
the state. At the same time, political authority reflects the dominant ideology which is 
reproduced within the social structural system to construct laws that are shaped by a so-called 
consensus of dominant interests and values. It is important to consider whose values are, and 
whose values ought to be embodied in the law (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Habermas, 1975, 
1985), and whose conception of what society ought to be like in order to fully appreciate the 
genesis of this movement towards a tough-on-crime approach. Specifically, how these values 
are reflected in the tough-on-crime legislation, and how these values are preserved and 
supported by the public is of particular concern.  
 Based on the findings from the literature and the relevant theoretical perspectives, there 
are three central questions. First, this research addresses the processes through which Bill C-10 
(Part 4) developed and was legislated. Second, the ways in which Bill C-10 (Part 4) has been 
implemented within Canadian youth courts is examined. Third, this research focuses on how 
tough-on-crime policies and legislation in Texas (United States) are consistent with a crime 
control model of juvenile justice, serving as an illustration of a tough-on-crime philosophy of 
justice. 7   
 The tough-on-crime approach is investigated in three ways. First, this study involved 
conducting interviews with twenty-two participants that were either involved in the political 
debates of Bill C-10 (Part 4) or connected with youth within the justice system. The 
7 The tough-on-crime approach has been implemented in Texas for approximately 20 years, and continues to be 
fairly punitive for youth in conflict with the law. See Chapter 5 (pp. 172-173) for more information on the 
selection process and why Texas was chosen for analysis.   
13 
 
                                            
perspective of these respondents was vital given that the literature has shown that tough-on-
crime measures have little effect on youth, and that the need for these amendments is not 
supported by most empirical evidence. Thus, in order to fully capture the processes through 
which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and legislated (see Research Questions #1 and 2), 
various judges, Crown Attorney’s, retired politicians, academics, federal civil servants, and 
individuals working with youth in conflict with the law were interviewed. 8 Although 283 
Members of Parliament cast a vote either for or against the passing of Bill C-10 (Part 4), none 
of them were able or willing to participate in this research.9  
 Second, a case law analysis was conducted in order to determine how the tough-on-
crime mandate is implemented within Canadian youth courts (see Research Question # 3). This 
analysis stems as far back as April 2003, when the Youth Criminal Justice Act first came into 
effect, and includes cases up to June 2013. Finally, a legal analysis of legislation in Texas was 
carried out. Specific case law from Texas was examined to illustrate the ways in which these 
laws are implemented in the courts on a state-wide basis. Further, the analysis examined the 
ways in which Texas’ youth justice policies and legislation are further along the tough-on-
crime continuum when compared to Canada.   
 The implications of these findings demonstrate the basis upon which tough-on-crime 
legislation is developed and implemented in Canada (the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4)), as 
well as how Canadians currently respond to youth crime. It also sheds light on the complex 
processes associated with the enactment of tough-on-crime policies on account of the various 
8 As this dissertation is qualitative, this research examines respondent perceptions of the process, especially with 
regards to what is perceived as important reasons for amendments from each participant’s perspective.  
9 For more information on the sample size and technique used in this research, please refer to Chapter 5 (pp. 193-
198). 
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superstructural forces that come into play. Furthermore, an analysis of how Texas oversees and 
responds to youth crime reveals the ways in which a more punitive jurisdiction embodies the 
principles of a model that enforces the law and maintains social order. The implications, 
therefore, not only provide a frame of reference as to where Canada currently sits on the tough-
on-crime continuum, but also have a bearing on the future development of youth justice 
policies and legislation in the Canadian context. This is particularly true given that the 
enactment of these tougher penalties have been deemed unsuccessful both by youth justice 
professionals and conservative politicians in Texas. As such, international policies recognizing 
that more austere legislation does not result in a reduction of crime have the potential to offer 
Canadian legislation an alternative approach to the tough-on-crime mandate.  
 The scope and depth of this study provide findings on issues that, because of the new 
legislation, have not previously been addressed on the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada. 
Consequently, the findings expand our knowledge within a Canadian perspective and develop 
our understanding of the micro and macro processes associated with the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation. This is especially the case given that both processes have been investigated to a 
very limited extent in the past, although there is evidence to suggest that the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation developed on similar grounds to other Western nations, including Texas, that have 
enacted comparable tough-on-crime measures.      
1.8 Chapter Overview 
  Chapter 2 describes the theoretical foundations in this research by outlining various 
conflict and Marxist/critical theories. These perspectives offer explanations for both the 
processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was legislated, and the responses to 
youth crime in both Canada and Texas. It also sheds light on the ways in which the state acts a 
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mediator of its complex interests by advancing decisions, and the ways in which authority and 
legitimacy is gained through the public. In essence, the theoretical perspectives discussed in 
this chapter emphasize a highly complex and nuanced approach to politics and the state more 
generally, and therefore partially form the research questions that are investigated in this study. 
 Chapter 3 provides a review of the significant findings in the literature on the dynamics 
of legislative change within Canada. In order to clarify the ways in which laws are created and 
by whom, the findings from prior research are organized in terms of policy creation, media 
constructions of youth crime, public views and attitudes about youth crime and Canada’s youth 
justice system, the ways in which public views about youth crime influence policy-formation, 
reactions to youth crime in terms of hegemony, the crisis over penal-welfarism and the various 
shifts in youth crime governance on account of the ideological movements and discourse of the 
state, and the social costs of tough-on-crime legislation. The latter part of the chapter addresses 
some of the statistical findings which attend to both the characteristics of the crimes committed 
by youth and various youth sentencing practices across the country. In effect, the material 
outlined in this chapter builds on the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2 to form a 
more precise understanding of the complexities involved in law-making as well as the nature of 
political power.   
 Chapter 4 presents the legal framework for responses to youth crime in both the 
Canadian and American contexts. The first half of the chapter addresses the evolution of legal 
principles in Canada by briefly tracing through the guiding philosophies of the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act, Young Offenders Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and finally the 
legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4). These sections focus on the ways in which a 
notable shift in youth crime governance can be observed through various changes in youth 
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justice laws and policies. The chapter then examines the implications of Bill C-10 (Part 4) in 
relation to the preceding version of the YCJA. In addition, a discussion on the conflicting neo-
liberal and neo-conservative rationalities, and on the basis of this ideological view, an 
assessment of the application of adult sentences to young persons as a response to youth crime 
is presented. The latter half of the chapter considers the ways in which the state of Texas 
oversees and responds to youth crime through various procedural mechanisms that are 
consistent with a model of crime control. The provisions that exemplify Texas’ philosophy of 
juvenile justice are addressed in terms of their tough-on-crime legislation. The chapter then 
addresses the effects of tough-on-crime legislation in Texas, and turns to a discussion on the 
ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation in both jurisdictions occurred on account of 
similar processes and transformations in youth crime governance. This review helps 
contextualize the findings in Chapters 7 and 8 by providing a frame of reference for the 
analysis. Thus, the final section of this chapter synthesizes what is known and what remains 
unclear by outlining the areas for further research in Chapter 4. These research questions are 
derived from the theoretical perspectives and literature discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.     
 Chapter 5 presents the methods and data used to address the research questions that are 
listed in Chapter 4. First, the purpose and appropriateness of a qualitative (constructivist) 
research design is addressed. Second, the sample and data collection techniques are discussed. 
Third, the approach and methods used to analyze the date are reviewed. Finally, the ethical 
considerations and the anticipated risks and benefits of participating in the study are outlined.  
 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the findings from analyzing the interview and case law data. 
Chapter 6 relies on the interview data and investigates the Canadian context for the tough-on-
crime legislation in Canada and the processes associated with Bill C-10 (Part 4), by addressing 
17 
 
a) whose values are embodied within the Bill’s legislation and whose values should be 
embodied in the Bill in order to better address youth crime in Canada (see Research Question 
#1); b) whose conceptions of what society ought to be like influenced the enactment of the Bill 
(see Research Question #2). In essence, Chapter 6 explicitly attends to the processes through 
which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and implemented. Chapter 7 examines whether or not 
Canadian youth have been impacted by the tough-on-crime legislation within the youth courts 
(see Research Question #3) by analyzing the applicable case law.10 This chapter addresses the 
ways in which tough-on-crime legislation is implemented or interpreted within a court of law. 
Chapter 8, on the other hand, explores the ways in which Texas oversees and responds to youth 
crime by looking at the governing policies and legislation and considers how tough-on-crime 
laws are applied to youth in conflict with the law via case law. This chapter relies on the case 
law data and applicable tough-on-crime legislation in Texas, and to a lesser degree analyzes 
findings from the interviews. By addressing notable differences in policies in response to youth 
crime, Chapter 8 is devoted to examining a) how other jurisdictions such as Texas oversee and 
respond to youth crime and how the legislation is implemented in the courts (see Research 
Question #4); and b) how policies and legislation in response to youth crime in Texas differ 
from those of Canada (see Research Question #5). These differences between policies provide 
a basis for what can be learned from the way a more punitive jurisdiction such as Texas 
responds to youth crime in terms of their legislation, and in what ways these differences can 
10 The analysis of case law from Canadian youth courts contributes to the dissertation’s objective by identifying 
any differences in sentencing practices from pre-enactment case law to post-enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) case 
law. The overall goal is to assess whether or not youth have been impacted by the legislative amendments, and if 
so in what way(s).    
18 
 
                                            
better inform Canadians on the future development of youth justice policy (see Research 
Question #6).11 
 Finally, the significant findings and their implications are summarized in Chapter 9. An 
overview of the results from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 is provided in consideration of previous 
research and the theoretical perspectives. The implications of the findings that lend support to 
the empirical and theoretical framework are discussed in conjunction with the limitations of the 
study. In light of these findings, the areas suggested for future research and theoretical 
development are considered.      
  
11 The analysis in Chapter 8 contributes to the dissertation’s objective because it has been posited that the tough-
on-crime mandate in Canada has been modeled after the American youth justice system. The analysis of case law 
and applicable policies/legislation from a state that is illustrative of a crime control model not only helps shed 
light on the potential outcomes of enacting harsher legislation, but also puts into context why Texan politicians 
presented evidence against Canada’s plans to enact a tough-on-crime approach given the costs and failures 
associated with the legislation.  
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CHAPTER 2 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 There are a number of theoretical principles which offer explanations of the intrinsic 
values, interests, and power involved in the policy making process. By using conflict theory 
and Marxist/critical theory as a basis for this research, this chapter provides the foundational 
determinants of the ways in which legislation is passed as well as how the state outputs 
legitimate power and control over law formation and relative decisions. While conflict 
theorists argue that society’s most powerful groups always control the law in ways that 
commonly embrace their values as the normative legal standard for behaviour,12 Marxist and 
many other critical theories suggest that much of the political, economic and social power is 
entrusted to a minute group of ruling class members in democratic, modern capitalist societies. 
According to this view, the political power gained from the ruling class’ monopoly over the 
market is essentially what allows the manipulation of the political state. These capitalist 
interests infiltrate the legal and criminal justice systems as a means of maintaining positions of 
power. Other critical theorists, however, suggest the ruling class is not always able to promote 
their interests through law due to the state’s relative autonomy (Habermas, 1975, 1985). 
Therefore, while it may be that some enacted laws reflect the interests of society’s most 
dominant groups, this is not always the case because the state has interests of its own (i.e., 
gaining and maintaining legitimacy, and “steering” the economy) (See Habermas, 1973, 1975, 
1985).  
 While these theoretical perspectives contribute to this research in their own ways, many 
of their underlying premises are highly interconnected. Thus, this chapter begins with an 
12 This view is reflective of Marx’s ruling elite thesis, predominately because this perspective argues that it is the 
state itself that is the dominant group.  
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explication of conflict theory with respect to law, criminal justice and criminal behaviour. It 
then discusses the transition from conflict theory towards Marxist/critical theories which 
essentially endorse a different understanding of law and criminal behaviour based on its 
assessment of social, economic and political power in late-capitalist (modern) societies. In an 
attempt to further nuance these perspectives, consideration is given to the ways in which the 
varying mechanisms in the social structure (i.e., political, economic, social and cultural 
systems) add to the complexity of the processes involved in the state’s ability to make laws and 
maintain legitimacy by exercising power. Together, these theoretical lenses are important 
because they shed light on the various processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was 
developed and enacted. In addition, it may provide a basis for understanding the ways in which 
youth justice in other Western jurisdictions have transformed on account of the same processes 
and challenges. Finally, the last section of this chapter addresses some of the key limitations 
associated with each theoretical perspective.    
2.1 Conflict Theory 
 Conflict theory examines aspects of political, social, or material inequality in a given 
social group while criticizing both the existent social and political systems that create an 
imbalance in power (Bernard, 1983; Chambliss, 1975; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Habermas, 
1973; Hall at al., 2013; Quinney, 1970; Sellin, 1938; Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958). Research finds 
inconsistency between the “consensus of values” and “shared beliefs” regarding the 
constitution of good morals, ethics and acceptable behaviour (Bernard, 1983). While some 
theorists argue that a “consensus of values” and “shared beliefs” are society’s foundational 
elements, conflict theorists claim that conflicts of interests such as rivalries over scarce 
resources, stature, prominence and power are the overarching mechanisms that govern human 
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society, eventually resulting in these “interests ultimately determining values” (Bernard, Snipes, 
& Gerould, 2010, p. 246; see also Bernard, 1983).13  
 On account of the discrepancy between theorists, differing views have surfaced in 
relation to the responsibilities of the state and on the disposition of crime (and thus the role of 
the criminal justice system more generally), as each theoretical branch translates into a 
divergent set of ramifications on such functions (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010). For the 
most part, the literature pertaining to conflict criminology agrees that interests such as 
economic acquisitions, individual forfeitures, financial expenditures and personal betterments 
are disguised as notions of “justice”, “righteousness”, and “goodness” (Bernard, Snipes & 
Gerould, 2010, p. 246; see also Bernard, 1983). This differs from the views of consensus 
theorists because under this perspective, it is the state’s responsibility to “mediate these 
conflicts and to represent the common values and common interests of the society at large” 
(Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 246). A consensus theorist’s point of view then, assumes 
that “values ultimately determine interests, since it is in everyone’s interests to have societies 
that are governed in accordance with goodness and righteousness and justice” (Bernard, Snipes 
& Gerould, 2010, p. 246). Conflict theorists, on the other hand, assert,  
The organized state does not represent common interests, but 
instead represents the interests of those with sufficient power to 
control its operation. As a result, more powerful people are 
legally freer to pursue self-interests, while less powerful people 
who pursue self-interests are more likely to be officially defined 
and processed as criminal. The result is an inverse relationship 
13 Values are referred to as the commonplace norms or standards in society that construe ideal principles, such as 
good, bad, right, and wrong. Beliefs, on the other hand, refer to specific concepts or understandings that are 
accepted to be true. Interests have to do with social outcomes that specifically benefit either an individual or a 
group over another. These may be objective (underlying) interests or apparent interests. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, both values and interests are considered throughout the analysis of the processes associated with the 
development and legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4).    
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between power and official crime rates: The more power that 
people have, the less likely they are to be arrested, convicted, 
imprisoned, and executed, regardless of their behaviour. And 
vice versa (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, pp. 246-247). 
  
This assertion then, suggests that power is the fundamental element of conflict theory.   
2.1.1 Conflict of Cultural Rules and Norms 
 According to the conflict of cultural rules and norms, people living in modern Western 
culture are subjected to “certain life situations” which “are governed by such conflicting norms” 
(Sellin, 1938, p. 66). Modern society experiences varying degrees of conflict due to differing 
cultural norms amongst various cultural groups. Regardless of one’s response to these 
circumstances, varying degrees of violation of norms of some social group will occur (Sellin, 
1938). These violations are deemed as social maladjustments or disorganization leading to 
crime. Borrowing from Sutherland’s work (1924), the conflict of cultural rules and norms 
builds on the discipline of criminology by expanding the analysis of culture conflict. Cultural 
conflicts, thus,  
Are the natural out-growth of processes of social differentiation, 
which  produce an infinity of social groupings, each with its own 
definitions of life situations, its own interpretations of social 
relationships, its own ignorance or misunderstandings of the 
social values of other groups. [...] Such conflicts within a 
changing culture may be distinguished from those created when 
different cultural systems come in contact with one another, 
regardless of the character or stage of development in these 
systems (Sellin, 1938, p. 66).  
      
In other words, members of differing groups will always appear to conduct themselves in a 
manner that is to some degree classified and defined as abnormal by an opposing group. Where 
cultural growth is prevalent, rules and laws are not characterized by the general consensus of 
members in society, but instead reflect the “conduct norms of the dominant culture” (Bernard, 
Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 247).  
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 A good illustration of culture conflict between opposing groups can be seen by 
analyzing laws of a state and the morality of different social groups within a given population. 
This is particularly the case when the ethical criteria of dominant groups lack congruency with 
those of the subservient ones. Laws and norms, such as conduct norms embodied in criminal 
law, are subject to modification upon such time as the values of a dominant group change. In 
addition, the physics of social growth has the ability to dictate a need for rearrangement of 
dominant groups and therefore causes fluctuation in, or substitutions of, power. Thus, 
definitions of acceptable or legal conduct (or unacceptable and criminal conduct) are 
contingent on the values of dominant groups in power and are susceptible to reinterpretation, 
redevelopment, and sometimes dissolution. Criminal law, as stated by Sellin (1938), can be 
seen “in part a body of rules, which prohibit specific forms of conduct and indicate punishment 
for violations. The character of these rules, the kind or type of conduct they prohibit, the nature 
of the sanction attached to their violation, etc. depend upon the character and interests of those 
groups in the population which influence legislation” (p. 21). To elaborate further, it is noted 
that “in some states these groups may comprise the majority, in others a minority, but the 
social values which receive the protection of the criminal law are ultimately those which are 
treasured by the dominant interest groups” (Sellin, 1938, p. 21).  
2.1.2 Group Conflict Theory and Social Processes 
 In 1958, George B. Vold presented a group conflict theory based on “social processes” 
that understand “society as a collection of groups held together in a dynamic equilibrium of 
opposing group interests and efforts” (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 247). Vold’s 
theory suggests that social groups are formed on the basis of shared needs and interests through 
which interaction may occur. The underlying concept of group conflict theory holds that the 
ways in which these groups interact is such that it generates a state of upheaval, primarily due 
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to their desire to either sustain, ameliorate, or expand their position to control resources, in a 
process of continuous “interaction and competition with other groups” who represent 
conflicting interests within the political sphere (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 247). 
Through social interaction, groups are able to stabilize themselves to create conditions that 
support social order by counterbalancing or acclimatizing to various social settings and 
circumstances to further their own interests. What is emphasized here is that “social order, 
therefore, does not reflect a consensus” across all competing groups, but rather reveals an 
ongoing process of adaptation and transformation common to all “groups of varying strengths 
and different interests” (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 247).  
 According to this theory, the successful functioning and conduct of society entirely 
depends on conflict as a social process (Vold, 1958). That is, the struggle involved in the 
precarious phase of adaptation brings about a relatively constant state of symmetry of equal 
forces or social order and social organization. It is asserted that group membership originates 
through a joint understanding of interests and needs, particularly when individuals recognize 
that their desires can be advanced through a series of concerted efforts. Thus, as group interests 
and needs become fulfilled and its goal has been accomplished, the group gradually wanes and 
eventually dissipates (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). Conflict between groups develop 
when competition amidst individual interests and purposes arise. Bernard, Snipes and Gerould 
(2010) claim that “conflicts among organized groups are especially visible in legislative 
politics, which is largely a matter of finding practical compromise between opposing interests” 
(p. 248). Until such time as conflicting groups find themselves in opposition, each group 
attempts to secure state support to safeguard their specific rights and corresponding interests 
(Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). During the law-making process, it is suggested that the 
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group most capable of amassing popularity through electoral means (i.e., what Habermas 
(1973) below describes as widespread loyalty and public support) “will determine whether or 
not there will be a new law to promote the interests of the one group and to hamper and curb 
the interests of the other groups” (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 248). Vold’s (1958) 
theory surmises that group conflict has a tendency to become even more discernible after a 
new piece of legislation has been set in place. In effect, this is because,  
Those who opposed the law in the legislature are more likely to 
violate the law, since it defends interests and purposes that are in 
conflict with their own. Those who promoted the law, in contrast, 
are more likely to obey it and to demand that the criminal justice 
agencies enforce it against violators, since the law defends 
interests and purposes they hold dear (Bernard, Snipes & 
Gerould, 2010, p. 248).  
 
 Possessing the power to influence decisions on policies determines who is defined and 
processed as criminals. In this sense, group conflict theory fully acknowledges that both the 
enactment and violations of laws are processual, and are intertwined with integral aspects of 
group interests, conflicts, and control of state/political power. Conversely, Vold (1958) 
suggests criminal behaviour is an expression of “minority power groups” in that they are 
unable to successfully “defend their own interests and purposes in the legislative process” 
(Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 248). On the other hand, this theory is limited to some 
degree in its applicability to criminal law, because it is more so the ways in which the law is 
enforced that represents group interests, not the law itself.   
2.1.3 A Theory of Criminalization 
 The theory of criminalization delineates “the conditions under which [...] differences 
between authorities and subjects will probably result in conflict, [and] the conditions under 
which criminalization will probably occur in the course of conflict” (Turk, 1969, p. 53). 
Criminality and criminals are socially “defined by the way in which an individual is perceived, 
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evaluated, and treated by legal authorities” (Turk, 1969, p. 25). Essentially it is argued that 
both the level of organization and sophistication of authorities and subjects play a role in the 
probability of conflict between the two (Turk, 1969).  
 As part of the conditions that influence the probability of conflict between authorities 
and those under control of authorities (subjects), this theory surmises that authorities are 
organized given that the mobilization and maintenance of power is established on group 
association. The organization of subjects further increases the likelihood for conflict given that 
difficulty in retracting one’s position tends to prevail in a group setting (Turk, 1969). 
Accordingly, the variable of sophistication affects the probability of conflict because 
“knowledge of patterns in the behavior of others” is “used in attempts to manipulate them” 
(Turk, 1969 p. 59). Thus, “conflict between authorities and subjects is most probable if the 
subjects are highly organized and relatively unsophisticated” for example, delinquent gangs, 
“less probable if they are unorganized and unsophisticated, still less probable if organized but 
sophisticated, and least probably if unorganized and sophisticated” such as professional con-
men (Turk, 1969, pp. 59-60). 
 The theory of criminalization suggests there are three circumstances under which 
conflict is expected to result in the direct criminalization of subjects. It is asserted that the 
primary reason as to why a subject is criminalized is due to the meaning and definition of the 
act or behaviour, as defined by “first-level enforcers”. Turk (1969) argues that “the norms of 
the police have a critical impact upon criminality rates, because police have a wide-range of 
alternatives to strict and dedicated enforcement, some of them legal, some not, and many in a 
gray area not explicitly covered by manuals and laws” (p. 65). However, first-level enforcers 
are not only the police; rather, all parties involved in the administration of justice such as 
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Crown attorneys, judges and politicians. That is, the greater the degree of offensive or illegal 
behaviour, as per its meaning and definition to first-level enforcers, the greater the likelihood 
of arrest, prosecution, and condemnation of the act.       
 Secondly, the criminalization of subjects impinges on the proportionate degree of 
power between authorities and subjects. Power differences between enforcers and subjects 
fluctuate from one relationship to the next in which “the enforcers are virtually all-powerful to 
cases where enforcers and resisters are about equal in resources, including effective 
organization, manpower, skills, funds, weaponry” (Turk, 1969, p. 67). For the most part, 
however, the criminalization of subjects is at its best when the power difference between two 
groups favours the enforcers. Furthermore, if the offensive behaviour being criminalized is 
solely found amongst those in the least powerful group, the rate of criminalization is apt to be 
the highest.  
 Third, the most promising achievement is directly linked to the probability of the 
approach taken by the subjects or authority. In this sense, criminalization is not defined by 
sophistication and the use of knowledge of others’ behavioural patterns to manipulate them. 
Instead, it is measured by how well one achieves (or fails) at manipulating these patterns (Turk, 
1969). Therefore, the more sophisticated a party in conflict is, the more likely their moves will 
be viewed as realistic and bring about a favourable outcome for those amongst the most 
successful group.  
2.1.4 The Social Reality of Crime 
 While group conflict theory focuses on conflicts amongst interest groups, the social 
reality of crime emphasizes the importance of conflict amongst “segments” of society. 
Segments are “people who share the same values, norms, and ideological orientations, but who 
may or may not be organized in defense of those commonalities” (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 
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2010, p. 250). For example, individuals who advocate for harsher legislation may be seen as 
those representing a segment of society with similar or shared morals, principles, norms and 
ideology, although they are not organized in a manner that protects their interests (as part of 
any specific interest group). In contrast, interest groups can be seen as those forming 
opposition parties such as a group of professionals working within corrections and the criminal 
justice system, The Canadian Bar Association or other conflicting parties. Therefore, the most 
notable difference between the two units of analysis (interest groups and segments) suggests 
that organization need not always be present. 
 Expanding on Sutherland’s differential association theory, the social reality of crime 
considers the likelihood of people violating criminal law strongly correlated to the degree of 
power and authority their particular segment has on the both the creation and implementation 
of criminal law (Quinney, 1970). Accordingly, it is argued that the more powerful segments of 
society are able to manoeuvre in ways that tend to align with accepted patterns of behaviours, 
and adhere to normative practices that thwart off the probability of being in contravention of 
the law (Quinney, 1970). In contrast, individuals belonging to a less powerful segment of 
society do not always display normative patterns of behaviour, and their actions, consequently, 
are both socially and legally defined as a breach of the law, and are formally processed as 
criminal.       
 According to the social reality of crime, individuals involved in the legislative process 
pursue their own self-interests within a political context (Quinney, 1970). Interests are not only 
demarcated by a disproportionate power structure but also in the ways in which each segment 
is able to transform their particular interests into public policy. Quinney (1970) refers to this as 
the conflict-power conception of the interest structure, and claims that some segments of 
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society that are highly specialized in their interests become so organized that they are able to 
manipulate policies pertaining to all individuals in a given state. He asserts,  
Groups that have the power to gain access to the decision-
making process are able to translate their interests into public 
policy. Thus, the interests represented in the formulation and 
administration of public policy are those treasured by the 
dominant segments of the society. Hence, public policy is 
created because segments with power differentials are in conflict 
with one another. Public policy itself is a manifestation of an 
interest structure in politically organized society (Quinney, 1970, 
p. 39).  
    
 In addition, law is conceived as a form of public policy that controls and constrains the 
behaviour of all members within a society (Quinney, 1970). Law is both produced and 
enforced by those most powerful segments in society “which are able to incorporate their 
interests into the creation and interpretation of public policy” (Quinney, 1970, p. 40). Thus, 
instead of demonstrating a mutually beneficial concern for all segments of society, the law is 
put in place to serve as an exclusively advantageous tool to further one segment’s interests at 
the detriment of others.  
 The social reality of crime recognizes that all aspects of law creation including 
substantive regulations and the procedural rules are designed to exemplify interests of those 
segments of society that are in powerful enough positions to actually construct public policy 
(Quinney, 1970). By systematically contriving laws, the more powerful segments of society are 
able to preserve and bolster their own interests, while at the same time manage other segments 
in a fashion that benefits the former. Quinney (1970) states the administration of justice is 
influenced by “localized conditions and the occupational organization of legal agents, the 
interest structure of politically organized society is responsible for the general design of the 
administration of criminal justice” (Quinney, 1970, p. 40). Therefore, the more powerful 
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segments in society influence all levels of legal regulation. However, a change in law is also 
dependent on and subject to dynamic social conditions as changes in the interest structure are 
generally followed by legal amendments or a reinterpretation of the existing law. 
 Taken as a whole, Quinney (1970) suggests “conceptions of crime are created and 
communicated as part of the political process of promoting particular sets of values and 
interests” that are advanced by groups and individuals in higher segments of power (Bernard, 
Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 250). More importantly, it is asserted that “the powerful 
individuals and groups promote particular conceptions of crime in order to legitimate their 
authority and allow them to carry out policies in the name of the common good that really 
promote their own self-interests” (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010, p. 251). This ability 
helps to achieve legitimacy because individuals in higher segments are commonly 
acknowledged as valid and credible. As a consequence, any policy that is implemented is done 
so under an allegedly well-founded pretext. 
2.2 The Evolution of Marxist/Critical Perspectives and Modern Political Power Relations 
 According to Bernard, Snipes and Gerould (2010), critical criminology is considered 
“an umbrella designation for a series of evolving, emerging perspectives that are characterized 
particularly by an argument that it is impossible to separate values from the research agenda, 
and by a need to advance progressive agenda favoring disprivileged peoples” (p. 267). Of these 
emerging perspectives, it is asserted that Marxist criminology coincides (to a degree) with the 
critical framework because it situates the problem of crime into a larger social, political and 
economic domain delineated by late capitalism. 14  To better understand the complexities 
14 Critical criminology is not entirely compatible or synonymous with conflict criminology, although they do 
share numerous commonalties. Given the lack of clarity as to what critical criminology actually covers in terms of 
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associated with the Marxist/critical perspective, it is important to briefly trace through some of 
the criticisms pitted against conflict criminology in order to appreciate the ways in which 
modern political power relations in late modernity have evolved. In fact, these limitations 
provide the basis for an improved (and perhaps superior) theoretical structure.     
 While critical criminology shares the same intellectual and scholarly legacy as conflict 
criminology in the works of Marx, traditional conflict theories have been subject to numerous 
criticisms that have led to the development of a more robust theoretical position. Although 
both critical and conflict theory view inequality in power as related to crime, one critique of 
conflict theory is that it lacks an emphasis on the provenance or derivation of power (Bernard, 
Snipes & Gerould, 2010). Marxist and critical theories, for example, discuss power in terms of 
ownership of the means of production. Thus, based on theories that have emerged from the 
Marxist tradition connecting crime to the capitalist economic system, it is not surprising that 
Friedrichs (2009) argues that the disproportionate allocation of power or of material resources 
in current society is the inception for all veins of critical criminology.  
 More significantly, the onset of the 1970s generated simplistic views of both the 
criminal justice system and criminals more generally, by introducing an instrumentalist 
position that asserted “that the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws are solely the 
instruments of a unified and monolithic ruling class that conspires to seek its own advantage at 
the expense of other groups” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 271). Earlier theories such 
as those proposed by Sellin (1938), Vold (1958) and Turk (1969) were criticized for 
content and validity, it is difficult to say what is covered by which perspective. It has been asserted, however, that 
critical criminology is much broader that Marxist criminology in that it diversifies itself in feminist theory, left-
realism, postmodernism, cultural criminology, peacemaking criminology, etc. (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006). For 
the purposes of this dissertation, much of the discussion regarding critical criminology is linked with Marxist 
tradition given the nature of crime in relation to capitalism and the modern state.  
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oversimplifying the nature of political power as well as the development of law and policy by 
making the state into a simple agent of a unified group. In addition, these theories were 
criticized “for their simplistic portrayal of the ruling class as a unified and monolithic elite, for 
the argument that the enactment and enforcement of laws reflect only the interest of this ruling 
class, and for the argument that criminal acts are a political response to conditions of 
oppression and exploitation” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 271).  
2.2.1 Marxist/Critical Criminology  
 As a result of the criticisms aimed towards the instrumentalist view, the Marxist/critical 
orientation expands on the foundational ideology introduced in earlier versions of conflict 
criminology, primarily by complicating the problem of political power in relation to the 
structural factors that exist within the context of capitalism. That is, this more complex 
structuralist view in advanced capitalism “[...] attempts to relate criminal behavior and crime 
policies to the political economy of the particular societies in which they occur, and it relies 
primarily on historical and cross-cultural studies for support [...]” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 
2010, p. 272). 
 Relative to criminal law and the criminal justice system, this structural Marxist view 
perceives the role of the state as different from the naive and unsophisticated instrumentalist 
argument from which it was born. According to Bernard, Snipes and Gerould (2010), 
The primary function of the state is not to serve the short-term 
interests of capitalists directly, but rather to ensure that the social 
relations of capitalism persist in the long-run. This goal requires 
that many different interests be served at different times, in order 
to prevent the rise of conditions that will lead to the collapse of 
capitalism. Thus, on any particular issue, including the 
enactment and enforcement of criminal laws, the action of the 
state may serve other interests besides those of the owners of the 
means of production. Nevertheless, the owners of the means of 
production can still be described as a ruling class in that the 
organized state serves their economic interests in the long run. 
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Moreover, the owners have an excessive amount of political 
power in comparison to other groups, with a disproportionate 
ability to get the state to serve their interests in the short run (p. 
272). 
 
Contrary to the instrumentalists view then, this more nuanced perspective suggests state 
authorities act to support long-term interests of the dominant group, but the state is relatively 
autonomous of the short-term demands of the ruling class. In other words, the state makes 
decisions on behalf of the ruling class, but can make laws that support other interests in an 
attempt to reduce conflict and maintain legitimacy. Overall, this conflicts with the 
instrumentalist position in that it implies not all laws reflect the interests of the ruling class, 
although both explanations agree that the long-term interests of the laws and the legal system 
are to protect and maintain the interests of the more powerful groups. Thus, the theory 
becomes more diverse when it is modified to include various structural conditions, 
contradictions and the relationship between power and conflict relative to the larger social 
structure (see the works of Habermas, 1975, 1985 in the following sections).   
 Marxist/critical criminology also expands the structuralist perspective by emphasizing 
the ways in which the conduct of the owners of the means of production exhibits elements of 
“harmful behaviour” as a consequence of fulfilling their “pursuit of economic self-interest” 
(Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 272). In line with the argument asserted by earlier 
conflict theorists regarding society’s most dominant groups and their relative power to develop 
and form the legislation of criminal laws, the structuralist view also recognizes and purports 
the unlikelihood of the ruling class’ behaviour to be construed and labelled as unlawful 
(Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). While there is evidence to support the notion that 
“public’s victimization by the ruling class is much greater than their victimization by street 
criminals”, there appears to be a general lack of willingness on the part of the criminal justice 
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agencies to criminalize the behaviour of the ruling class, particularly because such actions are 
committed by those in positions of power against the powerless (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 
2010, p. 272). In other words, many of the actions and behaviours of the ruling class “are not 
defined as criminal at all; when they are defined as criminal, the laws are rarely enforced; 
when enforced, the punishments are usually minimal compared to punishments that are 
routinely imposed on street criminal whose actions cause less objective harm” (Bernard, 
Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 273).15  
On this note, Reiman (1998) suggests the long-term interests of the ruling class are best 
achieved when the criminal justice agencies themselves are incessantly unsuccessful at 
governing or regulating street crime, which is most often associated with lower-class crime or 
“underclass” behaviour. It is when the public is preoccupied with lower-class (or “underclass”) 
crime that it remains in a chronically distressed mode (Reiman, 1998). Thus, it is suggested 
that those in more economically prominent and powerful positions take advantage of these 
opportunities to ensure that the public’s concerns about “underclass” crime redirects the focus 
from issues pertaining to the potential discrimination and oppression of the general population 
by the ruling class (Reiman, 1998). 
 The Marxist/critical criminological explanation for lower-class or “underclass” crime is 
currently understood in terms that are similar to those found in “more traditional 
15 There are a number of detrimental behaviours that have been considered by Marxist theory (but not by conflict 
theories) that are not officially defined or processed as criminal (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). According to 
Marxist criminology, there is some degree of impartiality when it comes to determining what constitutes a crime. 
These include behaviours such as “violations of human rights due to racism, sexism, and imperialism; unsafe 
working conditions; inadequate child care; inadequate opportunities for employment and education; substandard 
housing and medical care; crimes of economic and political domination; pollution of the environment; price-
fixing; police brutality; assassinations; war-making; violations of dignity; denial of physical needs and necessities; 
and impediments to self-determination, deprivation of adequate food and blocked opportunities to participate in 
relevant political decisions” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 273).    
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criminological theories” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 273). However, one of the main 
differentiations between the two arguments stems from the notion that the Marxist/critical 
interpretation of lower-class criminal behaviour is directly correlated with their fundamental 
view of the “political-economic systems and the historical processes in which those systems 
change” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, pp. 273-274). That is, the conception of lower-
class or “underclass” crime is expressed in terms of “the pathological consequences of the 
social structure of advanced capitalism” (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010, p. 273). While 
many Marxist/critical theories contend that engaging in criminal activity is a socially learned 
behaviour, such behaviour is commonly accepted as conduct that is acquired by ordinary 
people under conditions that are systematically framed by the various social mechanisms 
embedded in modern capitalism (Akers & Sellers, 2008; Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). 
On the whole, the ways in which people conduct themselves is typically influenced and 
supported by their economic positions and corresponding interests. This notion, however, has 
been criticized to some degree because crime also exists in non-capitalist economies and 
societies. Therefore, this cannot be the only reason as to why criminality flourishes.          
 In general, this view claims that the economic and political structures found within 
most Western nations is directly connected to the various elements of criminality found within 
that given society (Block & Chambliss, 1981). In fact, Block and Chambliss (1981) note that 
the entire structure of society requires a series of transformations in order to dissolve many of 
the disagreements and inconsistencies found within the political and economic systems. Thus, 
if criminal behaviour is a natural product of the disparities or crises found within the political 
and economic systems, it is suggested that the system itself is responsible for producing such 
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manifestations within society (Block & Chambliss, 1981). 16 Similarly, DeKeseredy (2011) 
notes that Marxists and critical criminologists place a great deal of emphasis on the “structural 
and cultural changes within society”, because they are vital to encouraging social justice while 
diminishing crime (p. 7). From this perspective then, the primary interest for critical 
criminologists entails examining marginalized persons both socially and economically to argue 
for “progressive short-term policies that target the major social, political, cultural, and 
economic forces that propel people into crime, such as poverty, sexism, and deindustrialization” 
(DeKeseredy, 2011, p. 8-9).  
 Both Marxist and critical criminology emphasize “the political nature of crime and 
deviance” (DeKeseredy, Ellis, & Alvi, 2005, p. 22). Overall, this branch of theory claims “the 
law is a tool used by powerful social groups to promote and protect their interests, and that 
definitions of crime favour those in privileged economic and political positions” (DeKeseredy, 
Ellis, & Alvi, 2005, p. 22). Despite some limitations stemming from the inability to accurately 
summarize this theoretical framework due to its denouncement of mainstream definitions of 
crime and criminology, Marxist/critical criminology sheds some light on the ways in which 
“crime and the present-day processes of criminalization are rooted in the core structures of 
society” (DeKeseredy, 2011, abstract).    
2.2.2 Left Realism 
 Known as a sub-theory of Marxist/critical criminology, left-realism focuses on the 
existing issues of crime by employing a slightly more narrow and restricted perspective (Cottee, 
16 According to Greenberg (1993), the enactment of crime control policies (or tough-on-crime legislation for that 
matter) is problematic because it does not address any of the root causes of crime that are generated by the 
political-economic system. Thus, these types of policies and legislation are indicative of the ways in which the 
issues of crime are managed as opposed to being dealt with in larger socio-political-economic sense. Greenberg 
(1993) argues that it is necessary to modify the dynamics within the political-economic structure in society for any 
noticeable change in crime to be realized.   
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2004). While the Marxist/critical criminology described above stresses the importance of 
altering the dynamics of the political-economic system in capitalist society, left-realists 
acknowledge the ongoing criminological issues that plague minorities, the working-class 
(including the lower-class or “underclass”) and individuals in less powerful positions within 
society (Alvi, 2012; DeKeseredy, 2011). The predominate difference between these branches, 
however, rests in the notion that left-realism advances the possibility of addressing such 
problems through various mechanisms (such as the criminal justice system) regardless of 
whether or not the current capitalist political and economic systems are subverted (Bernard, 
Snipes & Gerould, 2010; DeKeseredy, 2011; Matthews & Young, 1992). Accordingly, one 
distinguishing feature of this theory is the “rejection of solutions to crime measures such as 
zero-tolerance policing [...], three-strikes sentencing, private prisons, coercive counselling 
therapy, and so on” (DeKeseredy, 2011, p. 7). Based on some of the recommendations and 
responses proposed by left-realists, a great deal of importance is placed on the ways in which 
crime policies and legislation “attempt to reduce economic marginality, social alienation, and 
political oppression that characterize class-based capitalist society” (Bernard, Snipes &Gerould, 
2010, p. 275).    
 In this sense, left realism is said to analyze crime in relation to the multifaceted 
relations between individual (micro) and governmental (macro) level phenomena, such as the 
interplay between “the state, the offender, the victim, and the general public” (Wortley, 
Seepersad, Mcalla, Singh, Madon, Greene & Roswell, 2008, p. 210). Left realism is important 
to the study at hand because it largely focuses on how “inequality and power impact upon and 
reflect lawmaking, lawbreaking, victimization, reactions to crime, and social harm” and how 
“structural forces, cultural ideologies, and social processes create, sustain, and exacerbate 
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social problems” (Wortley et al., 2008, p. 211). DeKeseredy and Perry (2006) propose that 
continuing research in this area is imperative because failure to recognize the importance of 
left realism intensifies the power dynamic between those in more powerful positions and those 
in less powerful positions by allowing “right-wing politicians in several countries to 
manufacture ideological support for ‘law and order’ policies that are detrimental to the socially 
and economically disenfranchised” (p. 20).  
 In addition, left realists assert that “the left’s ongoing failure to take working-class 
victimization seriously contributes to the right’s hegemonic control over knowledge about 
crime and policing” (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006, p. 20). Further, this theoretical perspective 
has been given “selective inattention by conservatives seeking to preserve the status quo and 
by left-wing scholars who inaccurately portray this relatively new direction in critical 
criminology as little more than ‘an exercise in dubious politics and the cult of personality’” 
(DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006, p. 19). Nonetheless, the theory focuses on the various ways in 
which the overarching expansion of political, social, and cultural dynamics both frames and 
characterizes crime and its control (DeKeseredy & Perry, 2006).  
  According to this perspective, any legislation that specifically promotes the interests 
and values of powerful interest groups within society necessarily excludes those in less 
powerful positions. As a result, these underprivileged groups are strategically situated on a 
course that both encourages crime for the powerless, and supports the Conservative position of 
law and order with tough-on-crime policies (see DeKeseredy, 2011). The emphasis of the 
theory, therefore, is placed on proposing alternatives to conservative policies and theories. 
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2.3 The Political-Economic Structure and the Complexities of the State in Modern Society 
 A discussion on the complexities of the late-capitalist state relative to the political-
economic structure in modern society is important because it demonstrates the intricacies in the 
existing relationship between the state, polity, government, and other fundamental institutions. 
The ways in which the law is used as an instrument of power and legitimacy, therefore, must 
be analyzed against the political-power relations that both define and characterize it. The 
modern political-power relations discussed in the works of Habermas (1973, 1975, 1985) 
provides a highly sophisticated overview of the ways in which the theoretical complications of 
the conflict perspective is understood. While this view coincides with much of the critical 
views presented earlier, this section of the chapter seeks to elaborate on the particulars of the 
state as an apparatus that pursues authority and legitimacy through various mechanisms, and 
acts as a mediator of a broad range of complex interests. In essence, this discussion goes 
beyond the scope of the critical criminological theories addressed in the preceding sections 
because it analyzes the relationship between power and the state relative to current political 
discourse.      
 Drawing on Marx’s foundational work, Habermas (1973, 1975) considers the 
contemporary developments witnessed over the last hundred years in light of the ostensible 
dynamism of modern society. Similar to the argument posed by Marx regarding the nature of 
social evolution, Habermas (1975) views the progression and development of a given system 
as a product of various contradictions or crises found within the social structure.17 Described as 
17 According to Habermas (1973), the development of a “system crises” first originated with Marx as part of a 
compelling sociological theory. In modern society, any notion of social or economic crises is perceived in light of 
Marx’s conceptualization (Habermas, 1973, p. 644). A crisis, for Habermas (1975) involves a subjective and 
objective dimension. This suggests there must be the perception of threat by the public regarding social identity 
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“steering problems”, these inconsistencies result in weaknesses that consequently provide the 
basis for an unsustainable system.18 In such cases, there is an element of social disintegration 
given the threat of a collapse of the “normative structures” on account of a change in the 
system (for example, a lack of social identity) and the crises that may ensue.19 
 The disintegration of any given system is almost always associated with the political 
organization of society, although this is deeply connected with other important structural 
features of late-capitalist societies (Habermas, 1973). First, the economic system considers the 
ways in which the private and public areas are regulated both by production and competition, 
and are controlled by government or private firms. Second, the administrative system is seen as 
an instrument that not only “regulates the overall economic cycle by means of global planning” 
(that is, by controlling the insignificant decisions put forth by private enterprise to counteract 
any negative consequences while balancing the state’s role in superseding the “market 
mechanisms” in instances where the government constructs or ameliorates the circumstances 
for appropriating surplus capital), but as a tool that “improves the conditions for utilization 
capital” (Habermas, 1973, p. 646). This suggests that the administrative system is responsible 
for balancing “fiscal and financial measures to regulate cycles, as well as individual measures 
to regulate investments and overall demand” (Habermas, 1973, p. 646). In essence, this system 
is burdened with the responsibility of managing crisis by establishing a “compromise between 
(subjective), and that there are ongoing problematic issues within the structure of the system, such as economic 
challenges or “steering problems” (Habermas, 1975, p. 4).  
18 “Steering problems” may be understood in terms of unresolved crises within a social system. This notion is 
linked to the “steering mechanisms” (such as the economy) within society, as well as the development of 
organizational forms (Habermas, 1975, see pages 4-7 for more information). 
19 Normative structures are defined as “values and institutions of a society” (Habermas, 1975, p. 4). Thus, the 
normative structures of the socio-cultural subsystem, for example, are related to the “status system; subcultural 
forms of life”. The normative structures of the political subsystem are linked to “political institutions (state). The 
normative structures for the economic subsystem have to do with “economic institutions (relations of production)” 
(Habermas, 1975, p. 6).   
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competing imperatives” such as “steady growth, stability of money value, full employment, 
and balance of trade” (Habermas, 1973, p. 647). Finding a middle ground to establish 
equilibrium in this sense can be understood in terms of the state’s obligation towards 
“unemployment”, “welfare”, “ecological damage”, “universal education”, “programs of 
training and re-education”, “housing”, “transportation”, “support for scientific research”, etc. 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 647).   
 Third, the legitimation system is born out of necessity to uphold the fundamental 
imperatives specific to the production process by directly engaging in it (Habermas, 1975). For 
example, while some philosophical views have faded (i.e., what Habermas refers to as 
“bourgeois ideology”) as a result of system breakdowns, there appears to be an ongoing need 
for legitimation (Habermas, 1975). 20  In fact, Habermas claims “re-coupling the economic 
system to the political – which in a way repoliticizes the relations of production – creates an 
increased need for legitimation” (Habermas, 1975, p. 36). Accordingly, Habermas (1973) 
discusses this process in terms of a “government apparatus” that requires legitimation “in the 
growing realms of state intervention, even though there is now no possibility of reverting to the 
traditions that have been undermined and worn out in competitive capitalism” (p. 647-648). 
One of the most obvious remnants of the “bourgeois ideology” is understood in terms of 
formal democracy, whereby elections contribute to legitimation that can only be divorced from 
20 Legitimacy is defined as “a political order’s worthiness to be recognized” (Habermas, 1979, p. 178). It is 
considered to be a process and a state of affairs, and is based on three different sources (Weber, 1954). It is 
asserted that legitimacy is required for the types of anticipated outcomes outlined by a political order (in a form of 
justification for the authority), as well as the support needed by the public to meet these expectations (Friedrich, 
1972). In a more practical sense, legitimacy is understood in terms of general acceptance by the public of a 
governing authority that is given political power through a process of mutual agreement. The political power is 
bestowed upon the governing authority. Thus, it is not taken through coercion. There are instances, however, 
where political power is seized by intimidation or coercion. The concept of achieving political power through 
coercive legitimation is discussed in the works of Gramsci (1971) in Chapter 3.       
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such a structure in “extraordinary” and “temporary” situations (Habermas, 1973, p. 648). This 
process in itself ensures that it is the citizens of society that play a decisive role in the 
formation of government, although the participation of the public in “political will-formation” 
brings about consciousness that is caused by the inconsistencies found in the administrative 
system. Thus, in order to keep this awareness restrained, Habermas (1973) contends, 
The administrative system has to be sufficiently independent of 
the shaping of legitimating will. This occurs in a legitimation 
process that elicits mass loyalty but avoids participation. In the 
midst of an objectively politicized society, the members enjoy 
the status of passive citizens with the right to withhold their 
acclaim (p. 648).21  
 
This statement elucidates one main point. Habermas (1973) suggests the administrative system 
must remain as separate as possible from the legitimating system. In other words, 
administrative or political outcomes/resolutions are reached outside of any specific intention or 
rationale of the public, through a process of legitimation that captures widespread desire but 
circumvents any real involvement in the administrative system (see also Habermas, 1975, p. 
36). 
 Finally, class structure in late capitalism can be understood “as reaction formation to 
endemic crisis” that is averted by concentrating “all socially integrative strength on the conflict 
that is structurally most probable” (Habermas, 1973, p. 648). Aside from preventing the system 
from entering into a state of crisis, this is done in order to keep the underlying conflict 
concealed. While the “quasi-political wage structure” plays a role in which the government 
21 The administrative system is one of the most important structural features of late-capitalist (modern) societies 
(Habermas, 1975). It is responsible for managing and organizing the economic cycle in its entirety by 
reconstructing the ways in which capital is used. It also serves the function of managing crises when necessary 
(Habermas, 1975). In addition to this, Habermas (1973) includes the economic system, the legitimation system 
and class structure to form the remaining aspects of modern society. See Habermas (1973), pages 645-649 for 
more information.   
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must establish a degree of compromise in the demands between “increasing productivity, 
qualifying labor power, and improving the social situation of the wage workers” there are 
numerous social and economic costs of the “immunization of the original conflict zone” 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 648). Such ramifications include “(1) disparate wage developments; (2) a 
permanent inflation with the corresponding short-lived redistribution of incomes to the 
disadvantage to [...] marginal groups; (3) a permanent crisis in government finances, coupled 
with public poverty - i.e., pauperization of public transportation, education, housing, and 
health; (4) an insufficient balance of disproportionate economic developments [...]” 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 649).22 While Habermas (1973) notes that most late-capitalist societies 
have managed to suppress or pacify crises in relation to class structure and conflict, there are 
currently remnants of a distorted perception of “class consciousness” and “social identity” (p. 
649). In essence, the concessions made as part of the late-capitalist structure ensure that 
“nearly everyone both participates and is affected as an individual – although, with the clear 
and sometimes growing unequal distribution of monetary values and power, one can well 
distinguish between those belonging more to one or to the other category” (Habermas, 1973, p. 
649). Part of this is achieved through metastasizing the maladjustments of other systemic crises 
(such as an economic crisis) and dispersing them across other “quasi-groups” (such as “school 
children and their parents”, “the sick”, “the elderly”, “or divided groups difficult to organize” 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 649).  
 What this suggests is that modern capitalist societies are subject to a sort of 
“repoliticization” or “anonymization” of class structure in comparison to other preceding types 
22 Alvi (2012) p. 31-45 discusses the effects of capitalism and late modernity on youth, particularly with regards to 
familial socio-economic status, education and health.  
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of capitalist societies (Habermas, 1975). While traditional forms of class domination in pre-
capitalist societies were characterized by the blatant monopolization of the economic structure, 
modern capitalist societies are no longer dominated by the same direct political form. That is, 
advanced or late-capitalist societies rely on a type of legitimation that is generated through the 
masses but are still based on “universalistic bourgeois ideologies”, so long as they are fortified 
by reason (rationality) as opposed to tradition (Habermas, 1975) According to Habermas 
(1975) older forms of legitimacy (e.g., religion or tradition) are eroded by advanced capitalism. 
Instead, it is up to the administrative system to balance and control the economic system on 
account of any systemic variation or inconsistencies caused by competitive capitalism. The 
success of this form of control therefore cannot be characterized by explicit or politicized class 
conflict. As such, social conflicts in modern capitalist societies disguise themselves as other 
forms of crises, such as those that materialize or transpire within the economic or political 
system. This perspective provides a more complex or nuanced understanding of the state 
apparatus relative to class structure, in that it goes beyond the instrumental view that suggests 
the state serves only in favour of the interests of the ruling class. Thus, crises associated with 
class conflict in modern society are unlikely to occur in its pure form (Habermas, 1975).   
2.3.1 Disturbances to the System and the Legitimation Crisis 
 The role of the state in relation to late capitalism and the disturbances specific to the 
system are not straightforward. Theories regarding the state apparatus have been widely 
deliberated as a result of the varying interpretations of the relationship between capitalist 
structures and the ways in which it seeks various types of capital through alternative means 
(Habermas, 1975). Habermas (1975) asserts that there are four possible crises tendencies which 
can occur and consequently cause disruption to the system (or even “political eruption” 
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(Habermas, 1975, p. 45)). These include economic crises, rationality crises, legitimation crises 
and motivation crises.23  
 The state itself is not only viewed “as a system that uses legitimate power”, but as one 
that requires maintenance of such legitimacy (Habermas, 1973, p. 655). The political system, 
like all other systems, requires a source of input and output whereby input into the political 
system is that of “mass loyalty that is as diffuse as possible” (Habermas, 1975, p. 46). The 
output of such a system can be understood in terms of administrative functions that are 
independently carried out via legitimate power. Input crises then, are characterized by a 
legitimation crisis when the system requiring legitimation is unable to cultivate the necessary 
degree of “mass loyalty while the steering imperatives taken over from the economic system 
are carried through” (Habermas, 1975, p. 46). In comparison, output crises occur in instances 
where “the administrative system does not succeed in reconciling and fulfilling the imperatives 
received from the economic system”, and subsequently take shape in the form of a rationality 
crisis (Habermas, 1975, p. 46). Crisis tendencies in the political realm do not share a unified set 
of features.  More specifically, Habermas (1975) asserts, 
The rationality crisis is a displaced systemic crisis which, like 
economic crisis, expresses the contradictions between socialized 
production for non-generalizable interests and steering 
imperatives. This crisis tendency is converted into the 
withdrawal of legitimation by way of a disorganization of the 
state apparatus. The legitimation crisis, by contrast, is directly an 
identity crisis. It does not proceed by way of endangering system 
integration, but results from the fact that the fulfillment of 
governmental planning tasks places in question the structure of 
23 This statement does not suggest that these types of crises are mutually exclusive from one another, since there is 
a great degree of likelihood that certain crises develop from a disruption to another system and, at times, 
disturbances or crises permeate other systems. Although the systems listed above are interconnected with one 
another, this discussion is limited in scope so as to stay within the confines of the research on the problem of 
political power.  
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the depoliticized public realm and, thereby the formally 
democratic securing of the private autonomous disposition of the 
means of production (p. 46).  
 
Said differently, rationality insufficiencies or shortfalls in public administration is necessarily 
equated to the state’s inability to effectively “steer” the economic system, while a lack of 
legitimation suggests that it is “not possible by administrative means to maintain or establish 
effective normative structures to the extent required” (Habermas, 1975, p. 47).24  
 This suggests then, that political crises may develop on the basis of a number of 
different reasons. First, such crises can occur under circumstances where, as a result of late 
capitalism and the structural systems of modern day, traditional values dissipate and can no 
longer serve as a source of legitimation. Second, crises may occur when various policies are 
interpreted by the public as ineffective. Third, a disturbance to the system may occur in 
situations where there is a lack of reasonable control over the economy. Finally, crises may be 
cultivated when there are problems with legitimation when mass loyalty ceases to exist.25    
 The state’s role in developing a balance between the inherent contradictions outlined in 
the sections above pose issues for legitimation. More specifically,  
The state apparatus does not just see itself in the role of the 
supreme capitalist facing the conflicting interests of the various 
capital factions. It also has to consider the generalizable interests 
of the population as far as necessary to retain mass loyalty and 
prevent a conflict-ridden withdrawal of legitimation. The state 
24 “Normative structures” coincide with subsystems. For example, the political subsystem is linked to political 
institutions (state) as its “normative structure”. The “normative structures” associated with the economic 
subsystem are the economic institutions. The socio-cultural subsystem is tied to the status system as its 
“normative structure”. See Habermas, 1975, p. 6. Crises occur when there are disparities in the “normative 
structures” which lead to steering problems.     
25 Through the works of other theorists, Habermas (1973) offers his interpretation of the circumstances in which a 
state of crisis develops. One possibility has to do with the inconsistencies found between the state’s responsibility 
to encourage or generate economic growth and support a welfare state simultaneously (see Habermas (1973) on 
Claus Offe, p. 655-666). Since there is a disjuncture between the governing principles of organization for each 
enterprise, it is said that as the state strengthens and develops one end, the other, by nature, will be weakened.      
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has to gauge these three interest areas (individual capitalism, 
state capitalism, and generalizable interests), in order to find a 
compromise for competing demands (Habermas, 1973, p. 657).   
 
Thus, it may be said that the state itself has the responsibility of fulfilling interests of its own, 
such as “steering” the economy and preserving state legitimacy.26  
 When considering how this perspective fits in with the enactment of legislation, it may 
be said that it coincides with the earlier suppositions which suggest that not all laws represent 
the interests of the dominant group because the state is not always in a position to do so. While 
legitimate power is necessary for proper administrative functioning, there is a strong reliance 
on the public to legitimate this power by way of “formal democratic means” (Habermas, 1973, 
p. 656). Problems regarding legitimation may be managed in a fashion that essentially 
separates the state into two parts. From this perspective, one section of the state is responsible 
for administrative planning and functioning, while the other is dedicated to strengthening, 
reinforcing and expanding legitimacy by generating “a universal willingness to follow” 
(Habermas, 1973, p. 657). According to Habermas (1973), this has already been accomplished 
by “the personalizing of objective issues, the symbolic use of inquiries, expert opinions, legal 
incantations, etc.” (p. 657). In addition, propaganda and advertising alike are subjugated in a 
strategic attempt to manipulate the public. Habermas (1973) refers to this practice as “resorting 
to emotional appeals”, given that “they arouse unconscious motives, occupy certain contents 
positively, and devalue others” amongst the public since it is their role to provide legitimation 
26 Although the concept of “steering” the economy is not explicitly echoed in the works of Chambliss and Zatz 
(1993), Hall et al. (2013), and Miliband (2009), these theorists argue that the state is relatively autonomous of the 
dominant or ruling-class group. However, these theorists also recognize that there are ruling-class interests in 
lawmaking as well as in other facets of law. Habermas (1973) views this as an element of class structure, class 
consciousness, and institutionalized power. Chambliss and Zatz (1993), Hall et al. (2013) and Miliband (2009) 
acknowledge that ruling-class interests are not the only force responsible for law creation or law implementation, 
but that they do influence the process relative to the social structure of modern day. There are, however, both 
limitations and strengths of the ruling-class’ power on social order.      
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(p. 657). The purpose of the public, in this sense, is then to make known current and 
contemporary issues that require attention while diverting any interest from other problematic 
areas. In effect, this diminishes the degree of importance on other matters and removes them 
from the spotlight (Habermas, 1973).27  
 There is no question that the ways in which the state itself gains power and legitimacy 
are complex. It involves continuous processes to exercise legitimate power, but is narrowly 
restricted in scope.28 Much of this limitation has to with the notion that the development of 
modern society through ideology has caused the economic or socio-cultural 29  systems to 
permeate areas such as the political system. Presently, there is little guarantee that a standard 
full-blown economic crisis can be observed in late-capitalist society given the strategic and 
systematic shift of such crises into the political structure. However, the administrative system 
(i.e., planning and activity) is subject to limitations as well. For example, an excessive amount 
of manipulation of the public by the state runs the risk of exposing the means through which 
legitimacy itself is attained (Habermas, 1973). In this sense, any revelation of acquirement in 
27 This is also discussed in the works of Hall et al. (2013) in light of the state’s reliance on the media and other 
institutional forces to manipulate and appeal to the masses. Please see Chapter 3.   
28 In late-capitalist societies, governmental legitimacy is derived from a consensus amongst various (autonomous) 
structural institutions in society. Aside from the structural institutions discussed in this section, these may also 
include judicial and legislative components. The source of legitimacy is formed on the basis of a democracy 
through which the public elects a party to office. That is, the public must perceive that the governmental party 
they elect governs the state in a manner that is consistent with the doctrines outlined by democracy, and that the 
government is held responsible for their actions to the people (see Habermas, 1975, p. 36-37 for more 
information).      
29 The socio-cultural system is a structure which is part of a larger system. Habermas (1975) refers to this as a 
system of production and reproduction, or more specifically, “the cultural tradition (culture value systems), as 
well as the institutions that give these traditions normative power through processes of socialization and 
professionalization” (p. 149, Note 15). The socio-cultural system is interpreted as a life-world that essentially 
consists of a socially integrated arena of social interactions. The purpose of this system is to generate meaning that 
seeps across all other (sub) systems in order to motivate individuals to the appropriate degree of either political or 
economic conduct (Habermas, 1975). According to Edgar (2005), the output of the socio-cultural system is 
“constituted by the network of norms, meanings and worldviews that secure social integration” (p. 128). This is 
accomplished through the proper and relevant normative structures. Law, then, can be viewed in terms of an 
institutionalized type of communication or discourse on rules and social norms.    
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legitimacy jeopardizes itself (Habermas, 1973). This is particularly the case for the socio-
cultural system, which challenges the authority by administrative activity, because “there is no 
administrative creation of meaning, there is at best an ideological erosion of cultural values [...] 
Thus, there is a systemic limit for attempts at making up for legitimation deficits by means of 
well aimed manipulation” (Habermas, 1973, p. 657). This suggests that cultural traditions 
cannot be replaced by contrived ideology, but instead can be worn or manipulated in a limited 
sense in an effort to gain legitimacy. 30  Thus, any incongruency found amongst cultural 
traditions (which are fairly resistant to discontinuity) and the administrative efforts put forth by 
the state are bound by certain restrictions so as to not destroy pre-establish politically 
strategized legitimacy. 
30 This is an example of ideological movements and discourse within the government that acts as a driving force 
to ensure that the enactment of legislation is in everyone’s interest. A good example of this can be observed when 
crisis deepens on account of general disenchantment (either economically or politically), which consequently 
results in difficulties to maintain consensus. Thus, key ideological features or symbols are presented as a means of 
re-establishing legitimacy of the entire subsystem. In this case, the issue of crime and criminality is used to unite 
groups despite structural differences (i.e., class structure) or other conflicts. This is done in order to ensure that the 
crisis is diverted away from the state institutions and deflected onto other facets (such as youth crime or racial 
conflicts). This is also discussed by Habermas (1975) in the following section. According to Finlayson (2005) 
Adorno’s view on ideology is understood in terms of “socially necessary illusions” or “socially necessary false-
consciousness” (p. 11). This suggests that “ideologies are the false ideas or beliefs about itself that society 
somehow systematically manages to induce people to hold” (Finlayson, 2005, p.11). That is, “ideologies are false 
beliefs that are widely assumed to be true, because virtually all members of society are somehow made to believe 
them. Moreover, ideologies are functional false beliefs, which, not least because they are so widespread, serve to 
shore up certain social institutions and the relations of domination they support” (Finlayson, 2005, p.11). 
Habermas (1985) modifies the notion of ideology by claiming that people are “funnelled by economic and 
administrative systems into certain patterns of instrumentally rational behaviour” (Finlayson, 2005, p. 24). In 
essence, it is the systems that carry with it a number of obscure or covert “strategic or instrumental aims” which 
ensure the continuation of “oppressive social systems” (Finlayson, 2005, p. 24). According to Finlayson (2005), 
Habermas believes that “oppressive social systems survive, not because individuals mistake their own interests, 
but because their actions fall into pre-established, bewildering complex patterns of instrumental reasons. Because 
of the inherent opacity in social systems, the significance of actions exceeds the capacity of the agents to 
understand and to take responsibility for them” (p. 24).    
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2.3.2 The Need for Legitimation in Modern Society 
 There are latent consequences of administrative planning and activity which increases 
the need for legitimation in modern society.31 According to Habermas (1973), this consists of 
the ongoing development of state activity which calls for greater legitimacy on the basis of 
acquiring public allegiance. Not only is this linked to the notion of an expansion in the 
responsibilities of the state, but also to a shift in the “boundaries of the political system vis-à-
vis the cultural system” as a corollary of this development (Habermas, 1975, p. 71). The effect 
of this outcome results in a growth of the administrative system (i.e., the planning area) for 
issues that previously fell under the political system. That is, it brings into the limelight 
problematic matters that were traditionally withheld from the public (Habermas, 1975). As 
Habermas (1975) asserts, 
At every level, administrative planning produces the unintended 
unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken the 
justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of 
their nature-like course of development. Once their 
unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of 
validity claims can succeed only through discourse. The stirring 
up of cultural affairs that are taken for granted thus furthers the 
politicization of areas of life previously assigned to the private 
sphere. Efforts at participation and the plethora of alternative 
models [...] are indicators of this danger, as is the increasing 
number of citizens’ initiatives (p. 72). 
 
 A second example of how Habermas’ (1975) argument can be illustrated is within the 
context of “participatory planning” (p. 72). Participatory planning includes individuals outside 
of the government to participate in the planning process, particularly those whom are affected 
31 There are many unintended consequences of administrative planning which increase the need for legitimation. 
These are not included in this discussion, however, because it goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. For more 
information, see Habermas, 1975, pp. 71-72.  
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by the contentious topic.32 Given that there is a degree of infiltration of administrative planning 
on the cultural system, this type of participation allows the public to share in the discussion 
even though, as Habermas (1975) notes, it is uncertain as to whether participation will 
ameliorate or hinder the conflict.33 According to Habermas (1975),  
The more planners place themselves under the pressure of 
consensus-formation in the planning process, the more likely is a 
strain that goes back to two contrary motives: excessive demands 
resulting from the legitimation claims that the administration 
cannot satisfy under conditions of an asymmetrical class 
compromise; and conservative resistance to planning, which 
contracts the horizon of planning and lowers the degree of 
innovation possible (p. 72-73). 
 
Overall, Habermas’ (1975) views on the issues associated with administrative planning lend 
support to the argument that there is a need for an increase in legitimation on the basis that 
legitimation crises undoubtedly exist in modern society.34  
 On the one hand, a crisis of legitimation occurs in late-capitalist societies when the 
socio-cultural system increases confidence or boosts expectations which cannot be met by the 
rewards allotted by the system, and when the motivation provided by the socio-cultural system 
wears down (Habermas, 1973). On the other hand, missing legitimation can be compensated by 
rewards “such as money, time and security”, so long as it conforms to the system (Habermas, 
1973, p. 659). On the whole, this assertion suggests that the structural system found in modern 
society is one that is extremely fragile. While all systems within the structure are threatened to 
32 The cultural system that is affected by administrative planning is influenced by “the deep-seated representations 
of norms and values of those affected – and renders traditional values uncertain” (Habermas, 1975, p. 72). A good 
example of this can be observed in the ways in which victim’s groups are used by the government to support 
tough-on-crime legislation.    
33 This claim is also illustrated in the works of Garland (2001), who provides a fairly detailed analysis of the role 
of the public and more specifically of the various interest groups in the participatory planning stage and the effect 
this has on law enactment. Please see Chapter 6. 
34 This discussion is linked with the works of Friedrichs (1980) on the evidence used by sociologists to claim that 
such crises exist in late-capitalist societies. Please see Chapter 3.  
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a degree (i.e., the economic system is susceptible to a loss in profit), the political system 
suffers from insufficient loyalty which often results in a legitimation crisis. Unlike during 
liberal-capitalism where the system relied on traditional vestige for maintenance, the 
development of late-capitalism has destabilized the social structure and the system within it 
through its own rationality. In essence, this has resulted in the public politicization of traditions, 
norms and loyalties which has ultimately contributed to the deterioration of its own system 
(Habermas, 1975).  
2.3.3 Law as an Instrument of Governing Power                     
 The role of the state in relation to law and order has evolved from the foundation upon 
which it first emerged centuries ago. The law, and more specifically the criminal justice system, 
may be seen as a proponent of the state and its relative structural system which reflects its 
stance on the apprehension and punishment of those in contravention of the law. Aside from 
the state’s responsibility to produce a type of social conformity to the economic structure 
discussed above, the system requires a degree of control over other systems that fall outside 
this scope (such as the juridical apparatus). 
  In their analysis, Hall et al. (2013) suggest the generation of order and social solidarity, 
control, regulation, and at times coercion are all products of the state. The state not only 
controls and normalizes through culture, politics, and ideology, but also maintains and 
safeguards the obscurity of class by advancing notions of political autonomy or the “general 
will” of the public (i.e., what Habermas (1973) refers to as “will-formation” or “legitimating 
will”) (Habermas, 1973; see also Hall et al., 2013). In essence, the law is viewed as a mediator 
of social cohesion and integration that acts as a stabilizer in modern society, and as a power 
that usurps legitimacy from the compliance and submission it commands from its subjects 
(Habermas, 1985). The legitimacy of the law relies not only on power, but requires an element 
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outside of this domain. Thus, it is highly dependent on the consensus of the people in the form 
of widespread loyalty (Habermas, 1975).35 The legal system, then, is viewed as an educative 
instrument which is responsible for institutionalizing norms and creating new cultural 
developments, but only on the grounds that it is able to secure an extensive degree of consent 
(Habermas, 1985). 
 Habermas (1985) argues the ways in which the law in modern society develops and 
functions is directly related to both the larger social structural system and the life-world. The 
law itself serves as a means to legally institutionalize the autonomous operation of power and 
capital, respectively, in the administrative (public) and economic (private) systems. In this 
regard, the proximity of the state to the law manufactures a highly authoritative area which is 
subjugated by political ideology. The autonomy of the law, therefore, expels a form of 
persistent sectarian domination upon other systems in the social structure. This, Habermas 
(1985) and Hall et al. (2013) claim is done in a manner that not only strives to safeguard the 
deep-rooted purpose of preserving capital, but one that camouflages any non-legal disparities 
that could potentially disrupt the system. Further, this domination seeps into the social relations 
of the state in a way that reinforces it as a legitimate structure (Hall et al., 2013).36 
 The concept of legitimate authority is considered with respect to the existing 
relationship between politics and the law. According to Habermas (1975), the nature of this 
association has much to do with what Weber argues as “rational authority”, in that it is “the 
35 Much of this discussion is related to Habermas’ (1975) views of universalistic morality and its distinction 
between ethics (see pp. 86-92). For example, there are contradictions between the “human being” and the 
“loyalties of the citizen” which should be separated from one another in the formation of law in modern society. 
The law, according to Habermas (1975, 1985) may be understood as having a normative function that requires 
moral justification achieved through discourse.    
36 This discussion coincides with Habermas’ (1985) interpretation of ideology and the ways in which widespread 
beliefs are filtered through and by the various subsystems that form the larger part of modern society.  
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legally formed and procedurally regulated type of authority characteristic of modern societies” 
(p. 97). In the words of Weber (1978), “experience shows that in no instance does domination 
voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its 
continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its 
legitimacy” (Habermas, 1985, citing Weber, p. 213). What this suggests then, is that every 
system within the social structure strives to legitimate itself through the various mechanisms 
available in society, but that the power found within it has few boundaries. Legitimacy under 
rational-legal authority, therefore, is gained from the legal system and the laws that are enacted 
within it, while the power is derived from the administrative system that is legitimized through 
the public. In a more practical sense, legislation may be understood as a form of political 
function while the enforcement of the law is ensured by the government by controlling the 
enactment of legislation.37    
2.4 Theoretical Limitations of Conflict Theory and Critical Theory  
 There are a number of theoretical limitations associated with both the traditional 
conflict theory and the critical conflict theory discussed. One major limitation of conflict 
theory is that other theoretical explanations, such as macro-level threat theory and non-conflict 
interpretations are also able to account for similar trends present in crime and the justice 
system (Bernard, Snipes, & Gerould, 2010). Given that studies suggest there are numerous 
challenges in testing conflict theory (Beck, 2000; Chamlin & Cochran, 2000; Greenberg, 
Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Hagan, 1974; Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky, & Austin, 1987; Liska, 
1992; McCarthy & Smith, 1986; Moore, 1987; Pope & Feyerherm, 1990; Walker, Spohn, & 
37 The concepts of rational-legal authority and the modern state as a bureaucracy have been simplified and 
condensed for the purposes of this dissertation. See Habermas (1975), specifically pp. 97-102 for an in-depth 
analysis of his understanding of Weber’s concept of legitimacy, and see Weber (1978) for more information.   
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DeLone, 2000), it is difficult to confidently comment on the magnitude of the political and 
economic influence in relation to this process. As such, determining the real impact of power is 
a tricky pursuit through this theoretical lens.  
  According to Akers and Sellers (2008), the empirical testing of conflict theories are 
isolated and infrequent, likely due to a question of measurement as well as the character of the 
framework which attests to the social structure as problematic, given the countless number of 
interest groups constantly struggling to achieve power. Thus, a major criticism of conflict 
theory revolves around a lack of rigour to test the propositions of the theoretical perspective, 
especially since only a small range of crimes (i.e., political and ideological) can be explained 
by the theory. Although Ellis, Cooper and Walsh (2008) assert that a few studies have 
attempted to test the validity of this model, it appears as though the methods and measures 
used (i.e., surveys and scales) to test the propositions of these theories are unable to provide 
enough empirical evidence to persuade other criminologists towards acceptance of the theory 
due to a general lack of support for a theoretical explanation.38 
 To complicate matters further, the traditional conflict theory presented takes on an 
instrumentalist view which describes the “state as the instrument of a specific social class” 
(Kasinitz, 1983, p. 135). Aside from their widespread analysis of the state that contests 
political pluralism, it is asserted that society’s most dominant groups maintain control of the 
state by using it as an instrument to advance their interests and preserve their position of power 
within the economic system (Kasinitz, 1983). According to Kasinitz (1983), one of the 
weaknesses of such a perspective is rooted in the fact that there is little evidence to suggest that 
“elite members” or the dominant class always rule in favour of their interests. In addition, this 
38 See Brunk and Wilson (1991) for details on testing the propositions of conflict theory.  
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view appears to diminish “the whole relationship of the state and economy to that of capitalists 
and bureaucrats” (Kasinitz, 1983, p. 138). The notion of exercising power by the dominant 
group in ways that favour their interests seems to be overly simplistic in that they do not 
consider how other interest groups have influenced change or a restructuring of sorts, 
especially during social or economic hardships (Kasinitz, 1983). Thus, this view limits the 
ways in which one may understand how the state is used as a tool by other groups to further 
their interests. Since the instrumentalist view does not perceive the state as autonomous, it is 
relatively naïve and idealistic in that it does not account for the fact that the state has interests 
of its own.  
 The major limitation associated with the Marxist structuralist view stems from the fact 
that it places a great deal of emphasis on the relationship between crime and capitalism 
(Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1976). This perspective suggests that crime is a natural by-
product of a capitalist system and that the criminal justice system is used as a tool not only to 
maintain the interests of the ruling class, but also to control problematic or dangerous 
populations. In effect, this limitation is twofold. First, the theory is deficient in the sense that it 
advocates for the movement away from capitalism to a socialist system (Schwendinger & 
Schwendinger, 1976). Second, the theory does not account for individual or group behaviour 
that contribute to the cause of crime within a given society (Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 
1976). Thus, while there is a discussion about the rates of crime within a capitalist society, it 
does very little to address any additional underlying factors. Together, these prevent the theory 
from being accurately tested.     
 The critical conflict theory discussed in the works of Alvi (2012), DeKeseredy (2011), 
and Habermas (1975, 1985) consider the role of capitalism and class structure in relation to 
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(youth) crime and the role of the state. The foundation upon which critical theory is built has 
developed from the preceding theoretical orientation that takes a relatively instrumentalist 
(pluralistic) view of the state apparatus and the ways in which it is manipulated by the 
dominant groups in society. Although critical theory may be viewed as a multidisciplinary 
approach to understanding society (more specifically the subsystems that are characterized by 
larger social structure in which they preside), one of its major limiting factors is that the theory 
itself has not been able to achieve a consensus about its definition (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 
2010). In effect, critical theory has been criticized for being confused with other advancements 
of social theory which may also be critical in nature (e.g., postmodernism, pragmatism, etc.) 
(Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010).  
 A second limitation of critical theory is that it does not situate itself in a predetermined 
set of methodological techniques, nor does it outline a specific set of theoretical propositions 
because it has so many different branches. While the various theories themselves offers a 
comprehensive means of understanding social theory that is distinct from the theories from 
which it was born (i.e., Marxism and Neo-Marxist tradition), the empirical testing of this 
theory in general is challenging. Aside from the plausible explanations that are given, there is 
little evidence to support some of the more significant theorems proposed by critical theorists 
(Zaret, Edelman, Tar, McNall, Harkness & van den Berghe, 1980).  Instead, the assertions are 
set against a historical background that is interpreted within a relatively idealistic framework in 
an attempt to legitimate the views (Zaret et al., 1980). To further add to this limitation, there 
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are a number of differing trends in the arguments posed by critical theorists which often 
present varying extremes within the perspective.39  
 Finally, a significant weakness of critical theory is based on the notion that it seldom 
provides alternative explanations about the practice of free and private enterprise and its effects 
on crime, or the democratic state and system as a forum for legitimation. In essence, there is no 
real attempt at outlining any surrogate factors that may determine such political arguments 
(Finlayson, 2005). Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the theory itself offers a rich 
analysis of the processes that extend beyond the boundaries of capitalism and any of its 
consequences relative to democracy, legitimacy, law and crime by emphasizing the 
relationship between power, history, culture, economics and politics.        
2.5 Conclusion 
 Using both conflict and critical theory as the building blocks to assess the relationship 
between class structure, power, the state, the law and criminal justice, this chapter has provided 
an overview of the distinct yet highly interconnected explanations of these correlations. While 
the conflict theory (instrumentalist view) and later the Marxist view discussed in the first half 
of the chapter places a great deal of emphasis on the role of the ruling capitalist elite in that the 
state and thus the enactment of legislation serves the interests of those in society’s most 
dominant positions, the second half further complicates the role of the political state by 
characterizing it as relatively independent of the ruling class, which may result in legislation 
that, at times, reflects the interest of those in less powerful groups. Thus, it may be said that 
critical social theories build on Marxist theories in an attempt to analyze the larger social 
39 One example of this is the way in which critical theorists perceive the state (e.g., the state as autonomous vs. the 
state as relatively autonomous vs. everything in between). 
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structural framework which includes various institutions, culture, political power structures, 
roles, traditions, values, and state formations that accompany late-capitalist societies.   
 Together, these theoretical lenses form the basis of this research in two ways. First, by 
drawing from the conflict (instrumentalist) view, this dissertation places emphasis on various 
inconsistencies (such as the unequal distribution of power amongst the dominant class and 
various interest groups) that are directly correlated with the ways in which law or punishment 
upholds the status quo or the interests of the powerful. Second, by drawing from the 
Marxist/critical theories, this dissertation looks at some of the more complex relationships, 
effects and dangers of Western democratic states in relation to the political institution. That is, 
during times of crises on account of economic or administrative system contradictions, 
political decision-making frequently occurs on the basis of ideological misrepresentation and 
partiality towards society’s most powerful groups. When particular groups (such as minority 
youth) are deprived of effectively advocating for their interests during the “participatory 
planning” stage in the legislative process, they are not only more likely to be burdened and 
impacted by laws that do not represent their interests, but are also susceptible to further 
estrangement, marginalization and negativity. In essence, this contributes to their overall plight 
and may eventually threaten the established social order.  
 The position taken in this dissertation in not one that suggests that those in less 
powerful groups were not permitted to participate in the deliberative process of Bill C-10 (Part 
4). The decision-making process was open to influence by the public from both sides (those for 
the enactment of the Bill, and those against). In this sense, the law was correctly passed by the 
government, which was subject to input from the public, and considered all representations. 
This ensures legitimacy of the law in that the public is part of its formation (Habermas, 1985). 
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However, the governmental strategies used today by most Western nations is one that bases its 
decisions on the input received from various interest groups, professionals or experts, which in 
turn is assigned or appropriated to “bureaucratic elites” (Habermas, 1985; see also Garland, 
2001; Habermas, 2006; Hall et. al., 2013). Thus, it can be argued that the legislative assembly 
is used as a means to officiate policies as opposed to providing a forum in which the public 
may actively participate in the contemplative process of “deliberative politics” (Habermas, 
2006). This suggests that the process of developing policy and enacting legislation is somewhat 
ambiguous in that it is not formed on a transparent basis despite it taking on such an 
appearance (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). Instead, it is part of a larger mechanism which 
essentially bogs down the communicative process in the interest of practicality, efficiency or 
potentially for other alleged advantages (Bernard, Snipes & Gerould, 2010). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is the media that is responsible for disseminating these policies into the public 
sphere (Sacco, 1995). Although this step is integral to the passing of legislation in order to 
manufacture large-scale public consent as part of a scheme to legitimate decisions, this is 
merely one component of the overall governmental decision-making process (Garland, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
 The most notable research on rule creation and the dynamics of legislation stems from 
the analysis of the criminal justice system in relation to conflict, and specifically examines how 
laws are enacted and enforced within the system (Becker, 1963; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; 
Davis, 1962; Easton, 1953; Korn & McCorkle, 1959; Marvick, 1961; Parsons, 1962; Polsby, 
Dentler, & Smith, 1963; Quinney, 1970; Rosenblum, 1955). Moreover, the law making process 
itself is scrutinized in order to decipher whether or not it is deemed as an objective venture 
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Habermas, 1973, 1985; Lasswell, 1936; Lasswell and Kaplan, 
1950; Quinney, 1970; Schubert, 1963). The following sections in this chapter discuss a) the 
ways in which law is created as well as the specific types of people involved in the creation of 
law; b) the ways in which the media constructs crime; c) the existing link between the public’s 
opinion and attitudes about youth crime in Canada and the potential influence it may have on 
legislation; d) the reaction to youth crime and the issue of hegemony; e) the penal-welfare 
crisis and shift in youth crime governance; f) the social costs associated with tough-on-crime 
legislation, particularly with respect to discriminatory practices against marginalized youth; 
and finally, g) current Canadian youth crime statistics in order to gain a better understanding of 
whether or not a need to amend the YCJA legislation exists (or existed).   
3.1 The Creation of Laws 
 According to Becker, the birth of a specific rule or new piece of legislation stems from 
a consensus in shared values (Becker, 1963). As Becker notes, “people shape values into 
specific rules in problematic situations. They perceive some area of their existence as 
troublesome or difficult, requiring action” (Becker, 1963, p. 131). Generally, rules or laws are 
structured to uphold the values associated with them (Horowitz & Liebowitz, 1968). In 
addition, they clearly distinguish what type of behaviours or actions are acceptable or 
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forbidden, and as part of the differentiation between the two, the implementation of a sanction 
is attached to the breaking of that rule (Becker, 1963; Cohen, 1972; Hall et al., 2013; Hills, 
1971).  
 During the process of enacting a new rule or new legislation, the activities of 
enterprising groups is a “moral enterprise, for what they are enterprising about is the creation 
of a new fragment of the moral construction of society, its code of right and wrong” (Becker, 
1963, p. 145). According to Hills (1971), moral entrepreneurs “who by virtue of their imitative, 
political power, access to decision-makers, skillful use of publicity, and success in neutralizing 
any opposition” are perfectly capable of converting specific interests and values into public 
policy (p. 6). Moreover, the creation and application of rules and laws can be said to be 
accompanied by individuals seeking the support of “coordinate groups using the available 
media of communication to develop a favourable climate of opinion” (Becker, 1963, pp. 145-
146).40 Likewise, the processes concerned with the enforcement of the law are shaped by the 
level of involvement and organization of the group, “resting on a basis of shared understanding 
in simpler groups and resulting from political manoeuvring and bargaining in complex 
structures” (Becker, 1963, p. 146).  
 In Westernized societies, the ways in which the government is arranged intrinsically 
allows for an abundance of interest groups, or, moral entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, these 
groups are capable of impressing certain values and interests on the legal structure itself due to 
40 This view is also shared by Habermas (2006), who argues that “media professionals produce an elite discourse, 
fed by actors who struggle for access to and influence on the media. Those actors enter the stage from three 
points: Politicians and political parties start from the centre of the political system; lobbyists and special interest 
groups come from the vantage point of the functional systems and status groups they represent; and advocates, 
public interest groups, churches, intellectuals, and moral entrepreneurs come from backgrounds in civil society.” 
(p. 417).  
63 
 
                                            
existing power imbalances amongst groups. The legal order, that is, “the rules which the 
various law-making institutions in the bureaucracy that is the state lay down for the governance 
of officials and citizens, the tribunals, official and unofficial, formal and informal, which 
determine whether the rules have been breached, and the bureaucratic agencies which enforce 
the law” is explained as a system in which interest groups in dominant positions are able to 
maintain power and privilege (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 4).41 To a degree, this coincides 
with Habermas’ (2006) views on the political public sphere, whereby the involvement of 
various interest groups and moral entrepreneurs is of particular importance. The involvement 
of such actors in the public domain assures that these groups either represent certain interests 
within the deliberative process (interest groups), 42 or create public awareness for issues that 
are otherwise overlooked (moral entrepreneurs). Although Habermas (2006) notes the purpose 
of the contemplative process that occurs within the political public realm is expected “to ensure 
the formation of a plurality of considered public opinions”, the prospect of accomplishing such 
a challenging feat is recognized (p. 417).  
3.1.1 The Creators of Laws 
 In relation to the specific types of people who take initiative due to an interest to create 
rules, the “crusading reformer” is said to be the driving force behind all legislation. Crusading 
41 According to the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (Martini, 2012), “interest groups” or “special interest groups” 
are defined as “any association of individual or organisations that on the basis of one or more shared concerns, 
attempt to influence public policy in its favour usually by lobbying members of the government”. They also state 
that “the advantages and disadvantages of interest group influence will depend on how much power such interest 
groups have as well as on how power is distributed among them” (Dur; Bievre, 2007, cited in Martini, 2012). See 
sections entitled ‘Interest group Influence on Policy Making’ and ‘Pros and Cons of Interest Group Influence’ for 
more information.    
42 Habermas (2006) suggests that “Given the high level of organization and material resources, representatives of 
functional systems and special interest groups enjoy somewhat privileged access to the media, too. They are in a 
position to use professional techniques to transform social power into political muscle. [...] It follows that 
compared with politicians and lobbyists, the actors of civil society are in the weakest position.” (p. 419).  
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reformers are explained as those who are fairly interested in and concerned about the content 
of laws, whereby existing laws do not appear to be satisfactory (Becker, 1963). Crusading 
reformers simultaneously enterprise while employing publicity techniques to obtain support 
from already established, credible organizations (Becker, 1963; Cohen, 1972). Emerging as 
individuals set out to better those in less fortunate positions, moral crusaders are “typically 
dominated by those in the upper levels of the social structure” (Becker, 1963, p. 149). 43 
Essentially, the relationship between moral crusaders and those in more powerful positions is 
two-fold. First, moral crusaders are given power by those in superior positions in society in the 
process of bringing forth their initiative. Second, moral crusaders add to the power they gain 
from the legitimacy of their moral position, strengthening the pre-existing power amongst 
those in more astute positions within the social structure (Becker, 1963).   
 In order to succeed at creating new legislation, Cohen (1972) notes that the moral 
crusader “must either be in a position of power himself or must have access to and be able to 
convince such power institutions as the mass media, legal and scientific bodies, and political 
authorities” (p. 91). Within the legislative process, a moral crusader presents problematic 
issues as conflicting with values in a manner that appeals to certain interest groups, and 
successfully advances the problem by magnifying it to national proportions which demand 
governmental accountability.44 Chambliss and Seidman (1971) suggest that those which are 
43 According to Becker (1963), “it is appropriate to think of reformers as crusaders because they typically believe 
that their mission is a holy one” (p. 169). Thus, the terms “moral crusaders” and “crusading reformers” are used 
synonymously throughout this chapter.  
44 This statement coincides with Habermas’ (2006) view on the “power structure of the public sphere” relative to 
mass communication. Habermas (2006) notes that this type of power may be understood in terms of a “social 
power”, which “depends on the status one occupies within a stratified society; such statuses are derived from 
positions within functional systems” (p. 428). He continues to state the types of individuals involved in interest 
groups or social movements have a political impact, although they “do not possess ‘power’ in the strict sense but 
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most likely to be effective in crusading are either the individuals or groups that control (or at 
the very least influence) the economic or political institutions of society. In other words,  
A society is composed of individuals occupying positions that 
are defined by the normative structure. Every demand for a 
change in the rules of law, therefore, is a demand that the society 
be changed to that extent. Every demand for a change in the law 
reflects the sort of society envisaged by those who demand it; 
that is, it reflects their values and goals (Chambliss & Seidman, 
1971, p. 17). 
   
According to this view, any piece of enacted legislation or any change to the existing 
legislation appears to axiomatically support the view of those whom are most inclined to 
demand it.  
 According to Chambliss & Seidman (1971), there are two aspects of law passing. First, 
it is noted that some laws are enacted mainly as a symbolic gesture to moderate the behaviour 
of some group that is capable of disrupting the ongoing process of society (Chambliss & 
Seidman, 1971). Essentially, laws are passed to appease other interest groups that are either in 
conflict with the dominant one, or that pose a threat to society’s day-to-day activities, 
symbolizing a compromise (see also Miliband, 2009). This not only suggests that not all laws 
are passed in the interest of more dominant groups, but that the state itself is relatively 
autonomous from complete ruling class control. However, the second point states that “laws 
which are passed under these conditions are rarely if ever enforced with the same vigour as 
characterizes the enforcement of those laws which are in the best interests of persons in 
position of power” (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 65). In other words, those belonging to 
more powerful groups are rarely penalized in the same manner, or even to the same degree, as 
derive public influence from the ‘social’ and ‘cultural capital’ they have accumulated in terms of visibility, 
prominence, reputation, or moral status” (pp. 428-429).   
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those in more subordinate groups.45 Ultimately, both of these underlying law passing traits 
illustrates the unequal dispersion of power amongst varying interest groups in society. 
 Upon closer inspection, Chambliss and Seidman (1971) note that the nature and extent 
of stratification in society helps explain the dispute between such compromise and a decision 
of law (or norm) enforcement that determines one party as right and the other as wrong (i.e., 
the “winner takes all”). According to Chambliss and Seidman (1971),  
As societies grow more complex technologically, then for a wide 
variety of reasons – greater aggressiveness or competence of 
individuals, territorial conquests, accidental control of significant 
resources, and no doubt others – significant economic 
differences between members tend to arise. [...] The more 
economically stratified a society becomes, the more it becomes 
necessary for the dominant groups in the society to enforce 
through coercion the norms of conduct which guarantee their 
supremacy (p. 33).  
 
In essence, with the progression and advancement of society there is a shift from the 
underlying processes involving compromise towards one that supports the “enforcement of the 
rule by imposition of a sanction” (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, p. 34).46 The passing of any 
legislation or enforcement of the rule in this sense relies heavily on interest group activity, 
because it is one of the decisive factors in shaping the “content of legislation” (Chambliss and 
Seidman, 1971, p. 73). Thus,  
Whatever the interest groups may strive to achieve, of course the 
stance taken will be invariably be to defend the legislation in 
terms of its intrinsic beneficent consequences for “all” of society. 
But “all” of society never really includes everyone but 
45 This is most frequently seen with the relatively leniency and alleged infrequency of white-collar crime; 
although they too are governed by the same laws and are subject to apprehension and punishment. Examples of 
white-collar crime include Martha Stewart for insider trading and Bernie Maddoff for an investment scandal. 
Although quite serious, these types of crimes are not as contentious as violent youth crime.  
46 According to Habermas (1975), legitimate laws have several features. One of these features is based on the 
premise that laws must be enforceable and coercible upon the public.   
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necessarily excludes that groups whose behaviour the law is 
intended to control (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, p. 72).47 
 
Generally, this literature suggests there is very little room for diverse interest groups to 
negotiate compromise in support of their respective views that goes against the ideology 
expressed by the most powerful groups. Although it may be that the state is relatively 
autonomous, at  times it does act on behalf of the dominant group whereby legislation supports 
these interests. Thus, the law can support other interests in an attempt to reduce conflict and 
maintain legitimacy when necessary (Miliband, 2009).48 According to this view, the degree 
with which this occurs is not nearly as frequent as the former scenario.     
 Overall, research in the area of rule creating and rule creators (moral entrepreneurs), 
indicates that moral crusades are necessarily related to the conflict of interests on small and 
large-scale community and societal levels. This may further specify the assumptions of conflict 
theory, since moral crusades play a role in the likelihood of conflict between legal authorities 
and subject (particularly by defining certain behaviours as problematic), although not all moral 
entrepreneurs are organized as part of a group. Nonetheless, the moral entrepreneur contributes 
to the preservation and maintenance of power within the dominant groups. The presence of 
power differentials amongst groups also inevitably leads to the preservation and further 
amassing of power in the midst of those in the most dominant positions within society. Thus, 
those groups designated as less powerful within the greater social structure are inextricably 
destined to be vulnerable to attacks based on varying conflicts of interest.        
47 In this case, the behaviour of potentially violent, potential “career criminal” youth. 
48 For a more detailed discussion on the pressures from subordinate groups on the government which may 
influence the process of policy-making, see Miliband, 2009, particularly pp. 86-105.  
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3.2 Media Constructions of Crime 
 In modern democratic societies, it is improbable that interest groups are the only ones 
who can exercise power within the legislative process. Because modern societies allow the 
public to participate in the formal decision-making process of policies and legislation, the 
public has the ability to provide input on matters that will ultimately govern them (Habermas, 
1985, 2006). But where does public knowledge of such matters come from? Research suggests 
that the ways in which the public acquires information on crime in Canada stems mainly from 
the media (Dowler, Fleming & Muzzatti, 2006; Sacco, 1995). This is particularly the case for 
people who rely heavily on media reports and have no additional sources of information on the 
topic at hand. According to Sacco (1995), there is an association that exists between the media 
and crime, whereby “the news media are a vital part of the process by which individuals’ 
private troubles with crime – as victims or offenders – are transformed into public issues” (p. 
141). It is through individual experiences with crime that forms the basis upon which the 
private nature of crime is spearheaded into the public realm as part of a larger social problem 
(Sacco, 1995). In addition, the media’s involvement in private troubles has the potential to 
further exacerbate these personal problems if they heighten anxiety and fear for those who are 
regularly exposed to reports that allude to the “seriousness and pervasiveness of crime 
problems” (Sacco, 1995, p. 141; see also Doob, 1982; Doob & Macdonald, 1979; Hall et al., 
2013). In this sense, the media’s construction of crime seems to involve a multifaceted process 
that continuously shapes agendas and frame issues, particularly by intensifying the public’s 
fear and anxiety about the pervasiveness and/or seriousness of crime. As a result, the news 
media “provide an important forum in which private troubles are selectively gathered up, 
invested within a broader meaning, and made available for public consumption” (Sacco, 1995, 
p. 142).  
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 Studies show that crime news commonly reports incidences about or the formal 
processing of personal troubles explicitly in a criminal context (Dowler, 2004; Fleming, 1983, 
2006; Graber, 1980; Hall et al., 2013; Sacco, 1995). Much of this news is related to what 
journalists consider newsworthy, both in terms of what should be reported as problems and 
how these problems should be addressed.49 Moreover, media constructions of crime also lend 
themselves to the nature and extent of crime problems within the private sphere (Sacco, 1995). 
According to previous research (Best, 1989a, 1989b; Fishman, 1978; Orcutt & Turner, 1993; 
Sacco, 1995), patterns of news gathering and reporting on crime indicate a tendency to over 
represent official sources due to a number of factors. First, there appear to be constraints that 
are imposed upon journalists which dictate both the types and the ways in which stories may be 
covered. Second, many reporters are unfamiliar with the intricacies associated with the matter 
being covered and therefore exaggerate its prominence. Third, the story itself must qualify as 
being important enough to be considered over other rival issues, adding to its importance. 
Fourth, journalists sometimes systematize crime stories around a persuasive or gripping news 
theme, often leading to crime waves that suggest crime is on the up rise (Hall et al., 2013).  
 The news gathering process, however, is not limited to these findings. There are other 
influences on the ways in which private troubles associated with victims and offenders are both 
reported and transformed into public issues. For example, news is often filtered through law 
enforcement, is put into context by advocacy and governmental assertions, is echoed through 
49 Habermas (2006) suggests that “those who work in the politically relevant sectors of the media system (i.e., 
reporters, columnists, editors, directors, producers, and publishers) cannot but exert power, because they select 
and process politically relevant content and thus intervene in both the formation of public opinions and the 
distribution of influential interests. The use of media power manifests itself in the choice of information and 
format, in the shape and style of programs, and in the effects of its diffusions – in agenda setting, or the priming 
and framing of issues” (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005, cited in Habermas, 2006, p. 419). This, Habermas (2006) 
suggests, is a source of media power.  
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culturally defined news themes, and is produced, created and shaped by the principles and 
requisites of the media (Sacco, 1995). As such, “the social construction of crime problems may 
be understood as reflecting the types of relationships that link news agencies to their sources, 
and the organizational constraints that structure the news-gathering process” (Sacco, 1995, p. 
141). This suggests that there may be other factors involved in the news gathering process that 
remain outside the interests produced by elite bias or persistent pressures inflicted by interest 
groups.50   
 Regardless of how the media is structured, it is evident that when the media constructs 
a private problem as a social concern, the solution inevitably rests on the shoulders of the 
criminal justice system or the state. Ultimately, it is the system’s responsibly to correct the 
existing problem, which tends to reinforce conventional law and order responses and positions 
to effectively address crime (Best, 1991; Hall et al., 2013; Sacco, 1995). This is partially due to 
the fact that “the frame of reference offered by a government bureaucracy or other recognized 
authority with respect to crime problems may only infrequently be called into question and, as 
a consequence, competing perspectives may become marginalized” (Sacco, 1995, p. 146). 
However, it is an erroneous assumption to propose that the media only propagate or advance 
claims-making regarding crime issues advocated by government agencies, politicians (or other 
political contenders) or interest groups because “any such claims must be transformed to meet 
the requirements of the medium in question” (Sacco, 1995, p. 146). This suggests a degree of 
complexity in the construction of crime news that ranges from the news gathering process to 
50 Habermas (2006) suggests that politicians and political parties are the primary sources of new or information to 
the media in that “they hold a strong position as regards negotiating privileged access to the media” (p. 419). 
Similarly, it is acknowledged that “even governments usually have no control over how the media then present 
and interpret their messages, over how political elites or wider publics receive them, or over how they respond to 
them” (Jarren & Donges, cited in Habermas, 2006, p. 419).    
71 
 
                                            
the ways in which crime problems are publicly portrayed and by whom. Nonetheless, it is 
asserted that the media tends to symbolically reproduce the views and the opinions of the 
dominant groups (or dominant ideology) by reinforcing the structural power that exists within 
society’s institutional systems (Becker, 1963; Habermas, 1985; Hall et al., 2013).   
 While claims must be reconstructed in a fashion that meets the prerequisites of the 
media, there is a large body of research that asserts that interest groups use the media as a tool 
to convey underlying social and political issues to systematically create misperceptions about 
crime (including youth crime) that eventually elicits a response in favour of their cause 
(Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1987, 1991; Humphries, 1981). Since the media explicitly 
constructs images and generalized meanings of crime, studies show that particular interest 
groups use the media in a manner which proactively advance practicable solutions to the 
misconstrued problems (DeKeseredy, 2011). As such, interests groups that effectively 
broadcast their own explanations and opinions through the media have a greater likelihood of 
being involved in the resolution process. In other words, 
The group that is most successful in setting up facts that are 
recognized in the minds of politicians and the general public as 
being examples of the problem is going to be the group most 
likely to have an effect upon the development of the solution 
(DeKeseredy,  2011:81).           
   
This finding suggests that there is a multifarious interplay between the media and interest 
groups; however this relationship appears to frequently promote the strengthening of laws and 
the establishment of harsher measures within the criminal justice system (Dowler, Fleming & 
Muzzatti, 2006). In fact, some (right-wing) interest and victims groups have been very 
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influential in shaping opinion, law, and the punitive agenda within the public sphere due to 
their appeal to the public through effective media campaigns and lobbying the government.51      
3.3 Public Views and Attitudes about Youth Crime and the Youth Justice System 
 Images of deviance and youth crime portrayed through the media predominately 
instigated by interests groups are fairly instrumental in fueling the fear of crime amongst the 
public. Thus, public opinion regarding the need for a tough law and order approach is often 
based on fragments of information pertaining to the event(s) in question (Fleming, 2006; 
Muzzatti, 2004; Ratner & McMullan, 1985). Research suggests that media coverage of 
criminal sentencing for both adults and young offenders provide the public with reason to 
believe harsher sentencing practices are necessary (Campbell, 2000; Canadian Sentencing 
Commission, 1988; Doob, 1985; Doyle, 2006; Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1991; Hall et al., 
2013; Roberts, 2001; Roberts & Doob, 1990; Sprott, 1996; Sprott & Doob, 2008). Given that 
most people obtain their information regarding sentencing and the justice system from the 
media, the literature in this area reports that there is an overrepresentation of crimes of violence 
and sentencing in the news in both Canada and the United States (Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 
1991; Sprott, 1996).  
 A content analysis of stories about youth crime in Toronto newspapers illustrates 
exactly how overrepresented these incidents are in Canada. According to one study, 94% of 
these stories regarding youth crime involved cases of violence (Sprott, 1996). Ironically, when 
51 A good example of a group with prominent power and influence towards a more law and order approach is 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) that established “the public conviction that impaired driving is 
unacceptable and criminal, in order to promote public policies, programs and personal responsibility” (Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving, 2014). In this case, an argument can be made that MADD has effectively promoted their 
agenda through media campaigns such as television, but also through many other news outlets and agencies which 
include government organizations. Disseminating their message through the media assists in constructing public 
images of what is considered to be important societal values.     
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this figure was compared with youth court statistics, research found that not even 25% of the 
youth court cases presented in Ontario involved violence offences (Sprott, 1996). Moreover, 
the press “focused largely on the crime, the charge laid against the young person, and the 
impact of the crime on the victims,” while in contrast, official documentation of youth court 
dispositions “focused more on characteristics of the youth” (Sprott, 1996, p. 271). In fact, 
recent studies suggest that overrepresentation of youth crime in the media results in Canadians 
feeling more fearful of crime than their American counterparts, in spite of the fact that 
Canadians actually experience lower crime and victimization rates (Chesney-Lind, 2007; 
Dowler, 2004).   
 Similarly, a study of Toronto residents indicates that most Torontonians are of the 
opinion that youth court dispositions are too relaxed, particularly in relation to serious violent 
repeat offenders, even though newspapers almost never offer data about youth court 
dispositions (Sprott, 1996). Of those found to hold beliefs that youth court sentences are too 
permissive, there appears to be a tendency to favour harsher sentences, as well as a “prevailing 
sense of opposition to having a separate youth justice system to deal with youth crime” (Sprott, 
1996, pp. 282-283). These figures were also reflected in a Gallup Poll conducted in April of 
2000. When questioned as to whether, “overall, the legislation goes too far, not far enough, or 
is about right in dealing with youths who commit crime”, 48% of Canadians claimed that “it 
does not go far enough”. Additionally, 94% were in support of creating “a new category for 
repeat violent young offenders, who would be subject to adult penalties”. Three quarters of the 
respondents were very much for the development of such a provision, but 5% disapproved. 
Finally, 74% of Canadians were in strong agreement with a provision that supports the 
sentencing of youth 14 years of age and older as adults. In addition, there was “considerable 
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support for allowing the publication of names of youth sentenced for serious crimes”. On the 
whole, 80% of those surveyed were in favour of this provision, with 64% indicating they were 
strongly in favour (See Gallup Poll, 1999-2000). 
 These findings suggest that a complex relationship exists between the media and the 
public, but also amongst political and administrative authorities. Similar to Vold’s (1958) 
assertion that the notion of social order is not characterized by a consensus amongst varying 
groups, this research indicates that social order is neither realized nor derived naturally, or 
manufactured solely through the media. Rather, it is a product of an amalgamation between the 
citizens themselves, the media, the politicians and other institutional forces (Habermas, 1985; 
Hall et al., 2013). The findings also demonstrate that any consensus reached about claims 
regarding the rising rates of youth crime is directly attributed to a lax society that tolerates and 
supports less punitive sentencing practices. In line with research conducted by Hall et al. 
(2013), such beliefs about leniency in sentencing contribute to the legitimation of public 
perception that the youth criminal justice system does not adequately hold youth accountable 
for their crimes.52 In turn, legislation for tougher measures is called upon by both politicians 
and the public despite the fact that official responses to youth crime are disproportionate to the 
actual threat.     
 A troublesome aspect of this general belief for more rigorous legislation appears to 
stem from a lack of “accurate knowledge of the operation of the youth court in Canada, 
underestimating the severity of dispositions available to the court under the law” (Sprott, 1996, 
52 Friedrichs (1980) asserts that polls on public attitudes indicate a decrease in confidence of national institutions 
(including the criminal justice system). These sentiments are illustrative of a growing dissatisfaction and 
disrespect for the government, which in turn has resulted in a “public loss of faith in the government” and a 
“mistrust of political leaders” (p. 542). This is one of the grounds that form a legitimacy crisis.  
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p. 283). 53 In addition, there is an incorrect or misled assumption that youth courts cannot 
transfer cases to the adult jurisdiction (Sprott, 1996).54 In effect, the general beliefs underlying 
the presumed leniency amongst youth courts are best understood as an interconnection to crime 
and the youth justice system as opposed to a precise awareness and familiarity of existing 
evidence both about youth crime and the Canadian youth justice system (Sprott, 1996).  
3.3.1 The Interconnection of Public Opinion and Politics  
 Of great significance to the topic of public opinion on youth crime and the youth justice 
system is the undeniable influence of public opinion on policy agendas (Campbell, 2000; 
Doyle, 2006; Doyle & Ericson, 1996; Hall et al., 2013; Roberts, Crutcher, & Vergrugge, 2007; 
Roberts & Doob, 1990; Sprott, 1996; Sprott & Doob, 2008; Surette, 2007). According to the 
above literature, the illusive public yearning for more punitive sentences is commonly referred 
to by legislators as the logic behind challenging action involving reform towards greater 
leniency. Moreover, the public frequently appears to be intolerant to initiatives or amendments 
that may produce more permissive or compassionate dispositions (Doob & Roberts, 1988; Hall 
et al., 2013).  
 In fact, recent studies contend that even judges are vulnerable to public opinion – or at 
least the perceived public opinion, and may take these views into consideration when making 
dispositional decisions. According to Walker and Hough (1988), “there are signs that at a 
political level, at any rate, greater importance is now being attached to the congruence of 
public opinion and sentencing practice” (p. 1). However, before sentencing practices within the 
53 Habermas (2006) attests to similar findings. He claims that “the literature on ‘public ignorance’ paints a rather 
sobering portrait of the average citizen as a largely uninformed and disinterested person”, although there is some 
evidence which suggests that certain aspects of this phenomena are changing with time (p. 420).  
54 This is more so an artifact of the YOA than of the YCJA. Only in rare circumstances do youth court cases get 
transferred to the adult jurisdiction.  
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courts accommodate the views of the public, it is important to recognize that public views on 
matters of perceived leniency are generally in response to biased news media accounts of 
violent youth crimes and sentencing (Hall et al., 2013; Roberts & Doob, 1990).  
 Other research in this area indicates similar findings in relation to the effects of the 
media on public opinion. For example, in 1993 the “Liberal political agenda for young 
offenders appeared in some cases to be informed more by public concerns than by identifiable 
problems in the way in which adolescents are processed by the youth justice system” (Sprott, 
1996, p. 272). This suggests that policy makers fail to realize that public views tend to reflect 
both the choice and characteristics of the news that the public draws from the media. Policy 
makers who indiscriminately follow seemingly articulated feedback to polls that suggest a need 
to increase sentence severity often contribute to the problem at hand. According to Roberts and 
Doob (1990), “it is the naive, dishonest, or cynical policy maker, then, who recommends 
increased harshness in overall sentencing policy on the basis of simple assertions about 
sentencing made in response to simple questions” (p. 466). 55  Thus, in the event that 
“politicians are going to base policy reform on public opinion, more accurate information 
needs to be relayed to the public, most obviously through the media” (Sprott, 1996, p. 288). 
Taken as a whole, research demonstrates that a large extent of “public dissatisfaction with 
sentencing is based upon media misinformation about general and specific sentencing” 
principles and procedures pertaining to youth crime (Roberts & Doob, 1990, p. 466). These 
findings are similar to those found by Hall et al. (2013) on mugging as a social phenomenon 
(see Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order). 
55 Signs of this were seen in the development and enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Please see Chapter 6. 
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3.4 Reactions to Youth Crime and the Issue of Hegemony 
 The reaction to youth crime as a phenomenon originates from a number of different 
avenues. That is, reactions may be stirred by tensions that exist between youth and the police, 
youth and the public, youth and the criminal justice system, youth and the media, and youth 
relative to the crime rates. In order to better understand why reactions to youth crime are as 
prevalent and as pronounced as they are, it is important to recognize the existence of a micro 
and macro level relationship within the structure of society itself. In essence, there is a 
connection between the construction and labeling of these acts as deviant (and thus reactions to 
these acts), and the “larger role which the legal institutions play, through the control of crime, 
in the maintenance of the stability and cohesion of the whole social formation from which, 
under certain conditions, acts defined as infractions of the law develop” (Hall et al., 2013, p. 
183, see also Habermas, 1975; 1985). Fundamentally, the social formation of youth crime 
develops out of a complex relationship between “the police, judiciary, media, the political 
classes, moral guardians and the state”, which bring together small- and large-scale 
transactions to define the connection between the law and the law-breaker (Hall et al., 2013, p. 
x). The ways in which these forces combine to create an extreme reaction (overreaction) to the 
problem of youth crime, therefore, occur in a social, legal, economic, and political context that 
is “conceptualised as an ensemble of practices, institutions, forces and contradictions”, but are 
typically identified and defined by the dominant group (Hall et al., 2013, p. xi). 
 Harmonizing consensus of the practices, institutions and social forces by the police, 
media, courts, political authorities, prominent social figures, elite ruling-class, and the public 
more generally on the problem of youth crime is neither simple nor straightforward. It is more 
than a concentrated effort of dominant groups or governmental schemes to reproduce dominant 
ideology through the media. However, research suggests that this consensus frequently 
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develops from the interests of the dominant groups and is executed through the mechanisms of 
hegemony (Hall et al., 2013). Hegemony, defined as a “universalisation of class interests” is 
attained through the state, which is necessary for the construction of alliances (for example, 
interest groups, partnerships, non-state agency formations, locality-based organizations, and 
even the public) (Hall et al., 2013, p. 201). It is a concept which refers to how the dominant 
group exerts influence and power over subordinate groups in a way that promotes dominant 
political and economic ideology amongst the general public (Gramsci, 1971).56 When a crisis 
of hegemony occurs and all other means of establishing consensus (or consent) are exhausted, 
the state attempts to achieve consensus by calling on a “central value system” that essentially 
serves as a source of re-legitimation.57 To exert control over others through the process of 
legitimation or legitimate power, therefore, is directly related to one’s position of power or 
authority in light of their superior position or status. A legitimation crisis occurs when the 
governing party still has legitimate authority to govern, but has difficulty substantiating its 
56 Gramsci (1971) asserts that the practice of hegemony is achieved on “…two major superstructural ‘levels’: the 
one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is, the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of 
‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of ‘hegemony’ 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or 
command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government. [...] These comprise: 1) The ‘spontaneous’ 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) 
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. 2) The apparatus 
of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or 
passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of 
command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed” (p. 145).  
57 The process of legitimation refers to the act, ideology or process of normalizing or legitimating certain values, 
rules or norms within a given society. According to Miliband (2009), the primary reason for the process of 
legitimation is to prevent the notion that “[...] more and more people, particularly in the subordinate classes, 
should come to think as both possible and desirable an entirely different social order, [...] and dedicated to the 
elimination of privilege and unequal power; and that ‘the masses’ should also seek to give expression to this belief 
in terms of political action” (p. 189). One of the main characteristics that are linked with the legitimation crisis has 
to do with a loss of public confidence, whereby the public loses faith in the government’s ability to act in a 
productive or competent fashion (Habermas, 1975). For a more detailed discussion of hegemony and the consent 
of subordinate groups to dominant groups and the state, please refer to Gramsci (1971); Hall et al. (2013); 
Miliband (2009). 
79 
 
                                            
function to fulfill the purpose for which it was established. A trademark of the legitimation 
crisis is most frequently illustrated by an overreaction of a given issue, such as youth crime, by 
the government. Hall et al. (2013) assert, 
But this centralisation of power through the state is said to be 
countermanded by the play of public opinion and the 
independence of a free press. But, without directly absorbing the 
agencies of opinion formation, it is clear that governments, 
directly through the decisions they make and the policies they 
put into effect, through their monopoly of the sources of public 
knowledge and expertise, and indirectly through the mass media, 
political communications and other cultural systems, have the 
most powerful effect in shaping the ‘popular consent’ which they 
then consult. [...] The suggestion is not that power has been 
effectively dispersed in modern democratic mass societies but 
that the vast majority of people are united within a common 
system of values, goals and beliefs - the so-called ‘central value 
system’; and it is this consensus on values, rather than formal 
representation, which provides the cohesion which such complex 
modern states require. The dominant and powerful interests are 
therefore ‘democratic’, not because they are directly governed in 
any sense by the ‘will of the people’, but because they, too, must 
ultimately refer themselves and be in some way bound by this 
‘consensus’ (pp. 211-212).58 
  
A crisis of hegemony, therefore, establishes a central value system amongst all members of 
society as a means of re-legitimating hegemonic domination in the face of conflict, especially 
in cases where the public begins losing confidence in the elected governing body.     
 The process of re-legitimating necessarily involves the media in order to gain the 
consent of the subordinate groups or the “silent majority” (Hall et al., 2013, p. 171). Crime, in 
particular, is used by the dominant group to define the crisis away from the state by deflecting 
the problem onto issues such as youth, crime, and race. This strategically moves towards a 
progressively coercive application or use of the state by creating moral panics to which 
58 Some of these sentiments are also echoed in the works of Habermas (1975, 1985). 
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different control agencies must collectively respond. 59  In such instances, there is an 
augmentation of panic expressed through societal reaction which ultimately questions the very 
moral fibers of society.60 As a result, law and order campaigns are initiated, moral panics are 
perpetuated, key symbols such a family, family values, the need for respect, discipline, 
decency and public protection are invoked, and an increase in state control is witnessed (Hall et 
al., 2013). When such phenomena occur, the consensus of values about youth crime resurface 
and solidify to unite various social groups, including those separated by incongruousness in 
values, interests, and beliefs (Hall et al., 2013). In effect, an alignment of values occurs on 
account of crisis where re-stabilization is necessary. Consequently, there is greater control of 
the dominant group over the population due to various social order mechanisms that further 
promote the empowered, manufactured mainly through consensus (spontaneous consent), but 
can extend to coercion (when consent fails).    
3.5 The Crisis over Penal-Welfarism and Shifts in Youth Crime Governance 
 The crisis of the welfare-capitalist state, and more specifically of penal-welfarism, may 
be understood in terms of a corollary that is attributed to a world economic crisis beginning in 
the 1970s. As a consequence of this crisis, much of the Western world witnessed a significant 
shift in the redistribution of power on account of the changing power relations brought about 
by the welfare state. In effect, the welfare state went beyond developing a number of social 
59 A “moral panic” occurs when a “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen, 1972, p. 9). For more information, see Cohen (1972); Hall, 
Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts (2013).   
60 This statement is partially related to a legitimacy crises claim that incorporates elements of both the state and 
society in terms of its structural characteristics. According to Friedrichs (1980), this is based on the “spectacular 
failures of the modern nation-state, including the alleged failure to protect its population, demonstrated 
incompetence, pretentious developmental policies and ineffectiveness in promoting and guaranteeing growth” (p. 
544).  
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institutions to address the compromises between labour and capital (i.e., issues that were 
differentiated on the basis of class structure) as well as other interests that were specifically 
situated in a historical context. Rather, the welfare state was born out of the ensuing power 
relations that were characterized by the social structure of that time. The demise of the welfare 
state however, is directly linked with a period of economic decline and political volatility that 
disrupted not only the larger social structure but also the systems within.61 Much of this crisis, 
therefore, occurred on account of the varying employment patterns of uneducated, low-skilled 
workers which were largely comprised of inner-city minorities (mainly youth). Coupled with 
the “increasingly regressive tax structures and declining welfare benefits”, the crisis of the 
welfare state had a crippling effect on socially, politically and economically disadvantaged 
minority youth who,  
Were systematically excluded from the labour market just as 
many of their parents had been before them. The consequence 
was a more sharply stratified labour market, with growing 
inequalities separating the top and bottom tiers; a diminished 
sense of shared interests as the power and membership of mass 
unions declined; greater contrasts in working conditions, lifestyle 
and residence; and ultimately, fewer ties of solidarity between 
these groups (Garland, 2001, p. 82).  
 
The crisis of the welfare state, however, did not occur solely on account of a decline in 
economic and political prosperity. There were many other factors that contributed to the crisis, 
although the implications of such an outcome resulted in a shift in the ideology of welfarism, 
changes in the understanding of the structures of “normalization” and discipline, 
61 This discussion has been simplified for the purposes of this dissertation. For more information, please see 
Garland (2001) and Habermas (1985) who both analyze the changes in social order in modern society, and links 
them with the family, demography, culture, and mass media. The expansion of the media relative to culture is of 
particular importance, because during times of crises social media is the medium through which social and 
governmental agencies and organizations are brought under the public’s scrutiny. The media is responsible for 
increasing the state’s degree of liability by participating in a process that publicizes their relative successes and 
failures. 
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transformations in cultural assumptions, and modifications to socially democratic policies and 
practices based on reactionary responses to the state itself (Garland, 2001; Habermas, 1985). In 
other words, the social movements that are associated with the crisis of penal-welfarism are 
monopolized not only by the state, but are encompassed by a number of differing groups and 
social mechanisms that lend themselves to various “social structures, class relations, and 
cultural experiences” (Garland, 2001, p. 55). It is not surprising then that the crisis of the 
welfare state trickled down to the penal system, ultimately causing a shift in the ways in which 
it currently governs and views criminality.  
 Tracing the evolution of the governing legislation and legal principles of youth crime in 
Canada demonstrates that a redefinition of the problem of youth crime has occurred over the 
years. To an extent, this is on account of the crisis over (and decline of) penal-welfarism and 
the altered perception of the problem driving this change. The shift in youth crime governance 
has led Canada towards new crime control strategies in response to the alleged failure of the 
penal-welfare state. Since “the crime control field is an institutionalized response to a 
particular problem of order, growing out of a particular experience”, the modern techniques of 
crime control that preside over the 21st century (and thus were responsible for the decline of 
penal-welfarism) is “affected by the emergence of new security problems, new perceptions of 
social order, and new conceptions of justice, all of which were prompted by the social and 
economic changes of late twentieth-century modernity” (Garland, 2001, p. 72). A redefinition 
of such issues, perceptions and attitudes may be seen as a neo-liberal political trend that has 
been observed in Canada, the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, and most of 
Western Europe in the face of deep-seated conflicting interests (Garland, 2001).     
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 Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that both the issues surrounding youth crime 
and the perception of high crime rates more generally have contributed to the reactionary (or 
“adaptive”) response against the penal-welfare framework (Garland, 1996). These 
discernments are not only acknowledged as part of the everyday lived experience, but have 
become a normalized aspect of social life (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996, 2001; 
O’Malley, 1999; Wacquant, 2009). According to Garland (1996), this taken for granted notion 
is directly linked to the “broader social and cultural forces” that contribute to “shaping the 
‘problem’ and its ‘perception’”, because it is correlated to “phenomena such as a widespread 
fear of crime, pervasive media and cultural representations of crime and the politicization of 
crime control” (p. 446). In effect, a redefinition of the problem of youth crime necessarily 
shifts the focus in the ways in which youth and youth crime have been viewed historically 
under the JDA and YOA, and more recently under the current legislation of the YCJA, which 
progressively appears to result in a lesser degree of adherence and dedication to the penal-
welfare model. 62  Instead, this “new penology” 63  has shifted towards a framework that 
presently gives attention to “dealing with the effects of crime – costs and victims and fearful 
citizens – rather than its causes” (Garland, 1996, p. 447). Thus, it may be said that reshaping 
and redefining the problem of youth crime is responsible for inducing a sequence of 
“transformations in official perceptions of crime, in criminological discourse, in modes of 
governmental action, and in the structure of criminal justice organizations” which are “linked 
62 These legal principles are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. In addition, this paragraph lends support to 
Garland’s (1996) “adaptive” techniques, discussed in later chapters of this dissertation, to address the issue of 
youth crime.    
63 Feeley and Simon (1992) refer to the new penology as a “common focus on certain problems and a shared way 
of framing issues” that resituates the problem of youth crime (and crime in general). The authors note that “this 
strategic formation of knowledge and power offers managers of the system a more or less coherent picture of the 
challenges they face and the kinds of solutions that are more likely to work” (p. 452).  
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to broader reconfigurations of social and political discourse and policy” (Garland, 1996, p. 
446). 
 The collective need to redefine the problem of youth crime and the techniques for 
overseeing and governing it has led to a shift in the subject and/or target of punitive 
interventions, specifically for a small-scale group of youth who are responsible for a 
disproportionate number of offences.64 The new practices and policies that have emerged as a 
result of this changeover are viewed as an assembly of localized (as opposed to generalized) 
resolutions to urgent problems that confront the public and the state on a continuous basis 
(Garland, 2001). However, it also demands a certain degree of institutional adaptation where 
the entire scope and extent of crime control must progressively regulate itself to accommodate 
new directions, implementations, and orientations (Garland, 2001). In part, this is due to an 
alignment between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism on the perceived crisis of the welfare 
state, which ultimately strengthened this reactionary movement. As Garland (2001) points out,  
In terms of that bigger picture, the adjustments that have 
occurred are structural, and concern the relationship between 
crime control and social order. Over time, our practices of 
controlling crime and doing justice have had to adapt to an 
increasingly insecure economy that marginalizes substantial 
sections of the population; to a hedonistic consumer culture that 
combines extensive personal freedoms with relaxed social 
controls; to a pluralistic moral order that struggles to create trust 
relations between strangers who have little in common; to a 
‘sovereign’ state that is increasingly incapable of regulating 
society of individualized citizens and differentiated social groups; 
and to chronically high crime rates that co-exist with lower levels 
of family cohesion and community solidarity. The risky, insecure 
character of today’s social and economic relations in the social 
64 This statement is based on the youth crime statistics outlined in a subsequent section of this chapter, which not 
only indicate that the overall youth crime rate is declining, but also that only a small proportion of youth are 
responsible for committing very violent and serious crimes. Please refer to footnote 65 for information on chronic, 
repeat, and serious offenders.    
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surface that gives rise to our newly emphatic, overreaching 
concern with control and to the urgency with which we segregate, 
fortify, and exclude. It is the background circumstance that 
prompts our obsessive attempts to monitor risky individuals, to 
isolate dangerous populations, and to impose situational controls 
on otherwise open and fluid settings (p. 194).  
  
It is important to note, however, that the ways in which these crime control developments have 
adjusted to the problem of youth crime not only contributes to the response(s) of such issues, 
but also plays a role in creating the meaning of these responses in relation to their 
consequences and social implications. As such, a new direction towards control, order, security, 
and risk management appears to be a fundamental premise of the current youth justice 
legislation and policy (Feeley & Simon, 1992; France, 2007; Muncie, 2006). 
 More specifically, the concept of a new punitive governance strategy has been linked to 
the management of risk, particularly with regards to selectively enumerating, rendering, and 
targeting of a high risk group of persistent repeat offenders who have potential to become 
“career criminals”.65 Theoretically, these recently developed strategies coincide with the newly 
65 “Career criminals” are known as repeat offenders (resulting in a number of arrests and convictions), however 
the specific qualifying number for each varies from one jurisdiction to the next. It should be noted that there is 
very little research on delinquent and “career criminals” in Canada. The most recent study was conducted by 
Carrington, Matarazzo and deSouza (2005) which “presents a descriptive profile of the career criminals from the 
12th to the 22nd birthday, as revealed by charges filed in court, of Canadians born in 1979/80” (p. 8). According to 
their findings, approximately “18 per 100 members of the birth cohort were referred to youth court or provincial 
criminal court in relation to offences allegedly committed between their 12th and 22nd birthdays. [...] By their 
22nd birthday, approximately one in ten members of the cohort had received a court sentence which put them 
under the supervision of correctional or probation authorities for some period of time” (p. 39). This study 
indicates that slightly more than half (55%) of the offenders considered in this study were involved in a single 
criminal incident. Court careers for chronic offenders (comprised of anything above five incidents) accounted for 
16% of offenders, but made up 58% of all occurrences comprising “members of this cohort” (p. 39-40). The 
report also notes that 37% of offenders included in this study had court careers that were limited to offences that 
occurred prior to the youths 18th birthday. Forty-three percent of offenders indicated signs of a court career that 
occurred after ones 18th birthday. Persistent court careers were noted in 20% of the cohort, which accounted for 
offences occurring both prior to and following the youth’s 18th birthday (i.e., those classified as having a 
delinquent career both during adolescence and adulthood). Throughout their careers, persistent offenders were 
determined as being more likely to be associated with incidents that involved an offence against the person (62%) 
(p.40). It should also be noted that the time period for which charge data was collected for this study does not 
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enacted legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4), given that it is geared towards violent and repeat 
offenders. As such, an argument can be made that the Bill has amended the law to better track 
and identify potentially violent youth and potential “career criminals”, whose behaviour is 
frequently associated with the least powerful group or the “underclass”.66 As explained by 
Feeley and Simon (1992), this new strategy removes the focus from the individual because “is 
about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with the rationality not of 
individual behavior or even community organization, but of managerial processes. Its goal is 
not to eliminate crime but to make it tolerable through systematic coordination” (p. 455). For 
this very reason, it has been asserted that such techniques are employed to control various 
grades of deviance as opposed to addressing these issues on an individual basis or responding 
to the social irregularities associated with potentially dangerous youth groups (Feeley & Simon, 
1992). In other words, the shift in youth crime governance may be associated with a type of 
methodical and organized style of efficiency that “seeks to sort and classify, to separate the less 
from the more dangerous, and to deploy control strategies rationally” (Feeley & Simon, 1992, 
p. 452). Thus, it is asserted that this new penology reshapes society’s conception and 
understanding of the purpose of the system itself, the legislation that follows from policy, and 
the sanction(s) associated with the crime.  
 One example of this shift in youth crime governance towards a system of management 
may be witnessed in the ongoing diminution of the significance of recidivism (Feeley & Simon, 
surpass March 31, 2003. Therefore, these statistics report incidents occurring before the enactment of the YCJA, 
which may have a bearing on the findings and may result in a different conclusion today.          
66 The term “underclass” is “understood as a permanently marginal population, without literacy, without skills, 
and without hope; a self-perpetuating and pathological segment of society that is not integratable into the larger 
whole, even as a reserve labor pool” (Wilson, 1987, cited in Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 467). Viewed and treated 
as a high risk group, the “underclass” is seen as a dangerous class that requires surveillance and management for 
both the protection and greater good of society, from fear of its “collective potential misbehaviour” (Feeley & 
Simon, 1992, p. 467).     
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1992). While previously the meaning of recidivism was seen as a measure for failure or 
success amongst intuitional programs, it is now understood as an integral part of reintegrating 
offenders back into the community. In essence,  
High rates of parolees being returned to prison once indicated 
program failure; now they are offered as evidence of efficiency 
and effectiveness of parole as a control apparatus. [...] By 
emphasizing correctional programs in terms of aggregate control 
and system management rather than individual success and 
failure, the new penology lowers one’s expectations about the 
criminal sanction (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 455).  
  
This finding suggests that not only is there a redefinition in the way penal programs are viewed 
as a potential failure (or success), but that the goals and objectives of the penal sanction have 
also been reshaped so that they are understood in terms of effective control strategies that 
manage risky/dangerous youth. In turn, there is some evidence to indicate that the 
transformation in the ways parole and probation are perceived is likely to be recognized as 
“cost-effective ways of imposing long-term management on the dangerous”, because “the 
system now treats revocation as a cost-effective way to police and sanction a chronically 
troublesome population” (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 456). However, this shift towards a new 
penology is neither limited to the penal institutions nor the police, but instead goes beyond the 
mechanisms of social control. By filtering its way through the courts, “the new penology 
replaces consideration of fault with predictions of dangerousness and safety management and, 
in doing so, modifies traditional individual-oriented doctrines of criminal procedure” (Feeley 
& Simon, 1992, p. 457). This may be witnessed in the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 
(Part 4), specifically in reference to Clause 169, where the new provision is more expansive 
than the previous one and considers pre-sentencing detention of youth in cases “where they 
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have a history that indicates a pattern of either outstanding charges or findings of guilt” 
(Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 131).  
 Another example of the ways in which this new strategy has identified itself in the 
expansion of more cost-effective, managerial forms of governing can be seen in terms of 
custody and control therein. While Section 39(1) of the YCJA explicitly states that custody is 
reserved for the most serious offenders, there is evidence to suggest that custody is merely a 
form of “variable detention depending upon risk assessment” (Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 457). 
Although there is a strong emphasis on the rehabilitation of youth and their reintegration back 
into the community, the notion of incapacitation may be witnessed amongst youth held in 
custody for very serious offences (this includes youth who also pose a danger to society).67 
According to Feeley and Simon (1992), “incapacitation promises to reduce the effect of crime 
in society not by altering either offender or social context, but by rearranging the distribution 
of offenders in society. If the prison can do nothing else, incapacitation theory holds, it can 
detain offenders for a time and thus delay their resumption of criminal activity” (p. 458). This 
point reflects the notion of specific deterrence and is linked to the concept of “underclass” 
conduct.  As such, violent youth who are eligible for custody under section 39(1) of the YCJA 
are necessarily identified as high-risk offenders and require long-term control and management, 
while in contrast, low-risk offenders are in need of shorter management terms and minimally 
invasive control (Feeley & Simon, 1992).      
 Overall, the concept of risk-management can be linked to the development of a 
consensus which both identifies and recognizes the need to target the high-risk, potentially 
67 The YCJA does not make specific mention of incapacitation in the context of sentencing youth. Incapacitation is 
typically considered when sentencing adults, and as such, does not apply to youth (Section 50(1)) unless an adult 
sentence is imposed (Section 74(1)). See also Doob and Cesaroni (2004).  
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violent, prospective “career criminal”, and therefore coincides (at least to a degree) with the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). These youth are not only propagated by the media as a fearful, 
non-redemptive category, 68  but are often portrayed as the “underclass” or a marginal 
population who are most likely to exhibit conduct that directly corresponds with the type of 
behaviour that is criminalized (i.e., the behaviour of the least powerful).69 As discussed above, 
the growth of the risk-management strategy for addressing youth crime is frequently linked to 
policy reforms (in this case Bill C-10 (Part 4)), that often enable the tracking and identification 
of this potentially dangerous group (see Feeley & Simon, 1992, for more information).  
 Moreover, the shift in youth crime governance towards risk-based management can be 
observed within the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), although this does not 
suggest that such aspects were not previously embodied in previous versions of the YCJA. 
Nonetheless, certain elements of surveillance, control and exclusion are manifested in the Bill, 
particularly in reference to the following clauses: 1) Clause 190 which “requires the police 
force to keep a record of any extrajudicial measures taken to deal with the young person. If that 
person is convicted of the offence, the police force will then be required to forward the file to 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the purpose of keeping criminal history files or records 
of the offenders”, whereby the youth’s record is archived for future scrutiny (Library of 
Parliament, 2011, p. 134); 2) Clause 172 which “establishes specific deterrence and 
denunciation as sentencing principles similar to the principles provided in the adult criminal 
68 The risk management trend is also linked to the neo-conservative view about non-socially redemptive youth, 
and is associated with the neo-liberal and neo-conservative alignment against the penal welfare system. For more 
information on the assault on welfarism and the “emphasis on cost-effective, pragmatic, results-based 
government” (O’Malley, 1999, p. 184) and the states “role as the preserver of order and the governor of the 
nation” (O’Malley, 1999, p. 186), see O’Malley (1999).  
69 For more information on the behaviour of the least powerful and how this is socially defined, please refer to 
Chapter 2.  
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justice system”, whereby the target of the legislation may be seen as the small group of 
potential “career criminals” who are apprehended, charged and sentenced as opposed to youth 
in general (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123); 3) Clause 173 which “authorizes the court to 
impose a prison sentence on a young person who has previously been subject to a number of 
extrajudicial sanctions”, whereby the court may sentence a youth to custody even in cases 
where violence is not involved (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123); 4) Clauses 176 and 183 
which “requires the Crown to consider the possibility of seeking an adult sentence for young 
offenders 14 to 17 years of age convicted of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter or 
aggravated sexual assault” whereby the youth receives an adult sentence even though this 
legislation prohibits this marginal group of youth from being housed in any adult criminal 
institution (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123).  
 These points demonstrate the ways in which the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
target, penalize and track this high-risk (albeit fairly small) group of youth as a result of 
legislation that is intended to protect the public from repeat young offenders that have 
established a pattern of guilty findings or display a history of violence. The building of a 
consensus between the state and the public on the problem of the high-risk, potentially violent 
“career criminals” in the making is indicative of a process which yet again reflects a crisis of 
the perceived illegitimacy of penal-welfare strategies that have been characterized in the field 
of crime and criminal justice (i.e., as strategies that are no longer deemed to work). This crisis, 
which has much to do with a shift in the interests and responsiveness to youth crime, gives rise 
not only to new attitudes and definitions about the problem of high-risk, violent youth, but also 
about their welfare, their punishments, and the social order that seeks to govern such behaviour. 
Thus, although there is some indication that a conflicting or “bi-polar perspective on penality” 
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can be observed, there is reason to believe that a “heterogeneous allegiance” between neo-
liberal and neo-conservative rationalities has taken place to form modern day legislation 
(O’Malley, 1999, pp. 189-190). What is seen is policy that embodies both the neo-conservative 
perspective on getting tough-on-crime and the neo-liberal view that aspires to develop 
individual responsibility and reinforce the role of communities and family (O’Malley, 1999). 
The term “late modernity”, therefore, refers to the prominence of individual responsibility for 
undesirable or criminal youth behaviour and is coupled with the de-emphasis of rehabilitation 
characterizing present times (Muncie, 2006; O’Malley, 1999). Beyond these developments, 
this shift in youth crime governance has resulted in an imposition of control which is intended 
to manage “‘dangerous’ offenders and ‘undeserving’ claimants whose conduct leads some to 
suppose that they are incapable of discharging the responsibilities of the late modern freedom” 
(Garland, 2001, p. 195).                         
3.6 The Social Cost of Getting Tough on Crime 
 There are a number of other costs to enacting tough-on-crime legislation that fall 
outside the scope of the risk-management strategies discussed above. Research finds that the 
effects of tough-on-crime policies and legislation have a number of ancillary effects. While 
some of these findings have to do with the ways in which youth court judges often attempt to 
circumvent the imposition of a punitive sentence by exercising discretion (Freiberg, 2000; 
Harris and Jesilow, 2000; Morgan, 2000), the effects of tough-on-crime legislation are most 
markedly observed in the overrepresentation of certain groups convicted under these 
provisions. However, Canadian research indicates that discriminatory practices exercised 
against racial minorities involved in violent crimes most frequently stem from a connection of 
race with both social and economic deprivation (McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Wortley, 2003; 
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Wortley et al., 2008). Due to a lack of methodical data and systematic research on the 
association that exists between one’s racial background or ethnicity and youth crime in Canada, 
there exists an incorrect assumption that the (mis)treatment of minority groups has not been a 
concern within the Canadian youth justice system (Mosher, 1996; Wortley, 2003). For example, 
many of the studies that consider the extent of involvement of Aboriginal youth and other 
visible minorities within the justice system reveal that these groups are routinely 
overrepresented time and time again (Alvi, 2012; Bala, 1997; LaPrairie & Griffiths, 1984; 
Morin, 1990).  
 Further research on the correlation between one’s ethnic group and youth crime in 
Canada is needed given the notable gap in studies conveying a broad range of dependable, 
trustworthy, and well-founded data (Alvi, 2012; McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Mosher, 1996).70 
According to Alvi (2012), unlike youth belonging to the dominant social groups in Canada, 
there is a significantly higher risk for various groups of youth from particular racial and ethnic 
upbringings to be charged with offences in Canada. For example, in a study conducted by 
Calverley, Cotter and Halla (2010), only 6% of the youth population in 2006 consisted of 
Aboriginals, however, they accounted for 24% of youth on probation, 36% of youth that had an 
imposition of a custodial sentence, and 27% of youth that were detained in custody while 
awaiting trial or sentencing (Alvi, 2012). In addition, these youth had a higher probability of 
being charged with serious offences and, when measured against non-Aboriginal youth, were 
typically detained on remand for three days more (Alvi, 2012). It should be noted that the 
amount of time for which non-Aboriginal youth carried out their sentence was roughly 
70 It should be noted that the correlation between punishment and ethnicity in this case is linked to the notion of 
the “underclass” as a racialized class.  
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identical to their Aboriginal counterparts (Alvi, 2012; see also Calverley, Cotter and Halla, 
2010). 
 There is some evidence that suggests a similar trend in the United States with regards to 
the “symbolic racism” that occurs amongst those who advocate for tough-on-crime legislation. 
According to Green, Staerklé and Sears (2006), symbolic racism differs from blatant racist 
conduct because this type of behaviour is one where Whites characterize an elevated degree of 
defiance and contravention of shared social norms to Blacks. In fact, this notion “stems from a 
blend of anti-Black affect and traditional values” (p. 438), where Whites believe that Blacks 
are the recipients of too much entitlement based on their ideas of respect for authority, 
perception on work ethics and being self-sufficient. Similarly, another study administered by 
Chiricos, Welch and Gertz (2004) conducted national research in the United States in which 
the results suggested that those who offered the most support for tough-on-crime legislation 
were Whites. These findings indicate that White respondents are the most likely to embrace 
attitudes that support highly punitive measures for crime, and are also most likely to believe 
that crimes are disproportionately committed by Blacks. Overall, the study found that Whites 
who associate crime with race are ostensibly supportive of harsher crime legislation.    
3.7 Was There Really a Need for Change? A Look at Canadian Youth Crime Statistics 
 Notwithstanding any of the research discussed in this chapter on the social costs of 
getting tough on crime, it is important to analyze the Canadian crime rates in order to 
determine whether or not changes to the legislation were necessary from a purely statistical 
standpoint. According to the Integrated Criminal Court Survey of 2012, the number of 
completed youth cases in 2011/2012 are at its “lowest point in 20 years”, completing slightly 
over 48,000 cases (Dauvergne, 2013, p. 3). In fact, research shows that these figures signify a 
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10% decrease in cases handled within the youth courts from the year before, and represents a 
third successive annual drop (Dauvergne, 2013). The youth Crime Severity Index (CSI) also 
decreased from previous years. When compared to statistics from 2012, the volume and the 
severity of all types of youth crime is 16% lower (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). A decline 
in the severity of violent youth crime can be observed over the last three years, and more 
importantly, a 39% decrease in the violent youth crime rate has been recorded over the past ten 
years (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). The figures represent a fairly significant decline (see 
Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Police-Reported Youth Crime Severity Indexes, Canada, 2003 to 2013 
 
 
Note: Indexes have been standardized to a base year of 2006 which is equal to 100. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2013. See Boyce, Cotter and Perreault (2014) Police-Reported Crime Statistics in 
Canada, 2013, p. 23.   
 
 In 2013, over 104,000 youth aged 12 to 17 years were identified by police as allegedly 
committing an offence in violation of the Criminal Code - about 22,000 less than in 2012 
(Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). The entire grouping of “accused persons” is comprised of 
two main categories. First, it accounts for the number of youths who were in fact charged by 
police (or were recommended for charging); and second, it incorporates youth who were 
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handled in a way that differed from laying a charge (for example, this would include diverting 
youth away from the courts through the use of cautions, warnings, and referrals to community 
programs) (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). In 2013, 45% of chargeable youth were officially 
charged; while the residual 55% were diverted (see Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2: Youth Accused of Crime, by Clearance Status, Canada, 2003 to 2013 
 
 
Note: Youth not charged includes youth diverted from the formal criminal justice system through the use of 
warnings, cautions, and referrals to community programs. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2013. See Boyce, Cotter and Perreault (2014) Police-Reported Crime Statistics in 
Canada, 2013, p. 22. 
 
 Of these approximate 104,000 youth, forty of them were accused of homicide in 2013. 
When compared to the thirty-five youth accused of homicide in 2012, this figure represents a 
17% increase. Nonetheless, the author’s state this boost is still lower than the ten year average 
(Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). In addition, youth accused for aggravated sexual assault 
(level 3) also represented a slight increase from 5 youth in 2012, to 15 youth in 2013 (Boyce, 
Cotter & Perreault, 2014). Despite these minor increases, Boyce, Cotter and Perreault (2014) 
assert that the rate of more serious violent youth offences make up for less than 1% of all 
violent youth violations. Further, these author’s emphasize a 13% decline in the “overall rate of 
youth accused of violent crime” in 2013 (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). Declines could 
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also be observed in the rates of youth accused of common assault – level 1 (-14%) and robbery 
(-26%) when compared to figures from 2012 (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). The most 
recurrent type of violent offence for which youth are accused is Level 1 assaults. The downturn 
in the rates for youth accused of robbery, however, represents the largest drop ever recorded 
(Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). There is also a notable decline in the rates for which youth 
are accused of property crime (-19%) in comparison to 2012. Decreases in both the severity of 
youth crime and violent youth crime in 2013 were found in all provinces and territories but for 
Yukon (+4%) and Northwest Territories (+21%), respectively. The youth Crime Severity Index 
was lowest in British Columbia (50.3), followed by Ontario (53.6) and Québec (55.5), but was 
highest in Saskatchewan (169.9) (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014). 
 Under the Young Offenders Act, Canadian youth were prone to be formally charged 
more frequently than to be handled by other means. However, since the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act came into effect on 01 April 2003 this tendency reversed and “the rate of youth dealt with 
by other means has continued to be higher than the rate of youth formally charged, although 
the difference has been narrowing slightly since 2009” (Boyce, Cotter & Perreault, 2014, p. 22). 
This reversal in trends correlates to the YCJA legislation which delineates precise parameters 
for the functioning, purpose and use of extrajudicial measures (i.e., informal sanctions) for 
youth. The diversion of youth from the justice system corresponds with the principles found in 
Section 3 of the YCJA, but it should be noted that diversion practices are often misinterpreted 
by the public as a lenient form of accountability. In reality, both these practices differ by type 
of offence to some extent (e.g., “offences against the administration of justice” such as breach 
of probation, “failure to appear in court”, “unlawfully at large” or “failure to comply with an 
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order” or bail condition). 71 On the whole, there is a notable decline in youth court cases 
compared to previous years. The most significant decreases were in the territories, which 
demonstrated that between 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, the plummet ranged from -23% to -36%. 
Across all Canadian provinces, British Columbia registered the most significant reduction in 
youth court cases (-16%), followed by New Brunswisk (-14%) and Ontario (-12%). 
  Similarly, Dauvergne (2013) reports that in 2011/2012, a finding of guilt had been 
reached in approximately 6 in 10 (57%) of the cases brought before a court. These figures 
indicate an overall reduction in the number of cases from previous years, with continuous data 
showing that “the proportion of cases resulting in a finding of guilt has decreased” (p. 3). The 
proportion of guilty findings for 2011/2012 varies by offence, where being unlawfully at large 
made up for 90% of these incidents (Dauvergne, 2013). Since being unlawfully at large is an 
offence against the administration of justice, this offence has not seen the same degree of 
decrease as other types of offences. Thus, there is a marked difference between police and 
youth court statistics in relation to this offence (for example, the police reported statistics state 
approximately 10% of accused youth were accused in connection with an administration of 
justice violation), which may be attributed to the possibility of multiple charges and plea 
bargaining (Carrington & Schulenberg, 2008). 
 Dauvergne (2013) also notes that only in a minority of youth cases was a custodial 
sentence received - with 4,144 or about 15% of all guilty cases ending up with a custodial 
sentence, in comparison to 13,237 or 27% of all guilty cases in 2002/2003. In 2011/2012, 
approximately three-quarters (3/4) of the cases with a custody and supervision order resulted in 
71 These offences typically involve behaviour that would not be an offence outside of the court order but may 
justify detention in exceptional circumstances when the management, preservation and renewal of confidence in 
the administration of justice is at stake (Bala & Anand, 2012). 
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a time frame of three months or less (74%) (Dauvergne, 2013). An additional 18% of custodial 
sentences resulted in more than three months to six months, 7% exceeded 182 days to 365 days, 
and less than 2% of custody sentences surpassed the one year mark (Dauvergne, 2013). In 
2011/2012, the average duration of a custodial sentence was 39 days, albeit the average 
sentence for certain crimes such as attempted murder (240 days), sexual assault (176 days) and 
homicide (730 days) were notably greater (Dauvergne, 2013). Probation, on the other hand, 
was the most common sentence imposed upon youth, where it was ordered in approximately 6 
out of 10 guilty youth cases in 2011/2012 (Dauvergne, 2013).  
3.7.1 Characteristics of Crime Allegedly Committed by Youth Appearing in Court 
Similar to previous years, Dauvergne (2013) asserts that most of the youth court 
caseload (70%) consisted of only ten types of offences, the bulk of which related to non-violent 
offences. The importance of this finding suggests that most youth engage in non-violent 
offences as opposed to more serious types of crimes. On the basis of this data, this further 
questions the need for the newly enacted tough-on-crime legislation. The kinds of cases dealt 
with by youth courts most frequently involved common assault – level 1 (8%), theft (14%), 
and break and enter (8%) (see Figure 3.3). Cases involving crimes against the administration of 
justice (-8%), those against the YCJA (-5%), and impaired driving (-21%) were less frequent 
and declined significantly from the year before. Other federal statutes offences, (such as drug 
related) made up for 8% of all cases in 2011/2012 and were considered an exception to the 
overall decline in the courts caseload since possession of drugs increased by 7% and other 
types of drug related crime (e.g. production, trafficking, exporting/importing) spiked by 2% 
from the year before. Generally speaking, most cases heard in youth courts involve non-violent 
offences, however “there was one more case of homicide in 2011/2012 than in 2010/2011, and 
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six more cases involving the combined category of ‘other sexual offences’, such as sexual 
interference and invitation to sexual touching” (Dauvergne, 2013, p. 6). 
Figure 3.3: Ten Most Common Cases Completed in Youth Court, Canada 2011/2012 
 
 
1. Includes, for example, theft over $5,000, theft $5,000 or under, as well as motor vehicle theft. 
2. Includes assault with a weapon (level 2) and aggravated assault (level 3). 
Note: A case is one or more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at 
the same time and received a final decision. Cases that involve more than one charge are represented by the most 
serious offence. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Integrated Criminal Court Survey. See 
Dauvergne (2013) Youth Court Statistics in Canada, 2011/2012, p. 6.   
  
3.7.2 Youth Sentencing Practices 
 In 2011/2012, probation was ordered in 58% (about 6 in 10) of all guilty cases. This 
sentence was imposed either on its own or in conjunction with others, advancing it as the most 
frequently employed sentencing option (Dauvergne, 2013). However, Dauvergne (2013) 
acknowledges that these figures decreased from 2002/2003, when a probation sentence was 
handed out in about 70% of all guilty cases. This may be an artefact of the YOA where a 
probation term often followed serving a custodial sentence to assist with post-release 
supervision and reintegration (Milligan, 2010). Under the YCJA, and prior to any legislative 
changes put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4), every sentence involving youth custody is followed up 
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with a period of supervision within the community after the custodial segment of the sentence 
is complete. This decline in the ratio of guilty youth cases sentenced to probation could be due 
to an increase in the use of extrajudicial measures under the YCJA (Bala, Carrington, & 
Roberts, 2009) (see Figure 3.4). The statistics on youth sentencing practices are important to 
consider for two main reasons. First, it provides context on the types of sentences that were 
imposed on youth prior to enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Second, it sheds light on the types 
of sentences that are handed out to youth especially since not all youth court cases make case 
law.   
Figure 3.4: Proportion of Guilty Youth Cases Sentenced to Probation has Declined since the 
Enactment of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Youth Court Survey. See Milligan (2010) Youth 
Court Statistics 2008/2009. 
 
Another fairly frequent sentence imposed by youth courts in 2011/2012 is community 
service orders. As an extrajudicial sanction, approximately one in four (25%) guilty youth 
court cases led to an order requiring the youth to perform voluntary work in the community. A 
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community service order, which is frequently held often in conjunction with probation, was 
regularly “associated with cases involving the category of ‘other drug offences’, namely those 
for drug trafficking, exportation and importation, and production (39%), and drug possession 
(33%)” (Dauvergne, 2013, p. 10). The provisions of the YCJA currently specify that 
community service sentences cannot exceed 240 hours and are required to be completed within 
a year or less from the date of the sentence (see YCJA, S.42(2)).  
 Although custody is not a common sentencing option, Dauvergne (2013) notes that 15% 
of youth found guilty were sent to custody in 2011/2012. Cases involving attempted murder 
(75%), being unlawfully at large (67%) and homicide (53%) are most likely to be sentenced to 
custody. Custodial sentences are seen as the most severe penalty of all available sentencing 
options. As per Section 39(2) of the YCJA and Bill C-10 (Part 4), all practical alternatives to 
custody should be carefully weighed before the court imposes a custodial sentence. According 
to the Department of Justice Canada (2012b), “custodial sentences for youth are meant to be 
used primarily for violent and serious repeat offenders”. Figure 3.5 below provides a 
breakdown of guilty cases in youth court by disposition. 
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Figure 3.5: Guilty Cases in Youth Court, by Type of Sentence, Canada, 2011/2012 
 
1. Cases may involve more than one type of sentence, therefore, percentages do not total 100%. A case is one or 
more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at the same time and 
received a final disposition.   
2. Figures for custody include a mandatory period of post-custody supervision. 
3. Other sentences include conditional sentences, intensive support and supervision, attend a non-residential 
program, absolute discharge, restitution, prohibition, seizure, forfeiture, compensation, pay purchaser, essays, 
apologies, counseling programs and conditional discharge.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Integrated Criminal Court Survey. See 
Dauvergne (2013) Youth Court Statistics in Canada, 2011/2012, p. 11. 
 In line with the goals and intentions of the YCJA, the imposition of a custodial sentence 
has notably decreased over the past decade (see Figure 3.6). However, a slight increase may be 
observed in the use of deferred custody and supervision orders since its introduction in 2003. 
In lieu of ordering a youth to custody, a deferred custody orders give youth an opportunity to 
fulfill their sentence in the community under strict rules as opposed to serving their sentence in 
custody (Dauvergne, 2013). In the event any of the terms are breached, the youth may be 
ordered to serve the remainder of their sentence in custody (Dauvergne, 2013).          
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Figure 3.6: Guilty Cases Completed in Youth Court, by Selected Sentence, 1991/1992 to 
2011/2012 
 
 
1. Deferred custody and supervision is a sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act effective April 1, 2003. 
Data begin in 2005/2006 when all jurisdictions (with the exception of Saskatchewan) were reporting data.  
Note: A case is one or more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at 
the same time and received a final disposition. Due to the unavailability of data for certain years, data for 
Saskatchewan has been removed in order to make comparisons over time.   
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Integrated Criminal Court Survey. See 
Dauvergne (2013) Youth Court Statistics in Canada, 2011/2012, p. 14. 
 
  In terms of the distribution of custodial sentences by province and territory, there is 
considerable variation. Overall, Ontario (21%) and Prince Edward Island (21%) most 
frequently use of custody; while Manitoba (9%) and Nunavut (6%) use it the least (refer to 
Figure 3.7 for a full jurisdictional breakdown). The average duration of such sentences is 39 
days. However, it should be noted that the length of a custodial sentence varies according to 
the type of case, as cases which involve a violent offence typically results in the lengthiest 
terms (Dauvergne, 2013). More precisely, cases involving homicide result in custodial 
sentences that require the youth to serve the longest amount of time at 730 days, followed by 
attempted murder at 240 days, and sexual assault at 176 days (Dauvergne, 2013).  
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Figure 3.7: Guilty Cases Completed in Youth Court Sentenced to Custody, by Province and 
Territory, 2011/2012 
 
Note: A case is one or more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at 
the same time and received a final disposition. There are many factors that may influence variation between 
jurisdictions such as Crown and police charging practices, offence distributions, and various forms of diversion 
programs. Jurisdictional differences in the structure and operation of courts may also have an impact on survey 
results. Therefore, any comparisons between jurisdictions should be made with caution. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Integrated Criminal Court Survey. See 
Dauvergne (2013) Youth Court Statistics in Canada, 2011/2012, p. 13. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 The dynamics of legislative change are illustrated through the works of Becker (1963); 
Chambliss and Seidman (1971); Cohen (1972); Garland (2001); Habermas (1975, 2006); Hall 
et al., (2013); and Hills (1971), which shed light on the ways in which laws are created and by 
whom. Overall, there is a degree of interplay between interests and power that exist between 
legislators, moral entrepreneurs and the media which shapes new legislation. From this 
perspective, the creation of new legislation stem from individuals that either are or have access 
to others in a position of power (e.g., social, political, economic, or media power), which often 
reflects the dominant ideology (though this is not always the case).   
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 Much of the research on the construction of crime reveals that the public typically 
acquires their knowledge of crime from the media. There appears to be a complex relationship 
between the media and crime that emphasizes a connection between private troubles with 
crime and the morphing of these troubles into public concern. The ways in which crime news 
is reported has to do with the structure of the media and patterns of news gathering which often 
reflects the dominant ideology (Hall et al., 2013). Crime news is influenced by a range of 
constraints that are imposed on the journalist but is driven by the “strategic use of political and 
social power” to shape and define such issues (Habermas, 2006, p. 415). Aside from the 
specific dynamics of the media that form the context of crime news, these forces also extend to 
the involvement of law enforcement agencies, governmental and political authorities, pressures 
dictated by interest groups, and culturally defined news themes. Studies suggest that the 
dependence on the justice system to address the problem of crime often results in the media 
advocating for a law and order approach. Frequently, interest groups use the media to promote 
their opinions and arguments in fashion that supports their punitive agenda by constructing a 
seemingly rational solution to the distorted or misinterpreted problem at hand.   
 There is also a relationship between public views and attitudes about the ways in which 
the youth justice system operates, the issues pertaining to youth crime more generally, and the 
role of public opinion in politics (Sprott, 1996). The literature indicates that although public 
insight and knowledge of youth crime is fairly distorted and incorrect, it has an influence on 
policy agendas. This is partially due to the fact that politicians use public opinion to legitimate 
their authority when addressing concerns about youth crime, through the enactment of publicly 
supported legislation. However, the public’s knowledge of youth crime and the justice system 
is constructed by many misrepresentations about facts that are disseminated by the media.  
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 The (over) reaction of state authorities on the issue of youth crime has an effect on the 
re-legitimating process during a time of hegemonic crisis. The ways in which the state governs 
and controls the public is not only linked to dominant group ideology, but also to other state 
apparatuses, the media, and the internal/external allegiances pledged to the dominant group. 
Together, these fundamental elements converge to create a law and order society that, arguably, 
represents a movement which has become systematically normalized in today’s western culture. 
 Moreover, these findings indicate that a shift in youth crime governance has occurred 
over the years, much of which may be attributed to the allegiance between neo-liberalism and 
neo-conservatism. As a result, Canada has been subject to an as assault on the penal-welfare 
state, bringing about new crime control strategies that seek to identify, target and manage 
young offenders in a way that separates dangerous youth from the rest of the population and 
imposes additional controls (Garland, 2001). This shift of the target of punitive interventions 
can be linked to the problematization of penal-welfarism and the development of this new 
punitive governance approach that currently influences policy and legislation. 
 A discussion on the impact and consequences of tough-on-crime legislation is provided 
in relation to the overrepresentation of certain marginalized groups. The findings suggest that 
marginalized youth are most likely to be impacted by legislation that supports tougher 
measures. Views of implementing tough-on-crime legislation is most noticeable amongst 
individuals that subscribe to traditional values that intersect with the notion of symbolic racism. 
 Statistics indicate that the need for legislative change was not warranted at this time. 
The number of youth court cases in 2011/2012 declined for the third year in a row (Dauvergne, 
2013). In fact, between the years of 2010/2011, the number of youth court cases in Canada 
dropped 7% from that of the previous year (58,379 completed cases in youth court, 191,054 
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involving charges in 2009/2010). In 2010/2011, there were over 52,900 youth court cases, 
involving over 178,000 charges. Although not a substantial decline in the number of court 
cases processed between these years, there is nonetheless a decline among virtually all types of 
offences, as well as a trend favouring a reduction in the overall use of custodial sentences. 
Further, the 2011/2012 decline subsequently brought about the “lowest number of cases 
completed in youth courts” since the inception of national data collection more than two 
decades ago (Dauvergne, 2013).  
 Prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the Youth Criminal Justice Act appears to 
have been rather successful in achieving its primary goal, which was to lessen the use of the 
courts and custody. That is, the emphasis on diversion from court, coupled with the diminution 
of custody has led to a relatively effective youth justice model (Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 
2009). Nonetheless, the Conservative government has maintained that “Tories don’t use these 
statistics as an excuse not to get tough on criminals” (Nicholson’s spokesperson, Pamela 
Stephens [“Crimes rates continue to drop across Canada”, 2011]).     
 On the whole, the findings presented in this chapter are congruent with the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2, but more significantly with the assertions put forth by the 
critical perspective relative to complex interactions that take place between the public, the 
interest groups, the larger social structure, and the state more generally. This is due to an 
emphasis on the unequal distribution of power in relation to the reactions of crime by interest 
groups, as well as the impact of the law on those who are socially, politically and economically 
underprivileged (subordinate groups). In addition, trends and opinions on youth crime and 
relative rates add to the critical perspective given the importance it places on addressing the 
sources of power and influences on law formation.  
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CHAPTER 4 - THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR RESPONSES TO YOUTH CRIME 
 Despite ongoing research indicating a notable decline in youth crime, there appears to 
be a common trend amongst Western nations that calls upon tough-on-crime legislation. This 
has been witnessed in both Canada and the United States; although there is evidence to suggest 
that some states have been subjected to extremely punitive youth crime legislation when 
compared to other American jurisdictions, as well as Canada more generally. 72 The youth 
justice model adopted in Texas is illustrative of similar processes and challenges encountered 
domestically. Thus, by taking a closer look at the model implemented by the state of Texas, 
further emphasis can be placed on the fact that the transformations occurring in Canada are not 
exclusive.    
 On the basis that Canada and the United States have undergone reasonably analogous 
shifts in legislation, it is important to consider the ways in which North American discourse on 
youth justice have advanced. Thus, the first half of this chapter examines the evolution of legal 
principles in Canada which documents the progression through which these legal 
transformations have occurred. The second half of the chapter examines the procedural 
mechanisms currently outlined by the tough-on-crime legislation in the state of Texas. This 
material is included on two grounds. First, the state of Texas is illustrative of a crime control 
model that is further down the tough-on-crime continuum, as it is arguably one of the most 
punitive states in the Western hemisphere.73 Second, given that the enactment of Bill C-10 
72 Texas is a good example of how the tough-on-crime legislation has moved the state towards harsher sanctions 
and penalties for youth in conflict with the law.   
73 The crime control model is established on conservative views, values and traditions and has infiltrated the 
justice system since the 1970s (Packer, 1964). This model is illustrative of the conservatism that has dominated 
political ideology since the decline of the penal-welfare state (Packer, 1964). Packer (1964) suggests that criminal 
justice policy is formed on the underlying philosophies that guide the political culture of that time. The focus of 
this model is to manage or control criminal conduct in an attempt to safeguard the public. It typically supports 
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(Part 4) comprises part of modified model of crime control in Canada, an analysis of the 
procedures and legislation through which Texas currently operates provides a better 
understanding of where Canada presently sits on this continuum, relative to one of the most 
punitive models of crime control for youth justice.74 Generally speaking, it may be said that the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) has moved Canada closer towards the tough-on-crime 
legislation in Texas, although Texas is far more punitive on the whole. Overall, the material 
discussed in this chapter essentially provides a frame of reference for the analysis of the case 
law findings that follow in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. In contrast, those chapters shed light on 
the ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation is manifested in the case law in both 
jurisdictions.  
4.1 The Current Canadian Perspective on Youth Crime  
 Notwithstanding any evidence signifying the shortcomings of such legislation, Bill C-
10 was passed by the Canadian Senate in March 2012, and received Royal Assent on 13 March 
2012. The purpose of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is to amend certain provisions of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (YCJA) in order to “help ensure that violent and repeat offenders are held 
accountable through sentences that are proportionate to the severity of their crimes, and that 
the protection of society is given due consideration in applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act” 
(Department of Justice Canada, 2012b). In order to better understand how this legislation is 
meant to function, it is imperative to consider the evolution of legal principles as per the 
Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA), the Young Offenders Act (YOA) and the Youth Criminal 
harsher sentences, advocates for expedient delivery of punishments and stresses the importance of deterrence and 
denunciation. It also encourages the widespread expansion of judicial and prosecutorial powers to accelerate 
sentencing (Packer, 1964).  
74  Texas admitted that their punitive model of crime control has little bearing on deterrence or proper 
rehabilitation. During the Parliamentary debates of Bill C-4, Texas rejected the Canadian Conservative 
government’s plan to enact tough-on-crime policies on account of its failure. See Chapter 8 for more information.   
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Justice Act (YCJA), as well as the specific amendments to the YCJA as per the provisions put 
forth by the Bill. The overarching amendments to the YCJA can be broken down into seven 
principal objectives. A detailed analysis of these provisions is provided in Sections 4.1.4 and 
4.1.5 below, as they largely constitute newly enacted tough-on-crime responses to youth 
offending.  
 While the federal government of Canada is responsible for legislating criminal laws and 
procedures, the provincial and territorial governments have jurisdiction over the administration 
of justice which includes policing, courts, and corrections (Department of Justice Canada, 
2012a). According to Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 (originally the Constitution Act 1867), 
the federal government is given the responsibility of enacting juvenile justice laws in order for 
the provinces and territories to implement them with some financial assistance from the federal 
level. Essentially, juvenile justice policy is an intergovernmental endeavour that requires 
cooperation from both provincial and federal levels. 
4.1.1 The Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908 – 1984) 
 According to Bala (2002) and PLEA (2012), the Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA) 
represented an important philosophical transformation for the rehabilitative treatment of 
juvenile delinquents. Prior to 1908, youth in conflict with the law were dealt with in a manner 
that resembled adult criminals. For example, youth frequently received fairly punitive 
sentences for reasonably negligible or minor crimes. Further, young persons were often 
detained with their adult counterparts, although these practices were in contravention to the 
provisions outlined in Canada’s Criminal Code (1892). As such, these practices frequently led 
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to the sentencing of youth to adult institutions. In comparison, however, the JDA implemented 
a social welfare approach to address youth crime which was outlined in Section 38 of the Act.75  
 The development of the JDA occurred shortly after a number of destitute immigrants 
arrived in Canada from Britain in the early 20th century. According to West (1984), the 
growing number of newcomers to Canada resulted in an escalation of concerns regarding street 
crime by youth of the working class. The need for a separate justice system for youth was 
propelled by the “child savers” (also known as the “Children’s Court Movement”) as well as 
Protestant and Catholic children’s aid societies whose efforts guided the eventual passage of 
the JDA (Maurutto, 2003, p. 103). The child savers consisted mainly of middle and upper class 
individuals who supported “institutionalization, industrial schools, refuges, free public 
education and child protective legislation” and denounced the incarceration of youth in adult 
facilities and institutions (Carrigan, 1998, p. 63). The overarching goal of this movement was 
to redefine young offenders by rehabilitating them to become honourable and conscientious 
members of the community as opposed to punishing them. This association believed that it was 
necessary to “reshape the moral character of the offending child”, because there appeared to be 
a “lack of judicious home training” that caused the youth’s “lawless behaviour” (Maurutto, 
2003, p. 121). As a result, youth were seen as innocent individuals that required care and 
guidance through involvement that not only encompassed the child themselves, but also 
included their parents and family more generally (Maurutto, 2003).     
 Affiliates of this group hailed from a number of diverse backgrounds such as church 
goers, church ministers, small business owners, civil servants, and women and students who 
75  Section 38 of the JDA asserts that “the care and custody and discipline of a juvenile delinquent shall 
approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents, and that as far as practicable, every 
juvenile delinquent shall be treated, not as a criminal, but as a misdirected and misguided child.” 
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advocated for several agencies and lobbied governments for legislation that accounted for the 
safety and protection of youth (Carrigan, 1998). Interestingly, the child savers movement was 
“supported by an elite group of philanthropists who used their influence and gave their money 
in support of the endeavours” of the group (Carrigan, 1998, p. 63). As such, many powerful 
individuals came together throughout the country to “use their influence and powers of 
persuasion to bring about a wide variety of humanitarian developments at both the provincial 
and federal levels” (Carrigan, 1998, p. 66).      
 After the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms established that the Juvenile 
Delinquents Act failed to consider the legal rights of youth, the Young Offenders Act was 
enacted to replace the JDA in 1984 (Bala, 2002; Bala & Anand, 2012). The Young Offenders 
Act represented a movement away from the social welfare approach guiding the JDA in that it 
focused on the responsibilities (i.e., offence accountability) and the rights of youth, the 
protection of society, and due process76 (Bala & Anand, 2012; Carrigan, 1998).  
4.1.2 The Young Offenders Act (1984 – 2003) 
   The Young Offenders Act (YOA) replaced the Juvenile Delinquents Act in 1984. The 
YOA responded to issues concerning the treatment of children under the JDA, as it was 
criticized for being incongruent with the Canadian human rights legislation. The legislation of 
the YOA concluded the “paternalistic handling of delinquents by providing the same basic 
rights and freedoms before the law as those enjoyed by adults and as provided for in the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (Carrigan, 1998, p. 243). Section 3 of the YOA set guiding 
76 Due process, and more specifically the due process model, is an approach that is associated with fairly liberal 
views and values (Packer, 1964). It ensures that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty, and places 
emphasis on strategies that rehabilitate offenders as opposed to strictly punishing them. Aside from the fact that 
this model establishes fairness and consistency via procedural rules and upholds rights, individual liberties and 
freedoms, this model encourages offender reintegration to ensure proper/proactive functioning within the 
community upon release (Packer, 1964).    
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principles for its implementation, which included: 1) the accountability of young persons who 
committed offences, but ordinarily less accountability than for adults; 2) the protection of 
society from youth who committed crimes, however, where possible, the importance of 
rehabilitation and crime prevention should be recognized; 3) the legal rights and freedoms of 
children, which are inclusive of the provisions outlined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms; 4) the right to notify parents of any and all legal proceedings involving their child; 
and 5) the use of least possible interference, including diversion from court. 
 According to Carrigan (1998), Garland (2001), and Hogeveen and Smandych (2001), a 
number of governments in the Western world began focussing more so on a law and order 
approach that reflected tough-on-crime measures by emphasizing harsher punishments and 
more punitive youth justice legislation. There are two reasons given for the transformation 
from welfarism in the 1970s and the introduction of neo-liberalism in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The first reason had to do with the “social, economic, and cultural changes 
characteristic of late modernity” which was being experienced in all democratic societies of the 
Western world (Garland, 2001, p. 75). The second, and more important reason, had to do with 
“the political realignments and policy initiatives that developed in response to these changes, 
and in reaction to the perceived crisis of the welfare state” (Garland, 2001, p. 75). The effect of 
these developments in the larger political context (i.e., the macro political changes) shaped a 
“new set of class and race relations and a dominant political block that defined itself in 
opposition to old style ‘welfarism’ and the social and cultural ideals upon which it was based” 
(Garland, 2001, p. 75). These findings were mirrored in Canada as well as the rest of the 
Western hemisphere. For example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and 
the Solicitor General produced a report (Horner, 1993) that examined crime prevention on a 
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national level between November 1992 and February 1993.77 The report suggested that Canada 
required a national plan on how to curb the circumstances in which youth engaged in crime, as 
well as address some of the fundamental issues that contribute to crime (Caputo & Vallée, 
2007; Justice Canada, 1993a). Further, the report encouraged the development of a national 
approach that incorporated a joint venture between the varying levels of government and 
organizations involved in the youth justice system (Caputo & Vallée, 2007). This alliance of 
sharing information would also be extended to “special interest groups and non-government 
organizations” (Justice Canada, 1993a). Essentially, the shift from welfarism towards policies 
that emphasized a more crime control stance is argued to have occurred in reaction to a 
deviation in cultural and social interests (Garland, 2001). 
 There is evidence to suggest that this reactionary shift occurred because of a change in 
the ways broad social classes viewed policies in support of a welfare approach (Garland, 2001). 
According to the Garland (2001), 
Changes in demography, in stratification and political-allegiance 
left important sections of the working and middle classes to 
change their attitudes towards any of these policies – to see them 
as being at odds with their actuarial interests and as benefitting 
groups that were undeserving and increasingly dangerous. In this 
new political context, welfare policies for the poor were 
increasingly represented as expensive luxuries that hard working 
tax-payers could no longer afford. The corollary was that penal-
welfare measures for offenders were depicted as absurdly 
indulgent and self-defeating (p. 76).   
 
 
This shift can be progressively observed in the number of amendments made to the YOA over 
the course of its implementation. As noted by Bala (2005), the tough-on-crime approach in 
response to youth crime began developing out of a conservative framework that accompanied 
77 The official name of this report is “Crime Prevention in Canada: Towards a National Strategy”. 
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Canadian politics. In fact, it was the “law and order” campaign put forth by the Conservative-
Reform party that advocated for significant adjustments to the legislation concerning young 
offenders. Although these measures did achieve the desired results of “renewed discipline and 
a tightening of controls”, Garland (2001) suggests that the conservative approach which 
demands for a restoration of “moral discipline and traditional values” is predominately geared 
towards “poor individuals and marginalized communities” and had very little effect on the bulk 
of the population (p. 100).  
 With the increasing criticisms faced by the Canadian federal government regarding 
youth crime legislation, an attempt to “respond to concerns raised by police and provincial 
governments about difficulties implementing the YOA” was introduced by enacting several 
amendments to the YOA (Bala & Anand, 2012, p. 14). These steps to legislate tougher 
measures were driven not only by provincial authorities and political parties in opposition of 
the Act as it stood, but also by the public’s general concern for the alleged increase of violent 
youth crime. The first set of amendments established that the detainment of a young person 
could be greater than the three year interval if another offence was committed during this time 
(An Act to amend the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code, 1986; Bala & Anand, 2012). 
This sentence could continue once the youth was legally deemed an adult (amended in 1986). 
The second set of revisions demonstrated that sentence lengths for first or second degree 
murder carried an imposition for a maximum of 5 years (as opposed to 3 years previously set 
out in the Act) and any transfer of youth to the adult jurisdiction was done so on the basis of the 
“protection of the public” (amended in 1992) (An Act to amend the Young Offenders Act and 
the Criminal Code, 1992; Bala & Anand, 2012). The third set of amendments to the Act 
occurred in 1995, which was meant to restore credibility with the public by getting tough-on- 
116 
 
crime. These revisions established that sentences for first or second degree murders could not 
surpass the maximum penalty of ten years, and a presumption that youth who committed 
serious violent offences would be transferred to the adult jurisdiction if they were at least 16 
years of age or older (An Act to amend the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code, 1995; 
Bala & Anand, 2012). Despite the efforts to amend the YOA, these legislative changes were 
unsuccessful in rebuilding confidence in both the Act and the youth justice system more 
generally with the public. Moreover, the amendments did not address the high incarceration 
rates of youth, nor did it attend to the high rate of recidivism amongst violent youth (Bala, 
Carrington, & Roberts, 2009). Further, there appeared to be a need to “respond more firmly 
and effectively to the small number of the most serious and violent offenders” (McLellan, 
1999), which called for additional measures to toughen of the Act (see Leonard & Morris, 2000, 
for more information).          
4.1.3 The Youth Criminal Justice Act (2003 - ) 
 The Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) replaced the Young Offenders Act on 1 April, 
2003. Based on the objectives listed in the Declaration of Principle, the YCJA differs from the 
YOA in several ways. As Bala and Anand (2012) note, it first includes preamble about the ways 
in which the Act should be interpreted, so that the long- and short-term needs of the offender 
and society do not conflict with one another (p. 63). Second, it adds to the extrajudicial 
measures available not only by “encouraging involvement of victims, parents, and members of 
the community in the youth court process”, but also encompasses police warning (Bala & 
Anand, 2012, p. 63). Third, publication of the names of young offenders is permitted for those 
convicted of serious violent offences (Bala & Anand, 2012, p. 63). Fourth, it allows youth 
fourteen years of age or older to be sentenced as an adult in circumstances where a serious 
violent crime has occurred (Bala & Anand, 2012, p. 63). Fifth, it establishes that the primary 
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sentencing principle is to be fair and make accountability proportionate to the crime (Bala & 
Anand, 2012, p. 63). Sixth, it recognizes that the youth courts are reserved for more serious 
offenders, and that diversion from the court process is encouraged. Further, it promotes the use 
of non-custodial sentences (Bala & Anand, 2012, p. 63). Seventh, it supports the principles of 
rehabilitation and reintegration by introducing a graduated sentence for youth who receive a 
custodial sentence to serve the last third of their sentence under community supervision (Bala 
& Anand, 2012, p. 64; Department of Justice Canada 2012b, The Youth Criminal Justice Act: 
Summary and Background).78 Finally, it allows for provinces to have greater control over 
establishing youth justice policies as opposed to having the courts determine the level of 
custody (Bala & Anand, 2012, p. 64). The reintroduction of youth justice committees assists in 
developing community-based solutions to hold youth accountable for their crimes.    
 Unlike the YOA, youth are not officially transferred to adult court under the YCJA. 
Instead, judges are given the authority to enforce adult sentences within the confines of the 
youth court jurisdiction, although there is a great deal more weight placed on treatment for 
youth under this Act in contrast to the YOA. Further, the YCJA effectively reduces the age for 
which a youth may be sentenced as an adult. While the YOA included a provision that allowed 
youth who were 16 years of age or older to be transferred to the adult jurisdiction when 
charged with a presumptive offence (i.e., murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or 
78 The notion of community supervision in both the Canadian and American context is linked to Foucault’s (1991) 
claim that such strategies embed the state’s ability to exercise authority and domination through various 
institutional mechanisms and technologies which are currently used as a self-governing technique. This can be 
connected to the idea of “late modernity” as well as mass social control in which youth are expected to rehabilitate 
themselves through available programs to ensure self-imposed discipline (through a concept known as 
disciplinary normalization) (See Fraser, 2003). In effect, this finding is related to a model of risk assessment (i.e., 
low risk, medium risk, high risk) which targets intervention of youth offender behaviour and is seen as a strategic 
response to address any crisis of legitimacy (DeMichele, 2014). Chapter 8 sheds further light on the ways in 
which rehabilitative programs are aligned with neo-liberal rationalities.    
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aggravated sexual assault) (Bala & Anand, 2012), the YCJA lowers the age of presumption to 
14 (YCJA S.64(1)). However, it should be noted that each separate province is given the 
discretion to increase this age to 15 or 16, if they see fit. Currently under the YCJA, youth are 
not permitted to be transferred to the adult jurisdiction.  
4.1.4 The Provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4): What Do They Constitute?    
 Section 3 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act states the overall protection of society is 
one of the primary objectives of this legislation (Library of Parliament, 2011). Although 
provisions pertaining to the protection of society are not new, Bill C-10 (Part 4) places a great 
deal of emphasis on the short-term safekeeping of the community by enforcing the following 
objectives, as opposed to the long-term protection of society. In addition, Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
claims these changes enable the simplification of pre-trial detentions rules that are said to aid 
in guaranteeing that, when required, violent and repeat young offenders are detained while 
awaiting trial (See S.4 of the YCJA)  (Library of Parliament, 2011). 
 Prior to any legislative amendments, there appeared to be some confusion on the 
provisions in the Criminal Code that govern youth in regards to pre-trial detention. This 
confusion was due to the rules on pre-trial detention leading to inconsistent and insufficient 
applications of the Act (Nunn, 2006). Consequently, even under circumstances where violent 
youth pose a threat to society, the system had been accused of being unable to hold young 
offenders in custody. This amendment therefore facilitates and clarifies the pre-trial detention 
rules to make certain that youth charged with a serious offence (i.e., an “indictable offence for 
which an adult would be liable for a term of more than two years” and includes “violent 
offences”, “property offences”, and “offences that could endanger the public”) can be removed 
from society while awaiting trial (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 132). Further, detention of 
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youth during this period will also prevent them from committing another serious offence in the 
meantime.    
 Another provision of Bill C-10 (Part 4) involves the strengthening of sentencing 
provisions and the reduction of barriers to custody, in order to facilitate custody for violent and 
repeat young offenders when suitable (Library of Parliament, 2011). According to research on 
public opinion polls, any confidence that Canadians may have in the justice system drops when 
a sentence is unable to hold violent and repeat offenders accountable (Campbell, 2000; Roberts, 
2004; Roberts & Doob, 1990; Sprott, 1996; Sprott & Doob, 2008). This three-fold amendment 
therefore allows the courts to establish sentences for young offenders that are proportionate to 
the severity of the crime, and at the same time ensure the protection of society. This is 
achieved in three ways: 1) By including “specific deterrence and denunciation” to the 
principles of sentencing in hopes of discouraging a given offender from engaging in other 
offences, as opposed to the previous sentencing philosophy which did not include these factors 
in the sentencing process; 2) By adding to the current definition of “violent offence” any 
behaviour that may jeopardize or put at risk the life or safety of others; and 3) By permitting 
the courts to impose a custodial sentence on youth found to have a number of previous guilty 
findings or extrajudicial sanctions (see Library of Parliament, 2011).   
 “Specific deterrence and denunciation” are sentencing principles that are similar to 
those found in the adult criminal justice system (see S.7 of the YCJA). These principles allow 
the courts to impose sanctions on youth which are intended to reduce the likelihood of 
recidivism. Thus, the main objective of these principles is to ensure that the sanctions are 
severe enough to “denounce unlawful conduct”, and at the same time “deter the young person 
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from committing offences” (Library of Parliament, 2011). According to case law, the 
sentencing principle of denunciation,  
Mandates that a sentence should communicate society’s 
condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct. In short, a 
sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, 
collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be 
punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as 
enshrined within our substantive criminal law (R. v. M.(C.A.), 
1996, SCR 500 at 81). 
   
It should be noted that the principles of denunciation (which is largely linked to the concept of 
retribution) and deterrence (be it general or specific) do not have to involve incarceration for 
these principles to be satisfied. In some circumstances, for example, these conditions can be 
met whereby the publicity of these cases alone can provide for public humiliation (R. v. 
Ewanchuk, 2002; R. v. Ambrose, 2000; R. v. Kneale, 1999). The impact of public humiliation, 
however, is most likely to be effective in cases where identifying information about the youth 
has been revealed. These principles are subject to the application of one fundamental criterion 
as articulated in Section 3 of the YCJA: The nature of the sentence must be “in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offence”, and to the “degree of responsibility” of the youth offender for 
the offence (i.e., the degree of accountability).  
 From a legal standpoint, the political logics behind deterrence and denunciation appear 
to be consistent with one another, especially within the adult criminal jurisdiction. According 
to case law, these sentencing principles are meant to codify the objectives set forth in the 
Criminal Code with the goal of delivering “greater consistency and clarity” to sentencing (R. v. 
Nasogaluak, 2010, SCC 6 at 39). The combination of these two sentencing principles not only 
account for the imposition of certain sanctions on the offender in an attempt to curb harmful or 
unwanted conduct, but also considers the role of sentencing which “positively instills the basic 
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set of values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code” (R. v. C.A.M. 1996, 
SCR 500 at 81). Not surprisingly, it is the courts responsibility to harmoniously balance the 
law with the sentence in a way that recognizes the existing social values. Therefore, the 
imposition of a sentence must reflect any changes in these values (R. v. Stone, 1999, 134 C.C.C. 
(5d) 353 citing R. v. C.A.M., 1996, supra).  
 Interestingly, there is some research to suggest that there may be a disjuncture between 
denunciation and deterrence as sentencing principles, because deterrence may be seen as an 
artifact of modern punishment which implies that offenders are both rational and opportunistic 
(Garland, 1996), while denunciation (and public shaming rituals) is considered pre-modern 
because it lends itself to notions of public humiliation for unwanted behaviour (Pratt, 2000; 
Simon, 1995). This modern/pre-modern division may be attributed to the ways in which the 
social framework of punishment in the modern Western world has shifted from welfarism 
towards a greater emphasis on order and discipline. In other words, these findings are 
“reflective of the shift in political rationalities from welfarism to neo-liberalism” (Pratt, 2000, 
p. 146), towards a political stance that has been created from two diverse but overlapping 
schools of thought (neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism) (O’Malley, 1999); or what Simon 
(1995) refers to as postmodern (willful) “nostalgia” that suggests most modern penal practices 
and policy induce the revisiting of images of certain long forgotten virtues of the past, but 
thrives on “improbability, falseness, or artificiality” (p. 30) as well as on a “misrecognition of 
the past it evokes” to resurrect the likelihood of a meaningful reform (p. 37). Thus, while 
concepts such as denunciation are rooted in pre-modern penal mentality, they are better defined 
as “gestures, to be consumed as nostalgia not only by the public, but also by politicians and 
correctional administrators” (Simon, 1995, p. 37). Deterrence, on the other hand, is derived 
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from the notion that “the benefits of crime could be counterbalanced by the threatened loss of a 
certain quantity of time” which “formed an enduring logic of economic rationality in 
punishment” (Simon, 1995, p. 37). Together, it may be argued that these principles “share an 
orientation toward a linear and progressive structure of time as manifested in terms of 
proportionality and recidivism” (Simon, 1995, p. 37).    
 According to O’Malley (1999), sentencing principles and policies have been “formed 
by regimes that amalgamate and combine rather contradictory governing rationalities. Unity 
between them is possible, as we have seen, because of certain shared values and assumption” 
(p. 188). The alliance of these two competing rationalities has the potential to explain how pre-
modern and modern sentencing principles such as deterrence and denunciation come together 
in current day. It is asserted that, 
On the one hand is the resurrection or revitalization of formerly 
discredited but venerable penalties and penal orientation 
(retribution, strict discipline, death penalties, and chain gangs). 
This is effected through the resurgence of neo-conservatism [...] 
This neo-conservative nostalgia matches punishment and penal 
discipline with support for a unified moral order under the 
governance of state paternalism. On the other hand is the 
addition to the penological repertory of quite radical and 
innovatory initiatives, which are largely associated with neo-
liberalism [...] Meanwhile, in the center an amalgam of persisting 
welfare, disciplinary and regulatory sanctions either is left more 
or less intact, or represents a field where there is considerable 
overlap between the allied rationalities: as, for example, with the 
deployment of incarceration as a deterrent (O’Malley, 1999, p. 
189).  
   
Overall, these findings indicate that there is a degree of incoherence in policies and sentencing 
principles that strives to incorporate punishment, discipline and moral order under state 
governance (O’Malley, 1999). This suggests then that the employment of sentencing principles 
such as denunciation and deterrence appear to portray elements of the neo-conservative and 
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neo-liberal (New Right) evolution in the penal framework itself, because it brings together an 
amount of political unity and shared cultural awareness to the issue at hand.          
 Prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the Supreme Court of Canada defined a 
“violent offence” as “an offence in which the young person causes, attempts to cause or 
threatens to cause bodily harm” (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 135). The definition, however, 
did not account for situations where irresponsible behaviour (even if this behaviour did not 
result in any injury) posed a risk to others (Library of Parliament, 2011). The expansion of the 
term “violent offence” now includes offences in which the young offender jeopardizes the life 
or safety of others by constructing a significant probability that the behaviour will result in 
bodily harm (e.g. the joyriding/dangerous driving case that prompted the Nunn Commission 
investigation in Nova Scotia, see R. v M.T.S., 2006).  
 Previously under the YCJA, custodial sentences were permitted when a young person 
was found guilty of committing “an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of more than two years”, and when the youth had acquired a record 
indicating a pattern of guilty findings (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 134). Preceding 
requirements for demonstrating a history of criminal involvement based on findings of guilt 
were insufficient given that not all offences were formally handled through the justice system 
(i.e. extrajudicial measures). Consequently, demonstrating a necessity to sentence the young 
offender to custody in order to hold them accountable was often unattainable. Bill C-10 (Part 
4)’s amendment to the Act permits the courts to establish a pattern of criminal involvement in 
relation to the offender, either through prior guilty adjudications or through an analysis of 
extrajudicial sanctions (or both). Essentially, the court is now able to consider an offender’s 
full history in an attempt to propose a suitable sentence (see S.8 of the YCJA).  
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 Another amendment to the YCJA ensures that adult sentences are contemplated for 
youth 14 years of age and older for those who commit serious violent offences (see S.11 and 
S.18 of the YCJA) (Library of Parliament, 2011). Previously under the YCJA, and when 
appropriate, a judge may have imposed an adult sentence on youth over the age of 14 if 
convicted “of an offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of 
more than two years” (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 136). However, there was no 
requirement for the Crown to consider applying for an adult sentence (even in the most serious 
cases), and frequently such sentences were not sought out. According to Bill C-4: An Act to 
amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to make consequential and related amendments to 
other Acts, violent offences are defined as “murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, and 
aggravated sexual assault” (Casavant & Valiquet, 2011, p. 12).79 This amendment operates 
under the presumption that convicting a violent youth offender will be accompanied by an 
adult sentence, but may be invalidated if the length of a youth sentence is proven to be 
sufficient to render the offender accountable. Adult sentences are also imposed when a young 
offender is found guilty of a third offence in a series of serious violations involving violence 
(i.e., presumptive offences).80 
79 This definition remained constant throughout the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). 
80 Presumptive offences and serious violent offences are articulated in the earlier version of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act. Accordingly, presumptive offences were applicable to youth over the age of 14 and include: “first and 
second-degree murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, and aggravated sexual assault. In cases where a youth 14 
years of age or older is found guilty of a presumptive offence, the imposition of an adult sentence may be 
determined unless an application for youth sentencing is successfully carried out”. A serious violent offence “is an 
offence where the young person causes or attempts to cause bodily harm. If a youth over the age of 14 was 
previously found guilty of two separate serious violent offences, then the third serious violent offence can become 
a presumptive offence”. Youth found guilty of a presumptive offence were eligible for an adult sentence. As of 
2012, the YCJA was amended by the government to remove the “presumptive offence scheme” because it was 
found to be unconstitutional in a Supreme Court ruling (R. v. D.B., 2008), but preserved “Crown applications for 
adult sentences for youth” (see the Youth Criminal Justice Act Summary and Background, 2012, for more 
information).  
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 The requirement of the courts to remove the publication ban on the names (or other 
identifying information) of young offenders convicted of a violent offence is a further 
amendment to Act (see S.20 and S.24 of the YCJA) (Library of Parliament, 2011). According to 
Section 110(2)(a) of the YCJA, in instances “where the young person has received an adult 
sentence, the information on the identity of that young person is automatically published”. 
Similarly, if an  
Application has been filed for a young person to be subject to an 
adult sentence for certain offences (murder attempted murder, 
manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault or a third serious violent 
offences) and the court downgrades that application and instead 
impose a young offender sentence, there is a presumption that 
information on the young offender’s identity will be published 
(YCJA, S. 75 and 110(2)(b)).  
 
However, it is up the Crown to satisfy the court that publication of identifying information is 
necessary to uphold public safety.    
 Another provision of Bill C-10 (Part 4) requires police to retain records when informal 
measures are imposed in order to facilitate the identification of patterns of reoffending (see 
S.25 of the YCJA) (Library of Parliament, 2011). In the event that extrajudicial measures such 
as warnings, cautions, or referrals to respond to an alleged offence are imposed, this 
amendment requires police to keep records of these allowances and forward them to the Crown. 
The purpose of this change is to aid the retrieval of such documents by both the police and the 
courts in hopes of a more accurate prior history of offending. 
 The last amendment to the legislation ensures that all youth 18 years of age and 
younger serve their custodial sentence in a youth facility as opposed to an adult institution (see 
S.21 of the YCJA) (Library of Parliament, 2011). On the other hand, if a youth is 18 years or 
older at the time of sentencing, the court has the right to order a sentence of two years less a 
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day be served in a provincial correctional facility for adults. If a sentence is to be served for 
two years or more, the young person will be sent to a federal penitentiary for adults. Under the 
previous legislation of the Act, youth who reached the age of 18 could be transferred to an 
adult facility regardless of the type of sentence imposed upon them (either an adult or youth 
sentence), when their sentence had not been fully served at that juncture (Library of Parliament, 
2011).        
4.1.5 Implications of Bill C-10 (Part 4) in Relation to the YCJA 
 According to The Canadian Bar Association (2010), the YCJA is successful in 
constructing a suitable equilibrium between “toughening up” measures to address serious 
violent offenders, and achieving a more corrective approach by stressing the importance of 
extrajudicial measures for non-violent offenders (even in cases where extrajudicial measures 
have been previously imposed). On the whole, the literature on the YCJA is supportive of the 
notion that the overarching goals of the Act have largely been achieved in two ways: first, there 
are fewer cases brought before the courts and thus fewer youth in custody, and second, there is 
no associated increase in violent youth crime (Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 2009; Winterdyk & 
Okita, 2007). These findings therefore question the logic behind the implementation of Bill C-
10 (Part 4).   
 The Youth Criminal Justice Act itself was subject to a great deal of scrutiny after its 
enactment in 2003 (Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 2009; Barnhorst, 2004; Cesaroni & Bala, 
2008; Corrado, Gronsdahl, MacAlister, & Cohen, 2010). Bill C-10 (Part 4) expands the 
applicable sentencing principles to make them more punitive for violent and repeat offenders 
and alters the focus of the guiding principles under Section 3 of the YCJA. In essence, the 
amendments to the YCJA present very serious consequences for youth offenders. Not only will 
these changes result in greater numbers of incarcerated youth for longer periods of time, but 
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one can expect to see very little improvement on the long-term protection of society (Bala 
2011; Bala, Carrington, & Roberts, 2009; Cesaroni & Bala, 2008).   
 Although it has been asserted that the implementation of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is a 
“significant step backward from the progress that came with the passage of the YCJA” (The 
Canadian Bar Association, 2010, p. 1), it is important to consider two ways in which these 
provisions may in fact enhance legislation on youth crime. First, the expansion of the definition 
of “serious violent offence” removes any alleged confusion and uncertainty, leaving less room 
for interpretation or presumption. Second, according to Bala (2011), prohibiting youth from 
serving their sentence in adult prisons can be seen as a welcomed addition given that there is 
little in terms of rehabilitative programming intended for youth in adult institutions (Bala, 
Carrington, & Roberts, 2009). Youth serving time in adult prisons may also be subjected to the 
possibility of mistreatment or abuse by other adult inmates. Moreover, the incarceration of 
persons under the age of 18 in adult prisons is contrary to the stipulations put forth in Article 
37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see the Unicef Fact Sheet (2012) and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). 81 While both these amendments 
may be viewed as necessary portions of Bill C-10 (Part 4), it should be noted that neither of 
them actually reflect tough-on-crime measures. One could argue that any positive changes 
presented by Bill C-10 (Part 4) are not punitive in nature, and are instead merely supportive of 
the need for further clarity in the law as per the recommendations of the Nunn Commission 
Report (Nunn, 2006). Further, the Bill recognizes the notion that youth differ from their adult 
81 Article 37 (Detention and punishment) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that “no one is 
allowed to punish children in a cruel or harmful way. Children who break the law should not be treated cruelly. 
They should not be put in prison with adults, should be able to keep in contact with their families, and should not 
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release”. The Unites States is one of the only 
countries that did not ratify this agreement.  
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counterparts, and therefore require separate age-appropriate custodial institutions when under 
the age of 18. This particular amendment, however, was not articulated in the 
recommendations suggested by the Nunn Commission Report (Nunn, 2006).      
  Many of the noteworthy objectives of Bill C-10 (Part 4) appear to be stirred by political 
ideology and interest that contradict previous research on youth crime and justice policies 
(Bala, 2011). There are three amendments put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4) that undermine the 
guiding principles and provisions of the YCJA. These include the short-term versus long-term 
protection of the public, the addition of deterrence and denunciation, and concerns regarding 
the publication bans for youth (Bala, 2011). Furthermore, three supplemental changes 
pertaining directly and/or indirectly to the exercise of professional discretion within the 
criminal justice system is found in the provisions associated with police record keeping, Crown 
consideration of adult sentences, and judicial consideration of the publication ban removal 
(Bala, 2011). 
 The short-term versus long-term protection of the public presents a shift in the primary 
principle of the Youth Criminal Justice Act. Clause 3 of Bill C-10 (Part 4) amends paragraph 
3(1)(a) of the YCJA, which now refers to “protecting the public” in short- and long-terms “by 
holding young persons accountable, promoting their rehabilitation and reintegrating and 
referring them to programs or agencies in the community to address the circumstances 
underlying their offending behaviour” (Casavant & Valiquet, 2011, p. 7). According to Bala 
(2011), advancing short-term methods tend to amplify the long-term risks to society as youth 
will inevitably return to the community. Research supports the need for the rehabilitation of 
youth offenders as opposed to long-term incarceration (McMurtry & Curling, 2008).  
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 The inclusion of denunciation and deterrence as sentencing principles embodies a 
drastic departure from the objectives and goals of the Youth Criminal Justice Act. Although 
politically it may appear to be a fashionable proposition, this can increase the number and 
length of custodial sentences without enhancing public safety (Bala, 2011). The concept of 
deterrence contravenes the principle that, due to one’s age and limited appreciation for such 
acts, weight should be placed on rehabilitation and reintegration of young persons into society 
as opposed to denunciation and deterrence (Bala, 2011; Cesaroni & Bala, 2008). Moreover, the 
principle of deterrence mainly affects only one group – youth court judges (Cesaroni & Bala, 
2008). Incorporating deterrence in the sentencing principles suggests a need for judges to 
impose longer, harsher sentences. However in most cases youth are unable to anticipate the 
legal consequences of their actions and therefore deterrence is known to be ineffective on 
young persons (Bala, 2011; Foglia, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Mauer & Young, 1996; Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2001; Schneider & Ervin, 1990; von Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney, & Wikstrom, 1999; 
Yahya, 2006).  
 Amending the YCJA to specify that “the court shall decide whether it is appropriate to 
make an order lifting the ban” on the publication of a youth’s name if found for guilty of a 
violent offence raises two concerns (see Library of Parliament, 2011). The issue rests in the 
notion that the publication of identifying information is possible for a conviction of anything 
spanning between murder and common assault, and does not demand that this requirement be 
limited only to repeat or serious violent offenders. Ultimately, the decision to consider 
publication is left in the hands of the youth court judge, and is directly related to the expansion 
of publication power given the broad spectrum of the category. Secondly, the fundamental 
reason for the publication ban is to curtail the degree of stigma while optimizing the 
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probability for successful reintegration of youth into the community. Studies show that the 
identification of adolescent offenders in the media inexorably imposes a burden on their 
families and primarily leads to difficulties in rehabilitation (R. v D.B. (2008)). In addition, this 
provision breaches Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see the Unicef Fact 
Sheet (2012) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)). 82 
 The requirement specifying that police should now hold a record of any extrajudicial 
measures used with young persons implies a shift in the management of such documentation. 
Although police records of such measures were always kept, they must now be delivered as 
part of the Crown package. The amendment to S.39(1)(c) of the YCJA has been criticized for 
undermining the integrity and intent of the extrajudicial sanctions in the Act, while conveying 
messages suggestive of a deficiency in the way police services exercise judgment in keeping 
records of incidents that do not lead to a formal charges (Bala, 2011). Bill C-10 (Part 4) may in 
fact foster the assumption that police officers have employed these measures too frequently 
which consequently discourage police from resorting to extrajudicial sanctions (Bala, 2011).  
 The Youth Criminal Justice Act has also been subject to some disputes in relation to 
adult sentences. In 2006, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal repealed sections of the Act 
that required some youth to establish that it was inappropriate for an adult sentence to be 
imposed for their crime, as it was a violation of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.83 The Court found that the principles outlined in the YCJA entail that it is the 
82 Article 16 (Right to privacy) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that “children have a right to 
privacy and that the law should protect them from attacks against their way of life, their good name, their families 
and their homes”. 
83 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that citizens “have the right to life, liberty, 
and the security of the person, and may only be deprived thereof in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice”. 
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state’s responsibility to establish the appropriateness of an adult sentence and not the duty to 
prove otherwise by the accused.  
 In the same year, the provincial Governments of both Ontario and Alberta appealed two 
cases under the premise that general deterrence should have been considered when handing 
down the sentences, and that harsher sentences should have been imposed (although contrary 
to the principles outlined in the YCJA). Recognizing that the sentencing principles that guide 
the Act for youth is a departure from the principles that govern adults, it was concluded by the 
Supreme Court that “general deterrence” was not to be used for youth in conflict with the law. 
In fact, the Supreme Court noted that the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration of 
youth into society took precedence when considering sentencing options (R. v. B. W. P.; R. v. B. 
V. N., 2006). As such, the exclusion of general deterrence as a sentencing principle in the YCJA 
was deliberate. However given that the Conservative government has consistently criticized the 
YCJA for not being tough enough on youth crime, the newly enacted Bill C-10 (Part 4) amends 
this provision of deterrence for serious and repeat offenders to mirror those found in the adult 
criminal justice system. For example, by adding clause 172 into Section 38(2) of the YCJA, 
two objectives are enveloped in the sentencing principles. First, “to denounce unlawful 
conduct”, and second “to deter the young person from committing offences” (Library of 
Parliament, 2011). It should, however, be noted that the deterrence principles included in this 
legislation are more general than those found in the adult framework, “since the punishment 
may be used to deter the adult from committing a new offence and the public from committing 
this type of offence (specific deterrence vs. general deterrence)” (Library of Parliament, 2011). 
This is a radical departure from the sentencing principles established in the YOA, since 
deterrence had to be considered under that legislation (Library of Parliament, 2011).     
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 Further, the consideration of adult sentences by the Crown in cases where a serious 
violent offence has occurred is a provision that also undermines the authority and integrity of 
the Crown Counsel. According to Bala (2011), this provision is problematic in that it cultivates 
notions of disregard and doubt in the Crown Counsel by questioning their ability to 
appropriately exercise their judgement in violent cases. Thus, this amendment may direct youth 
court judges to make inquiries of the Crown as to the specific reasons for their decision, which 
may impinge on constitutionally protected prosecutorial discretion (see Krieger v Law Society 
of Alberta, 2002). This provision suggests skepticism of the judiciary. Previously, both the 
Crown and the youth court justice would consider this option in appropriate cases pertaining to 
the most serious and violent offences (YCJA S.110). 
4.1.6 Applying Adult Sentences to Young Persons 
 A great deal of dialogue on youth justice in Canada currently targets proportionality 
and the role it plays in sentencing (Bala, 2011; Bala & Anand, 2012; Roberts, 2004; Roberts & 
Bala, 2003). That is, any “sentence imposed on a youth must be proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence” 
(YCJA, S. 38(2)(c)). Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code identifies proportionality as a primary 
principle for sentencing adults; however the sentencing of juveniles under this principle brings 
about a different set of issues for the courts to take into account. Notwithstanding the 
difference between convictions at the adult and youth levels, the reformation of youth court 
sentencing through the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) appears to correspond with one 
another’s guiding principles. Research in this area generally supports the notion that the 
primary principles governing adult and juvenile sentences may correspond to one another, 
however the imposition of adult level penalties on juvenile offenders is not favoured. This 
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approach, therefore, is not deemed to be effective (Roberts, 2004; Roberts & Bala, 2003; 
Webster & Doob, 2011).         
 Adult sentences for juvenile offenders are not newly enacted by the provisions of Bill 
C-10 (Part 4). Young offenders were subject to adult sentences under the Young Offenders Act 
via a transfer to the adult jurisdiction, and under the Youth Criminal Justice Act through an 
order for an adult sentence (based on judicial discretion) in youth court. In fact, the transfer of 
youths to adult court emerged as a possibility in Canada since the Juvenile Delinquents Act 
was enacted in 1908 (Library of Parliament, 2011).  
 There appears to be a gap in knowledge on justifications for sentencing youth as an 
adult, regardless of whether it follows transfer to adult court (YOA) or takes place in youth 
court (YCJA) (Roberts, 2004). In comparison, studies in America provide a list of factors that 
determine whether a youth case will be heard in criminal court, including the young person’s 
age and the seriousness of their offence, to a juvenile’s history of criminal involvement, and 
their likelihood of rehabilitation. These studies suggest that the variables are interconnected in 
that older youth (particularly males) have a greater probability of committing serious crimes, 
are more likely to have amassed a wide-ranging record of past criminal behaviours, and are 
seen as having a reduced or limited potential for rehabilitation (von Hirsch, 2000).    
 According to von Hirsch (2000), the principle grounds for sentencing a youth as an 
adult are typically based on one’s seriousness of crime, prior criminal history, and amenability 
to treatment. However, these grounds do not nullify the justifications for enforcing such 
measures (von Hirsch, 2000). Utilizing the severity of crime and prior convictions as a basis 
for prescribing an adult sentence is said to better reflect the public’s desire to penalize 
offenders instead of rehabilitating them. In fact, Duff (2002) suggests that preserving the 
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sentencing range available for youth is greatest for more serious crimes. This is largely 
attributed to the fact that, unlike adults, youth are only marginally capable of comprehending 
the real extent and ramifications of these acts (and subsequently have a diminished moral 
blameworthiness), even if they are able to appreciate the repercussions of minor forms of 
offending. Thus, the validation for sentencing youth as an adult in response to youth crime 
seems suspect.  
 As an alternative to imposing adult sentences on youth, research indicates a greater 
need for an order of custody and supervision or the order of intensive rehabilitative custody 
and supervision created by the Youth Criminal Justice Act (Doob & Cesaroni, 2004; Roberts & 
Bala, 2003). An order of custody and supervision refers to serving time in a young offender 
centre or community. It is also based on the availability of a residential facility, and is followed 
by an order of supervision in the community. As per Section 42(2) of the YCJA, “the period of 
community supervision must be one-half as long as the period of custody”, and the length of 
the sentence is dictated by the judge.  On the other hand, an order of intensive rehabilitative 
custody is “the most serious youth sentencing option available under the YCJA” (S.42(7)) 
(Department of Justice, 2012). This sentencing option was introduced in 2003 for young 
persons affected by mental health issues who are guilty of the most serious violent offences. 
According to the Department of Justice Canada (2012b), “it is estimated that at least 20% to 25% 
of the roughly 500 most serious violent youth offenders each year may suffer from various 
mental health issues that must be addressed if they are to be rehabilitated and safely 
reintegrated into the community”.   
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4.2 The Crime Control Model: Juvenile Justice in Texas 
 Determining how Texas both oversees and responds to youth offenders84 through its 
procedural mechanisms provides an illustration of the ways in which the state currently 
operates under laws that are consistent with a model of crime control. While both Canada and 
Texas have been subject to comparable (albeit not identical) processes and transformations of 
tough-on-crime measures, the legal systems within each jurisdiction differ. For example, Texas 
(and the United States more generally) and Canada have been largely influenced by the English 
Common Law, although traditionally Canada has been particularly influenced by the Civil Law 
system dominant in continental Europe. This suggests there is variation in the ways each 
jurisdiction views and shapes law, although there are also distinctions between social, 
economic, and political contexts. Nonetheless, much of the shifts in the youth crime legislation 
have occurred on similar grounds and for related reasons.  
 This section of the chapter attempts to highlight Texas’ philosophy of justice as a 
counterpoint to the philosophy and youth justice model developed in Canada. The procedural 
mechanisms through which the tough-on-crime legislation is implemented are exemplified by 
laws that are consistent with a punitive crime control model. The following subsections do not 
consider the processes through which the current legislation in Texas has come to be. In other 
words, it does not examine the processes associated with the state’s ability to exercise 
legitimate power, because it does not trace the genealogy of youth crime legislation through its 
various transitions. Instead, this section focuses on the point that it is currently at, relative to 
84 Young/youth offenders in the United States are often referred to as juvenile delinquents. Delinquency entails 
“an act committed by a youth that also would be a crime if committed by an adult. Delinquents may be 
adjudicated as youth within the juvenile justice system, or they may be waived to criminal court for processing as 
adults” (Walker, 2001). 
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the enacted tough-on-crime legislation that has been implemented for almost twenty years. 
Although there have been a number of changes to the tough-on-crime legislation during this 
time, the following analysis considers the existing legislation as illustrative of a crime control 
model embodying the tough-on-crime approach to youth justice, which in many ways falls on 
the extreme end of the spectrum.     
4.2.1 The Development of a Separate Juvenile Justice System in the United States  
 According to Caputo and Vallée (2007), the development of a separate justice system 
for juveniles was propelled by “the American positivist movement [...] during the latter part of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”, with Illinois leading this faction (“Youth Justice 
in the United States”; see also Krisberg (2006) and Snyder (2002)). Those in favour of separate 
justice systems desired to safeguard young offenders from their adult counterparts, while 
adopting a philosophy that appeared to established the youth court as an assertive but 
sympathetic authoritarian when one’s family was unsuccessful at doing so. In 1899, Cook 
County, Illinois established the first American youth court, whose main goal was to rehabilitate 
rather than punish young offenders. Consistent with their pseudo-parental responsibility, 
juvenile courts shifted their emphasis towards the best interests of the youth by applying 
sympathetic, adaptive and  informal (through diversion) measures to cases whereby the courts 
were required to follow limited procedural rules. As a result, youth cases were seen as civil 
(non-criminal) actions, with the paramount goal of ushering a young offender towards a life 
encompassing responsibility as a respectable citizen. The juvenile courts were in their 
authoritative right, however, to remove youth from their residents and order them to a juvenile 
reformatory as an integral component of rehabilitation. This movement towards a separate 
justice system in the United States which emphasized the need for rehabilitation is illustrative 
of similar processes that occurred in Canada.  
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 There is evidence to suggest that juvenile justice policy in the United States has 
undergone a radical transformation over the last hundred years (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, 
“Youth Justice in the United States”; see also Bishop & Decker, 2006). Particularly since the 
1960s, these authors assert juvenile justice policies have shifted in a number of ways that have 
both reorganized the system and disputed its founding philosophies (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, 
“Youth Justice in the United States”; Bishop & Decker, 2006). More precisely, during the 
1960s and 1970s the United States Supreme Court was presented with a number of cases that 
drastically altered proceedings in the youth courts (especially in reference to the potential 
rehabilitation of youth) (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, “Youth Justice in the United States”). For 
example, the case of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966),85 established that the youth 
court judge had the power to waive the case to the adult jurisdiction for Kent to be tried as an 
adult without a hearing (see Pound, cited in Krisberg, 2006). While the waiver was opposed 
based on the grounds of seeking rehabilitation for Kent, the youth court jurisdiction did not 
address or dispute the youth’s removal from one court to the other.  
 Similarly, in 1967 the case of 15 year old Gerald Gault 86 resulted in a significant 
departure from the methods with which youth were processed by the courts (see Pound, cited 
in Krisberg, 2006). For example, neither the youth nor his guardians received notice of the 
charges laid before the hearing. In addition, the individual who launched the complaint about 
85 According to the In re Gault case, “at the age of sixteen the appellant, Morris Kent, was accused of committing 
several robberies and rapes. He was waived by the juvenile court and indicted on three counts of housebreaking, 
three counts of robbery, and two counts of rape. A jury returned a verdict of guilty on the housebreaking and 
robbery counts and not guilty by reason of insanity on the rape counts. The district court sentenced him to thirty to 
ninety years, with credit for the time spent in Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-301(d)”.    
86 According to Gault’s case summary, “Gault was a 15 year-old accused of making an obscene telephone call to a 
neighbor, Mrs. Cook, on June 8, 1964.  After Mrs. Cook filed a complaint, Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were 
arrested and taken to the Children’s Detention Home. Gault was on probation when he was arrested, after being in 
the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a woman’s purse”.  
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Gault was not even present at the hearing. Despite these discrepancies, the court ordered Gault 
to an industrial school in the state of Arizona until he turned 21 years of age, but was given the 
opportunity to be discharged in advance by due process of law. Consequently, an application 
for a petition for release was carried out under the pretense that the youth had been denied due 
process of the law87 and that his right to a lawful and fail trial had been breached (see Pound, 
cited in Krisberg, 2006). Gault’s case was heard in the Supreme Court which ruled in favour of 
Gault in the Application of Gault (1967). With its decision in the Application of Gault, the U.S. 
Supreme Court expanded several of the rights associated with due process to youth involved in 
juvenile court proceedings. Krisberg (2006) asserts that “the conception of a benign Children’s 
Court that always acted in the best interests of the child was replaced with new attention to the 
legal rights of minors” (p. 7). Essentially, the transformations that occurred throughout this 
phase initiated a movement to minimize the gap between the youth justice system and the 
inimical justice system governing adults (Caputo & Vallée, 2007). 
 Presently, there is no national youth justice system in the United States of America. The 
juvenile justice systems within each state significantly differ from one another, even though 
87 According to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, due process of law entails that any individual who 
engaged is a legal matter or proceeding has the right to certain securities that “afford equal protection of the law”. 
The Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution determines and specifies many due process rights, and includes: The 
Fifth Amendment, which ensures that a) “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, [...] nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. The Sixth Amendment’s 
right wherein “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence”. The Seventh Amendment’s “[...] right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law” (i.e., right to trial by jury in most civil (noncriminal) cases). The Eighth Amendment’s 
right whereby “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted” (The U.S. Bill of Rights,1789 (2013)). 
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federal policies, legislation, and the U.S. Constitution cogently generate universal 
characteristics (Caputo & Vallée, 2007; Snyder, 2002). The ways in which the youth courts 
function vary from one county to another and even from one municipality to the next within 
the same state. Controlled by state legislation, these detached systems differ from each other in 
terms of their scope, mission, and procedure (Snyder, 2002). Thus, each state’s law governs the 
structure of their respective courts as well as the correctional institutions available within it. In 
addition, “these inherent variations provide many opportunities to test different approaches and 
new programs and to learn from others, but they make it difficult to describe succinctly the 
delivery of juvenile justice in the United States” (Snyder, 2002, p. 43). This differs 
considerably from the youth justice system in Canada, since all provinces are governed by the 
same legislation. The ways in which the courts in Canada operate, however, vary to some 
degree from one province to the next.  
 In practice, an ongoing tension between the social welfare model and the model of 
crime control in the United States has progressively surfaced over time. While these tensions 
have fluctuated and have varied significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the focus on the 
needs of the child as opposed to an emphasis on punishment, incapacitation and the protection 
of society from young offenders is widely disputed. In reaction to the augmentation in violent 
crime (stemming mainly from the 1980s and 1990s), a number of state-wide reformations in 
youth justice have taken place (Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). For example, this legal 
remodeling predominately shifts its focus on accountability, concern for public safety, and 
punishment while discarding long-established principles of rehabilitation and diversion in 
favour of a “get tough” approach to youth crime and retribution (Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). 
This is particularly the case for states such as Texas that deal with very serious offences. This 
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transition from the importance of focusing on rehabilitating the individual to punishing the 
youth for the offence is illustrated by a number of states (17) that restructured the purpose 
clause of their youth courts to highlight the safety of the public, demonstrate the sureness of 
penalties, and augment the responsibilities of the offender (Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). 
Intrinsic to this altered purpose is the public’s underlying belief that the youth justice system, 
like that of Canada’s, is too passive and forgiving of youth in conflict with the law, and that 
youth are essentially viewed as having the potential to be nearly as threatening to the public’s 
general safety as their adult criminal counterparts.88  
 Pursuing procedural changes in practice pose a challenge, not only due to the variations 
in the constitution of the youth justice system between the states, but also because the data 
acquired about the ways in which cases are processed and about imprisoned youth contrast 
from one state to the next. That is, there may be a lack of consistency in the methods used to 
collect such statistics (Abbott, 1926). These factors are in addition to the issue of limited 
national data. Although some states both accumulate and circulate copious degrees of 
information on an assortment of elements about the youth justice system, the data are not 
immediately obtainable in most states. While national data are gathered about the processing of 
youth court cases, there is no legal obligation to distribute data or make it publicly known. As a 
result, nationally acquired youth court statistics are adopted from courts that comprise 
approximately 67% of the total youth population (Stahl, Sickmund, Finnegan, Snyder, Poole, 
& Tierny, 1999). Moreover, unlike the youth court statistics found in Canada, there is 
minimally available countrywide data on the number of youth found guilty by offence, the 
number of youth imprisoned by offence, the length of each sentence, the amount of time served 
88 This discussion has to do with similarities in the way juvenile offenders are viewed within these jurisdictions.  
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in detention, or the time served on parole (Langan & Farrington, 1998). Yet, these figures are 
available for adults sentenced to prison and jail. Although most states have confidentiality 
provisions89 relating to young offenders, specific information is relatively impossible to locate.   
 Some juvenile justice systems, however, were established well before the first official 
separate juvenile court in Illinois and go as far back as the mid-1800s (Texas Youth 
Commission, 2009). In Texas, the juvenile justice system developed on the basis of legislation 
that excused youth from certain criminal situations as a means of emphasizing the importance 
of rehabilitation (as opposed to punishment) (Texas Youth Commission, 2009). With this 
legislation came the formation of the Texas Youth Commission, whose purpose was essentially 
to act as a council to develop strategies to rehabilitate youth within the community, but always 
administered such treatments under the confines of the law (Texas Youth Commission, 2009). 
The council itself was subject to a number of different transitions between the 1960s and 1970s, 
and like the findings from Canada, the legal principles guiding the legislation underwent a 
variety of changes. Thus, while the earlier stages of the council stressed an institutionalized 
approach, it later acknowledged the importance of community-based treatment on account of 
the ensuing welfare model (Texas Youth Commission, 2009). However, with the issue of “late 
modernity”, such as the rising youth crime rates, the political and economic instabilities, and 
the reactionary crisis that plagued the 1980s and 1990s, the council shifted back towards an 
89 According to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) (2012), “the legislature reaffirmed its 
belief that juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential” in 1995. However, in Texas, “they did 
provide for a limited exception to juvenile court record confidentiality to promote more effective communication 
among juvenile courts, law enforcement agencies, and schools to ensure rehabilitation of juvenile offenders as 
well as to lessen the potential for drug use, violence, and other forms of delinquency” (S.58, Texas Family Code). 
Another section of the legislation pertains to “disclosure to schools of juvenile court records involving serious acts 
of violence” (Chapter 552, S.411.135(a)(1) of the Texas Government Code). These provisions include “an open 
hearing, release of name, release of court records, fingerprinting, photographing, offender registration, statewide 
repository, and seal/expunge records prohibited”. 
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institutional correction approach as a primary means of addressing youth crime in Texas 
(Texas Youth Commission, 2009). 90 This transformation encompassed “zero-tolerance” 
policies which are still largely realized through the current tough-on-crime legislation (Texas 
Youth Commission, 2009). As a result, the number of commitments to the Texas Youth 
Commission increased during those years and continued to rise well into the 2000s (Texas 
Youth Commission, 2009).91 On the whole, these findings indicate that the United States (but 
more specifically Texas) has undergone a similar transformative experience to that of Canada, 
given that a number of legislative changes have resulted in laws that are consistent with a 
crime control model of youth justice. 92 These models stress the governmental powers and 
abilities of minimizing the importance of individual freedoms and liberties while advocating 
public safety.     
 As a result of the promises made to the public, Texas made changes to their juvenile 
justice laws to reflect 1) modifications in sentencing structures, 2) alterations to (or the 
complete removal of) traditional confidentiality provisions, 3) changes regarding the rights of 
victims of juvenile crimes, 4) changes in the minimum and maximum ages of jurisdiction, and 
5) adjustments to correctional programming (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999; Torbet & Szymanski, 
90 Similar to the findings from Canadian youth crime statistics, American research shows that serious violent 
youth crimes hit its peak between the years of 1989 and 1994 across the United States. According to Krisberg 
(2006), serious violent crime had increased by more than 30% in a period of four years. During this phase, both 
the American media and politicians alike produced fear in the public by creating a “moral panic” about youth 
crime and violence that ultimately resulted in the legislation of tougher responses to violent youth crime in most 
states (Krisberg, 2006, p. 11, see also Caputo & Vallée, 2007). Similar to the transformations and the 
philosophical shifts witnessed in Canada, the legislative responses to youth crime were subject to the same 
processes and challenges on account of public and political perceptions which alleged problems with the youth 
justice system. 
91 These findings are similar to the Canadian statistics which indicate a significant increase in the number of youth 
incarcerated under the YOA.   
92 Similar to the philosophical shifts witnessed in Canada youth justice laws, the legislative responses to youth 
crime were subject to the same processes and challenges on account of the public and political perceptions which 
alleged numerous problems with the youth justice system. Much like the ways in which the Canadian government 
depends on the public to legitimate their authority via elections, so too does the American political system. 
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1998).93 Similarly, studies find that more than forty states introduced tougher legislation during 
1992 and 1997 while simultaneously facilitating transfers of youth to adult courts (Torbet, 
Gable, Hurst, Montgomery, Szymanski, & Thomas, 1996). However, research reveals that the 
proportion of serious violent offences committed by youth on a national level decreased 
considerably after 1993, but prior to the enactment of any tough-on-crime legislation. In light 
of the tough-on-crime policies that were enacted in Texas, the following subsections discuss 
the current legislation and procedural mechanisms that have been implemented by virtue of the 
prevailing crime control model.      
4.2.2 Minimum and Maximum Ages of Jurisdiction   
 The tough-on-crime legislation has resulted in a number of changes with regards to the 
minimum and maximum ages of jurisdiction within each state. Not all states in America have 
specified a minimum age for youth, although a limited number of youth under the age of 10 
appear before the juvenile court for delinquency charges. Due to a reactionary crisis and public 
outcry in the 1990s, Texas lowered its minimum age of responsibility for a youth to 10 years of 
age. The maximum age of criminal responsibility as a juvenile in Texas is 16 years of age (up 
until a youth’s 17th birthday), while states such as New York and North Carolina define the 
upper age of jurisdiction as 15 years of age. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (2013), “the upper age of jurisdiction is the oldest age at which a 
juvenile court has jurisdiction over an individual for law violating behavior. State statutes 
define which youth are under the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. These definitions 
are based primarily on age criteria”. In most states, the youth court has authority over all youth 
93 This list is not arranged in a particular/chronological order.  
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under the age of 17 that are charged with a criminal law violation (Bartollas, 2003). In contrast, 
Canada’s minimum age of jurisdiction is 12 years of age, and its maximum is 17 years of age.  
 Juvenile courts do not necessarily lose jurisdiction over young offenders once they are 
legally deemed adults. In some instances, protracted jurisdiction may be limited to specific 
offences or youth, such as violent offences, repeat offenders, and juveniles committed to 
institutions for treatment/rehabilitation (Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012, see also Fabelo, 
1997). As such, the extended age of juvenile court jurisdiction in Texas is 19 years of age. 
Moreover, in Texas, the youth court may in fact order an adult sentence for specific 
adjudicated delinquents that surpass the “term of confinement well beyond the upper age of 
juvenile jurisdiction” 94  (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2012). Similarly, 
Canadian youth under the age of 18 facing an adult sentence are sentenced under the youth 
court’s jurisdiction in order to benefit from the rehabilitative services offered in youth 
facilities.   
4.2.3 Detentions and Informal Dispositions in the State of Texas 
 The onus of the initial decision to detain a youth temporarily in the state of Texas is 
placed on either the police officer or another court intake employee (Bishop, Frazier and 
Henretta, 1999). Lengthier detentions most frequently occur where there is immediate danger 
to the public, where there is risk of flight prior to any scheduled court hearings, when the youth 
has committed a serious violent offence (such as homicide, rape or armed robbery), or when 
the accused may be in physical danger of the public (Feld, 2003). These findings are similar to 
94 These sentences are included in the bundle of dispositional options known as blended sentencing (i.e., juvenile 
blended sentencing in Texas).  
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the procedures used in Canada to detain youth prior to trial and are reflective of the enacted 
tough-on-crime legislation.  
 Alongside these decisions, the prosecutor’s office in Texas is typically responsible for 
deciding whether to dismiss a given case, handle it formally, or file a petition to formally 
request an adjudicatory hearing95 or waiver hearing96 (Lawrence & Hemmens, 2008; Sanborn, 
2003). However, similar to the findings in Canada, research on the ways in which cases 
generally flow for delinquents across all states including Texas illustrates that a fairly large 
percentage of youth are funneled out of the system prior to being formally processed.97 Filing a 
petition on behalf of a youth in Texas most frequently occurs in cases that involve youth who 
have committed a serious violent offence, have parents who cannot or have not exercised 
control over the youth, or who appear as repeat offenders. However, like Canada, there are a 
number of options available to the courts for those cases that do not go beyond the intake 
stage.98   
95 An adjudicatory hearing occurs when the parties involved in the case cannot reach an agreement to settle. As a 
result of a filed petition, the court plans for an adjudication hearing (described as the “fact-finding hearing” or 
“jurisdictional hearing”). The reasoning behind an adjudication hearing is to allow the courts to establish whether 
the prosecutor has adequate ground or evidence (via testimony of witnesses, experts, caseworkers, or police) to 
prove the allegations in the petition.   
96 A waiver hearing occurs once a petition requesting the case be transferred to adult court is filed. A waiver 
hearing effectively determines whether the court should waive its jurisdiction over the young offender, ceding its 
authority to adult criminal court. During this hearing the court considers a wide range of criteria in making this 
decision.     
97 According to The State of Juvenile Probation Activity in Texas (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013c), 
98,805 juvenile arrests were made in 2011. Of these youth, “45,151 were warned and released, processed in 
justice and municipal courts, or diverted, and 53,654 were referred to juvenile probation departments.” The 
statistical report suggests that “schools, probation departments, municipal courts and the state referred another 
21,062 cases, for a total of 74,716 referrals to juvenile probation departments in the year”. Approximately 79,130 
dispositions were made in 2011 on account of the “action taken by the juvenile department, the juvenile 
prosecutor or the juvenile court”. Of these dispositions, the probation departments were able to rid themselves of 
31,331 cases by dismissing or withdrawing 4,208 of these, by handing out a sanction of supervisory caution in 
15,724 cases, and by deferring prosecution in 11,399 of these cases (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013c).     
98 These sanctions include informal probation or community supervision to address minor or first time offenders 
(i.e., shoplifters) where events do not involve crimes against persons, or diversion. According to Schwartz (1989), 
diversion programs emerged from the federal government’s Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 
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4.2.4 Adjudicatory Hearings 
 The adjudicatory process for delinquents in Texas is outlined by two distinct aspects. 
The first, according to Feld (2003) and Patenaude (2003) is the diversion of less serious 
offenders from being formally processed, which removes the majority of minor offenders from 
the court. This finding is similar to the ways in which the YCJA effectively diverts youth away 
from courts and custodial sentences (Bala, Carrington & Roberts, 2009). On the other hand, 
there is evidence to suggest that the more serious offenders are increasingly being transferred 
to adult criminal courts on account of the tough-on-crime measures (Torbet & Szymanski, 
1998). The combination of these developments suggest that the perimeters of the youth justice 
system are blurry, and that youth who remain in the system are those that are most likely to 
become chronic offenders. Given Texas’ bifurcated approach to juvenile justice, the youth 
justice system is able to concentrate on youth who have the potential for becoming repeat 
offenders, but who are still capable of benefiting from rehabilitation. However, these are not 
necessarily the youth whom are targeted by harsher legislative controls.   
 There is significant variation in the way hearings take place across the United States 
(Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012; Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). In Texas, much like in 
many other states, there is a strong emphasis of concern placed on the child. Thus, it would 
appear that many hearings are less formal than their adult court hearing counterparts 
(Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012; Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013b). However, on 
account of the tough-on-crime measures and the range of dispositions available, delinquency 
hearings in Texas can be interpreted as significantly more adversarial than in the past. Both 
these findings are similar to those reported by Caputo and Vallée (2007) in relation to the 
1974.98 While some scholars believe the effects of diversion to be satisfactory, others are critical of their goals 
(Patenaude, 2003; Schwartz, 1989).  
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“patterns observed in Canada” and “in other Western nations” (“Executive Summary”). These 
shifts in formality suggest that juvenile courts operate under a due process model, mirroring 
adult criminal court proceedings (Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012). As such, there exists 
the ongoing quandary about the court’s guiding philosophy and whether or not it follows the 
principles of rehabilitation or due process (Caputo and Vallée, 2007). However, like Canada, 
the juvenile justice system in Texas is one that branches off and can, as Lindsey (1914) and 
Weisheit and Alexander (1988) suggest, uphold the principles of due process in an 
adjudicatory hearing and rehabilitation in a dispositional hearing.  
 The logic behind the due process model in the youth courts stem from the notion that 
fairness should be exercised and that the youth’s constitutional rights should prevail in a court 
of law. Theoretically, the due process model provides support for rehabilitation as it is in direct 
contrast with the crime control model. The tough-on-crime legislation, however, eases and 
assists the transfers of youth to the adult jurisdiction, subsequently illustrating how the justice 
system has expanded the powers of the court by calling on a crime control model when 
necessary.   
4.2.5 Dispositional Alternatives 
 Generally, juvenile court judges in Texas have a number of options when deciding on 
the appropriate type of punishment for youth who have been found guilty of delinquency 
(Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012). The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals (1976) place these alternatives into four categories: a) nominal; 99 b) 
99 A nominal disposition is typically a judicial court outcome which involves a verbal reprimand or warning by the 
judge, but may or may not include control and supervision over adjudicated delinquents. Thus, this approach is 
predominately considered an apathetic or relatively lenient form of probation for cases involving relatively minor 
offences (Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Assocation [IJA-ABA], 1979). 
148 
 
                                            
conditional;100 c) suspended;101 and d) custodial dispositions (see Gardner, 2009 for additional 
information). While the first three types of dispositional alternatives are used to respond to 
relatively minor offences, Snyder and Sickmund (2006) suggest custodial dispositions involve 
short- or long-term incarceration and are seen as last resort by juvenile court judges (see Table 
4.1 for a for a full breakdown of the correctional aspect of the youth justice system). This is 
particularly noteworthy given the court’s widespread rehabilitation philosophy which 
encourages the use of other alternatives to incarceration first. These findings are mirrored in 
the Canadian justice system as well.  
 Ruddell and Thomas (2009) suggest there are a number of different correctional 
facilities available for incarcerated youth. In Texas, these environments encompass minimum-
security facilities that are operated at the local level. In many instances, these facilities are 
modeled after college dormitories. In other cases, the state has implemented training schools 
that are relatively similar to adult correctional facilities. The statutes in Texas dictate the 
amount of time youth are to spend in confinement; however it should be noted that Texas 
100A conditional disposition, on the other hand, is comprised of a type of community supervision that carries with 
it various “conditions” or orders in order to maintain this favourable status (IJA-ABA, 1979; Snyder & Sickmund, 
2006). Due to the fundamental function of probation in the juvenile justice system, conditional dispositions are the 
most common type of sentence imposed on youth by juvenile court judges (IJA-ABA, 1979; Snyder and 
Sickmund, 2006). Conditional  dispositions may include a) financial sanctions (such as fines and restitution); b) 
community service (most often imposed in relatively minor offences, but also requires the presence of supervision 
by a probation officer); c) remedial services (such as personal or family counseling, treatment for substance abuse, 
and therapy for various educational deficiencies); and d) alternative residential placement (includes foster or 
group homes, shelters, halfway houses, psychiatric facilities, residential treatment centers, or boot camps) (IJA-
ABA, 1979; Rogers & Mays, 1987; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). A youth’s compliance with the stipulations put 
forth by the conditional disposition is overseen by a probation officer. If it is reported that the youth has violated 
the terms of the conditional sentence, the imposition of probation may be lifted and substituted with a custodial 
sentence instead (IJA-ABA, 1979; Rogers & Mays, 1987; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).   
101 Suspended dispositions are similar to nominal dispositions in that they involve cautions or warnings in a court, 
but can be followed with more serious court action if unwanted behaviour continues. These types of dispositions 
are most often used for first time offenders and minor property offences, where judges may be agreeable to forego 
formal adjudication in cases where the youth shows signs of remorse, indicates a willingness to behave as a law 
abiding citizen, or ceases their delinquent behaviour (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; IJA-ABA, 1979). 
149 
 
                                            
functions both under an indeterminate sentencing model and under determinate sentencing 
procedures.102 In the first occurrence, youth are sent to a correctional facility for a specific 
amount of time determined by a judge, where they are able to benefit from various 
rehabilitative services.103 As a result, a juvenile’s release date is set upon such time as a judge 
believes rehabilitation has been achieved. Thus, open-ended sentences can range from weeks to 
months to years, or when the juvenile court loses jurisdiction over the youth. In the latter 
instance where youth are sentenced determinately, a fixed amount of time is imposed upon an 
incarcerated youth. This procedure has little bearing on whether the youth has been 
rehabilitated and is demonstrative of a model of crime control that is more in line with adult 
offenders.   
4.2.6 Transfer Laws and Mechanisms 
 The ability to waive jurisdiction to the adult criminal court by youth court judges by 
means of certification in Texas has been available since the origin of a separate youth court.104 
While the YOA included provisions for transferring youth to the adult jurisdiction, the YCJA 
currently governing youth justice prohibits it. In effect, this automatically places Texas further 
along the tough-on-crime continuum, since it allows youth into the adult criminal jurisdiction 
and thus adult facilities. 
102 See Mears (2002) for more information on the shift in sentencing procedures in various states. 
103 Note that in Texas, a disposition (i.e., a sentence) can be indeterminate or determinate. While the majority of 
young offenders are committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for indeterminate sentences 
where the TJJD dictates the amount of time to be spent in the facility, serious and violent offenders typically 
receive a determinate sentence. Of the 34,107 cases that were referred to youth court to be dealt with by a judge or 
prosecutor, 954 juveniles were committed to the Texas Youth Commission (now the TJJD); with 841 youth 
receiving an indeterminate sentence and 113 receiving a determinate sentence. See “The State of Juvenile 
Probation Activity in Texas” (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013c).    
104 This statement applies to all American states; however most states do not refer to the process of waiving 
jurisdiction as “certification”.  
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 The general criteria used in Texas for assessing suitability for waiving youth to adult 
court most likely fit into three case types: a) serious offences; b) extensive youth records; or c) 
youth nearing the age limit of the court’s jurisdiction (Zimring, 1998).105 The first situation 
suggests that the disciplinary actions available to the youth court are not sufficient enough to 
hold the youth accountable for the type of crime committed (Zimring, 1998). Generally these 
types of cases involve serious felonies106 and violent crimes, but most frequently homicide. 
The second instance, on the other hand, gravitates around youth with extensive arrest histories 
(i.e., “a pattern of guilty findings” similar to those outlined in Bill C-10 (Part 4)) and various 
disciplinary measures (such as probation or a range of miscellaneous dispositions) (Zimring, 
1998). Extensive arrest histories suggest youth are no longer capable of profiting from the 
merits of the dispositional alternatives or rehabilitative programs. In the third occasion, the 
youth is nearing the upper age of jurisdiction of the youth court (Zimring, 1998). As a result, 
these cases tend to be waived since the youth court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile cannot be 
sustained for an adequate amount of time, or because of the youth’s age, the youth is more 
eligible for sentencing under the adult jurisdiction (Zimring, 1998).  
 According to Torbet and Szymanski (1998), all states are allotted the necessary means 
for treating youth as adults, provided that certain criteria or conditions are met. The criteria 
used in Texas to determine how and when cases are transferred to adult court are governed by 
105 Of the 34,107 cases referred to youth court in 2011, 175 youth were certified and transferred to adult court 
(Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013c). Overall, only two percent of youth who received a sentence were 
certified as adults or committed to the Texas Youth Commission (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013c). 
Thus, it is a fairly infrequent sentencing practice.  
106  A felony is defined as a serious crime and is roughly equated to an indictable offence in Canada. A 
misdemeanour, on the other hand, is a minor offence and roughly corresponds with a summary conviction in 
Canada.   
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state law. 107  The state law in Texas only allows for judicial (discretionary) 
waivers/certification to transfer youth to an adult court, although there are other possibilities 
and methods available in other states.108 As such, the decision to transfer a youth to an adult 
court in Texas rests on the sole discretion of the juvenile youth court judge, but typically after a 
full investigation has taken place. Over the last 20 years, Texas, like all other states, has 
facilitated the transfer of juveniles to adult court despite the fact that other transfer mechanisms 
are not permitted (Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). Generally speaking, Texas has amended their 
state law by including offences that allow or stipulate transfer to criminal court and lowering 
the age at which certain youth could be tried in criminal court.  
 Griffin, Torbet and Szymanski (1998), Champion, Merlo and Benekos (2012) and 
Torbet and Szymanski (1998) assert that judicial waiver proceedings have a number of diverse 
formats. In Texas, discretionary waivers are permitted in order to allow the juvenile court 
judge the power and discretion to settle on whether a matter will be tried in youth court or adult 
criminal court. While age and offence criteria are common components of judicial waiver 
provisions, other factors appear to come into play as well. For example, Texas’ statutes limit 
judicial waivers to youth who are seen as incapable of benefitting from treatment, but the 
precise factors that establish whether or not a youth is amenable varies. Most frequently, these 
factors normally take into account the youth’s offending history as well as previous 
dispositions. Cases that fall under discretionary waivers in Texas require the court to consider 
whether public safety is dependent upon it, whether the youth is able to take advantage of 
107 Please refer to Chapter 8 for more information on state law. 
108 Torbet and Syzmanski (1998) suggest that it is possible to use one or more of the following methods to transfer 
a youth into an adult court, depending on the laws of the state: a) judicial (discretionary) waiver; b) prosecutorial 
direct file; and c) statutory exclusion.  
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additional services (including rehabilitation if the youth is willing) through the youth justice 
system, and whether turning over jurisdictions serves in the interest of the youth (Griffin, 
Torbet and Szymanski, 1998; Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012). Once a youth has been 
transferred to the adult criminal court, the “once an adult, always an adult” provision applies 
(Griffin, Torbet, & Szymanski, 1998; Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). As part of the tough-on-
crime legislation enacted in 1995/1996, Texas created this special transfer category to provide 
the state with a statute that supports the notion that once a youth has been transferred to the 
adult criminal court, all ensuing offences require criminal prosecution (Juvenile Justice, 
Geography, Policy, Practice and Statistics, 2012). 109  According to Johnson (2010), this 
provision was enacted in order to accelerate the procedural methods used by the courts to 
transfer such cases, as well as “increase judicial economy” (p. 15).    
 The transfer of youth to the adult jurisdiction characterizes an important field where 
human rights principles apply to youth justice. Specifically, Article 40 (3) of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child states that “states shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, 
procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused 
of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law.” Article 40 (3)(a) & (b) and 40 (4) also 
declare that the youth justice system ought to create a minimum age below which youth are to 
be presumed not to have the mental competence to contravene the penal law (minimum 
jurisdictional age), that, where possible, the system itself should develop a means for dealing 
with youth informally, and that the scope of dispositional options and/or alternatives need to be 
109 This only applies to cases that do not require a detailed investigation to take place in discretionary waivers 
scenarios. There is exception to cases where the youth was acquitted or had the conviction reversed on a final 
appeal.  
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established in order to ensure that youth are dealt with in a manner that both considers their 
situation and holds them accountable.  
 Rule 2(3) of the Minimum Standard Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 
(United Nations, 1985) equally articulates the need for the states to construct a separate youth 
justice system to pass judgement over youth criminal offences, while taking into account the 
basic needs of youth in conflict with the law. These provisions implicitly specify the need for a 
different youth justice system than the one available for adults (Amnesty International, 1998; 
Hodgkin & Newell, 1998). In reference to these latter provisions, it appears that the 
circumstances under which Texas both processes and incarcerates youth as adults contradicts 
the principles outlined in the United Nations Convention. However, it should also be noted that 
the United States was one of the only countries that did not ratify this document, while Canada 
did. This finding might help explain why Canadian youth who receive an imposition of an 
adult sentence under the age of 18 are not permitted to serve their sentences in an adult facility 
(YCJA S. 76(2)).  
 The transfer of youth to the adult jurisdiction statistically represents approximately 1-
2% of cases presented before the courts in Texas. Although these figures are indicative of the 
relative infrequency in which cases are certified, Johnson (2010) suggests that the hearings 
associated with these referrals have a significant bearing on the potential outcome for the 
youth. Transfers to the adult criminal courts entail a loss in “the juvenile protection and 
safeguards which have been mandated in Texas law since the Gault decision”, whereby the 
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legislation governing the youth’s well-being is substituted for laws and provisions designed for 
their adult counterparts (Johnson, 2010, p. 16).110      
4.2.7 Sentence Structure and Blended Sentences 
 Prior to any legislative amendments that occurred in the last couple of decades, the 
adopted welfare approach in Texas required the courts to give consideration to the well-being 
and needs of the youth when imposing a sentence. During this time, youth court judges 
possessed a great deal of power and discretion in dispositional decision-making, and frequently 
considered the role of rehabilitation in sanctioning (Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012). 
Preceding the implementation of determinate sentencing provisions, indeterminate disciplinary 
measures ensured that the youth courts could supervise youth until such time as they reached 
the maximum age of jurisdiction. However, with the ongoing statewide legislative amendments 
in Texas, the juvenile justice system has become more emblematic of a model that upholds 
individual responsibility and punishment as opposed to adhering to principles of rehabilitation 
(Muncie & Goldson 2006; Snyder, 2002). This transition has not only resulted in a shift in 
sentencing principles by placing emphasis on deterrence and retribution instead, but also shifts 
its focus from the offender to offence itself (Torbet & Szymanski, 1998). According to Torbet 
and Szymanski (1998), the use of “mandatory minimum sentences”, “extended jurisdictions”, 
and “blended sentences” are techniques used for imposing sanctions on youth for dispositions 
that are considered “offence-based”. In contrast, there are no mandatory minimum sentences 
for youth in Canada.      
 The use and application of blended sentences vary by state, but intend to unite both 
youth and adult criminal sanctions (Champion, Merlo & Benekos, 2012; Torbet & Szymanski, 
110 This statement is illustrative of the crime control model used in Texas.  
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1998). 111  According to Griffin (2011), “juvenile blended sentencing schemes empower 
juvenile courts to impose adult criminal sanctions on certain categories of serious juvenile 
offenders” (p. 1). In Texas, the juvenile or the adult court may impose a sentence to be served 
in the youth corrections system but may be subsequently followed by a sentence in an adult 
institution. 112   
 Advocates of blended sentences tend to view them as a less stringent option than 
transferring youth directly to criminal court. According to Dawson (2004), juvenile blended 
sentences that give juveniles a suspended criminal sentence only when they violate the terms of 
their disposition give youth the prospect of avoiding serious criminal sanctions. Those against 
blended approaches, however, argue that these types of sentences not only represent a degree 
111 In Texas, legislatures call their blended sentence laws “determinate sentencing”. In these instances, the youth’s 
sentence is imposed for a given number of years as opposed to ordering a youth to supervision by the court for an 
“indeterminate” amount of time, up until the point where the youth reaches the maximum limit of the court’s 
jurisdiction. “Determinate sentencing” refers to a sentence of imprisonment in which a convicted offender is given 
a fixed term of punishment for a criminal offence. “Indeterminate sentencing”, on the other hand, is a prison term 
imposed after conviction of a crime but does not specifically state how long the offender will be incarcerated or 
when they are entitled to be released. The purpose of “indeterminate sentencing” is to prevent the offender from 
further committing violent offences. It is a sentence which places the decision to release the offender outside the 
guidance of the courts and under supervision of another authority such as a parole board. A distinguishing feature 
of the “indeterminate sentence” is that the offender has no guarantee of ever being released from custody, and is 
therefore subject to what is called a “life sentence”. (see Cole & Smith, 2007). In Texas, dispositions can be either 
indeterminate or determinate, pending on the offence. In 2007, Texas law was amended to ensure that sentenced 
offenders be discharged from Texas Juvenile Justice Department supervision by their 19th birthday. However, 
youth who have not completed their sentence prior to their 19th birthday or have not been transferred to the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice by their 19th birthday are transferred to adult parole supervision in order to 
complete the remainder of their sentence (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013b). Most sentences in Canada 
that includes incarceration for young offenders are for a fixed term of punishment and do not require that the 
young person remain in custody for the entire length of the sentence. Rather, they may be granted a discretionary 
release at various eligibility dates during their sentence. If they are still in custody at two-thirds of their sentence, 
they are typically released to serve the final one-third under supervision in the community.    
112 Blended sentencing provisions in Texas allow a serious offender to receive a sentence “up to 40 years for a 
capital felony, first degree felony, or aggravated controlled substance felony”, a portion of which is spent in 
confinement at the Texas Juvenile Justice Department followed by a transfer to adult parole or prison. Blended 
sentences for youth who commit a second degree felony may receive “a sentence up to 20 years, and up to 10 
years for a third degree felony”. Commitments are initially made to the TJJD, however if the sentence is 
incomplete and the youth’s behaviour suggests that the wellbeing of the community necessitates it, the Texas 
Youth Commission may recommend that the youth be transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice at 
any time until the youths 20th birthday (see The Texas Juvenile Justice Department (2013b) “Overview of Juvenile 
Justice System,”). 
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of harmony between the adult and youth courts, but also amalgamate the way both courts are 
procedurally carried out. On this note, Feld (1997) suggests there is no real need for a separate 
youth court if the systems resemble too closely in their sentences and procedures.113   
 To help understand how Texas may be used as an illustration of a more severe crime 
control model, the following table summarizes some of the major similarities and differences 
between the Canadian and Texan juvenile justice systems. Table 4.1 offers a more 
comprehensive understanding of where Canada sits on this tough-on-crime continuum, but also 
provides a frame of reference for a more complete analysis of the tough-on-crime legislation 
witnessed in the case law in Chapter 8. These findings demonstrate the variations in sentencing 
practices associated with (or in contradiction to) the tough-on-crime legislation that can be 
used to help inform Canadians about the development of youth criminal justice policies. 
113 It is difficult to make any veritable claims with regards to how many juveniles are affected by blended 
sentences given that there are no national data, albeit there are some records at the state level which suggests that 
blended sentencing may have the ability to produce sentences that are longer than anticipated. The findings in 
accordance with the Texas Youth Commission purport that the changes to Texas’ legislation had an effect on 
sentencing practices which resulted in an increase in the number of youth commitments in adult state prisons. 
However, this does not suggest that all youth who are certified as adults necessarily serve time in adult prisons. 
Blended sentences merely enable youth to commence their sentence in a youth facility and later serve the 
remainder of their sentence in an adult correctional facility. 
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Table 4.1: Illustrative Summary of Youth Justice Systems and Mechanisms in Canada and Texas 
 
Characteristic Canada Texas 
 
Purpose of system 
outlined in the 
governing legislation 
 
The Declaration of Principle outlined in the 
YCJA states that the protection of the public by 
the youth criminal justice system involves: 
• Holding youth accountable for their actions 
with responses proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offence and degree of 
responsibility. 
• Promoting the rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
• Supporting crime prevention with referrals 
to community-based programs and agencies 
that address the root causes of the criminal 
behaviour. 
 
 
The emphasis in the Legislative Guide is on “community 
protection, offender accountability, crime reduction 
through deterrence, or punishment”. 
Minimum and 
maximum age of 
jurisdiction 
• Minimum: 12 years of age 
• Maximum: 17 years of age 
 
• Minimum: 10 years of age 
• Maximum: 16 years of age 
Transfer laws & 
mechanisms 
YCJA does not allow for youth to be transferred 
to the adult court jurisdiction. 
• Discretionary (traditional/judicial) waivers 
• “Once and adult, always an adult” 
• Juvenile blended (determinate) sentencing  
 
Pre-trial detention • Allowed if youth poses a risk to themselves or 
to the public, is likely to reoffend is released, 
is likely to fail to appear in court, has 
• Detained on the same grounds as youth in Canada.  
• Can be held in an adult facility only if separated by 
sight and sound, although this is not always the case.  
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involvement with the justice system or faces 
other charges.  
• Must be detained in separate facilities from 
adults. 
 
• If a waiver proceeding is granted, separation by sound 
and sight is not required.  
Adjudication process • No preliminary inquiry.  
• No right to trial by jury except in rare 
situations where youth is facing the 
possibility of an adult sentence for more than 
5 years. 
 
All adjudication hearings are held before a jury unless the 
youth waives their right to a jury, but in cases regarding 
determinate sentencing of violent or habitual offenders, 
youth have a right to a grand jury. 
 
How and when adult 
sentences are 
applied 
Based on judicial discretion, even though Crown 
can apply for adult sentence for youth over the 
age of 14 for presumptive offences. 
• Based on prosecutorial discretion.  
• In cases where a discretionary waiver is used, the 
prosecutor asks the court to waive its jurisdiction over 
the youth. Certification of youth as adults is available 
for any felony and non-violent crimes for sentences up 
to 99 years for youth 14 years of age or older.  
• Determinate sentencing is available for the most serious 
and violent offenders, and is determined by a juvenile 
judge. Includes sentences up to 40 years.  
Placement of youth 
sentenced as an adult 
• If the youth is under the age of 18 at the time 
of the sentence, the youth must serve their 
sentence in a youth custody facility. 
• If the youth is over the age of 18 at the time 
of the sentence, “the youth may serve their 
sentence in a provincial correctional facility 
for adults or, if the sentence is 2 years or 
more, in a federal penitentiary for adults”.  
• If certified and transferred to the adult jurisdiction, the 
youth is placed in a secure adult facility. 
• Determinate sentences start in the TJJD with a possible 
transfer to the adult prison after 19 years of age if youth 
is not rehabilitated. 
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4.2.8 The Effects of Getting Tough-on-Crime Almost Twenty Years Later  
 Although budgetary cuts in 2009 have forced Texas legislators to re-evaluate major 
structural components of the juvenile justice system, changes towards a more community-
based rehabilitative model are still in the works. While conservative members in Texas have 
indicated that tougher sentencing practices are both costly and ineffective at curbing youth 
crime, research indicates that a substantial number of youth who commit serious violent 
offences as well as other types of crimes are still transferred to the adult jurisdiction each year 
in Texas. The process, whereby a youth court judge waives jurisdiction, entails that eligible 
youth are subject to receiving almost the whole scope of disciplinary penalties set out for adult 
offenders under the Penal Code.114 As such, Texas housed 156 youth under the age of 18 in 
adult facilities in 2009 – the 6th highest state in America to sentence youth to adult jails and 
prisons after Florida, Connecticut, North Carolina, New York, and Arizona (Arya, 2011).115 
Research suggests that youth in contact with the adult justice system are deprived of 
rehabilitative or instructional services that incorporate educative elements needed for 
successful development, given that the adult justice system is far more punitive and far less 
inclined to treat amenable youth (Deitch, 2009a, 2009b).         
    Overall, the effectiveness of tough-on-crime laws and policies enacted in Texas and 
the United States more generally remains somewhat bewildering. Tonry and Doob (2004) 
114 There are two exceptions for certified youth: First, youth “cannot receive the death penalty”, as outlined in the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005); and second, “they are no longer eligible for a 
life without parole sentence for a capital offence” (See Texas Penal Code, Chapter 12: Punishments, S.12.31(a)(1) 
for more information). Youth who are ordered to a life sentence are “eligible for parole consideration after serving 
40 years of their sentence” (Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, 2012). At that juncture there is no requirement 
stipulating their release, but they are entitled to a case review by the Parole Board. Thus, youth “tried as adults can 
receive sentences ranging from probation to up to 99 years or life, depending on the felony” (Texas Penal Code, 
Chapter 12: Punishments, S.12.31(a)(1).   
115 There were no youth under the age of 18 in adult prisons in 2009 in Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, 
Kentucky, West Virginia, California and Idaho.  
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suggest that unnecessarily clamping down on youth crime has led to divergent paths. In some 
cases these policies have excelled in thrusting revolutionary improvements by constructing 
ground-breaking measures to address and respond to youth whom have had contact with the 
justice system. In other instances, legislation is fashioned to support more punitive and 
prohibitive practices, especially with regards to transferring youth to the adult jurisdiction. As 
reported by the Task Force on Community Preventive Services (2007), the effectiveness of 
policies and legislation that aid the transfer of youth to the adult jurisdiction has a minimal 
deterrent effect on either preventing or reducing violence. In fact, studies show that transfers to 
adult courts increase future violence rates and is an inimical technique for deterring any 
ensuing violence (see the Task Force on Community Preventive Services, 2007). On a similar 
note, Snyder (2002) explains that disconnections between the adult and youth court 
jurisdictions create complexities for legislators and professionals in the area of youth justice, 
because there is confusion around the model to be followed (i.e., a model that supports the 
welfare of the youth or a model such as the youth justice system that favours punishment and 
retribution). Subsequently, 64% of America (or thirty-two states) has developed legislation that 
not only takes into account prevention, diversion and treatment, but also emphasizes the role of 
punishment as part of their purpose (Snyder, 2002).    
4.3 An Illustration of Similar Processes  
 The tough-on-crime legislation in Canada and Texas is demonstrative of a number of 
universal trends that illustrate the same processes underlying its enactment. These findings are 
best explained by Caputo & Vallée (2007) on the similarities amongst most Western nations. 
Both Canada and Texas have observed a notable spike in the number of youth charged for 
crimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although this finding has been noted in other 
161 
 
jurisdictions as well (Caputo & Vallée, 2007; Prior, 2005; Tonry & Doob, 2004). This increase 
consequently compelled the public to demand that greater emphasis be placed on controlling 
crime and establishing harsher sanctions. Accordingly, these jurisdictions have either initiated 
and launched new youth justice legislation or have presented amendments to current youth 
justice laws (Caputo & Vallée, 2007). Preoccupation with the public’s attitude towards and 
understanding of the nature and extent of youth crime is also prevalent in other areas of 
authority. Recent comparative studies on youth crime reveal that most jurisdictions have in fact 
experienced an unjustified increase in their perception of the rates of crime as well as the types 
of youth crime (such as violent crime) (Caputo & Vallée, 2007). That is, it is believed that 
youth crime is more prevalent than is the case. In both Canada and Texas, this is a 
phenomenon which appears to be unfounded by statistical evidence, although these 
jurisdictions (and U.S.A. more generally) have been equally impacted by tough-on-crime 
legislation (see Caputo & Vallée, 2007). 
 According to Caputo & Vallée (2007), a growing concern for children’s rights is 
illustrative of the profound consequences on the processes in which judgements are made 
within these justice systems. The emergence of separate youth justice systems highlights the 
connections that exist within welfarism and the crime control model that most typically guides 
and oversees youth justice policy not only in Canada and Texas, but amongst most Western 
nations (Caputo & Vallée, 2007; Prior, 2005; Tonry & Doob, 2004). Prominent shifts in the 
social/cultural, political, or economic environments in Canada and Texas are subsequently 
interrelated with these oppositional approaches to youth justice. Therefore, the significance of 
youth justice between both archetypes is necessarily dictated by various structural factors 
(Caputo & Vallée, 2007; Garland, 2001; McMurtry & Roy, 2008).       
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 As noted earlier, both Canada and Texas are indicative of a progressive movement 
“towards a more adversarial, criminal court approach”, and away from those that traditionally 
encompass practices in favour of child welfare (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, “Executive 
Summary”). Studies find that the push for more punitive approaches stems from an overall 
consensus in response to the ongoing issues surrounding youth violence (Caputo & Vallée, 
2007; Garland, 2001; McMurtry & Roy, 2008; Prior, 2005; Tonry & Doob, 2004). 
Consequently, Canada has witnessed the emergence of “longer sentences and presumptive 
offences for serious and repeat offenders” in light of the YCJA legislation (Caputo & Vallée, 
2007, “Executive Summary”). Yet, much research on sentencing practices in the United States 
and Texas recognizes that the implementation of harsher sentences (such as deterrence) has 
failed to produce and achieve the sorts of positive results that were originally anticipated 
(Caputo & Vallée, 2007; McMurtry & Roy, 2008; Prior, 2005; Tonry & Doob, 2004). 
Consequently, there is some evidence to suggest that the United States (including Texas) is 
currently in support of implementing more extensive strategies to address youth crime which 
incorporates “community-based treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration” as opposed to 
systematically addressing these issues with tough-on-crime measures (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, 
“Executive Summary”; see also Bishop & Decker, 2006; Snyder, 2002). It can be said that this 
paradigmatic shift in dealing with youth crime is partially attributed to the fact that Texas been 
governed by tougher sentencing practices for a longer period of time, and is therefore better 
positioned to comment on the successes and failures of these tactics. Overall, however, these 
findings are linked to the allegiance of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative rationalities that 
have attacked penal-welfarism in unison amongst almost all Western countries.   
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 The “politicization” of youth justice in Canada and the United States (but more 
specifically Texas) is illustrative of one of the most significant developments over the last few 
decades (Caputo & Vallée, 2007; Tonry & Doob, 2004). This “politicization” is a by-product 
of “public concerns over perceived increases in youth crime and youth violence and to 
sensationalized media accounts of tragic but isolated incidents” (Caputo & Vallée, 2007, 
“Executive Summary”; see also Garland, 2001). Although both jurisdictions report a relative 
infrequency of crimes that are serious or violent, Caputo and Vallée (2007) suggest that events 
such as various school shootings116 are illustrative of the ways in which remote occurrences are 
capable of influencing tough-on-crime measures to enhance legislation against youth crime. In 
relation to the resurgence of fear of the perceived increase in youth crime, it is the interaction 
between the public, the press, the so-called failed legislation, and the politicians that 
simultaneously produce a demand for tougher sentencing practices. The history of the ideas 
and cycle of youth justice suggest that the perception of an increase in juvenile crime has little 
basis. Nonetheless, perception disguised as knowledge calls for stricter legislation whether 
youth crime genuinely increases or not.    
 Despite the ways in which youth are defined by age within Canada and Texas and the 
transfer mechanisms used to waive youth to the adult jurisdiction, it is evident that both areas 
of authority have increasingly experienced political involvement in the debate about youth 
offending in order to advance tough-on-crime agendas. Youth crime in these jurisdictions has 
116 Texas has the second highest rate of school shootings across all of the United States, next to California. Since 
1992, there have been 29 school shootings, resulting in 17 deaths. Seventy-six percent of all victims involved in 
these shootings fall between the ages of 10 and 19. Similarly, 70% of the shooters are from the same age group 
(StopTheShootings.org, 2014). Examples of school shootings in Canada are Centennial Secondary School 
Shooting (15 victims), 1975, which led to tougher guns laws in Canada – prior to this incident, anyone could walk 
into a store and purchase a firearm; W. R. Myers High School Shooting, 1999 (1 victim); C.W. Jeffries Collegiate 
Institute Shooting, 2007 (1 victim).   
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created a lasting impression that conveys the ongoing need to address adolescent criminality 
due to perceptions on its nature and prevalence. Thus, employing tough-on-crime legislation is 
intended to be a preventative measure from fear of further decline in values and behaviour, 
which falls in line with the neo-conservative perspective. This is reported by literature from 
Western nations which indicate that a “get tough” stance on out-of-control youth is simply a 
political allegory for the discomforts associated with such hot button issues (Bishop & Decker, 
2006; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; Krisberg, 2006; O’Malley, 1999). Similarly, the 
United States Surgeon General (2001) acknowledged that tough-on-crime legislation serves 
political interests as opposed to the best interests of young people or community health.  
 In a sense, the commonalities amongst both the American and Canadian jurisdictions 
suggest that, symbolically, juvenile offending holds a similar meaning. In both national 
contexts, there is a strong emphasis on the negative aspects of “norm violating behaviours” that 
contradict the values upheld by society (Tanner, 2010, p. 4). In response to the problematic 
behaviours exhibited by youth that go against the ascribed grain, tough-on-crime legislation 
embodies a political response to this issue by devising policies that publicly demonstrate that 
something is being done to correct the growing quandary. This is witnessed not only in Texas, 
but also in Canada where the tendency to focus on disciplinary measures through legislation is 
rooted in crime control policies that originated in the United States (Muncie & Goldson, 2006). 
Further, it has been asserted that the ways in which juvenile offending is viewed in Canada 
(and both the reactions and responses to these behaviours) “are heightened because of 
Canada’s proximity to the United States. To some extent, and largely through the cross-border 
influence of American media outlets, we have imported American law-and-order fears into 
Canada” (Tanner, 2010, p. 270). These findings help justify the inclusion of Texas in this 
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dissertation as an illustration of how both jurisdictions have undergone similar youth justice 
transformations.         
 Although the ways in which each jurisdiction oversees and responds to youth crime 
varies, research in this area reveals that all tough-on-crime policies assert a greater need for 
public safety while simultaneously advocating for reductions in government spending for 
health, education, and social services (e.g., the Canadian Conservative government cut funding 
from youth rehabilitation programs by 20% in April 2013). For this reason, tough-on-crime 
strategies do not benefit at-risk youth or serious repeat offenders in any jurisdiction, especially 
given that studies urge a need for better preventative and rehabilitative measures. It is 
imperative to note that most jurisdictions that have adopted tough-on-crime legislation stem 
from fairly conservative governments that are far more concerned with strengthening or 
enacting harsh sanctions for youth as opposed to fostering adequate social and rehabilitative 
programs. Thus, it comes as no surprise that jurisdictions such as Texas that are far stauncher 
than Canada are experiencing or have previously experienced comparable issues as a result of 
harsher legislation.  
 Overall, the findings presented in this chapter are indicative of the ways in which 
tough-on-crime legislation is a result of similar transformative processes in relation to youth 
justice. Shifts in the legislation and guiding principles in Canada are illustrative of the 
changing perceptions and treatment of youth and more specifically of young offenders. This 
transition from a focus on rehabilitation towards more punitive legislation demonstrates how 
definitions of young offenders have changed over time. More specifically, there is a strong 
emphasis on the ways in which some youth, particularly those who represent a dangerous class 
of offenders, are perceived by the public as youth in need of control. References to the larger 
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political context that escorted this movement towards harsher sanctions provide a basis to 
similar phenomena that have been observed in Texas, indicating that these processes are not 
exclusive to Canada. The macro political changes that have occurred over the last century in 
Canada are perceived as transformations that are fueled by politicians, the media and the public, 
which ultimately gave rise to a neo-liberalist state that focuses on a differing set of interests. In 
the Canadian context, these changes are witnessed in the legislative amendments that 
accompanied the YOA, but in the end required a more nuanced piece of legislation to address 
youth crime. As such, the current approach to youth justice in Canada under the YCJA blends 
together certain aspects of its preceding legislation, which emphasizes the role of the young 
offender (JDA) and the offence itself (YOA). These findings are mirrored in the legislation 
currently governing youth in the state of Texas, although the role of rehabilitation is secondary 
to the offence when youth are transferred to the adult criminal jurisdiction. As a result, this 
jurisdiction is illustrative of a crime control model that upholds a more tough-on-crime 
philosophy than its Canadian counterpart.  
4.4 Areas Identified in the Literature for Future Review 
 Based on the literature reviewed in the last two chapters, there is a fair amount of 
research pertaining to the ways in which the state exercises legitimate power on account of 
gaining and maintaining legitimacy, as well as on the creation of laws and the shaping of them 
by a consensus of interests and values by interest groups and those in a position of power. This 
literature is highly interconnected with the sensationalism of youth crime through the media, 
the way media constructs public opinion about youth crime, and the various responses to youth 
crime in relation to tougher sentencing practices. Moreover, prior research indicates that the 
ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation has developed in Canada is not exclusive and 
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thus extends to other jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere. As such, a synopsis of the ways 
in which Texas respond to youth crime was considered, as it serves as an illustration of a crime 
control model which exemplifies a tough-on-crime approach to youth justice. Nonetheless, 
there still remain a number of questions which are not adequately addressed in a Canadian 
context. Table 4.2 outlines identified issues requiring further research that this dissertation will 
address. On the basis of these, this dissertation investigates six research questions that are 
formed on three central issues. These are: 1) The processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
was developed and legislated; 2) The ways in which tough-on-crime legislation been 
implemented in youth courts; and 3) The ways in which Texas differs in their policies and 
legislation in response to youth crime, relative to their crime control model and placement on 
the tough-on-crime spectrum.  
  
168 
 
Table 4.2: Areas Identified in the Literature for Future Research 
1. There is virtually no research which specifically addresses the processes through which 
Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and legislated.  
 
2. There does not appear to be any research that investigates how Bill C-10 (Part 4) has 
been implemented within the youth courts. In part, this is because Bill C-10 (Part 4) is 
still too new and therefore renders it difficult to assess if and how this has occurred.   
 
3. There does not appear to be a great deal of literature pertaining to the justification for 
the imposition of adult sentences to youth in the Canadian context, as well as the 
impacts of adult sentences to youth as a deterrent.117 However there seems to be an 
abundance of literature on this matter from the United States.  
 
4. There is very little research in terms of where the newly enacted legislation places 
Canada on the tough-on-crime continuum, relative to other jurisdictions such as Texas 
which have enacted similar measures more than two decades ago.    
 
5. There is very little research on how a youth’s characteristics (i.e., as part of the 
“underclass”) are linked to an escalating proportional disadvantage which may lead 
youth towards a path of violence or a differential response to criminal behaviour in 
Canada.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 One of the main criticisms against exercising such practices in Canada is related to the youth’s limited mental 
maturity, which essentially diminishes the effects of a longer sentence due to a lack appreciation for the nature 
and consequences of the crime. The concept of diminished moral blameworthiness is explicitly outlined in the 
provisions of the YCJA. 
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4.5 Research Questions 
 This dissertation research will investigate three central research questions: 
(1) What are the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and 
 legislated? 
(2) In what way(s) has tough-on-crime legislation been implemented in youth 
 courts? 
 (3) How does Texas differ in their policies and legislation in response to youth crime, 
  relative to their crime control model and placement on the tough-on-crime  
  spectrum? 
 Given what is known about the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) (and tough-on-crime 
legislation more generally), the following research questions form the basis for this dissertation 
and are developed from what still remains unanswered or unexplored by previous studies. Each 
research question is linked to a gap(s) in knowledge that currently requires investigation. The 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 informs the development of the research 
questions to investigate whether these theories can provide an explanation for the process(es) 
of enacting this piece of legislation.   
Issue 1: What are the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed 
and was legislated? Despite research indicating that tough-on-crime 
measures will have no effect on youth crime rates, why has the 
Canadian Government legislated Bill C-10 (Part 4) as a viable 
response? 
 
Research Question #1:    
 
 
Whose values and interests are embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation? From the perspective of the respondents, whose values 
should be embodied in Bill C-10 (Part 4) in order to better address 
youth crime in Canada? 
 
Research Question #2: 
  
Whose conceptions of what society ought to be like influenced the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4)? 
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Areas in the Research:            1 and 3 
 
 
Issue 2:   
  
 
In what ways has tough-on-crime legislation been implemented 
within youth courts in Canada? 
 
Research Question #3:
    
    
 
Have youth in conflict with the law been impacted by the tough-on-
crime policy, either negatively or positively? If so, in what ways? 
(i.e., sentencing practices, deterrence). 
 
Areas in the Research:            
 
2 and 3 
Issue 3:   
  
How does Texas differ in their policies and legislation in response 
to youth crime, relative to their crime control model and placement 
on the tough-on-crime spectrum? 
 
Research Question #4: How does Texas oversee and respond to youth crime in relation to 
their tough-on-crime legislation, and how has this legislation been 
implemented within youth courts in Texas?  
Research Question #5:            How do policies and legislation in response to youth crime in Texas 
differ from those of Canada? 
Research Question #6: What can we learn from the way Texas responds to youth crime in 
terms of their policies and legislation? In what ways can these 
differences help inform the future development of Canadian youth 
criminal justice policy? 
Areas in the Research:            4 and 5 
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CHAPTER 5 - METHODS 
 In order to examine the micro and macro processes involved in the development of the 
tough-on-crime legislation, one needs to uncover the processes, rationale and the impact of 
sentencing practices associated with the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). The research 
questions outlined in Chapter 4 demand different types of data that require the use of three 
analytical techniques. Consequently, a qualitative approach is adopted that not only analyzes 
interview data, but also analyzes case studies from Canada, and allows for a legal analysis of 
both current legislation and case law from Texas as well. Thus, the description and explanation 
of the data derived from this research is presented through a constructivist lens, which shows a) 
the processes associated with the tough-on-crime approach in Canada and the processes 
through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed, legislated and implemented within the courts; 
and b) the ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation is implemented within the youth 
courts in Texas.  
 Texas was chosen for analysis for two main reasons. First, it was chosen on the basis of 
its diversity from Canada, especially in terms of its legal norms, rules, customs, policies, and 
legislation. Although Texas and Canada share in some commonalities, the first rationale behind 
choosing Texas was based on the notion that, overall, it appears to be more harsh and 
disciplinary. The state of Texas is well known as being one of the most punitive in the Western 
world. In essence, Texas is further along the tough-on-crime continuum, and therefore stands 
to serve as an illustration of a crime control model that upholds laws consistent with this 
philosophy of justice. Second, conservative experts from the state of Texas spoke against the 
legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (or Bill C-4) in hopes of curbing the Canadian 
government from implementing them. This was not only due to the costs associated with more 
punitive measures, but that rehabilitative and community-based approaches have been found to 
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be far more successful. The inclusion of data from Texas essentially creates a means for using 
this material as illustrative of a model that acts as a counterpoint to the philosophy in Canada.        
 This chapter provides an overview of the data collection and analytical techniques used 
in this study. First, the overall approach to research is reviewed with a discussion on the 
appropriateness to address the research questions. Second, the research methods are introduced 
and considered in relation to the research objective. Third, various sources of qualitative data 
are reviewed. Fourth, the methods pertaining to both the data collection and subsequent 
analysis are discussed. Fifth, a summary of the ethical considerations are outlined in addition to 
the potential risks and benefits associated with the study. Finally, a brief synopsis of the 
various sources of data, collection methods, and analytic procedures is provided.    
5.1 Qualitative Approach to Research       
 According to Creswell (2003), a qualitative approach is best used in research where an 
“inquirer often makes claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives (i.e., the multiple 
meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and historically constructed, with an 
intent of developing a theory or pattern) or advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e., political, 
issue-oriented, collaborative or change oriented) or both” (p. 18). Given the theoretical 
perspectives and research questions, an emergent research design is appropriate in order to 
examine the micro and macro processes of the newly enacted tough-on-crime approach in 
Canada. Thus, strategies of inquiry such as legal analyses, interviews, and case studies are 
employed to enable the collection of open-ended and emerging data.   
 Qualitative research is based on the underlying premise that the existence of multiple 
realities stem from a process of interpretation whereby individuals negotiate meanings and 
understandings. Qualitative inquiries therefore enable investigations into the ways in which 
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individuals perceive their personal environment through day-to-day processes. Since the 
research questions pertain to various perspectives on values, interests, policy-making and 
implementation, as well as the perceptions of effectiveness in Canada by various stakeholders, 
this study requires the use of an analytical methodology that is characterized as inductive. 
 Constructionist ontology views social phenomena as produced by the perceptions and 
ensuing actions of social actors. Thus, both the social phenomena and their meanings are 
defined and redefined by the actors and are in a constant state of flux (Creswell, 2013). Crotty 
(1998) defines constructivism as,  
the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality 
as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in 
and out of interaction between human beings and their world, 
and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context. (p. 42)  
 
 Interpretivism is an epistemological perspective that promotes the need for researchers 
to both understand and develop familiarity with the differences between humans in their role as 
social actors (Creswell, 2013). This perspective requires a researcher to assume an empathetic 
position that challenges them to immerse themselves into the world of their research subjects in 
order to develop an awareness of the world from their perspective (Creswell, 2013). Given that 
participants in this study have varying opinions on youth crime and how to best respond to it, 
as well as differing perceptions of effectiveness, this paradigm is most suitable for this type of 
research.    
 The objective of interpretivist research is to understand and make sense of human 
behaviour based on meanings and actions from the actor’s perspective, as opposed to making 
generalized inferences that forecast causes and effects. Interpretivist researchers note the 
significance of understanding intentions, meanings, reasons, rationales and other subjective 
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experiences which are constrained both by time and context (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). 
According to Hudson and Ozanne (1988), interpretivist researchers enter the field with some 
knowledge about the research topic, but assume that there is sufficient awareness of the topic 
in order to develop a fixed research design (albeit challenging due to the multifaceted and 
erratic disposition of what is understood as being reality).   
5.2 Reliability and Validity  
 The concepts of reliability and validity in qualitative studies bring forth a great deal of 
challenges, both in terms of their definitions and in the ways in which they can be tested or 
applied within the design of the qualitative research. According to Joppe (2000), reliability is 
defined as, 
The extent to which results are consistent over time and an 
accurate representation of the total population under study is 
referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be 
reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research 
instrument is considered to be reliable (p. 1).  
 
Reliability is centered on the notion of whether the results or observations can be repeated. 
Reliability in quantitative research is composed of three categories, which primarily describe 1) 
“the degree to which a measurement, given repeatedly remains the same”; 2) “the stability of a 
measurement over time”; and 3) “the similarity of measurements within a given time period” 
(Kirk & Miller, 1986, pp. 41-42). Thus, according to Charles (1995), the use of the test-retest 
method over time can determine stability by testing items that are frequently answered in a 
comparable fashion. Likewise, this technique can be applied in instances where one’s 
individual scores remain reasonably similar from one test to the next. Therefore, one can argue 
that the more stable a measure is, the more similar the results should be.  
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 Eisner (1991) asserts that a valuable qualitative study can assist one to “understand a 
situation that would otherwise be enigmatic or confusing” (p. 58). Awareness regarding 
satisfactory and competent research is embodied in the notion of quality, particularly where 
reliability is used as a means to assess value in the inquiry itself in hopes of “generating 
understanding” (Stenbacka, 2001, p. 551). It is also argued that researchers must be concerned 
with the reliability and validity of their own research design by both interpreting and analyzing 
results, and determining the quality of the study. Healy and Perry (2000) emphasize the 
importance of quality in a study by noting that each concept (or paradigm) should be assessed 
according to its own paradigm’s terms. In qualitative studies, the essential criteria for quality 
should be founded on notions such as credibility (internal validity), 118  impartiality or 
confirmability (objectivity), 119  uniformity or stability (reliability) 120  and relevance 
(generalizability, external validity)121 (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Thus, in order to ensure quality 
and consistency in qualitative research, a demonstration of “trustworthiness” and authenticity 
is essential (Seale, 1999).  
118 In order to gauge for credibility, it is necessary to determine “that the results of qualitative research are credible 
or believable from the perspective of the participant in the research. Since from this perspective, the purpose of 
qualitative research is to describe or understand the phenomena of interest from the participant's eyes, the 
participants are the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results” (Research Methods 
Knowledge Base, 2006). In order to ensure that credibility will be achieved, participants will receive a copy of an 
executive summary and the dissertation if it was requested at the time of consent.  
119 Confirmability appertains “to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others” 
(Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2006). 
120  The conventional quantitative perspective “of reliability is based on the assumption of replicability or 
repeatability” (Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2006). Dependability focuses on “the need for the researcher 
to account for the ever-changing context within which research occurs” (Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
2006). In other words, it is up to the study to provide the reader with any contextual changes that may have taken 
place during the research process, and explain how these changes may have affected the research at hand 
(Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2006). 
121 Transferability has to do with “the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or 
transferred to other contexts or settings. From a qualitative perspective, transferability is primarily the 
responsibility of the one doing the generalizing. The qualitative researcher can enhance transferability by doing a 
thorough job of describing the research context and the assumptions that were central to the research” (Research 
Methods Knowledge Base, 2006). 
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 The concept of validity is neither static nor one-dimensional, but “rather a contingent 
construct, inescapably grounded in the processes and intentions of particular research 
methodologies and projects” (Winter, 2000, p. 1). The long-established measures for validity 
originate from concepts found in positivism and thus quantitative research. As Joppe (2000) 
suggests,  
Validity determines whether the research truly measures that 
which it was intended to measure or how truthful the research 
results are. In other words, does the research instrument allow 
you to hit “the bull’s eye” of your research object? Researchers 
generally determine validity by asking a series of questions, and 
will often look for the answers in the research of others (p. 1). 
 
 Creswell and Miller (2000) propose that a researcher’s perception of validity within the 
study not only influences the validity of the research itself, but also shapes the choice of 
paradigm assumption (qualitative vs. quantitative). Subsequently, a number of researchers have 
advanced a personalized concept of validity by producing and implementing more suitable 
terminology like “quality”, “rigor” and “trustworthiness” (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Davies & 
Dodd, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Mishler, 2000; Seale, 1999; Stenbacka, 2001). One way 
of effectively establishing the credibility of a study is the specific perspective of the researcher 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). This lens enables a researcher to establish an appropriate amount of 
time to spend in the field, whether or not the data are saturated enough to create acceptable 
categories or themes, and the ways in which the analysis of the material may develop into a 
convincing account or description. This technique of credibility involves an ongoing process 
whereby qualitative researchers revisit their data “over and over again to see if the constructs, 
categories, explanations, and interpretations make sense” (Patton, 1980, p. 339).  
 A second way of establishing validity through a qualitative lens is directly through the 
participants in the study (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Creswell and Miller argue, “The 
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qualitative paradigm assumes that reality is socially constructed and it is what participants 
perceive it to be” (p. 125). Essentially, this lens advocates the significance of scrutinizing the 
accuracy of how the participants’ realities have been illustrated or characterized in the final 
report. In instances where analysts employ this technique (e.g., member checking, probing), the 
active involvement of the participants is sought out as a means of assessing whether the 
researcher’s interpretations accurately represent their views. In order to ensure that respondents 
in this study had an opportunity to actively participate, a range of questions in relation to their 
views, beliefs and perceptions were prepared. At the end of the interview, respondents were 
asked whether or not they wished to contribute any additional information that was not covered 
by the interview questions. This process allows one to gather data or information in areas that 
may have previously been unknown by the researcher, but adds to the overall understanding of 
how participants view and construct their own reality.  
 Self-disclosing hypotheses, philosophies, and preconceptions on the part of the 
researcher is another validity procedure that was employed throughout this research (Creswell, 
2013; Creswell & Miller, 2000). This process entails the researcher to “report on personal 
beliefs, values and biases that may shape their inquiry”122 (Creswell & Miller, 2000 p. 127). 
This procedure of establishing validity relies on the researcher’s perspective “but is clearly 
positioned within the critical paradigm where individuals reflect on various social, cultural and 
historical forces that shape their interpretation” (Creswell & Miller, 2000 p. 127). In essence, 
researchers must acknowledge their entering beliefs and biases prior to conducting research so 
122 This is also referred to as reflexivity which involved the researcher acknowledging how the research process 
has affected the researcher and the steps that were taken as a result when interpreting the findings (or during data 
collection). As such, the impact of ascribed and achieved status characteristics should be considered when 
conducting interviews.  
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as to suspend these beliefs during data collecting and analysis. Having read the literature, one 
can argue that the need for harsher legislation is unnecessary and ineffective. However, these 
personal beliefs were withheld during the interviewing process, and individual biases such as 
these are neither reflected nor reported in the findings. 
 According to Miles and Hubberman (1994), a search by researchers for “disconfirming” 
or “negative evidence” is one whereby the social scientist first develops exploratory themes or 
categories in the research, but then subsequently combs through the material for data that either 
supports or invalidates the themes. The purpose of disconfirming evidence is to search for rival 
explanations while providing support for credibility through diverse and multiple meanings of 
reality. This procedure depends on investigating the varying viewpoints of a theme or category 
through a constructivist approach, and therefore relies on the researchers own lens in order to 
rule out alternative explanations for negative evidence.   
5.3 Research Methods 
 In light of the framework guiding the qualitative approach, the research methods that 
were employed in this research consist of 1) in-depth interviews; 2) specific case law studies 
from Canada and Texas; and 3) legal analyses of legislation in both Canada and Texas. While 
each choice of method is inherently associated with various limitations and challenges, it is 
important to consider the advantages of each method in relation to the research questions. 
5.3.1 In-Depth Interviews  
 Interviews are appropriate when research requires historical information on a given 
topic of interest. Interviews are said to provide substantiated, rich descriptions of processes 
occurring in their local contexts - such as investigating one’s experiences and developing 
fruitful explanations of phenomena that are often difficult to investigate with quantitative data 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In these instances, researchers are able to 
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control the line of questioning by making use of open-ended, semi-structured or structured 
questions. In doing so, interviewees and interviewers may find themselves in favourable 
circumstances that encourage the development of a relationship based on trust and rapport. 
This method of data collection promotes the extraction of essential points, facts, and narratives 
that are otherwise a challenge to capture.   
 The in-depth interviews were particularly appropriate for addressing Research 
Questions #1 and #2 given that they required some degree of familiarity with the legislation of 
Bill C-10 (Part 4).123 Moreover, the majority of interview participants had knowledge of the 
YCJA both pre- and post-enactment which enabled them to provide educated, well-informed 
responses to the interview questions. Since many participants had been actively involved in the 
area of youth justice for a number of years, conducting in-depth interviews was most suitable 
for addressing Issue 1 of this study. In addition, given that some youth court judges agreed to 
participate in the interviews, insight was provided on Research Question # 3 with regards to 
whether or not youth in conflict with the law have been affected by the tough-on-crime 
legislation. The information gained from these individuals would have otherwise been 
unattainable through the case law studies due to administrative delays in the legal system. 
Finally, the interviews also shed light on Research Question #6 by providing insight on 
whether or not the Canadian government considered how other jurisdictions respond to youth 
crime, prior to enacting Bill C-10 (Part 4), in an effort to assess which strategies are perceived 
as effective or ineffective from the participants’ viewpoint (see Question #14 on the Interview 
Schedule, Appendix A).   
123 Please refer to pages 170-171 for a full list of the research questions. 
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5.3.2 Case Law Studies    
 The use of documentation from a qualitative lens enables researchers to better 
understand how specific words and language about the research problem are understood by 
various stakeholders (Creswell, 2013). Case law studies or legal analyses, for example, provide 
a great deal of insight on the how the law is applied by allowing researchers the opportunity to 
draw comparisons or use the material as a means of illustrating a similar point. Contrasting 
present day cases with those from previous years enhances one’s ability to observe changes in 
the interpretation of laws and/or language, as well as the implementation of any amendments.   
 Case law studies were most appropriate for addressing Research Questions #3 and #4, 
and to a lesser extent Research Questions #5 and #6. Since the objective of Research Question 
#3 was to identify whether or not Canadian youth in conflict with the law have been impacted 
or affected by the tough-on-crime policy, either negatively or positively, case law studies 
provided a means through which it was possible to determine if and how the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation has been implemented within youth courts. Research Question #4 asked in what 
ways the tough-on-crime legislation in Texas has been implemented in the courts. As such, a 
qualitative case study methodology was employed in order to determine how tough-on-crime 
legislation in Texas is both implemented and applied to youth in conflict with the law. 
Similarly, Research Question #5 relied on the case law studies collected from Canada and 
Texas in order to compare tough-on-crime legislation between the two. This analysis provided 
a frame of reference for where Canada currently sits on the tough-on-crime continuum. Finally, 
case law studies were also appropriate for addressing Research Question #6 given that it 
provided insight into what can be learned from the ways in which legislation and procedures in 
Texas respond to youth crime, and how differences can be beneficial to Canadians.    
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 A qualitative case study methodology provides researchers with the instruments needed 
to examine multifaceted phenomena within a given setting or environment. According to Yin 
(2009), case study designs are best used when 1) the study attempts to answer “how” and “why” 
enquiries; 2) it is not possible or feasible to shape, handle, manage or form the behaviour of the 
research participants; 3) the inclusion of circumstantial settings and environments and are 
considered crucial to the study because they are thought to be integral to the phenomenon 
being researched; or 4) there is a lack of a precise delineation between the what is being 
observed and the conditions or environment in which it is being studied. Given the nature of 
this study and the questions associated with this research, a case study was highly relevant 
particularly in relation to the focus of the study (i.e., the “how” and “why” questions and the 
contextual conditions, for example, binding decisions made by a supreme court). In the 
Canadian context, this was especially important since Research Question #3 addresses whether 
or not cases were handled differently after the passing of Bill C-10 (Part 4) when compared to 
previous years. Further, a qualitative case study methodology was most appropriate to 
determine if there were differences in sentencing practices pre- and post-enactment, and if so, 
in what ways this had occurred.     
 According to Yin (2009), the overall purpose of the research leads to the selection of a 
particular type of case study design. Yin (2009) categorizes case studies as “explanatory”, 
“exploratory”, “descriptive”, or “multiple case studies” based on whether the research attempts 
to explain a case, investigate a case, or distinguish between cases. As part of this research, both 
an “exploratory” and a “multiple case study” was employed from as far back as 2003, when the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act came into force. In addition, this time frame allowed for an analysis 
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of Canadian case law pre-and post-Bill C-10 (Part 4), and provided a means to compare cases 
from the onset of the YCJA to the present day.  
 An exploratory method is employed when investigating various settings where the 
matter under consideration does not have predetermined or distinct results (Yin, 2009). This is 
particularly the case with violent and repeat youth offenders since each case is uniquely 
different based on a number of varying factors. On the other hand, a multiple case study 
method allows the investigator to examine differences contained within a case, as well as study 
any specific characteristics or disparities between cases (Creswell, 2013). The objective of this 
technique is to reproduce findings across cases, since the case law analyzed typically indicates 
that many young, violent offenders convicted of the same crime receive similar sanctions. 
Since comparisons were drawn, cases were selected conscientiously in order to ensure that the 
investigator was attuned to comparable findings from one case to the next, or was able to 
foresee contrasting results based on existing legislation. 
 According to Creswell (2013), multiple case studies are often purposefully selected in 
order to show different perspectives on the same issue or to carry out a comparative approach 
(or in this case, potentially different outcomes for violent and repeat youth offenders by 
country and type of offender). Yin (2009) suggests that the multiple case study design is 
dependent on the concept of reproduction, in that the researcher repeats the same procedures 
for each and every subsequent case. However, Yin (2009) asserts that one of the underlying 
beliefs follows from the fact that qualitative researchers tend to be unenthusiastic about making 
any sweeping assumptions from one case to next (i.e., as Creswell (2013) explains, 
“generalizing beyond the case” p. 101). This is largely due to the fact that the context between 
cases may in fact differ significantly from one another. In response to this reluctance, the 
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researcher must include “representative cases” (i.e., influential cases) in the qualitative study in 
order to make any broad generalizations. A detailed discussion of cases that were both 
included and excluded during data collection can be found below.    
5.3.3 Legal Analysis 
 A legal analysis of documents supplies researchers with information pertaining to either 
a single jurisdiction, or multiple jurisdictions that may or may not employ similar practices. 
This method of collecting data is derived from an unobtrusive source of information. The 
varying ways in which a case may be viewed or understood is known as a legal analysis 
(Romantz & Vinson, 2009). This includes any relevance of one case to another, such as how it 
pertains and responds to youth in conflict with the law. For example, cases involving violent 
and repeat offenders need to be considered in a context that is relative to the legislation. In 
order to understand laws and policies in other jurisdictions, it is important to consider the 
language and processes that both determine and define the role of precedent in a court of law. 
Essentially, a legal analysis is an examination of the process whereby the application of law is 
appropriate for one’s case. The foundations of legal analyses are the set of principles that are 
used to analyze the law, devise legal arguments, and predict legal outcomes. Thus, the 
fundamental key to understanding legal analysis revolves around the ways in which lawmakers 
(typically legislatures) make and change the law which are then applied in a court of law (i.e., 
via statutes and case law). 
 A legal analysis was most appropriate for addressing Research Questions #3, #4, #5 
and #6 since all four questions are linked to the tough-on-crime legislation in either Canada or 
Texas (or draws on examples, explanations or comparisons between the two jurisdictions). 
Research Questions #3 and #4 particularly rely on a legal analysis since both questions deal 
with case law studies. In other words, case law can only be analyzed in light of the existing 
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policy and legislation that governs and dictates how youth in conflict with the law should be 
addressed. Research Question #5 also required a legal analysis since it asks how tough-on-
crime legislation in response to youth crime in Texas differs from those of Canada. Finally, in 
order to address Research Question #6, a legal analysis was necessary to determine what can 
be learned from the ways Texas responds to youth crime in terms of their legislation and their 
current stance on the tough-on-crime continuum, and how these differences in legislation can 
inform Canadians of youth criminal justice policies.       
 According to Romantz and Vinson (2009), a legal analysis is comprised of a number of 
different steps. The first step involves identifying the issue or legal question to be analyzed. In 
this case, the issue to be analyzed pertains to youth offenders in Texas and the ways in which 
their legislation and judicial system responds to youth crime. Evidence suggests that Texas 
responds in accordance with a crime control model that is further along the tough-on-crime 
spectrum in contrast to Canada. Specific time parameters for the legal analysis were contingent 
upon when first evidence of the tough-on-crime legislation appeared in Texas (discussed 
below). The second step involves identifying the rule, statute or law that is associated with the 
issue at hand. A rule is a legal principle established by an authoritative body that proscribes or 
governs conduct, and includes law enacted by legislative bodies such as statutes, treaties, 
ordinances, regulations, constitutions, and laws derived from judicial opinions. Enacted law,124 
124 Enacted laws are known as “rules established by an authoritative act of a legislative body” (Romantz and 
Vinson, 2009, p. 22). In the United States, for example, it is up to “both state and federal constitutions” to 
determine and oversee how “the legislative branch makes law” (Romantz and Vinson, 2009, p. 22). Enacted laws 
may only be declared by a lawfully commissioned legislative body. As such, the courts and other judicial tribunals 
are not authorized to enact law or bind law. Once enacted, the law can neither be amended nor modified by the 
court (Romantz and Vinson, 2009).  
185 
 
                                            
case law,125 common law,126 or a mixture of these is required to accurately examine (and later 
analyze) the cases (this includes precedent and stare decisis).127 Collectively, the laws offer as 
a more methodical and comprehensive appreciation of what specifically pertains to the case at 
hand.  
 The third step in conducting a legal analysis entails the analysis itself. This stage 
requires the researcher to determine how the law in each jurisdiction applies to the legal 
subject or inquiry (or in this case, how the law applies to cases involving the tough-on-crime 
approach). One crucial step of the analysis involves dissecting the essential features or aspects 
of the rule of law. Following this stage, these legal components can be applied to the facts of a 
chosen case in order to determine whether there is any relation between the two. According to 
Romantz and Vinson (2009), legal analysis may involve one of two modes of analysis: 1) 
analogical reasoning; or 2) rule-based reasoning. Analogical reasoning “identifies the 
determinative facts from a body of cases and then compares those facts to a case to induce a 
conclusion” (p. 101). Rule-based reasoning, on the other hand, “structures the analysis around 
a rule and then applies the facts of a case to the rule to deduce a conclusion” (Romantz & 
125 A case is explained as a “judicial proceeding between parties” (Romantz and Vinson, 2009, p. 23). A case that 
has been published is essentially a recorded declaration by a court that both indicates and describes how a 
decision was reached. A judicial opinion on this matter consists of “the procedural history of the case, the factual 
circumstances surrounding the case, the issue(s) in contest, the holding of the court, the rules employed by the 
court to decide the matter, the court’s reasons to support its holding, and the court’s disposition of the case” 
(Romantz & Vinson, 2009, p. 23).  
126 In the absence of enacted law, common law prevails. In such instances, common law steps in place of an 
enacted law in order to provide case law (Romantz and Vinson, 2009). As indicated above, under federal and state 
constitutions in the United States, only the legislature has the power to create law. Thus, the courts are given the 
ability to create laws in situations where there are gaps left by the legislature. The common law is derived from 
the collection of judicial opinions on similar matters (Romantz & Vinson, 2009).  
127 According to the Canadian Encyclopedia (2006), Stare decisis (Latin for “those things which have been so 
often adjudged ought to rest in peace” or “let the decision stand”) is in reference “to the doctrine of precedent, 
according to which the rules formulated by judges in earlier decisions are to be similarly applied in later cases”. 
The underlying assumption of the stare decisis principle is to ensure that all courts “follow precedent when 
deciding similar cases” (Romantz & Vinson, 2009, p. 9).  
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Vinson, 2009, p. 101). However, beyond these modes, legal analysis may also involve policy-
based reasoning. Policy, as is the case with the YCJA or Bill C-10 (Part 4) or for example, the 
transfer provisions in Texas, is the reasoning following the rule, and provides the rationale as 
to why courts or legislators formulated law. Thus, this study employed policy-based reasoning 
for analysis purposes. 
 According to Romantz and Vinson (2009), the underpinnings of a policy have a two-
fold function. First, it identifies the ways in which the law has an effect on society. Second, it 
indicates the ways in which the law plays a role in the overall welfare of the general public. 
Since it is alleged that rules are typically created for the “betterment” of society (often through 
the influence of interest groups or the demands placed on the government by the public), it can 
be argued that policy reflects society’s most dominant values and ideology. 128  In reality, 
however, this may be seen as an oversimplification of the complexities involved in policy-
making.129 There is evidence to suggest that governing authorities of present day are subjected 
to a predicament that places them in a precarious position (Garland, 2001). For example, 
Garland (2001) suggests that all political theories or models are built upon this concept of 
sovereignty, which by today’s standards no longer exists. Sovereignty is described as a 
“complex” and “contested notion” that “refers to the competence of a state legislature to make 
or unmake laws without challenge by other law-making authorities” (p. 109). In a more 
generalized sense, the term “relates to the sovereign state’s claimed capacity to rule a territory 
in the face of competition and resistance from external and internal enemies” (p. 109). Thus, 
while it would appear that both efficient crime control and the protection of society shape part 
128 This discussion coincides with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 that guides this dissertation.  
129 This may be argued as one of the reasons for conducting this research. 
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of the political platform put forth by politicians, this notion of state sovereignty is untenable in 
most cases (Garland, 2001). As Garland explains, 
In crime control, as in other spheres, the limitations of the state’s 
capacity to govern social life in all its details have become ever 
more apparent, particularly in the late modern era. [...] the late 
modern era is now faced with its own inability to deliver the 
expected levels of control over crime and criminal conduct. Like 
all myths, the myth of the penal sovereign and its ‘law and order’ 
powers is too deeply inscribed, too long-standing, and too 
politically potent to be easily dismantled by rational critique and 
administrative reform [...] But what has changed in the last 
decade or so, is that the myth has itself become problematic. [...] 
In consequence, it no longer forms the taken-for-granted frame 
of policy and practice in the field of crime control (p. 110). 
 
What this suggests then, is that ramifications associated with this predicament result in policy 
development that can reflect erratic and contradictory elements in hopes of prevailing over any 
preceding policy initiative (Garland, 2001), but is still predominately shaped by those who 
belong to the most dominant and powerful groups in society. This assertion coincides with the 
works of Chambliss and Seidman (1971), which acknowledges that some laws or policies are 
developed in order to pacify other groups that are in conflict with the dominant one, but does 
not necessarily occur on a regular basis.  
 To complement this finding, it has been asserted that policy implications extend to the 
courtroom in that judges too are “no more value-neutral than the legislatures” (Chambliss & 
Seidman, 1971, p. 75). In effect, it has been noted that “the courts necessarily take sides in the 
constant war between antagonistic interest groups in society” (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 
75). This assertion may have an impact on the ways in which the legislative amendments are 
interpreted since, for example, Bill C-10 (Part 4) places a strong emphasis on both the short 
and long-term protection of society. According to Edwards (1996), policy-based reasoning 
“reaches an answer by analyzing which answer would be the best for the society at large. It 
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asserts, ‘X is the answer because that answer will encourage desirable results for our society 
and discourage undesirable results” (p. 5). This research carries out a legal analysis of laws in 
Texas in order to determine how they oversee and respond to youth crime in a legal context. It 
also examines how the tough-on-crime legislation differs in terms of a philosophy of justice 
that acts as a counterpoint to the philosophy currently seen observed in Canada. On this basis, 
this analysis is conducted through policy-based reasoning. 
 Policy prevails in both case law and enacted law but have few parameters (i.e., 
boundaries and limitations). In case law, the underlying policy backing a rule is carefully 
considered when a decision on a case needs to be reached. The nature of precedent (an earlier 
ruling that is regarded as an example or guide to be considered in subsequent similar 
circumstances), is such that judicial decision-making affects both current and future cases. For 
example, precedent on decisions reached by judges in similar cases directly affect youth in 
conflict with the law. However, precedent also affects future judicial decision-making. Thus, 
any decisions put forth by a court of law should, in theory, promote the policy behind the law 
involved in that case. This especially holds true since this mode of reasoning appeals to future 
consequences that follow from adopting a certain rule. Huhn (2002) argues that in establishing 
policy-based reasoning, the court first predicts the ramifications that will progress from 
interpreting the law in a certain way. Following this stage, the court then “decides which set of 
consequences is more consistent with the underlying values of law” (p. 60).  
 When identifying policy in case law throughout this legal analysis, reasons as to why 
the court reached its decisions were considered. For example, if an opinion specifically refers 
to policy, any justification pertaining to the outcome of the case should directly relate to that 
policy. It is anticipated that any outcome based on policy may explain how the decision 
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advances the underlying purpose of the law or how the purpose safeguards the public as 
perceived by a youth court judge. However, if a youth court opinion does not point to the 
underlying policy supporting its decision, reviewing prior cases that consider like issues may 
expose the purpose behind the rule. In such circumstances, a review of cited prior cases was 
conducted in order to better understand how Texas responds to youth crime in light of their 
crime control model.      
5.3.4 Limitations of the Research Methods    
 Despite the many benefits of employing qualitative methods to conduct an investigation, 
this approach has limitations. Interviews, for example, are restricted to the information that is 
filtered through the views of the participants. This is particularly problematic for those 
conducting interviews in a political sphere given that membership within a political party 
generally necessitates adopting the perspectives of its leader. In addition, there is a constant 
possibility that an investigator’s presence may bias responses to form answers that are known 
as politically correct or socially desirable. More generally speaking, however, interviews are 
accused of its selectivity in reporting results (that is, it lacks in its ability to be quantitatively 
generalized to a larger population), and its failure to provide alternative perspectives that 
enhance the credibility of the findings. Nonetheless, interviewing various members of the 
academic community, members of impartial non-profit organizations, Ontario Court judges, 
legal counsel, former Members of Parliament and former Members of Provincial Parliament, 
members of Justice for Children and Youth, members of the Office of the Provincial Advocate 
for Children and Youth, employees of the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre, and employees of the 
Boys and Girls Club of Durham supplied this research with in-depth information to address the 
research questions. 
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 On the other hand, the use of documents in data analysis may be hindered by protected 
information that is inaccessible to the researcher. Furthermore, collected materials may either 
be incomplete, inaccurate or outdated which could ultimately result in gaps in the research. 
Such outcomes may produce fragmented or disjointed research which may generate an 
imprecise understanding of the whole picture. One of the well-known drawbacks connected 
with case study methodology is that there is a high likelihood for investigators to endeavour 
responding to a research question that is too extensive or address an issue that simply 
incorporates an overabundance of goals for a single study. In an attempt to bypass this concern, 
several researchers including Yin (2009) and Stake (1995) recommend “binding a case” by 
establishing limitations. Binding a case may be accomplished by including boundaries that 
account for 1) time and location (Creswell, 2003); 2) time and activity (Stake, 1995); and 3) 
definition and situational context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As such, binding cases made 
certain that the scope of the study remained plausible. In light of these suggestions, case 
studies that were carried out as part of this research pertain only to serious and/or violent 
young offenders. Moreover, the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 and the issues 
highlighted as part of the research questions in Chapter 4 guided the research process, as well 
as increased the likelihood that feasible limits on the scope of this study were attained.  
 According to Stake (1995), “issues are not simple and clean, but intricately wired to 
political, social, historical, and especially personal contexts. All these meanings are important 
in studying cases” (p. 17). Notwithstanding these limitations, the main benefit of conducting 
case studies was gained from the particular details and general understanding of sentencing 
practices from the perspective of a specific case(s). Pre- and post-Bill C-10 (Part 4) cases 
allowed for a comparative analysis of how sentences were and currently are imposed, and in 
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what ways sentencing practices may have evolved over time. It should be noted that the 
Canadian case law was conducted last so as to ensure an adequate amount of time had passed 
since the enactment of the legislation.  
 Legal analyses also exhibit limitations. This predominately involves the examination of 
a set of judicial opinions to determine whether courts have applied legal norms consistently, 
fairly, and logically. Legal analysis depends on value judgements about what constitutes 
effective and fair law, and policy. Policy-based reasoning in particular argues that the meaning 
of a rule should conform to the underlying values and interests that the rule is designed to serve 
(Huhn, 2008). This perceived short-sightedness and subjectivity of legal analysis is coupled 
with the underlying presumption that judges may simply be cloaked legislators. Posner (2008), 
who studies the connection between a judge’s decision making ability and their judicial 
experience, finds that many judicial decisions are heavily affected or persuaded by a judge’s 
political partiality or by other factors, such as the judge’s individual attributes. That is, a 
judge’s personal and professional experience plays a role in shaping one’s political preferences 
(Posner, 2008). As a result, a judge’s decision may reflect his affiliation to (or preference 
towards) a political party or political ideologies which might be “liberal” or “conservative” and 
thus correlate with either of these political platforms. Given this aspect of judicial discretion, it 
is difficult to empirically assess cases due to possible judicial inconsistencies based on varying 
approaches to statutory interpretations of text, context and purpose of legislation (Posner, 
2008).  
 In addition, the enactment of new legislation has the potential to lead to further 
complications for the analysis with regards to a lack of precedent. Routine cases, for example, 
rely on conventional legal material (i.e., case law, common law, or statutes) which enables the 
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judge to determine the real facts of the case and subsequently apply very specific pre-
established legal rules to them (Posner, 2008). In non-routine cases that lack precedent in case 
law, however, conventional materials are no longer available. This deficiency may cause a 
judge to rely solely on their own personal experiences that are influenced by their mental state 
and instincts because there is no evidence that the newly enacted legislation works. In such 
instances, judges may seek advice from police, social workers, victims or other stakeholders in 
order to determine whether or not the legislation is reasonable. 130 Consequently, it can be 
argued that judges may, at times, take on a role as an occasional legislator. This role, however, 
is restricted by any internal and external pressures that may exist (e.g., professional ethics, 
assessments made by associates, re-evaluations of judicial decisions by higher courts, and 
restrictions dictated by other areas of government on one’s ability to exercise discretion) 
(Posner, 2008).  
5.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Size 
 The majority of the data pertaining to the specific enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) was 
collected by conducting interviews with stakeholders from the following streams: Members of 
the academic community, members of non-profit organizations such as the John Howard 
Society of Canada (who served as a federal civil servant at the time of the parliamentary 
debates), Ontario Court judges, legal counsel (both defence and Crown Attorneys, some of 
whom were involved in the parliamentary debates), former Members of Parliament and former 
Members of Provincial Parliament (some of whom were involved in the legislation process as 
consultants), members of Justice for Children and Youth, members of the Office of the 
130 Please note that it is the Supreme Court of Canada that is the decision-making body. Youth court judges 
interpret and apply the law.  
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Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth, employees of the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre, 
and employees of the Boys and Girls Club of Durham. 131  In order to fully capture the 
processes upon which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and legislated, the diversity of the 
sample of participants ensured a broad range of responses and perspectives on the topic at hand.   
 It was expected that the aforementioned participants would have sufficient knowledge 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) given their occupational positions. The Safe Streets and Communities Act 
(Bill C-10) which consists of nine different Bills in one and includes An Act to Amend the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act and to Make Consequential and Related Amendments to Other Acts 
(Bill C-10, Part 4) was passed in March 2012 by 154 Conservative Party members. In contrast, 
129 members from various political parties (such as the New Democratic Party, the Liberal 
Party, the Bloc Party and the Green Party) voted against Bill C-10. Given that 283 members 
cast a vote either for or against Bill C-10, it was hoped that this study would elicit responses 
from both members from the federal and provincial level of government given that they would 
be best able to provide information on the legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4), regardless of their 
political alignment. However despite one’s political party association, not a single active 
politician was willing to participate in this research. In essence, the perspective of various 
active participants from diverse political parties was not included in this study, although it was 
anticipated that members from different political parties would add to the depth and breadth of 
this study by providing multiple outlooks on both the enactment of the Bill itself as well as the 
perceptions of effectiveness on current responses to youth crime. Potential participants were 
approached with a recruitment letter via email, as attempts were made to contact various 
131 Some of these respondents were directly involved in drafting and shepherding the legislation, but are not 
identified for confidentiality reasons.  
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members of the Canadian Senate as well as Members of Parliament directly involved with the 
youth justice committees. However all of these individuals were either unwilling or not 
allowed to comment. 
 Acknowledging the various complexities in securing interviews with vital stakeholders, 
this research began with a review of Hansard made available to the public online.132 Hansard 
is known as the official published verbatim report of the proceedings of a parliamentary body. 
These printed transcripts of the parliamentary debates ranged from the end of the 39th session 
to the end of the 41st. This ensured that all matters pertaining to Bill C-25, Bill C-4, and Bill C-
10 (Part 4) was covered since Bill C-10 (Part 4) was preceded by two others proposals that 
were not passed. Parliamentary sessions from the 40th Parliament were the most valuable to 
this research given the lengthy deliberations on Bill C-4. Conducting a parliamentary debate 
review in order to examine the committee proceedings to identify influential Members of 
Parliament and others who provided evidence during the process of legislative enactment 
provided a roster of names for initial interviewees. Where possible, these individuals were 
contacted via email for a prospective interview. These documents were also used to examine 
any additional processes involved in the development of the legislation that may have been left 
out by the participants. In addition, the inclusion of data found in Hansard had a two-fold 
function: first, it allowed for the perspective of politicians, legislators and other individuals that 
were unable or unwilling to directly participate in the research by providing an interview. This 
assisted with filling in some of the gaps that were created by the respondent sample (i.e., no 
active politicians, and no participants that supported the legislative amendments). Second, it 
132 Hansard can be found at: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HouseChamberBusiness/ChamberSittings.aspx?View=H&Parl=39&Ses=2&Language=E&
Mode=1 
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added to the trustworthiness of the data gathered from the interviews, because much of the 
material derived from the interviews could be confirmed by the parliamentary debates and 
committee evidence.       
 This study relied on a two-stage sampling strategy. First, the concept of purposive 
sampling was used to select interview participants in this study. Purposive sampling is 
employed when the researcher feels certain individuals (in this case federal civil servants, 
members of the academic community, members of interest groups, legal counsel, etc.) should 
be selected for study given that “they can purposefully inform” and communicate “an 
understanding of the research problem” based on researcher knowledge (Creswell, 2012, p. 
156). Since these individuals were expected to have insight into the research topic in relation to 
their knowledge of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the preliminary sample of suitable candidates for 
interviews was derived from the roster of names initially gathered from the parliamentary 
debates. However, due to the general reluctance of individual participation, this study 
predominately reports the findings of perspectives that are against the enactment of Bill C-10 
(Part 4). As such, capturing the perspectives of those in favour of the Bill (outside of Hansard) 
is excluded.   
 Approximately 17 individuals from the Parliamentary debates (Hansard) were 
contacted via email for an interview. More than half of these individuals did not reply to the 
email, although two replied to confirm their non-participation. The remaining five individuals 
from the Hansard roster who were willing to participate in this research were contacted to set 
up an interview. This not only included academics that were invited to present their case during 
the parliamentary debates, but also federal civil servants and legal counsel). At the conclusion 
of the interview, each of these interviewees were asked to provide additional names of 
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individuals that may, from their perspective, be identified as knowledgeable on the specific 
processes of the enactment of the Bill. This process allowed for the adoption of respondent 
driven sampling whereby all participants were presented with the same question that solicited 
the names and contact information of other potential subsequent interviewees that were thought 
to have enough knowledge to be able to respond to the interview questions. The respondent 
driven sampling resulted in a total of 38 individuals, which were all contacted for an interview.  
 The combination of both the purposive and respondent driven sampling led to a total 
sample size of 22 in-depth interviews. Seventeen of these participants were derived from the 
respondent driven sampling, while the other five were derived from purposive sampling. In 
keeping with the overall goal in this dissertation of providing a comprehensive account, 
individuals were recruited from varying backgrounds across Canada within the youth justice 
realm as they were most familiar and knowledgeable about Bill C-10 (Part 4).  
 Of the approximate 55 individuals that were contacted for a potential interview, more 
than half declined to participate. Of those who were willing to participate, most participants 
represented a voice from Eastern Canada (with the exception of Québec). No participants from 
Western Canada were willing to participate in this research, regardless of their occupation. Of 
those who did participate, slightly less than half were members of the academic community 
(N=8). The remaining participants were comprised of individuals that represented the voice of 
the provincial youth justice advocates (N=1), one was from Justice for Children and Youth 
(N=1), one was a former federal civil servant (N=1), some were well known and established 
Ontario Court judges (N=4), one was a retired politicians (N=1), a few were managers, 
directors or researchers in various youth related fields (N=2), some were Crown attorneys 
(N=2), and finally, one was involved with the pre- and post-charge extrajudicial sanctions 
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(community based) (N=1), while the other was involved with youth in pre-trial detention or 
custody (N=1). One third of the interview sample was, in many cases, unable to comment on 
the specific processes involved in the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), mainly due 
to the degree of technicality involved. In other words, some of the questions required an in-
depth familiarity with both the provisions of the YCJA and the legislative process of Bill C-10 
(Part 4) that some interview participants did not possess.  
5.4.1 Case Law  
 The compilation of Canadian case law data from LexisNexis accounts for case law 
found between April 2003 and June 2013. Collecting case law from as far back as April 2003 
allowed for a comprehensive analysis of cases as they pertained to the provisions of the newly 
enacted YCJA (as opposed to the preceding YOA), as well as similarities between offences 
committed, mitigating factors, and potential changes in sentencing trends over the years. While 
the new legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) was not passed until March 2012 and did 
not come into effect until October 2012, the rationale behind collecting Canadian cases that 
ranged over the span of a decade was based on developing an understanding of whether or not 
cases were handled differently after the passing of Bill C-10 (Part 4) when compared to 
previous years.  
 As such, a total of nine hundred and forty-one Canadian cases were collected from 
LexisNexis. To ensure adequate coverage, the search term “YCJA” was used to amass a list of 
all cases which included either a reference to the Act, or supplied specific provisions of the Act 
itself. In almost all cases, the search term found cases that expressly addressed a case involving 
a youth(s) either charged or convicted of a given offence(s). Of these nine hundred and forty-
one cases, forty-four cases were from 2003 (April to December), eighty cases were from 2004, 
ninety-six cases were from 2005, ninety-seven cases were from 2006, seventy-one cases were 
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from 2007, one hundred and five cases were from 2008, one hundred and ten cases were from 
2009, ninety-six cases were collected 2010, one hundred and thirteen cases were from 2011, 
seventy-four cases were from 2012, and finally fifty-four cases were collected 2013 (ending 
June 2013).133 
 The compilation of American case law data from LexisNexis was collected from the 
first evidence of the tough-on-crime mandate. In Texas, the tough-on-crime legislation began 
in 1996. The enactment of harsher legislation in Texas created the time parameters through 
which an online search was conducted. As such, case law was collected from 01 January 1996 
until May 2013. Given that Research Question #4 did not ask how Texas responds or 
responded to youth crime both pre- and post-tough-on-crime legislation, a comparison in 
sentencing practices over the years was not conducted. Thus, organizing Texas case law by 
year was unnecessary.    
 An advanced search was conducted using various terms applicable to Texas. Search 
terms were derived from the youth crime legislation reviewed for the state. The search terms 
used to generate case law for Texas consisted of “Juvenile Justice Code”, “juvenile delinquent”, 
“violent juvenile”, “juvenile court”, “delinquent adjudication”, “determinate sentencing”, 
“discretionary transfers to criminal court” and “sentenced as adult”. Using these search terms, 
the total number of case laws generated was 552. Of these five hundred and fifty-two cases, 
two were from “sentenced as an adult”, one hundred and eighty-three were from “Juvenile 
Justice Code”, one hundred and twenty-four were from “juvenile delinquent”, fourteen were 
from “violent juvenile”, one hundred and ten were from “delinquency adjudication”, ninety-
133 Some Canadian case law exclusions were made. Please refer to Section 5.6 (Data Collection: Canadian Case 
Law) for more information.  
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one were from “determinate sentencing”, and twenty-eight were from “discretionary transfer to 
criminal court”.134         
5.5 Data Collection: Interviews  
 All participants were personally contacted via email with a Recruitment Letter from 
information that was either gathered online from occupational websites or from contact 
information volunteered by other participants (see Appendix B). Once respondents agreed to 
take part in the research, a Letter of Information and an Informed Consent (see Appendix C) 
form to participate in the interview was provided to each individual. This letter explained the 
purpose of the study, listed the key research questions, the procedures involved in the research, 
the potential harms, risks or discomforts associated with participation, and matters pertaining 
to anonymous confidentiality. Participants were also informed that they had the absolute and 
sole discretion of deciding which questions they wanted to answer, and had the right to 
withdraw from the interview at any time without any negative consequences. If the letter did 
not generate a response within a reasonable time (approximately 3-4 weeks), a follow-up email 
was sent to the potential participant as a further attempt to establish communication with hopes 
of receiving a reply. A spreadsheet was created in order to track the names of those already 
contacted (by date), those whom were willing to participate (and the date on which they did), 
those who declined to take part in the research, and those who received or required a follow-up 
email given their lack of response. A copy of the Letter of Information, Informed Consent, and 
a detailed interview schedule can be found in the appendices at the end of this dissertation.  
  In the introductory letter, participants were given the option of agreeing to an interview 
that would either take place face-to-face, remotely by telephone or via Skype. Conducting 
134 Any duplicates of case law were removed and are not reflected in the numbers above.  
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interviews remotely not only allowed for the inclusion of participants from regions outside of 
the greater Toronto area, but also those residing in other provinces. Respondents were free to 
remain in the comfort of their own environment which facilitated the process for many who 
were retired or no longer in political office. In cases where participants were located elsewhere, 
most preferred interviews over the telephone as opposed to Skype. Regardless of location and 
method, interviews lasted no longer than 30-60 minutes, and were held on a day, time, and 
place convenient for each participant. Of the twenty-two interviews, two were conducted via 
Skype and were only audio (not video) recorded, seven were conducted in person, and thirteen 
were conducted via telephone. Interviews of all types (face-to-face, telephone and Skype) 
involved note taking, and were audio recorded with permission to ensure the accuracy of 
information and to facilitate analysis. All interviews were transferred from the audio recorder 
to a text document by the researcher. Prior to data analysis, recurring themes that appeared to 
be commonplace across the interviews were noted so as to assist in the subsequent coding 
process.  
  A Thank You letter (see Appendix D) was sent to each participant once the interview 
was complete. This provided an opportunity to acknowledge appreciation for their voluntary 
participation and to emphasize the importance of their perspective on understanding the 
specific processes involved in the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) and the perceptions of youth 
crime from the perspective of the stakeholders across Canada. In essence, this letter allowed 
respondents to be recognized for what was considered cooperation for data that would have 
otherwise been unattainable. For those wishing for a copy of the dissertation, a subsequent 
email will be sent once this research is publicly available.  
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5.5.1 Interview Questions and Procedures 
 One of the most fundamental aspects of interview design has to do with creating 
effective interview questions for the interview process. Turner (2010) suggests that researchers 
should construct questions that “allow the examiner to dig deep into the experiences and/or 
knowledge of the participants, in order to gain maximum data from the interviews (p. 757). In 
order to effectively address the research questions, the wording of the interview questions were 
open-ended so that respondents were able to speak freely by choosing their own terms to 
respond to questions (see Appendix A). Questions were also as objective as possible. This 
ensured that questions avoided words that may have influence answers (i.e., evocative or 
judgmental wording). Further, the questions were worded clearly and included the use of any 
terms particular to the respondents’ culture (i.e., policy-making, Bill C-10 (Part 4), other 
political terminology in relation to laws and legislation) without asking questions pertaining to 
“why”.   
 The success of an interview highly depends on the ways in which the interview is 
implemented. To ensure the implementation stage of the interview process is conducted in an 
appropriate manner, the following steps were taken when meeting with respondents. 
McNamara (2009) suggests the first stage should always begin by occasionally verifying the 
audio recorder is working during the interview. This was monitored from time to time to 
ensure interviews were being recorded. Second, researchers should ask only one question at a 
time in order to avoid confusion. The interview questions were designed in a manner that only 
focuses on one issue per question. Third, the researcher should attempt to remain as neutral as 
possible. This was accomplished by refraining from exhibiting emotional reactions to 
respondent responses. Fourth, the interviewer should and did encourage responses with 
occasional nods of the head and by using words that promote continuation of the interview. 
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Fifth, caution was exercised during the note taking process. Interviewers are advised not to 
take notes in an abrupt fashion since it may appear as though the researcher is surprised or very 
pleased about an answer. As a result, these reactions may influence a respondent’s answer to 
future questions. Sixth, the researcher provided transition between major topics. This consisted 
of a sentence such as, “we’ve been talking about (some topic) and now I’d like to move on to 
(another topic)”. Finally, caution was exercised in order to ensure respondents did not stray 
from the topic at hand. According to McNamara (2009), straying to another topic is most likely 
to occur when respondents attempt to avoid answering a question, take too long to answer a 
question, or start interviewing the researcher instead. 
 A semi-structured interview was developed after a review of the literature on the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), and the perceptions of effectiveness on the tough-on-crime 
legislation in Canada. The issues and research questions introduced various concepts that are 
not addressed in the literature, particularly in reference to the need for more austere sanctions 
given that research explicitly contravenes overly punitive measures. Thus, the underlying 
purpose for conducting the interviews was to collect data not only on the ambiguous rationale 
behind this Bill, but also on the specific processes involved in its development and legislation. 
5.5.2 Interview Schedule 
 Data pertaining to the motivations and justification for legislating Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
was provided by two-thirds of the interview participants. 135  The interview schedule had 
specific questions that were directed towards those who engaged in the political process of the 
legislation or who had intimate knowledge of the processes involved in the passing of the Bill.  
135 This excludes one-third of the individuals who neither followed the parliamentary debates nor took part in the 
political process of the Bill (N=14).   
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Questions 1 through 3 asked respondents to provide background information on their 
involvement with politics (if applicable), and as such were tailored to each individual in terms 
of their occupation. Questions 4-16 address the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation in detail. 
Respondents were asked to provide their input on the development of this Bill. The next set of 
questions (questions 17-22) asked respondents to share insight on the effectiveness of harsher 
sanctions, as well as the role the media plays in informing the public of crime rates, trends and 
the need for harsher legislation. These questions allowed respondents to provide their own 
opinions as to how perceptions affect legislation and to what degree. Finally, questions 23-26 
asked respondents to comment on the effectiveness of Bill C-10 (Part 4), to discuss whether or 
not they believed the enactment of the Bill has produced positive results, and to provide 
remarks on the effectiveness of Bill C-10 (Part 4) to adequately respond to youth crime. After 
all questions were asked, participants were asked a small set of reflection questions which 
essentially allowed respondents to add any additional information that may have not been 
addressed during the interview. The overall purpose of the interview questions was to better 
understand the processes through which the Bill developed and was legislated from the 
perspective of stakeholders, whether or not it was required, the ways in which the evidence for 
and against it had been fully considered, where the tough-on-crime ideas had come from, how 
individual perceptions of youth crime are shaped, and whether respondents felt the Bill has 
fulfilled its goal.   
 Prompts, probes and encouragement were used throughout the interviews when needed. 
A prompt or probe may be used when the interviewer needs to remind the respondent about 
something, or when the respondent offers few details on a specific aspect of a question which 
requires more detail. Prompts may be a question in the form of “You haven’t mentioned X: 
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How do you feel about that/what do you think about that?” Probes, on the other hand, may 
consist of the following questions: 1) “When did this happen?” 2) “Who else was involved?” 3) 
“What was your involvement in that situation?” 4) “How did that come about?” 5) “Where did 
that happen?” 6) “How did/do you feel about that?” 7) “Would you elaborate on that?” 8) 
“That’s interesting. Could you please provide me with detail?” 10) “I think I understand, but 
do you have any examples?” 11) “You mention that X was a “success”. What do you mean by 
the term “success”?”136 12) “This point is very important. I want to make sure I’m clear about 
it. Would you mind giving me some additional information?” In addition to these prompts and 
probes, verbal and non-verbal cues to continue were used. This consisted of nodding, smiling, 
maintaining eye contact, and using words such as “uh huh” or “I see” in an encouraging way. 
Where interviews were conducted via telephone, only verbal cues were used.  
5.6 Data Collection: Canadian Case Law 
 One notable characteristic of case study research is the ability to incorporate numerous 
sources of data, which is also seen as a technique that strengthens the credibility of one’s data 
(Patton, 1990; Yin, 2009). Prospective data sources may consist of such things as physical 
artifacts, direct observations, participant-observation, documentation, archival records, and 
interviews. For the purposes of this research, the case study analyzes documentation and 
archival records of case law. Case law studies may be reviewed repeatedly and are exact in 
terms of their content, names, references, details of an event, and judicial decisions. Both 
Canadian and American cases were easily retrieved through LexisNexis Academic as it offers 
full-text court decisions, legislation, legal commentary and analysis, and current and archived 
136 The term “success” is an example of a word that may be used during the interview; however it may be 
substituted for another term more suitable to the context of the question. 
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news. Access to the exclusive content on this database required membership that was provided 
through the University of Waterloo.     
 Canadian case law were recorded and organized in a spreadsheet by year, name, type of 
charge or conviction, and in some instances the mitigating factors involved. Where convictions 
were made, the reasoning behind the sentence (including degree of culpability and 
accountability; and prior convictions, charges or sentences) was recorded. The sentence itself 
was of particular importance in relation to the governing Act (YCJA) and was also noted. This 
was done for all cases found both pre- and post-the Bill C-10 (Part 4) amendments. The 
majority of cases included fairly serious convictions and/or charges such as 1st degree murder, 
2nd degree murder, 3rd degree murder, attempted murder, robbery with use of firearm, assault, 
aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, and break and enter. While not all cases 
involved “serious bodily harm” or were considered “violent” by definition, all cases were 
considered for inclusion and subsequent analysis.  
 Multiple cases were carefully chosen after they were reviewed for their content. Cases 
that were most likely to illuminate the research questions guiding this dissertation were chosen 
for analysis. Selections of these cases were based on the following criteria: a) cases that had 
occurred between April 2003 and June 2013; b) cases that involved youth offenders; c) cases 
that involved various violent offenders; d) cases that involved various repeat offenders; e) 
cases that involved “serious bodily harm”; f) cases that involved “presumptive offences”; g) 
cases that involved “pretrial detention”; h) cases that involved “custody and supervision orders” 
for various young offenders who may serve their sentence in either closed (secure) or open 
custody with a portion served in the community, “intensive support and supervision orders” for 
those youth who require better and more secure supervision and additional support not offered 
206 
 
by a simple probation order, “intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision orders” for 
serious violent offenders, and “deferred custody and supervision orders” for those youth who 
have not caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm and can otherwise serve their 
sentence in the community with conditions. 
 The collection process of Canadian data also involved the exclusion of approximately 
three hundred and nine cases based on their applicability (i.e., cases that did not particularly 
pertain to sentencing). For example, cases involving questions pertaining to the Charter 
whereby hearings were not held in a timely fashion (i.e., violations of right to trial within a 
reasonable time allowed) were removed from consideration. Other cases that were exempt 
include those where the YCJA was determined to not apply (i.e., where the Education Act was 
more applicable for issues of truancy, or where breaches of probation were covered under the 
Provincial Offences Act); those which addressed cases pertaining to adults that have had 
previous records under the YCJA; those that were outside the scope of sentences, detention, 
release and questioned the authority to suspend sentences (see, for example, R v K.P.A. (2005)); 
cases that commented on the consideration of mandatory review that remained unchanged (see, 
for example, R v J.S. (2005)); cases that addressed committals for trial or discharge (i.e., 
considerations on procedural grounds); cases pertaining to DNA samples and unwarranted 
intrusions on young people’s liberty; cases that discussed court orders pertaining to disclosure 
of youth records and whether youth court judges have exclusive jurisdiction; cases involving 
the rights of the accused regarding the legal profession and practice by unauthorized persons; 
cases that included applications for trial to proceed in the absence of the accused (see, for 
example, R v D.D.B. (2006)); cases regarding state-funded counsel (see, for example, R v L.S. 
(2006)); cases that were dismissed or the person was acquitted; cases involving the Human 
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Rights Commission (see, for example, K.F. v Peel Police Service Board); cases arguing for or 
against the (in)admissibility of statements and statements not made voluntarily; and cases 
found only in French (mainly Québec jurisdiction).137   
5.7 Data Collection: Legal Analyses of Texas Case Law  
 Legal analyses were carried out by accessing documentation on cases from Texas. The 
retrieval of this information was through LexisNexis, given that it is a legal database that 
provides information and documentation on other jurisdictions and grants access to all of the 
American legal publications. LexisNexis was chosen as a suitable database due to its 
distinguishing features. Unlike HeinOnline, for example, LexisNexis offers a much more 
comprehensive range of resources which include a fair amount of administrative material, 
federal and state case law, journal articles and newspaper reports. LexisNexis is comprised of 
two separate companies merged together. Lexis.com is composed of an abundance of up-to-
date American statutes and laws as well as a myriad of published case opinions dating as far 
back as the 1770s. In addition, the site houses some unpublished cases from 1980 onward. 
Approximately fourteen years ago, Lexis organized their database to include statutes as well as 
briefs, motions, case judgements, law reviews, journal articles and opinions for other countries 
which include France, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and South Africa. 
Nexis.com, on the other hand, provides data from a large variety of international news, 
business, biographical and public sources, but more importantly supplies users with legal 
material which include (but are not limited to) legislative and regulatory filings.  
137 The final sample size after these exclusions was 632 Canadian cases. In 2003 fifteen cases were excluded. In 
almost every year between 2004 and December 2011, approximately 30 cases (rounded to the nearest 10th) were 
excluded for consideration each year. Thirty-five cases were excluded for 2012. Nineteen cases were excluded for 
the first six months of 2013. Cases that were excluded not analyzed in this dissertation.     
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         The legal analyses were performed in a two-fold fashion. Because a legal analysis is 
essentially an assessment of the processes whereby a law may be applied to and appropriate for 
a given case, the first part of this data collection came from gathering state-specific documents 
on the law and legislation related to youth in conflict with the law. Texas has a different set of 
governing rules, laws and language, and thus responds to youth crime differently than its 
Canadian counterpart. Naturally, these differences were observable in the cases as Texas 
applied the rules in a manner that upheld their philosophical principles. Fundamentally then, 
the set of principles that guide legal analyses allow one to formulate a legal argument, and 
assist in predicting a legal outcome. Laws pertaining to juvenile delinquency in Texas are 
found in the Texas Family Code (Title 3, Chapter 51). This document was retrieved in order to 
better understand how the applicable laws were referred to in the findings when appropriate.     
 The second aspect of conducting a legal analysis entailed the acquisition of state-
specific case law. Unlike the case law required for the Canadian component of this research, 
Texas case law was not retrieved on a year by year basis, nor was there a specific numerical 
target in mind. Texas case law was recorded and organized in a spreadsheet by name, year, 
type of charge or conviction, and in some instances the mitigating factors involved. In cases 
involving convictions, the reasoning behind the sentence was recorded. The sentence itself was 
noted in relation to the Texas Family Code. This was done for all case law found post-
enactment of the tough-on-crime legislation from 1996.  
 While the Canadian case law search encompassed only one search term (“YCJA”), 
multiple search terms were used to retrieve Texas case law. This was done for two reasons: 
First, a basic search using a term such as “Texas Family Code” retrieved over 3000 cases but 
did not necessarily apply to individual cases of youth in conflict with the law. Second, this 
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particular search term was so broad that it was unable to capture specific case law that reflected 
the tough-on-crime legislation. Thus, very specific terminology was necessary in order to 
collect sufficient data for analysis and filter through the sheer volume of available case law. 
 Case law from Texas frequently cited examples of other cases that had previously dealt 
with similar (if not the same) legal question or issues at hand (e.g. determinate sentencing for a 
similar offence). Case law citing precedent effectively widened the search by referring to 
specific rulings and laws within the established time frame and in ways the basic search terms 
could not. Given that this data was used as a means to better understand the law by way of its 
applicability in Texas, exemplars were used to support the various ways in which responses to 
youth crime in Texas is addressed.   
5.8 Data Analysis: Interview Data 
 The approach to the analysis of the qualitative data is predominately inductive but is 
also deductively derived from the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2. The 
theoretical framework essentially provided the lens through which the findings were 
interpreted. This process assisted in contextualizing the findings and give meaning to them. 
The analysis itself required the reduction of large amounts of interview and Hansard data to 
organize, summarize and categorize it, and identify and link patterns and themes within it. 
These three steps were accomplished with the assistance of a software program (NVivo) that 
allowed for the data management of qualitative interviews and Hansard.  
 The process of identifying codes (or categories) and themes is based on the frequency 
with which a particular aspect occurs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The analysis of the textual 
interview data and Hansard was coded for recurring salient themes or issues that presented 
themselves, in a chronological manner or otherwise, throughout the interviews or text (i.e., 
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thematically for perspectives held by subjects, process, activity, strategy, legislative, or 
government codes). Themes are known as “broad units of information that consist of several 
codes aggregated to form a common idea” (Creswell, 2013, p. 188). Units of information 
include, but are not limited to, processes, interactions, cultural themes, political themes, or 
issues of power. Thus, the coding process involved the analysis of each theme which was then 
labelled according to applicable categories. For example, the theme “Government” arose 
across all interviews, but given that it was far too broad a theme and did not extend itself to the 
specific aspects of the government, data coded under this title were further divided into 
categories or sub-categories that accounted for respondents’ views or definition of the term (for 
example, “minority”, “majority”, “influential persons within the government”, “Liberal”, 
“Conservative”, or “democracy”). A similar process was employed for the analysis of data 
gathered from Hansard, however fewer themes were present. This was largely due to the 
extent and nature of the questions found in the interview schedule which covered a broader 
spectrum of topics. Subsequently, this process enabled a more thorough interpretation of the 
data in order to capture the essence of what has been learned from the perspective of the 
respondents, and was substantiated with the data provided through Hansard.    
 While some researchers develop their codes prior to conducting data analysis 
(prefigured from a theoretical model or the literature), the findings from this dissertation 
reflected a great deal of emerging data. In other words, the use of prefigured codes would have 
not only limited the analysis to these particular codes, but would have restricted an exact 
representation of the views and perceptions of the participants. Thus, code labels in some cases 
emerged from the exact words used by participants (in vivo codes), or through labels the 
researcher composed that seemed to best describe the interview data. In addition, codes also 
211 
 
accommodated for data that represented information that both were and were not anticipated to 
be found by the researcher prior to the study’s commencement, and for data that appeared to be 
conceptually fascinating, unexpected, or atypical to the researcher, such as no noticeable 
changes amongst those working with pre- and post- charged youth (extrajudicial sanctions) 
(see Creswell, 2003, 2013). 
 The analysis and interpretation of the findings involve making sense of the data in an 
attempt to better understand the “lessons learned” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Interpretation of 
data in this study involved conceptualizing outside of the various codes and themes to the 
broader context of the data. Interpretations are based on a number of different factors such as 
acuity and awareness, general perceptions of effectiveness from stakeholders, and social 
constructs put forth by both the respondents and the reviewed literature. Thus, the 
interpretation of the findings is linked to the larger body of research literature developed by 
others that, overall, refutes the need for harsher legislation and is not in support of the 
Canadian government’s decisions.  
  While interviews were not conducted through a typical narrative research design, a 
narrative research analysis was applied to the questions 4 through 16 given that respondents 
discussed their perspectives and recollection of certain politically factual events in a 
chronological order (i.e., Bill C-25 followed by Bill C-4 followed by Bill C-10 (Part 4)). The 
data collected as part of a narrative study were analyzed for a chronology of developments, 
unfolding events, critical junctures or revelations in the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). 
Narrative analyses need not describe an individual’s story, but rather can describe an objective 
set of experiences placed in a chronology. Within the broad sketch of this type of analysis, a 
chronological approach (Denzin, 1989) assisted in furthering our understanding of the specific 
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processes involved in the passing of Bill C-10 (Part 4), particularly in relation to how the 
legislation came to fruition despite opposition. Given that some of the interview questions 
pertained to events or considerations prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), a narrative 
research analysis supports a process that involved analyzing text data for elements of plot 
structure, such as the political characters, the political settings, the problems (political or 
otherwise), the actions, and the final resolutions or outcomes (Yussen & Ozcan, 1997). In other 
words, this type of data analysis and representation enable one to interpret the larger meaning 
of the story, event, or experiences from the perspective of the participants.               
5.9 Data Analysis: Canadian Case Law         
 A legal analysis of case law pertaining to youth crime in Canada over the last decade 
assisted in developing a more comprehensive understanding of whether youth in conflict with 
the law have been impacted or affected by the tough-on-crime mandate within the Canadian 
youth justice system. Specifically, this research took into account various sentencing practices 
as per the provisions of the YCJA (commencing from April 2003), and compared them across 
similar youth crime cases that were adjudicated both prior to and directly after the enactment 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) (ending at June 2013). A comparative analysis between prior and recent 
youth crime cases identified the ways in which youth court judges currently exercise judicial 
discretion, and whether these practices evolved given the new legislation.  
 Case study analysis involves a description and a within-case analysis which includes 
the identification of themes, (legal) issues, or specific situations to study in each case. In terms 
of the Canadian data, cases were organized into a chronology and analyzed across cases (cross-
case analysis) for likeness and variation amongst cases, according to offence, some mitigating 
factors, and sentences received. Given that the enactment of differing sentencing provisions 
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can be traced within individual cases, a chronological analysis was best to provide any 
evidence of an evolutionary shift in sentencing practices over time by year.  
 Using a cross-case synthesis as an analytical technique generally involves the creation 
of a Microsoft Word table that presents data from each case according to a standardized 
framework (similarities) (Yin, 2009). In this way, the technique relied on aggregating findings 
across a series of singular studies which later linked cases to one another according to 
similarities (for example, findings regarding different sentences for similar offences). 
Additional Word tables were then used in order to reflect other processes and outcomes of 
interest (i.e., exceptional cases that resulted in an unexpected sentence were noted, mitigating 
factors were recorded, and citations to other similar cases were distinguished). According to 
Yin (2009), additional Word tables exceed the unitary aspects of a case and offer a multiple set 
of features on a case-by-case basis. Various features of a case allow the analysis to investigate 
whether different groups of cases appeared to share commonalities and warranted being 
included as an example of the corresponding type of general case (or qualified for the same 
offence category, especially in cases were youth were convicted of multiple offences).  
 Once cases were organized chronologically, according to offence type, by sentence, and 
by factors that may have affected the sentencing decision, cases were then organized into 
three-year intervals (with the exception of 2003 and 2013, given that neither year represented a 
full year of case law). This procedure not only assisted in condensing the material at hand, but 
allowed for a more accurate illustration of how changes in sentencing practices might have 
occurred for a similar offence with the progression of time. Three-year intervals were chosen 
in order to divide the material equally across the remaining nine years, after 2003 and 2013 
were organized on an individual (annual) basis. Case law between October, 23 2012 (when the 
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YCJA amendments first came into effect) and December 31, 2012 was not considered as post-
Bill C-10 (Part 4) case law because these amendments could not be applied to cases 
retroactively. All thirteen cases heard within this time frame pertained to youth who committed 
crimes prior to the enactment of the new legislation. Given these findings, all case law from 
October 23, 2012 to December 31, 2012 was treated as pre-enactment cases since none of them 
could consider the newly enacted provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4).   
 According to Yin (2009), it is imperative to return to the theoretical perspectives that 
direct or actuate the research during the analysis phase of a case study. Due to the abundance 
of case law reviewed, the theoretical perspectives and Research Question #3 were both re-
visited on numerous occasions. This was necessary for a number of reasons. First, this 
procedure assisting in guiding the researcher towards a more focused analysis that fit within 
the objective of the research. Second, investigating conflicting or opposing theoretical 
understandings may be seen as an attempt to provide a different account of the studied 
phenomenon. Third, by undertaking this repetitive process the trustworthiness of the results 
was enhanced as the theoretical perspectives were addressed and discussed. This attended to 
the most significant aspect of the case study. Cross-case synthesis greatly builds on 
“argumentative interpretation” as opposed to other methods of analysis that employs “numeric 
tallies” (Yin, 2009, p. 160). Under these circumstances, these case studies provided data that 
support “strong, plausible, and fair arguments” pertaining to sentencing decisions and 
outcomes for youth crime (Yin, 2009, p. 160). 
5.10 Data Analysis: Texas Legislation and Case Law  
 An analysis of laws in Texas was conducted in a manner similar to that of a content 
analysis. By analyzing the enacted statutes and legislation for its content, a better 
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understanding was developed as to a) how Texas responds to youth crime via their laws; b) 
how the legislation or purpose(s) underlying the law is expressed within the courts (in relation 
to a given case); and c) how the tough-on-crime legislation in Texas differs from that of 
Canada. As such, the laws and legislation pertaining to juveniles in Texas was thoroughly 
examined from as far back as 1996 in order to capture the first evidence of the tough-on-crime 
mandate. Specific legislation was then analyzed in relation to any notable changes within the 
law, but more particularly to illuminate the ways in which legislation and the related legal 
provisions were reflected within the courts through various sentencing practices.   
 The inclusion of Texas case law assisted in illustrating the ways in which laws were 
applied and imposed upon youth in conflict with the law. In this sense, some case law that 
interpreted statutes were considered in order to attain a grasp of the legislature’s intent when it 
enacted the law. These cases allowed for a broader analysis of the legislation by explaining the 
contents of the law and applying it to an individual. Typically, policy in case law was 
identified by analyzing the rationale provided by the judge. In some cases where the court’s 
opinion did not refer to the underlying policy in support of its decision, a review of prior cases 
that considered the issue were examined in hopes that it may reveal the purpose behind the rule.  
 The cross-case analysis and interpretation of youth crime cases from Texas was 
conducted in a manner similar to those of Canadian court cases (see cross-case synthesis 
above). Texas cases were recorded by year, by offence, and by sentence type. Cases were 
coded according to categories and later reduced into themes that corresponded with similarities 
and differences across all cases chosen within the context of the appropriate legislation. Given 
that Texas legislation has not drastically changed since the enactment of the tough-on-crime 
legislation (although any substantial change is noted in Chapter 8), analyzing and comparing 
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cases on an individual basis by year was not essential. In other words, there were no signs that 
indicated these cases required consideration of pre- and post-enactment of a given Bill, since 
all cases considered for this research were post-tough-on-crime legislation in Texas.   
5.11 Ethical Considerations 
 The main ethical considerations associated with this research were to ensure voluntary 
participation, anonymity and confidentiality of all participants’ answers to the interview 
questions. In a Recruitment Letter (see Appendix A), all participants were informed of the 
research, data analysis, data storage procedures, and the type of information that was requested 
throughout the interview. Permission was requested to audio record each interview. Face-to-
face interview participants were informed that they may turn off the recorder at any time 
during the interview, while those who participated by telephone or Skype were notified that 
they could go off-record at any time. They were also made aware that they were under no 
obligation to answer any of the questions, and that they had the right to terminate the interview 
or withdraw their consent to participate at any time for any reason. To ensure participants were 
in control of their interview, face-to-face participants were given control of the digital audio 
recorder throughout the entire interview process. In the case of Skype or telephone interviews, 
participants would have had to notify the researcher to turn off the digital recorder as they 
could not be given control of the device. Should a participant have wished to withdraw from 
the study, their interview data would have been destroyed immediately.  
 Confidentiality was of the utmost importance to this research. Maintaining 
confidentiality of information collected from research participants implies that only the 
researcher has the ability to identify the responses of the participants. However, it also entails 
that the investigator has taken the necessary steps to ensure that no one outside of the research 
217 
 
is able to link individual responses to the participants. Offering participants anonymity of any 
information collected suggest one of two possibilities. First, it implies that the research is 
unconcerned with collecting any information that may identify the participants (i.e., name, 
address, email address, etc.). Second, it suggests that the research is unable to link specific 
responses to participants’ identities. Given that many of the respondents were and are public 
figures, it was impossible to refrain from collecting identifying information. Any material 
taken from the interviews and used in the research was not linked to any person or location. 
This was communicated both in writing and verbally prior to the commencement of any 
interview. In addition, no information used in the research can directly identify the participants. 
This is especially important in light of their occupational positions.   
 Respondents in this study were notified that each recorded interview would only be 
identified with a study code (i.e., an interview number), and that all other identifying 
information (i.e., names from transcripts) would be removed. Making use of interview numbers 
is an efficient strategy for protecting the confidentiality of research participants. Interview 
numbers are used in lieu of any identifying information during the data collection process, not 
only to safeguard stored (or out in the open) data, but to protect the participants’ responses. 
This upholds confidentiality even under the most unusual circumstances where data is stolen or 
lost, and ensures that the participant’s identity remains undisclosed.   
 All interview data collected remains anonymous and all identifying material (i.e., 
Informed Consent form) is secured in a location separate from paper and electronic interview 
data and is kept safely in storage. All paper copies of interview related data is kept in a locked 
filling cabinet in the researcher’s home. All electronic versions of the interview data are stored 
on a password protected computer and in encrypted format on an external memory stick. All 
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paper and electronic data (saved on an encrypted USB key) and identifying information will be 
kept in secure locked storage for ten years after completion of the study and will then be 
destroyed.   
5.11.1 Anticipated Risks and Benefits 
 There were no anticipated physical or psychological risks with participation in this 
study. While the interview questions directly asked about personal opinions, controversial 
topics, and decisions or situations that have previously been dealt with in legislative assembly, 
the interviews were concerned with the varying perceptions of each participant regarding the 
newly enacted legislation that affect both youth and society as a whole. In addition, they 
strived to uncover the underlying processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed 
and legislated. Given the public nature of policy implementation, these questions did not pose 
risks, harms or discomforts to respondents taking part in this study. Further, the information 
collected and the identity of participants will continue to remain confidential due to various 
sensitivities associated with occupational positions. 
 Upon request, participants will be provided with an executive summary. The results 
from this study are of direct benefit to academics, law enforcement, social workers, at-risk 
youth oriented community groups, government officials, and policy experts, as the findings 
better inform these individuals about policies and legislation that may address the prevention 
and treatment of youth crime while tending to the various needs of at-risk youth or youth in 
conflict with the law. By participating in this project, participants have the ability to promptly 
access the findings that pertain to the perceived effectiveness of various responses to youth 
crime, particularly in relation to responses that work best when dealing with youth crime. The 
results generated from this study are of benefit to the aforementioned individuals by 
contributing to the collective search for the most effective and appropriate ways to respond to 
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youth crime based on data collected from Canada as well as other jurisdictions such as Texas 
that have previously implemented tough-on-crime mandates. It is hoped that this study adds to 
the overall understanding of youth crime in Canada, predominantly with regards to the micro 
and macro processes associated with tough-on-crime legislation. It is anticipated that this 
research will foster dialogue between various social welfare agencies and encourage a 
collaborative approach to addressing youth crime in the near future.   
5.12 Conclusion 
 The most appropriate research design to investigate the micro and macro processes 
associated with the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada and the ways in which Texas 
responds to youth crime is a qualitative research design that adheres to the constructivist 
paradigm. The analysis of the findings ranged from reporting varied perceptions held by 
interviewees (and Hansard) to an analysis of legal policies and legislation, to conducting case 
law studies (via cross-case synthesis) that either illustrated whether the tough-on-crime 
mandate has had an effect on youth in conflict with the law (Canadian cases) or the ways in 
which responses to youth crime are illustrative of a crime control model that is consistent with 
the enacted tough-on-crime legislation (Texas cases). Overall, these analyses allowed for the 
provision of expanding and building on the emerging data that support the theoretical lens 
chosen for this research. Table 5.1 lists the research questions that were outlined in Chapter 4 
by the data source that was used, in order of priority. All research questions used a qualitative 
data type.138 
 
138 Please refer to pages 170-171 for a full list of the research questions.  
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Table 5.1: Research Questions and Data Sources 
                                     Data Source 
Issue 1: 
Research Question #1                                           Interviews, Hansard 
 
Research Question #2                                           Interviews, Hansard 
 
Issue 2: 
Research Question #3                                  Case Law Studies, Legal Analysis 
 
Issue 3: 
Research Question #4                                  Case Law Studies, Legal Analysis 
Research Question #5                                  Legal Analysis, Case Law Studies 
 
Research Question #6                                  Legal Analysis, Case Law Studies,  
                                                                                      Interviews 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE CANADIAN CONTEXT FOR TOUGH-ON-CRIME 
LEGISLATION 
 The context and ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation developed in Canada is 
addressed in this chapter by responding to the research questions in Issue 1, as outlined in 
Chapter 4.139 Given the research reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4 on what is known about the 
tough-on-crime mandate and the vast number of issues associated with this type of legislation, 
the findings in this chapter shed light on a variety of aspects of Bill C-10 (Part 4) that remained 
largely unexplained or previously undetermined. While the reviewed studies show that tough-
on-crime laws do not generally have a deterrent effect on youth crime or ameliorate conditions 
for youth in need of rehabilitation, Canadian legislation has designated Bill C-10 (Part 4) as a 
component of the response to dealing with youth crime. 140  In order to address Research 
Questions #1 and #2, the analysis in this chapter relies on the findings from the qualitative 
interview data that reflect the perspectives of stakeholders with regards to this legislation.  
6.1 Processes Associated With the Bill C-10 (Part 4) Legislation   
 Research indicates that enacting tough-on-crime legislation has minimal effects on the 
rate of youth crime in Canada. Despite these findings, the Canadian Government has legislated 
Bill C-10 (Part 4) as part of a viable response to youth crime. Thus, Issue 1 examines the 
processes through which the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and is 
enacted as a constituent of the current youth justice legislation. More specifically, Research 
Question #1 asks whose values and interests are embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation. 
In other words, it questions whose ethical ideals and central beliefs about youth crime (and 
139 Please refer to pages 170-171 for a full list of the Research Questions. 
140 Please note that the aim of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is to specially deter those in high risk groups. It is not meant to 
serve as a general deterrent to all youth.  
222 
 
                                            
thus the responses to youth crime) are pursued in relation to the tough-on-crime legislation. 
 The second portion of Research Question #1 asks whose values should be embodied in 
Bill C-10 (Part 4), from the perspective of the respondents, in order to better address youth 
crime in Canada. The works of Habermas (1985) and other critical theorists suggest that one of 
the dangers associated with Western democratic societies is that, at times, those belonging to 
less powerful segments of society (such as the “underclass” or minority groups) are not free to 
pursue their own interests during the legislative process. Other theories and research discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3 extend beyond the confines of propagating self-interests within a political 
context, by postulating that each powerful segment is able to transform their particular interests 
into public policy by manipulating policies to reflect genuine interests held by those of the 
dominant segments (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Hall et al., 2013).  
 From the perspective of the respondents, the findings below illustrate in what ways 
these theoretical explanations are supported. These findings, however, are best explained when 
traced through the legislative process that led to enactment of this Bill. In doing so, the 
historical framework from which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was born creates a context in which one 
can better understand the processes behind whose values and interests are really embodied in 
the Bill. While the development and adoption of the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation has been 
covered by a few published sources (Bala & Anand, 2012; Davis-Barron, 2009; Tustin & Lutes, 
2013), the findings from these interviews are important and add to what is currently known by 
making use of insider knowledge to shed light on the political and legislative processes. 
6.1.1 Chronological Development of Tough-on-Crime Measures       
 The majority of respondents agreed that the deliberations leading up to the final passing 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) took considerable time. In fact, respondents note that Bill C-10 (Part 4) is 
widely known to have been preceded by two other Bills while the Conservative Party was in 
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power. However, neither was passed given that the Conservatives held a minority government 
during that time. As far back as 2007, the Conservative Party platform encompassed a proposal 
for amending the YCJA with Bill C-25. 141  Interestingly, as respondents suggested, the 
introduction of Bill C-25 occurred prior to a scheduled undertaking of a detailed cross-national 
review of the Act, which was to be conducted in order to assess the Act’s strengths and 
weaknesses. Bill C-25 specifically aimed to address the amendments concerning sentencing 
principles of the YCJA to include “deterrence and denunciation” and to facilitate pre-trial 
detention of youth charged with offences endangering public safety.  
 Respondents alleged that in 2008, the Conservative Party’s election campaign 
reinforced its position on fortifying Canada’s youth justice laws by guaranteeing the enactment 
of a policy that reflected a modified but fair approach. The Conservative Party’s policy 
proposal on youth crime extended well beyond the narrow amendments advanced by Bill C-25 
to include deterrence and denunciation as sentencing principles, to provide that deterrence was 
to be overtly applied as a primary objective of youth sentencing. Other aspects of the election 
platform included proposals regarding the provisions for “enhanced youth sentences” that 
would entail “automatic, stiffer sentences for persons 14 and older convicted of serious and 
violent crimes such as murder and manslaughter,” as well as the disclosure of names of youth 
fourteen years and older who committed such crimes (see Balancing rehabilitation and 
responsibility, 2008).  
141 Bill C-25, also known as “An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act” was “introduced by the Minister 
of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Robert Nicholson, and received first reading in the 
House of Commons on 19 November 2007” (Bill C-25: An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 2007). 
The overarching goal of the bill is to enhance the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act on pre-trial 
detention and sentencing.  In particular, it: “broadens the possibility of pre-trial detention for a young person who 
represents a danger to the public or has previously failed to comply with conditions of release; and adds the 
denunciation and the deterrence of unlawful conduct to the Act’s principles of sentencing” (Bill C-25: An Act to 
Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 2007).  
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 Respondents suggested these amendments were allegedly sparked on the basis of the 
findings put forth by the Nunn Commission Report.142 While this is partially true, Hansard 
indicates that the Conservative Party knowingly proposed legislation that fell outside the scope 
of the report’s recommendations. 143  In a speech made by the Honourable Member Rob 
Nicholson, it was stated that, 
I always tell the members of the Liberal Party to not look for 
excuses and to not look for ways to not support what are very 
reasonable measures. We have to update the law. We have the 
royal commission report of Justice Nunn, who pointed out a 
number of areas within the Youth Criminal Justice Act that have 
to be updated [...] I appreciate that nobody wants to see increases 
with respect to violent crime among young people. However, 
quite apart from this fact, these are changes that must be made. 
In part, some of them were recommended in the Nunn report but, 
as members can see, we have gone [...] considerably beyond that 
(House of Commons Debate, 19 March, 2010, at 1020). 
 
Given this finding, there may be reason to believe that there were other undisclosed factors at 
play when Bill C-25 (and all subsequent versions of the bill) was proposed in parliament. The 
Conservative Party neither specified nor justified where these additional propositions to amend 
the legislation emanated from. However, the Conservative Party’s decision to propose 
legislative amendments that extended well beyond the confines of the report suggests that the 
tough-on-crime agenda was triggered for reasons that, in part, have nothing to do with Justice 
Nunn’s recommendations.  
142 The provincial government of Nova Scotia appointed Justice Merlin Nunn on June 29, 2005, “to head a public 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the release of a young offender who was convicted under the YCJA of 
a fatal car crash” (The Nunn Commission, 2013). The Nunn Commission report was submitted on December 5, 
2006, which contained 34 recommendations to be taken into account (The Nunn Commission, 2013). The Nunn 
Commission report suggested that the YCJA required some tweaking, such as facilitating judicial discretion and 
better enforcement of the dispositions of the courts, but was not intended to result in the changes put forth by Bill 
C-10 (Part 4).    
143 These findings are mirrored in every stage of the proposed legislation and can be observed in all three Bills.   
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 The re-election of the Conservatives with a minority government in 2008 allowed the 
party to continue promoting their tough-on-crime agenda. For example, the provincial and 
territorial roundtable discussions on youth justice took place during this time. Knowledgeable 
or involved respondents indicated that the research team entrusted with this responsibility 
consisted of “academics, police chiefs, and researchers from many provinces” and were 
specifically selected by the Minister of Justice’s office. As noted by one participant, “the idea 
was that he handpicked people that he would consult with. But it was a pretty, in my view a 
pretty weighted kind of consultation in that these people were handpicked by the political part 
of his office, not the bureaucratic”.144 The underlying purpose of this team was essentially to 
analyze the tough-on-crime Bill that was being proposed, in order to determine whether or not 
the provinces were in support of the changes. 
 From the perspective of some of the respondents, the report addressing the findings 
from the cross-national roundtable discussions indicates fairly clearly whose values and 
interests were not taken into consideration while drafting any subsequent proposals or 
legislation. One respondent noted, “The report that I wrote, it never ever saw light. In fact, my 
friends that are the bureaucrats and in the youth policy, they always refer to is as a (whispering) 
‘dusting’ report because it was never to be seen because it didn’t say what (he) wanted it to 
say.” Overwhelmingly, the report demonstrated that almost every province and territory 
believed that the YCJA worked well as is. 145  In fact, the provinces believed that the 
implementation was the issue.  
144  From the perspective of the respondent, bureaucratic in this sense is synonymous with the term 
“administrative”. 
145 Alberta was the only exception to the general consensus suggesting that the YCJA worked well, partially due to 
the fact that a day before their roundtable discussion took place, a taxi driver was murdered by a young offender. 
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 On December 9, 2010, a Member of Parliament addressed the Honourable Rob 
Nicholson by reading an excerpt from this report to which no counterstatement was made. It 
asserted,  
Little support for changes to the YCJA at this time: Legislation 
cannot prevent crime, reduce crime or protect the public. 
Changing legislation will not change behaviour. The YCJA 
should not be changed just for the sake of change. There was an 
overwhelming consensus that the perceived flaws are not in the 
legislation; the flaws are in the system. The development of the 
YCJA was described as a long and thoughtful process that came 
from evidence based research. A sensible and defensible Act 
based on intelligent principles. Any changes should be evidence-
based and made following the same thoughtful process. It was 
noted that the YCJA [...] needs “time to take root”. The 
effectiveness has to be communicated to the public, who, to this 
point, have not been very well informed. In recognizing that the 
YCJA is complex legislation that deals with complex issues, the 
message was clear it should not be amended based on individual 
cases or stories. [...] The YCJA itself is not the challenge; it is 
the dialogue that happens in the public. The public perception of 
public safety, whether real or perceived, will not change with 
amendments to the YCJA. Changing the YCJA will not change 
behaviour. If changes must be made to the YCJA, they should 
only be made slowly and as a result of a more comprehensive 
review (Serge Menard, Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights, 9 December, 2010, at 1550). 
 
In the words of one respondent, “the lack of resources or the need for additional resources to 
implement all of the pieces of the Act” was at the heart of improving it. Thus, prior to the 
introduction of the proposed amendments in subsequent Bills, the Minister of Justice was 
aware of the need for more programs or supporting programs for young people in need.  One 
respondent explains, 
Basically, the general response from those that work in the youth 
justice field, that advocate for youth, who were being consulted 
was more resources are needed for kids in trouble outside of the 
According to one participant who was actively involved, this incident allegedly steered the direction of the 
discussion.   
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youth justice system. The kids, you know, who are in the child 
welfare system, kids who have mental health issues, kids who 
have learning disabilities, all that range of at risk youth. There 
was a sense that there needs to be more supporting programs and 
not less for these kids. So I think it came as a bit of a surprise to 
those people who were consulted that the response was 
essentially to increase the custodial component which will 
certainly make fewer resources available for the things that were 
thought to be a higher priority. 
 
Despite the various revelations outlined in the report, respondents suggest that its presence was 
removed from the political sphere from fear that it was unsupportive of the proposed 
amendments in Bill C-4. This finding is a good example of the ways in which the government 
eradicates evidence which may pose a threat to their underlying interests or to the dominant 
ideology. These findings are also echoed in the works of Hall et al. (2013) relative to the 
tough-on-crime policy that developed in the United Kingdom on similar grounds, and lend 
support to Garland’s (1996) discussion on “denial” as part of the state’s response to reaffirm its 
ability to deliver protection to certain social groups.   
  In March 2010, the government presented Bill C-4 (Sébastien’s Law) which also 
proposed amendments to the YCJA on the basis that “Our government believes that the law 
must uphold the rights of victims and ensure the safety of our communities. If in any way our 
justice system fails to do so, we must take action” (Hon. Rob Nicholson, House of Commons 
Debate, 19 March, 2010, at 1010; see also House of Commons Debate, 6 March, 2012). It was 
also noted by another Conservative member that, “What that means to me as a legislator is that 
this is an urgent problem that can’t wait and that we need to take action. Something like Bill C-
4, which is targeted at violent repeat offenders, is a highly necessary step, even if it’s not the 
whole way” (Stephen Woodworth, House of Commons Debate, 23 March, 2011, at 1625). 
These findings coincide with Garland’s (2001) assessment of the general thrust towards 
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punitive penal policy that redefines the problem of youth crime (specifically high-risk, 
potentially violent youth groups) as a pressing issue requiring immediate attention. This 
movement can be seen as a result of a shift in penal intervention strategies (Feeley & Simon, 
1992; O’Malley, 1999), although it also corresponds with Garland’s (1996) analysis of the 
boundaries of the state and the “adaptive” governmental and agency responses to the problem 
of youth crime. This also suggests that as the issues about youth crime are re-evaluated, 
society’s cultural rules and norms about violent behaviour and repeat offenders are brought to 
the forefront. To this end, there appears to be some support for the theoretical perspective 
asserted by Habermas (1975, 1985) which claims that the conflict of cultural rules and norms 
are often dictated by dominant ideology which is reproduced in society to reflect the views of 
those in society’s most dominant positions. It is through communication and public debate 
within the political sphere that such ideologies are claimed to be weakened over time 
(Habermas, 1985).      
 Bill C-4 was subject to a great deal of scrutiny by Committee Hearings and received 
opposition from various youth justice professionals that represented the voices of the less 
powerful segments of society, such as average citizens and offenders, youth, Aboriginal, 
marginalized peoples, persons with a mental illness, and some victims whose stories would 
support the government’s cause. It was during the public deliberation of Bill C-4 that “people 
in the academic community, people in the youth justice system, youth advocates and some 
defence counsel expressed concern about the thrust of these changes”. These voices 
predominately opposed the changes of the Bill on the basis that “people who work with young 
people, people who are actually doing research in the area are aware of the fact that in general, 
a more punitive approach, sending more young people into custody for longer periods of time 
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is not going to result in a safer society”. The inclusion of the public as well as various youth 
justice experts supports Habermas’ (1975, 1985) view that considers the use of public inquiries 
and the consultation processes during the deliberation of proposed legislation.  
 Respondents noted that instead of enacting legislation that better represented the needs 
of youth in conflict with the law, the Minister of Justice pushed for legislation that went in the 
complete opposite direction. This finding lends support to Hall et al.’s (2013) work which 
demonstrated that similar law and order techniques were implemented in the United Kingdom. 
It is also congruent with the analyses provided by Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 
2001) and O’Malley (1999) on the assault on welfarism, which, as a result moves the state (and 
thus policies and governing legislation) towards a more responsive and reactionary 
bureaucracy most often coinciding with the neo-conservative stance. To some degree, this 
finding provides support for Habermas’ (1985) view of the declining welfare-state, as he is 
also cognizant of the attacks against this concept of government.  
 An examination of Hansard corroborates the above finding in that, upon questioning 
the Minister of Justice about his decision to enact tough-on-crime legislation, he was unable to 
produce a substantiated response. As one Member of Parliament inquired, 
Why, even though I know you don’t like it, did you not model it 
(the Bill) on the situation in Québec, which has had phenomenal 
success, as we can see throughout the report, in rehabilitating 
young offenders? Why tear something down that is working so 
well? Everyone is asking you not to touch this Act. Give it time 
to mature. Five years is too short. The judges are the ones telling 
you this, Minister (Marc Lemay, Standing Committee on Justice 
and Human Rights, 9 December, 2010, at 1615). 
 
While all of the participants believed that the YCJA was a good piece of legislation that simply 
needed better implementation of varying aspects of the Act, most respondents recognized that 
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such decisions involving amendments of this nature result in significant costs instead of 
producing the desirable effects the Bill was allegedly meant to achieve.  
 Alongside the numerous individuals or segments of society voicing concern over Bill 
C-4 were some interest groups such as the John Howard Society of Canada, the Canadian Bar 
Association, the Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth, and Justice for 
Children and Youth. According to the qualitative analysis of the interview data, these groups 
strongly considered the well-being of youth in conflict with the law, (i.e., marginalized youth 
who typically represent less powerful segments of society) and therefore argued against the 
amendments to the YCJA for a variety of reasons. While these groups are considered to have a 
significant amount of political influence, the concerns presented by these groups had a minimal 
effect on the legislation of the Bill because it represented concerns for individuals on the 
opposite spectrum (i.e., the out-of-control offenders that typically fall victim to a number of 
risk factors, such as poverty, on account of their social condition).  
 This finding lends some support to the conflict and Marxists/critical perspectives by 
demonstrating that groups of people with similar interests and values are in a constant state of 
conflict that are ultimately defined by ongoing competition and collective action in modern 
capitalist society. While in this case, those opposing the legislation were unable to realize their 
desires through collective action (Vold, 1958); those on the other side of the coin successfully 
advanced their agenda. Aside from what is known about tough-on-crime laws and their 
inability to curb crime, there was no social science evidence that would substantiate that the 
changes being proposed would achieve the government’s stated policy objective of protecting 
society. This in particular lends support to Garland’s (1996) argument about “denial” and the 
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ways in which the state deliberately disregards “evidence that crime does not readily responds 
to severe sentences” (p. 460).  
 Further, there were a number of issues that appeared to be inconsistent with the rights 
of a young person such as the relaxation of the “privacy principle” (YCJA S.3(1)(3)(b)(iii) and 
S.38). Respondents felt that the ability to publish the names of young offenders led to long-
term stigma and labelling and is therefore likely to lead to more criminal offending by the 
person than if they were able to retain some measure of privacy. Much of these issues lend 
support to the findings of Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley (1999) 
on new (current) crime control strategies that reflect conflicting (or “bi-polar”) rationalities, 
relative to the “innovative” sanctions that bring forth a number of disciplinary measures to a 
system of sanctions that maintain a welfare approach.    
 In light of these findings, the abundance of individuals who presented data against the 
legislation of Bill C-4 coupled with the fact that the Conservative’s held a minority 
government contributed to the proposed Bill not being passed. However, after the 
Conservatives won a majority government in 2011, the Omnibus Crime Bill (Bill C-10: Safe 
Streets and Communities Act) was introduced as a single proposal but essentially launched 
much of their criminal law agenda from previous Bills into one (mostly addressing adult 
offenders but included the amendments for the YCJA). Some of the interview participants who 
were personally involved in the political realm of these Bills (House of Commons Committees, 
Senate Committees, etc.), acknowledged that the Bill C-10 hearings were particularly 
abbreviated when it came to the amendments pertaining to youth (Part 4). While the Bill C-4 
hearings were quite detailed and were addressed for a rather lengthy period of time, the Bill C-
10 (Part 4) hearings were reported by many participants as being somewhat a matter of 
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formality that appeared to simply uphold the mark of democracy. In other words, the hearings 
were held out of necessity for the sake of keeping in line with a democratic government that 
encourages the free and equal practice of all eligible citizens to participate in the proposal, 
development and creation of the Bill. This finding can be understood through Habermas’ (1975, 
1985) theory of communicative action during the deliberative process in the political sphere in 
which the public is expected and encouraged to participate. It can also be asserted then that this 
process established the legitimacy of the Bill as reflecting public opinion from public debate, 
which again falls in line with the works of Habermas (1975, 1985).  
 Interestingly, some respondents noted that it was during this time that the roundtable 
report was made public to politicians and other individuals participating in the hearings. While 
respondents suggested that the findings in the report remained untouched, the public release of 
the document highlighted “one or two little negatives that were in there” that fueled the 
government’s cause of supporting the interests of society’s powerful groups reflecting 
dominant ideology. In essence, the majority of the findings indicated that any discussion on the 
ways in which the youth justice system could be improved on a provincial level was dismissed 
by the Conservative Party (see the statement made by Marc Lemay above).       
 Politically speaking, 95% of the participants in this research believed that the purpose 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) was to appear as though they were getting tough-on-crime in response to 
an allegedly growing need to appease public concern. In fact, this is mirrored in numerous 
speeches made by politicians during the parliamentary debates. For example, Stephen 
Woodworth (Member of Parliament for Kitchener Centre) argued in 2011 that “This is what 
Canadians expect of their youth justice system, and it is an important priority for our 
government” (Woodworth, 2011). In addition, many respondents strongly believed that the 
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tough-on-crime agenda was a ploy initially designed to increase votes amongst the general 
public, since “such approaches get a party elected.” This strategy is a prime example of how 
politicians gain consensus by shifting the focus onto the public, which in turn furthers a tough-
on-crime agenda (Garland, 1996, 2001; Hall et al., 2013).  
 More specifically, the public may be understood as a mechanism to forward crime 
policy. In this regard then, the values and interests embodied within Bill C-10 (Part 4) had very 
little to do with the best interests of youth in conflict with the law. 146 In fact, almost all 
respondents (politically involved or not) claimed that the mere notion that the Conservatives 
won a majority government effectively led to enactment of the legislation since the tough-on-
crime campaign was part of an agenda which fulfilled a Conservative election promise.147 
From the perspective of the respondents, the majority government ensured that “there wasn’t 
going to be much of a change or real debate about the Bill this time around.” According to 95% 
of the participants, gaining a majority government officially established that any and all 
opposition would have little chance to dispute the numerous provisions of the Bill. This 
viewpoint and interpretation of the legislative process is not surprising since parties with a 
majority in the House of Commons can pass their legislation.  
 Given that none of the participants in this study were active politicians, it was difficult 
for many to specifically address whose values and interests are embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 
146 This finding may illustrate the ways in which the legitimation process occurred. Given that there appeared to 
be a loss of public confidence in the youth criminal justice system, and more importantly, the legislation itself, it 
may be asserted that the Conservative government’s emphasis on public safety and protection served as a means 
to re-legitimate their position in the face of crisis. This finding lends support to the government’s call on society’s 
central value system, discussed on pages 79-81.      
147 Wining a majority government is only one aspect of legitimation. According to Habermas (1973), “the state 
can avoid legitimation problems to the extent that it can manage to make the administrative system independent of 
the formation of legitimating will. [...] Well known strategies of this sort are: the personalizing of objective issues, 
the symbolic use of inquiries, expert opinions, legal incantations, etc.” (p. 657). All of these strategies were used 
in the process of developing and enacting Bill C-10 (Part 4).   
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4) legislation. Outside of the three key influential people whose names were constantly 
mentioned, respondents had a hard time providing the researcher with additional references 
outside of the “Conservative Party” blanket statement. While all respondents noted that the 
values and interests embodied in the Bill are not those of the youth committing these crimes 
(i.e., those who represent the less powerful segments of society), distinguishing where and how 
the values and interests encompassed in the Bill were from was challenging for most. In 
numerous instances a common response was “you better ask the government that,” although 
the majority of interviewees suggested that the many values and interests represented in this 
Bill are those of the politicians and lawmakers. However, it is unknown as to who specifically 
informs the politicians and lawmakers (or whether they are even informed at all), where their 
ethical ideals and central beliefs may come from, and how many other individuals or groups 
are actively involved in the process of creating and enacting legislation. In a sense, this finding 
coincides with the view of the modern state as the systematic agent of a united group, although 
it may be argued that such legislation was enacted as a result of the state’s need to maintain 
and preserve legitimacy given that the state has interests of its own (Habermas, 1975, 1985).   
 What is known is that beyond the evidence provided by experts at the Standing 
Committees or the parliamentary debates, the Minister of Justice admitted to having “other 
input into legislation” but specifics as to what these additional contributions are or where they 
came from were not shared with the public (Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 
2010). According to respondents, the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed 
and became legislated were done so on the basis of no social or empirical evidence, did not 
address the underlying issues, had “nothing to do with interesting crime policy”, and has “to do 
more with politics than about anything to do with strategies about keeping Canada safe.” This 
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finding may lend support to Habermas’ (1973) discussion on the state’s reliance on certain 
images (in this case society’s safety) as a means of emotionally appealing to the public. 
Emotional appeals are said to stimulate “unconscious motives, occupy certain contents 
positively, and devalue others” (Habermas, 1973, p. 657).  As one Member of Parliament stated,  
As for incarcerating our youth, we are seeing in the 
Conservatives’ attempt in the youth justice bill, which is waiting 
before the justice committee right now to be reviewed, this 
attitude that more penalties and harsher penalties will cure all of 
society’s evils, contrary to all the evidence. [...] it is clear 
especially for youth that if a treatment modality is used, versus 
an incarceration modality, the treatment modality has a success 
rate that is four and five times that of the incarceration modality 
rate. We have the knowledge. We have the ability, from a social 
science standpoint, to treat. We just do not have the resources 
(Joe Comartin, House of Commons Debate, 15 April, 2008, at 
1555). 
 
 Further, when participants were asked to comment on how the tough-on-crime 
legislation was rationalized particularly when Statistics Canada reported an overall decline in 
the rates of youth crime, almost all interviewees had similar responses: “I don’t think they 
cared”, “It doesn’t matter when you have a majority government”, “They didn’t make an 
attempt to rationalize it”, “They claimed the stats are wrong and they don’t rely on numbers to 
make these decisions”, “They simply ignored and rejected it” and finally, “They used the 
public justification that this is going to make you safer”. These findings are consistent with the 
arguments of Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley (1999) that the 
neo-political trend and “late modernity” that has developed in much of the Western world, 
whereby there is a complete disregard for or “denial” of statistics and other evidence on 
account of the recent developments in state governance. Part of this may be explained by the 
crisis of the illegitimacy of the penal-welfare state, specifically with regards to the limits of the 
effectiveness of criminal justice and the “adaptive” and “non-adaptive” responses of the state 
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in light of the perceived “normalcy of high crime rates” that have “become an organizing 
principle of everyday life, an integral part of social organization” (Garland, 2001, p. 106). 
 Denial, as explained by Garland (1996), is a symbolic exercise whereby the state enacts 
punitive policies to counter the problem of youth crime. Despite evidence suggesting that such 
strategies are ineffective, the act of “denial” reinforces the states sovereign position therefore 
contradicting other “adaptive” responses to the “predicament of crime control” (Garland, 1996, 
p. 446). On the one hand, the state acknowledges its limitations of effectively managing crime. 
On the other hand, it reverts back to its original stance which claims absolute authority and 
power (i.e., “state sovereignty”) over “providing security, law and order, and crime control 
within its territorial boundaries” (Garland, 1996, p. 448).  
 The concept of “denial” makes clear why some participants believed that from the view 
of the politicians, “kids are still doing bad things even though the numbers are going down. 
The fact that it’s declining is good, but in their view it’s simple, we’ll toughen things up and it 
will get better.” All respondents noted that the government placed a strong emphasis on the 
protection of the public as a justification for the need to better respond to youth crime through 
harsher measures, as opposed to making allowances for the general decline in the youth crime 
statistics. In many instances, participants referred to this act as “fear mongering” that 
essentially strengthened the Conservative’s position on the need for tougher legislation in 
support of the underlying interests. These findings coincide with the process of legitimation, 
but even more so with the analysis of the media, whereby the government instilled fear in the 
public through the media to construct problems with youth crime, and subsequently proposed 
legislation to attend to these issues (such as an increase in the amount of violent youth crime). 
This is also confounded by a redefinition of the problem and the subject of penal interventions, 
237 
 
which aim to target a specific group of youth (i.e., violent and repeat offenders) that pose a 
danger to society.       
 The lack of consideration for declining youth crime rates, as noted by the respondents, 
provide some evidence to suggest that the interests embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation are those of the politicians, lawmakers, and powerful interest groups. It has been 
reported by interviewees that the influential persons involved in the enactment of the 
legislation have commented on not being overly interested in the statistics and therefore do not 
govern by them, however interviewees overwhelmingly believed that the government 
deliberately deflected what the statistics showed to be true. This finding lends support to 
Garland’s (2001) argument about the ways in which the state focuses on penal controls in 
response to “public outrage”, “middle-class fear and mass media news values” as opposed to 
considering the “statistical frequency of such events” (p. 173). One participant explains, 
Every time someone would say ‘but crime rates are dropping’ the 
minister responsible for the legislation or the other ministers say 
‘no we don’t agree’. It was the most obvious example of just 
anti-statistic decision making and rejection of evidence that I’ve 
seen in a very long time. So what it demonstrates, and I guess 
I’ve always known this to be true, that if you just say loudly 
enough and often enough ‘I don’t agree with that, I think it is 
wrong’, a strong governing party can get what they want, 
especially a majority. And remember, in the midst of that they 
were devaluing Stats Canada and the Census and other data at 
the same time basically [...]  
 
While it is clear that the government chose to dismiss (or perhaps deny) the statistics at hand, 
there was no mention as to what evidence was in fact used to support their decision to enact the 
legislation.  
 In line with this perspective, a statement made by Member of Parliament Stephen 
Woodworth explains,  
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When we talk about evidence-based decision-making, it 
sometimes comes down to a question of what evidence we want 
to accept and what evidence we don’t want to accept. But as a 
legislator, I can’t simply ignore the evidence of the 47 witnesses 
whom Justice Nunn heard when he came to his recommendations, 
nor can I ignore the evidence of Canadians across the country 
who see repeated problems in the implementation of our youth 
criminal justice system. Therefore, when we come to what are 
focused and targeted procedural improvements proposed in Bill 
C-4, I need to rely on that evidence (Standing Committee on 
Justice and Human Rights, 2011, at 1625).148 
  
Aside from the findings presented in the Nunn Report (2006), this statement suggests that 
public opinion was specifically used as evidence for the ways in which the YCJA (and the 
youth criminal justice system more generally) required improvements to legislation that 
appeared inadequate to Canadians. Not only does this imply that public opinion is a proxy for 
consent, but that politicians take an active interest in enacting legislation that appears to be 
supported by the public, even if the public is misinformed. This finding strongly supports the 
works of Garland (2001), Habermas (1975, 1985), and Hall et al. (2013), because it suggests 
that the public may be conceptually understood as an abstraction that is mobilized to make 
phenomena governable. That is, the public is used a vehicle to advance crime policy. 149 
Interestingly, while the statement above indicates a need for the “focused and targeted 
procedural improvements proposed in Bill C-4”, it fails to acknowledge that many of the 
148 The “evidence-based decision making” referred to in this statement solely reflects the findings of the Nunn 
Report (Nunn, 2006), although there is mention of Canadian public opinion on the efficacy (or lack thereof) of the 
youth criminal justice system as “evidence” of a problem. Nowhere does Stephen Woodworth refer to other 
specific studies or findings that suggest that any other “evidence” was considered (or even exists) outside of 
Nunn’s recommendations. More importantly, this raises a general question about what can accurately be claimed 
to be evidence, since there appears to be a lack of a) consensus on what constitutes legitimate evidence, and b) 
whether certain types of evidence are considered as more valid than others (Young, 2013). For additional 
information on the complexities of evidence-based decision making and how public opinion (“the selective use of 
evidence” or “the untested views of individuals or groups, often inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, or 
speculative conjecture”) is incorporated into policy, see Young, 2013, pp. 4-5.      
149 This statement can be linked to Habermas’ (1973) conception of the public as “engineered for purposes of 
legitimation” which, “primarily has the function of structuring attention by means of areas of themes and thereby 
of pushing uncomfortable themes, problems, and arguments below the threshold of attention” (p. 657). 
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provisions proposed in the Bill had little to do with the “repeated problems in the 
implementation” of the governing legislation (Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights, 2011, at 1625). In essence, the provisions outlined in Bill C-4 did not propose 
improved or enhanced implementation techniques.     
 While the Conservatives claimed that the central reason for not governing by statistics 
was due to the fact that the numbers are often flawed and inaccurate (based on the fact that not 
enough people report crimes committed against them), most participants purported that the 
issues pertaining to these numerical discrepancies are rarely properly addressed by those 
proposing tough-on-crime legislation. According to most respondents, those in support of the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) “did not tackle these issues head-on” simply because it was not 
in their best interest to do so. Although it may be true that crime statistics do not reflect actual 
crime rates, the other side of coin suggests that there is no evidence that shows there has been a 
change in these rates over time. In other words, participants note that there are many 
unreported crimes; however it is likely that there are as many unreported crimes now as there 
were a few years ago. For this reason, some interviewees acknowledge that while the statistics 
may not be entirely accurate, they certainly are reliable especially from a short-term 
perspective since much has not changed. As one respondent explained, “The longer you go 
over time, the bigger change you’ve had in police reporting practices so the less reliable stats 
are”. Thus, many participants attested to the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation as a law that was put 
into practice on the basis of “smoke without fire”.           
 Overall, the results indicate that the processes upon which Bill C-10 (Part 4) is 
legislated developed more so on the basis of an ideological philosophy rather than 
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substantiated grounds.150 This finding corresponds with the views of 90% of the participants as 
well as previous research which discusses the Bill in terms of a legislation that is more 
symbolic than intended to produce substantial change (Bala & Anand, 2012; Hall et al., 2013). 
In the opinion of one respondent, “I was not and I am not supportive of it, but I also as I say 
view this as a fairly astute move by the government in terms of maximizing the political bang 
and minimizing the actual impact.” Others suggest it as a “theological exercise” which at its 
core is “symbolic to make the public believe that this is the government that protects victims 
and is hard on criminals, particularly those violent young offenders, but unfortunately it’s very 
damaging.” Whether the legislative amendments are genuinely meant to be more symbolic as 
opposed to effecting significant change remains unknown. However, it does appear as though 
Canadians are “living through a potentially expensive social experiment and we’re going to see 
what happens”.  
 Symbolic or not, these findings suggest that the values and interests embodied in Bill 
C-10 (Part 4) are based on a combination of those found amongst the public that are in support 
of the dominant ideology, as well as those in the more powerful segments of society. This is 
particularly the case amongst those within the political sphere who were staunch advocates for 
tough-on-crime measures, whom have successfully transformed their interests into public 
policy by legitimating the claim through the public. This finding is based on evidence 
150 Habermas (1996) notes that there are groups in society that are less driven on account of economic reason, but 
are instead more interested in ideological objectives. He classifies these individuals as “suppliers”, and describes 
them as “associations, and organizations, that before parliaments and through the courts, give voice to social 
problems, make broad demands, articulate public interests or needs, and thus attempt to influence the political 
process more from normative points of view than from the standpoint of political interests”. These groups include 
“organizations representing clearly defined group interests”; organization with “goals recognizably defined by 
party politics”; “cultural establishments” (i.e., “writers’ associations”, “academics” and “radical professional”); 
“public interest groups” which include, but are not limited to “churches or charitable organizations” or human 
rights groups (pp. 26-29).        
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established through the views, statements and themes in the interview data, although there are 
signs of this in Hansard as well.  
 In the event the legislation has little impact on the overall youth crime statistics, the 
enactment of the legislation would have been nothing more than a political strategy to 
accumulate votes disguised as a tactic to convince the general public that getting tough on 
crime is in Canada’s best interest. This approach is highly supportive of Garland’s (2001) 
argument about “the populist current in contemporary crime policy” which exemplifies “a 
political posture or tactic, adopted for short-term electoral advantage” (p. 172). Under this 
circumstance, the Bill effectively subscribed to the dominant ideology expressed in the views 
of the public and represents the values and interests of those in the more powerful segments of 
society. If the legislation produces a significant effect on the youth crime statistics, the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) again supports the same critical theoretical view. These results 
are echoed in Hall et al.’s (2013) findings on youth crime (mugging) as a social phenomena in 
the United Kingdom, which in a sense illustrate the ways in which the state mobilizes 
dominant ideology and ideological apparatuses to appeal to the masses. In essence, this finding 
lends strong support to the notion of gaining and maintaining legitimacy, but also to the 
development of an “authoritarian consensus” (Hall et al., 2013, p. 2).   
6.1.2 “Underclass” and “Power” Constructs      
 The constructs of the “least powerful” and “powerful” segments of society touch on the 
complexities of how structural inequalities are produced and reproduced through laws and 
policies. Much of this distinction is developed on the basis that the conditions that are present 
in one’s life have a great deal of influence on their values and internalized norms. Extending 
beyond this for the “least powerful” segments or groups of society is the notion that the 
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broader structural forces (such as political, social and economic inequality and poverty) align, 
and consequently form groups of what is known as “underclass” or “truly disadvantaged” 
youth (Blau & Blau, 1982; DeKeseredy, 2011; Hall et al., 2013; Wilson, 1987). These groups 
or segments have the highest risk of committing very violent crimes (DeKeseredy, 2011). 
  According to Feeley and Simon (1992), the term “underclass”, 
Is used today to characterize a segment of society that is viewed 
as permanently excluded from social mobility and economic 
integration. The term is used to refer to a largely black and 
Hispanic population living in concentrated zones of poverty in 
central cities, separated physically and institutionally from the 
suburban locus of mainstream social and economic life in 
America (p. 467).  
  
It should be noted, however, that the notion of “underclass” involvement in crime is more 
prevalent in the statistics on youth crime in the United States than in Canada. This is due to the 
ways in which youth crime statistics in the United States are gathered. Whereas America 
publishes information on youth crime according to race, Canada does not. The developing 
visibility of the correlation between race and crime (particularly in the United States) has the 
potential to “reinforce the sense that crime is the product of a pathological subpopulation that 
cannot be integrated into the society at large, as well as the perception that the penal system 
can do no better than maintain custody over a large segment of this population” (Feeley & 
Simon, 1992, p. 467). Thus, the argument is that society’s structural barriers strengthen the 
general assumption in which the conditions that perpetuate the existing circumstances of the 
“underclass” are not only imminent, but are immune to any intervention advanced via social 
policy (Feeley & Simon, 1992). Despite the notable difference between Canadian and 
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American statistical information on race and crime, such notions of underclass are common in 
Canada as well (DeKeseredy, 2011).151     
 According to Chambliss and Seidman (1971), “the probability of a group’s having its 
particular normative system embodied in law is not distributed equally among the social 
groups but, rather is closely related to the group’s political and economic position” (p. 474). 
This statement supports the assertion that there is a greater likelihood that the groups or 
segments that hold the highest political or economic positions have the greatest probability that 
“its views will be reflected in the laws” (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, p. 474).  Although this 
view is a stepping stone in the development of Marxist theories of law relative to the state, this 
view is too simple, general and abstract in light of this research data. It may be that youth that 
belong to segments of society that broadcast aspects of disadvantage or marginalization are 
least likely to be in a position of power (Hall et al., 2013), while those who belong to the most 
prominent economic, social and political groups have the greatest likelihood of forming the 
“powerful” segments of society. However, there is no guarantee that segments that hold the 
highest positions within the economic or political sphere will undoubtedly pass laws in their 
favour (Kasinitz, 1983).  
 Instead, it may be more accurate to suggest that law is driven by the development of 
political class struggle, which at times enacts legislation in favour of more powerful groups in 
society, but is not always obliged to do so (Hall et al., 2013). Yet, threats to the superstructure 
call upon a “normative system” which has a tendency to reinforce the bourgeois social 
151 There is limited statistical evidence that points to chronic offending (“career criminals”) or high-risk youth 
groups in Canada. The “high-risk” group referred to above is difficult to track with the statistics currently 
available, because much of one’s life conditions that contribute to such circumstances are not accounted for in the 
data. Please see Carrington, Matarazzo and deSouza (2005) for information on “court careers”.        
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relations that underlie the modern capitalist state.152 Thus, the reproduction of the dominant 
ideology can be observed in laws and policies that advance tough-on-crime legislation, because 
it is geared towards “persistent offenders” and “career criminals” that are not representative of 
these “powerful” groups (Garland, 2001). To complicate matters further, it appears there is 
evidence to support the notion of building a consensus on the perceived problem (of high-risk, 
potentially violent “career criminals” in the making), which reflects a process of crisis on the 
perceived illegitimacy of the penal-welfare strategies. In such cases, the public is used as a tool 
to win and maintain the consent of the public for the states intervention in crime control by 
supporting legislation that responds to seemingly problematic youth (Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 
2013).           
 These findings are not surprising given that most respondents felt that the legislation 
addresses very little of the needs and interests of youth in conflict with the law. For example, 
some segments of society that were highly specialized in their interests who were generally 
known to have some political influence were unable to pursue the interests of those in less 
powerful segments within the political realm. As one respondent explains, “I always thought 
that some members of The Canadian Bar Association had a say in some of the policy, but it 
appears not because they were really very vocal about the changes in the YCJA and they 
couldn’t get through.” Although groups such as the Canadian Bar Association, the John 
Howard Society, and the Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth have 
influenced policy in the past, it appears that those segments of society that possess a more 
dominant or authoritative position and express a view that corresponds with the dominant 
ideology are most successful in pursuing their self-interests within the legislative process, 
152 The “normative system” or structure here refers to views, interests, values and attitudes.   
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regardless of opposition, because they are in a more powerful position to do so. 153  This 
provides support for research conducted by Hall et al. (2013) on the hegemonic domination of 
more powerful groups over subordinate groups given the existing structural inequalities in 
Canada. In addition, it lends support to research on the structured preference given to some 
interest groups over others (Hall et al., 2013), and confirms the ways in which interest groups 
play a role in legislative decisions as part of the deliberation and negotiation process within the 
political sphere (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Habermas, 2006).          
6.1.2 Values That Should Be Embodied In Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
 The second part of Research Question #1 asks whose values should be embodied in Bill 
C-10 (Part 4) to better address youth crime in Canada. Undoubtedly, respondents recognized 
that youth crime is not merely an affair that solely affects young people. In fact, many 
respondents noted that youth crime is a social phenomenon that broadly affects society in a 
highly complex sense. In essence, the values embodied in any piece of youth justice legislation 
should take into account both the needs of the general public as well as the youth in order to 
implement a balanced approach that works best for all parties involved. Yet, of the twenty-two 
participants recruited for interviews, not one believed that the amendments put forth by Bill C-
10 (Part 4) would effectively address youth crime. This finding suggests that the values 
embodied within the Bill itself, from the perspective of respondents, do not encompass values 
or legislation that attend to the best interests of the youth or augment the safety of the public. 
More notably however, all respondents believed that while the youth justice system has a role, 
153 By no means does this dissertation suggest that The Canadian Bar Association, the John Howard Society, or 
the Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth represent the least powerful groups or segments of 
society. It is merely asserted that these groups voiced their concerns about the legislative amendments on behalf of 
youth that fall within this “least powerful” category. In reality, these associations do have political influence. In 
the case of Bill C-10 (Part 4) however, their degree of influence appeared minimal based on the views of the 
respondents.  
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the provisions of better community and mental health services for youth, changes within the 
educational system, and increasing youth employment have a stronger impact on youth crime 
than changes in legislation.    
 While many of the participants believed that some of the provisions outlined in the 
amendments to the YCJA “makes things clearer”, particularly with regards to bail provisions 
that were “previously a confusing mess”, all participants accept that a rehabilitative approach 
to responding to youth crime may better address the needs of both the youth and society as a 
whole. This consists of education, greater resources, better developed organizations and 
programs to assist at-risk youth, and tools and skills needed to build confidence. More 
specifically, when participants were asked what types of responses they believed would have 
meaningful consequences for youth, the most common terms used were: expediency 
(immediate responses), fairness, proportionality, comprehensiveness, compassion, 
understanding, firmness, and coordination on the supportive responses. However, many 
respondents exhibited difficulty in answering a question of this nature given that meaningful 
consequences tend to vary on the disposition of the offence as well as the young person. 
Overall however, these findings support a type of welfare state that appears to have dwindled 
by virtue of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative alignment and the substitution of “late 
modernity” (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996, 2001; Hall et al., 2013; Muncie, 2006; 
O’Malley, 1999).     
 In many cases, interviewees suggested that legislation placing a greater emphasis on the 
swiftness of responses would better address youth crime in order to link the crime with the 
sanction. For example, many participants noted a distinction between the severity of one’s 
response with the swiftness of one’s response. To a degree, this finding lends support to 
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Bentham’s (2008) philosophy of punishment, whereby a sentence is more effective when it is 
promptly imposed. The severity of a punishment, therefore, could be less if it is delivered 
swiftly because it acts as a deterrent in itself.154 Interestingly, respondents suggested there is a 
general degree of confusion between the two concepts, because on the one hand “we sit there 
are talk about lengthening sentences, we’re toughening things or making the presumptions 
different, etc., all of which is, you know, about the severity of response.” On the other hand, 
some participants suggested that what is really needed is “certainty and speed of response - and 
that’s something that we’re not doing as a society.” As one respondent states, 
I do think that the speed with which you can respond makes a big 
difference. And that's one of the problems especially with 
younger people who are in the system. You can't make the 
system go any faster than a sort of speed and the police have a 
huge influence on how quickly things happen because you're 
waiting for their information [...] A lot of things can muck up the 
system. And so you're really looking at least six months until 
you're getting down to something responsive and that's a long 
time in a teenager's life in terms of what you did and getting a 
sanction or a response to it. 
 
In this regard, many respondents commend Québec and acknowledge that “we have a lot of 
lessons to learn” when it comes to addressing youth crime in a more expedient fashion. 
    Legislation that embodies an educative function is of utmost importance from the 
perspective of the respondents. In order for youth to comprehend the nature of their behaviour 
in relation to the consequence(s) for their offence, participants believe that legislation may 
benefit from provisions that alert youth to the broader context of their behaviour. One 
respondent notes, 
154 Garland (2001) argues that the new style of governance and the new penology has led to a change in the way 
the offender is presently viewed. This view “seem at first to be a puzzling return to the naive criminology of 
Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarian followers” (p. 189). However, Garland (2001) continues to say that “this 
revision appears less puzzling in light of the institutional forces that now pull in that direction” (p. 189).  
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I don’t think they really get the nature of consequences in their 
behaviour. I think they act spontaneously and without much 
regards for what the consequences in their behaviour would be 
[...] So I think some measure of restorative justice, some measure 
of explaining what the consequences of their behaviour had for 
others or what the consequences of their behaviour may have for 
themselves of their family, I think is always extremely helpful.  
 
In other words, legislation that offers solutions that enable youth to understand the impact of 
their offence may better address youth crime as opposed to the provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4). 
Another participant adds,  
I think approaches that involve the youth understanding the 
impact of their behaviour and being involved in some active way 
to undo the harm or to compensate for the harm is best. There is 
clear evidence that that’s much more effective than incarceration 
or removal from the community [...] and in the long run, it’s 
much cheaper and more effective than these traditional criminal 
responses.  
 
While it may be asserted that the need to formalize so many aspects of youth crime diminishes 
one’s understanding of their consequences, legislation embodying values that connect the 
behaviour to the consequence (even through community shaming or dealing with the victim 
face-to-face) may have a more immediate effect resulting in a more significant response to 
youth crime.    
 Respondents also agree that providing youth with tools (i.e., education, self-confidence, 
and anger management skills)155 as part of a rehabilitative scheme that is encompassed within 
the legislation would be useful in order to give youth “some options besides criminal behaviour 
155 It should be noted that anger management as a skill falls outside the scope of a traditional technique of social 
redemption (rehabilitation). According to Foucault (2009) there were three distinct apparatuses that distinguished 
the prison structure during the 19th century. These consisted of “refamilialization”, whereby the family brokered 
the successful correction of their loved one; “labour”, whereby the offender was subjected to meaningful work as 
a means of punishment and effective correctional method; and “self-punishment”, whereby the offender actively 
participates in constructing programs from which they are meant to be rehabilitated (pp. 15-16). Anger 
management as a skill set may be seen as a more modern take on rehabilitation.   
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in the future”. Many interviewees assert youth require these skills to manage similar future 
occurrences as a means to deal with the associated emotions and related conduct, like those 
that initially prompted the criminal behaviour. Thus, enacting legislation that supports such 
rehabilitation provisions may help eliminate the need for responding to future youth crime, 
while also promoting pro-social development into adulthood.      
 Frequently cited by participants was the notion that the amendments put forth by Bill 
C-10 (Part 4) poorly address youth crime because it does not appear to demonstrate a 
constrained use of the criminal law. For example, interviewees note that the decision to treat an 
incident as criminal should not only be restrained as per the YCJA, but be accompanied by the 
utmost protection of youth’s rights. While the discussion of youth rights modestly presented 
itself during the interview process, the majority of participants commented on the 
proportionality of sentences for youth in relation to the legislation, especially in cases where 
youth are convicted as adults. All participants note that prior to any legislative amendments, 
the YCJA was “on the right track”. One respondent states “It certainly could be that it (the 
YCJA) could be improved, but the idea of responding with restraint, using custody with 
restraint, seeing sentencing as being an issue of proportionality more than for the kind of child 
welfare purposes of the kid [...] it was a pretty good start. But I think this Bill could be pretty 
destructive.” In essence, the tough-on-crime values embodied in Bill C-10 (Part 4) have 
created concern for some in relation to the sentencing principles for youth, most notably with 
regards to the potential for producing a gateway towards incarcerating more youth, particular 
because the true effects of the Bill remain undetermined as it is still too new.      
 Respondents recognized that there are many factors that contribute to youth being at 
risk of criminal involvement. Given the multitude of circumstances and situations that may 
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make some youth more prone to criminal behaviour, participants suggest that legislation 
should be more understanding of the various systemic, inter-generational, racial, relational and 
risk factors that are interwoven into both the legal system and society more generally. Most 
respondents believe that legislation which implements a tough-on-crime approach represents a 
certain political ideology that upholds the values of some lawmakers at the cost of the 
underprivileged, “underclass”, or at-risk youth. The findings put forth by Hall et al. (2013) 
reported similar results. As one participant states, 
So you bring in these policies, they’re extensively colour-blind, 
they’re extensively neutral, they’re suppose to accomplish things, 
but if you look at how they actually have an impact, it’s often 
disproportionate in certain groups and extremely expansive, right. 
So I think that’s really where it stems from and there’s a lot of 
truth to that. Bill C-10 (Part 4) is sort of a blunt tool for all 
potential people who come before the justice system, that doesn’t 
take properly into account individual differences and in 
particular doesn’t recognize sort of the plight of many minority 
groups and whatnot who are vastly overrepresented in the prison 
system. 
 
Such notions can also be linked to the neo-conservative risk-management trend outlined by 
Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley (1999) whereby the legislation 
is used to penalize, target and track certain youth that are either high-risk offenders or part of a 
(racialized) minority group. While it is acknowledged that the legislation of any youth criminal 
justice Bill is likely to be limited in its mindfulness of these factors, interviewees maintain that 
such creative and conscientious legislation is only part of the equation.  
 From the perspective of the respondents, the other side of the coin involves crime 
prevention strategies and programs that better assist youth more generally, and not just young 
offenders. Participants often discussed a greater need for services for youth, especially those 
between the ages of 10 and 14 who are “vulnerable,” “uninvolved with their families,” and 
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“who come from difficult circumstances that are partly responsible for bringing them in 
contact with the criminal justice system.” Many questioned the availability of services for 
youth in this age bracket within the province of Ontario, and claim that preventative measures 
are far better than enacting crime legislation as a means of effectively addressing issues related 
to youth crime.  
 Better community programs were regarded as one of the most crucial components of 
crime prevention and crime control. While many respondents were torn between whether or 
not the province of Ontario has adequate resources available when responding to youth crime, 
implementing harsher sentences and penalties were not advocated for by a single participant. 
Some interviewees vehemently argued that Ontario does in fact have adequate resources to 
respond to youth crime, but that they are financially mismanaged by either the province itself 
or the program administrators. In addition, community programs, prevention programs, 
diversion programs and social skills programs that do exist are rarely evaluated to determine 
the strengths and weaknesses. These findings suggest respondents believed youth could benefit 
more from a welfare state as opposed to the new crime control strategies that underlie the 
current legislation. In effect, the views expressed by the respondents lend support to the 
conclusions made by Garland (2001) and Hall et al. (2013) about the futile attempts of enacting 
law-and-order policies.  
 For many, the real issue is to what extent legislation can actually affect the prevalence 
and seriousness of certain types of youth crime. As such, a good portion of interviewees 
suggested that the education system in Canada could better address crime prevention in schools 
by instilling values all the way through, with the help of the neighbourhood and various 
support systems within the community. One interviewee purports, 
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So the best way in my view, is to focus on long-term 
rehabilitation for offenders, but really the criminal justice system 
is just the last cog in the machine right along the way. What 
should be being dealt with before then is that there are proper 
support systems in place to help minimize that this can happen. 
And by that I mean, you know, an education system that truly 
reaches everybody, social services that are there, acknowledging 
that, you know, when these family systems break down, 
something has to help fill the void.  
 
 Respondents also noted that keeping youth in school longer may help prevent crime in the 
long run. As asserted by one participant, “part of the awful problem with overrepresentation 
with some minority groups or native people is very few of them get through high school. 
We’ve got to just keep improving that somehow.” In lieu of developing tough-on-crime 
legislation, interviewees proposed that early intervention and long-term prevention programs 
are more valuable for youth than stricter penalties.   
 In addition to the development of long-term prevention strategies and social support 
systems, most respondents advocate for community based sentencing, where appropriate, for 
youth already involved with the criminal justice system. Participants believed accountability is 
paramount in the rehabilitative process, however most did not consider getting tough on crime 
a viable solution to raising the standard of accountability. Although it is recognized that “in 
some cases a certain degree of punitive measures may be necessary just to drive home the 
message to some youth and also to hold them accountable for what they’ve done,” most 
participants agreed that less serious offenders (even second and third time offenders) are fairly 
suitable for “restorative justice, community based sentencing, and circle sentencing” which are 
“invaluable and do hold young people accountable.” This not only suggests that these types of 
sanctions are appropriate for these types of offenders, but it also coincides with Garland’s 
(1996) analysis of the many “adaptive” responses of the state. 
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  “Defining deviance down”, as Garland (1996) refers to it, encourages the widespread 
use of community sentences, although this is partially attributed to a strategy which essentially 
redefines the public’s perception of the various achievements (and malfunctions) of the 
criminal justice system and the state. As one participants stated, 
We should deal with them by responding but responding 
effectively, generally in a way that accepts they have a 
diminished understanding and responsibility and deals with it 
that way and inventively, almost always in the community, 
usually by trying to reinforce the environment that they’re in in a 
way that works, whether that’s the family environment, an 
alternative family environment, or programs and resources that 
are available within the community. It’s a serious mistake to 
write off kids, especially to do so too early. There is no evidence 
that incarceration or removal from the community is terribly 
effective. I think we need to take the deviant behaviour that 
happens in our community as something the community has to 
deal with and should be well resourced to do so.  
 
It should be noted, however, that participants also acknowledged a “decreased value” in 
continuously handing out community-based sentences, particularly for youth who “take a long 
time to figure out what’s going on” or those who have learning disabilities. In the first instance, 
some youth simply do not respond to sentences unless they are more punitive. In the second, 
some youth with learning disabilities are unable to comprehend the full scope of their offence 
and as such may not be amenable to community based sentencing or rehabilitation in general.     
 In cases where society legitimately places youth in custody as per the legislation, all 
participants agreed there exists a need for improved long-term rehabilitation programs that 
better attend to youth in conflict with the law. As one respondent explains, “Some of our 
custody programs in Canada are actually pretty good. I mean, good, there’s always a problem 
of peer-to-peer violence and that kind of stuff. But, you know, custody can be for some young 
people a positive experience. And so we have to work on what we’re doing in custody as well.” 
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A re-evaluation of custody programs was reported as necessary, not only to ensure that the 
system is “doing all that it can to rehabilitate youth”, but also because an overuse of custody 
“can have a backwards effect.” Given that “teenagers are obsessed with fairness more than 
anything else,” participants believed that rehabilitative programs in custody should be designed 
in a manner that maximizes the positive effects on youth. 
 Overall, these findings support the critical view which purports that within the 
legislative process, socially, economically, and politically underprivileged groups are more 
likely to be burdened and impacted by the consequences associated with laws that do not 
represent their interests. These findings also correspond with previous research on the ways in 
which the law encompasses dominant ideology which appears to have a universal quality, but 
instead merely conceals the interests of the more powerful groups (i.e., the ruling 
class/dominant capitalist groups/economic elite) as presented in their legal facets. From the 
perspective of the participants, it is evident that the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) neither 
promotes the best interests nor well-being of those belonging to minority or underprivileged 
groups. Instead of placing emphasis on legislation that embodies values more in favour of 
groups that tend to be more at risk, the interview data suggests that the current legislation 
strategically situates many underprivileged groups on a path that not only endorses crime for 
some of these youth, but also advances the Conservative position that advocates for law and 
order via tough-on-crime policies.  
 This also supports the critical criminological perspective discussed by Alvi (2012), 
DeKeseredy (2011), and Garland (1996). In essence, tough-on-crime legislation facilitates the 
processing of those with less economic, social and political power (as opposed to those with 
more) mainly because there is less likelihood of adversity from those in less powerful positions. 
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Thus, these findings lend support to the position of the Birmingham School (Hall et al., 2013), 
but also to the works of Feeley & Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley (1999) 
which examine a multitude of layers of the subordinate groups in relation to the extreme 
sanctions and strict enforcement actions on youth in light of the state’s reaction to crime in a 
developing law and order society. Moreover, much of these findings correspond with the 
conflicting rationalities that underlie “late modernity”, particularly with regards to the use of 
incarceration as a means of specific deterrence.   
 Consistent with the YCJA prior to the amendments, the interview findings suggest that 
legislation which bears a greater degree of interpersonal responses in conjunction with 
rehabilitation serves as a far better alternative to implementing harsher and longer sanctions for 
youth. On the other hand, recognizing that legislation only goes so far in terms of effectively 
addressing youth crime is a finding in and of itself. From this perspective, the values that 
should be embodied in the legislation theoretically ought to reflect those of underprivileged 
groups in need of assistance but have little means, resources, and access to address some of the 
social and economic conditions that accentuate their marginalization. These findings are 
similar to previous literature that makes clear that marginalized or disadvantaged youth “do not 
receive the same treatment [...] as the well-to-do or middle class. This differential treatment is 
systematic and complete” (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 475; see also Alvi, 2012; Garland, 
2001; Hall et. al, 2013). In reality, these values need not only be mirrored in the legislation that 
addresses youth crime in Canada, but also within the broader social structure that responds to 
underprivileged youth and their respective communities.            
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6.2 Power, Ability and Influence in the Process of Legislative Change 
 In the political realm, it would appear that most policy ideas leading to legislative 
change originate from various perspectives and ideals of what society ought to look like from a 
given standpoint. It may be argued that the views from which policies are derived represent the 
overall beliefs and perspectives of the general population, especially when considering 
democratic societies. This occurs on the basis of consensus as a result of the (re)legitimation 
process, which in democratic societies is expressed through the electoral system by the public 
(Habermas, 1975, 1985; Hall et al., 2013). On the flip side, even within democracy it may be 
said that some policies are initiated and shaped by voices that represent the dominant ideology 
within a given society, but are not necessarily those held by the public (Hall et al., 2013). Even 
when these views are held by the public on the basis of consensus, there is evidence to suggest 
that governments, through the use of their power, resources and knowledge, have the greatest 
influence on the shaping of public consent. This consent often calls on the “central value 
system” which advances dominant ideology and interests (Hall et al., 2013, discussed in 
Chapter 3). Research Question #2 asks whose conception of what society ought to be like 
influenced the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). When considering the legislative amendments 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the interviews suggest that almost all interview participants believed that 
a few major players influenced policy changes. 
 All twenty-two interview participants were asked where they thought some of the most 
influential policy ideas had come from with regards to the tough-on-crime legislation, 
particularly in relation to the most influential actors. While some interview participants were 
unsure of the names of specific individuals involved in the legislative process, all respondents 
believed that the most influential actors were certain members of the Conservative Party. Some 
respondents identified a number of the provincial Ministers of Justice as proponents of the 
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legislative change, although it was reported that many of these individuals began changing 
their minds after analyzing the provincial cost. Those who followed politics closely or were 
directly engaged with the political process reported three key political figures from the 
Conservative Party whose influence within the legislative process was pronounced.156A great 
number of respondents credited these political figures as having an enormously strong voice in 
support of the legislation. However, in line with the findings of Feeley and Simon (1992), 
Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley (1999), there is strong evidence to suggest that public 
opinion on youth crime and youth crime policy is used as a surrogate for consent, as a means 
for enacting legislation that appears to be reactive to public desire. It can be argued then, that 
there is an assumption made about the state’s authority relative to the citizen’s role in the 
enactment of penal laws (and legislation more generally) that is allegedly representative of 
each individual member of the public. In terms of the public discourse that occurs on account 
of the deliberative process, this finding falls in line with Habermas’ (1975, 1985) critical social 
theory. Two participants note, 
They (the Conservatives) take a view of this and they seek 
amendments and changes that they believe are responsive to 
public opinion [...] But really, in my view anyway, the thrust of it 
all comes out of the federal Conservative party. That seems to be 
the one that really pushes this, although there are a few other 
groups I guess - Interest groups that have their own issues and 
push for them. 
 
Policy unfortunately in criminal justice seems with this 
government to be largely driven by the priorities of the Prime 
Minister’s office and the politics that the Prime Minister’s office 
sees rather than coming up from the Department of Justice with a 
detailed study saying “Okay, there’s a problem with this piece of 
legislation, this needs to be tweaked”.  
 
156 The names of these political figures remain undisclosed to protect anonymity and ensure confidentiality.  
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 Not surprisingly, some interviewees found it difficult to accurately respond to the 
question at hand, predominately due to the fact that a lot of discussion about legislation comes 
out of Privy Council.157 In that sense, knowing exactly where the most influential policy ideas 
comes from were challenging to determine simply because the legislative process itself does 
not entirely allow for public inclusion. This finding suggests that the deliberative process is not 
one that is transparent, although Habermas (1985) makes this very argument in relation to the 
need for ongoing public discourse. One participant explains,  
I always thought (Influential Person #3) was a major player. It’s 
hard to know. The legislation comes out of the government of the 
day. So who are the people most influential in any government at 
the time legislation is  passed? Who has input to those people? 
You know, if you’re Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, or, 
you know, the head of the Privy Council or whoever the most 
powerful, you know, Deputy Prime Minster – If you’re one of 
the top cabinet people, my guess is you probably have more 
influence than the average Canadian. I’m being facetious. Of 
course they do!  
 
Effectively knowing where some of the most influential policy ideas have come from 
necessarily entailed participants to be politically involved.158 However, some of those who 
were in fact allowed to partake in the committee hearings were still unclear as to where 
specifically influential ideas were derived from.  
 From the view of some respondents, the Conservative Party’s position to exercise and 
exert both power and influence over the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) was 
157 The Privy Council Office (PCO) provides “non-partisan, public service support to the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and its decision-making structures”. The PCO has three functions: “Advisor to the Prime Minister”, in 
which it provides “policy advice and information to support the Prime Minister” and Cabinet; acts as a “secretary 
to the Cabinet”, in which it “facilitates the smooth, efficient and effective functioning of Cabinet and the 
Government of Canada on a day-to-day basis”; and ensures “public service leadership”, whereby their goal is to 
make certain that “Canada and Canadians are served by a quality public service” (Privy Council Office, 2013).  
158 Please note none of the participants were active members in Parliament during this time. The participants who 
were involved in the legislative process served as experts who testified during the Parliamentary debates, as 
drafters of the legislation, or as consultants to the Minister of Justice.  
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essentially two-fold. First, the Conservative Party had acquired a majority government which 
legitimated their having total control of the Bill that went in and came out of Parliament 
(starting with Bill C-25, and ending with Bill C-10). Second, some participants believed that 
there was minimal opposition from other political parties. While all respondents noted that 
there was some degree of general opposition, many suggested that the political opposition 
simply was not strong enough to curb the content of the legislation or force the Conservative 
Party to forgo the legislation altogether.  
 Take, for example, a statement made on 08 December 2010 by a Conservative Member 
of Parliament which said, 
Yesterday, the Liberal member for Winnipeg South Centre stood 
in this place and said, “If the government wants to be tough on 
crime, then it should call an inquiry”. Despite what the Liberals 
say, calling an inquiry is not what it means to be tough on crime. 
Research is not action. Unlike the member for Winnipeg South 
Centre, our Conservative government does not just talk the talk 
and call an inquiry, we actually walk the walk (Shelly Glover, 
House of Commons Debate, 8 December, 2010, at 1415). 
 
Although some interviewees attributed this to the fact that few really spoke against these 
amendments at the provincial level from fear of appearing “soft on crime”, others alleged it 
had to do with the “muted voice of Québec” though, politically speaking, Québec was more so 
against the Bill than any other province. According to one participant, “when the 
Conservatives lost most of their seats in Québec and it became primarily NDP, when the 
cabinet table no longer had strong Québec voices around it” the voices from “more to the west 
of the country that were more law-and-order-ish and tied to the right or centre perspectives in 
terms of politics became much louder and stronger than they were in the past”.  
 These results support the argument put forth by Bala and Anand (2012) that discuss the 
support of the West and the opposition of Québec (and the remaining Eastern provinces more 
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generally). Thus, on a macro level these findings suggest that the legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 
4) was influenced by the orientation of the Federal government around at the time. In other 
words, the enactment of the Bill was propelled by the Conservative Party and through the 
dominant ideology, but was not avidly countered by opposing political parties because no 
political party wanted to appear as though they were “for crime” as opposed to being against it. 
 Further, an argument can be made that these findings coincide with Habermas’ (1975) 
work on the state’s ability to exercise legitimate power. The enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
may be seen as part of an ideological movement (and discourse) of the current government. 
This is reflected in the perspectives of respondents. In effect, legislating the Bill demonstrates 
the way in which the law is used as an instrument of power and legitimacy, especially on 
account of the majority government. Thus, the state is understood in terms of a mediator of its 
complex interests, resulting in outputs (e.g., decisions to enact tough-on-crime legislation) that 
are legitimated by their authority.    
 In some instances, participants claimed that the most influential policy ideas pertaining 
to the tough-on-crime legislation were not loosely derived from the various members of 
parliament. While it was noted that some of the major players promoting the campaign may 
have been in parliament at the time, the ideas themselves originated from the Americans and, 
more notably, the Reform Party (predecessor to the Conservative Party of Canada). One 
participant in particular who was previously very actively involved in politics asserts that much 
of the influence that came from the Reform Party was comprised of “rural based sort of 
Evangelical people, who, many of whom have a view that, once you’re a criminal you’re 
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always a criminal and that people can’t be rehabilitated, even young people. And they view it, 
they view them as sinners. So it (the legislation) comes from those kinds of roots”.159  
 Although the degree of the Reform Party’s involvement in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
legislation did not appear to be known to the majority of participants, the general values 
associated with this political party may have in fact had some influence on the conceptions of 
what society ought to be like. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that such perspectives 
about non-socially redemptive youth comprise much of the neo-conservative rhetoric, as 
discussed in the works of Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001) and O’Malley 
(1999). Neo-conservative rationalities affirm that “the law may not only control and contract 
the crime, but may also regulate family relationships, personal morality and so on. And the 
state must possess severe and ultimate sanction and may utilise retributive punishment and 
social controls” (Hayes, 1994, p. 122, as cited in Feeley & Simon, 1992, p. 186). In other 
words, this perspective is congruent with “punishment and penal discipline with support for a 
unified moral order under the governance of state paternalism”, and focuses less on the 
possibility of redemption through other mechanisms outlined by neo-liberalism (O’Malley, 
1999, p. 189).    
159 The concept of the “sinner” in this context is what Garland (2001) refers to as the criminal “other” (pp. 135-
138). The criminal “other” is a type of “reductionist account” of high profile crimes that are often sensationalized 
by the media and is a focus for public concern and political discussion. According to Garland (2001), sometimes 
“the problem is traced to the wanton, amoral behaviour of dangerous offenders, who typically belong to racial and 
cultural groups bearing little resemblance to ‘us’”. (p. 135). The criminal “other” is frequently selected on the 
basis of “its usefulness as a ‘suitable enemy’ – usefulness not just for the criminal justice state in its sovereign 
mode but also for a conservative social politics that stressed the need for authority, family values, and the 
resurrection of traditional morality” (p. 136). To some degree, this concept can be linked to the “underclass”, in 
which youth are perpetually subject to poverty, suffer from diminished moral values, are involved with drugs, lack 
in work skills, turn to crime, and are often young minority males. For additional information, see Feeley and 
Simon (1992).   
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 In addition to the main political parties and figures that influenced the enactment of Bill 
C-10 (Part 4), perhaps one of the most notable findings from the interviews emphasize the role 
of victims’ groups. In line with the works of Becker (1963), almost all respondents familiar 
with the specific processes involved in the enactment of the Bill reported that the victims’ 
movement had a very strong voice in support of the legislation. Given that by definition the 
victims’ movement is a very legitimate concern about protecting and responding to the needs 
of victims, interviewees suggest that these groups are best at promoting a tough-on-crime 
approach in response to youth crime. In fact, Influential Person #3 was named on several 
occasions as one who articulated this position on behalf of the victims’ groups and “got a lot of 
mileage out of it”. According to one respondent, 
Victims’ groups are huge! Victims’ groups have the ear of 
politicians and everybody else. Everybody who wants victims 
issues to be address. And this is the one area where both side 
come together. Everybody would say “I wish there were no 
victims and if there was a victim, you know, I hope they’re 
treated with kindness, compassion, understanding, full 
information and support, all those things”. Both sides would say 
yes to that. But then how they use that position is quite different. 
The hardliner would say, “You know, I want to support victims, 
therefore we need to get tough on crime”. Well, why would you 
do that? Would you think that if a kid went to custody society 
would be better off after he came out? Well, if that’s what you 
actually believe, then yes, I can see that, but we don’t have that 
debate. 
  
 For those respondents who developed an intimate familiarity with both the Bill and the 
ways in which the Conservative Party used the victims’ groups to support their position on the 
Bill, it is reported that the legislation is predominately based on very specific, individual cases 
of youth crime and does not take into account the prevalence of youth crime more generally. 
Many participants acknowledged that the Conservative Party accurately pulled out various 
people in order to use them as examples of why new youth crime legislation was needed. 
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These consisted of individuals that were a) victims themselves; b) the families of victims; and 
c) witnesses to crimes. Upon closer examination of Hansard, virtually all of the invited 
speakers had suffered the loss of a loved one on account of youth crime.  
 In addition, these incidents were sensationalized by the media and had received an 
abundance of attention, frequently citing things like “her story made national and international 
headlines”, and “my family was in the news”. In many cases, the victims of these youth crimes 
were described as “model citizens” and “heroes to their siblings”. These findings are congruent 
with previous research on youth crime and the role of the media and the ways in which it 
construes crime stories that heighten concern and anxiety (Becker, 1963; Hall et al., 2013; 
Garland, 2001; Sacco, 1995). Essentially, the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is alleged to have 
been implemented into policy because of “one person’s situation”. One respondent recalls, 
In this particular case I remember seeing (Influential Person #2) 
talk at a luncheon, and his speech, it was interesting because you 
could almost predict it. He mentioned, “Well, John Smith 
wouldn’t agree with that”. You know, “John Smith whose son 
was killed by blah blah blah would not agree with that” and he’d 
do these little one-offs on things. So I think the victims in this 
particular case did a lot of lobbying [...].  
 
 In many other instances, participants recall the involvement of Line Lacasse in the 
committee hearings, whose son Sébastien (after whom Bill C-4 was named) was killed by a 
group of young people and whose case became an exemplar. Lacasse, who was White, was 
stabbed to death by about ten Black teens after singing a rap song that was offensive to Black 
people (“Family damaged by slaying”, 2006). Some of the teens involved in the death of 
Lacasse were adults at the time, while others were minors. This case became highly 
sensationalized by the media which provided further evidence that the YCJA needed 
“toughening up”.  
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 In fact, on one occasion a Member of Parliament (Serge Menard) asked the Minister of 
Justice (Rob Nicholson) why Bill C-4 was specifically named Sébastien’s Law. The minister’s 
response was simply that “It was a decision of the government to call it Sébastien’s Law in 
recognition of this young victim” (Rob Nicholson, Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights, 2010, at 1625). The act of naming laws after victims is explained by Garland (2001) 
who purports, 
The new political imperative is that victims must be protected; 
their voices must be heard, their memory honoured, their anger 
expressed, their fears addressed. The naming of criminal laws 
and penal measures for crime victims [...] purports to honour 
them in this way, though there is undoubtedly an element of 
exploitation here too, as the individual’s name is used to fend off 
objections to measures that are often nothing more than 
retaliatory legislation passed for public display and political 
advantage. This sanctification of victims also tends to nullify 
concern for offenders. [...] As a consequence of these usages, the 
symbolic figure of the victim has taken a life of its own, and 
plays a key role in political debate and policy argument (p. 143). 
  
The arguments put forth by Garland (2001) helps explain and contextualize the findings 
obtained from the participants on this matter. The findings also support the assertions put forth 
by Habermas (1975, 1985) and Hall et al. (2013) regarding the discourse of the current 
government and the ideological movements that follow to ensure that such activities become 
everyone’s interests. This is done by personifying the victim through legislation because it 
adds to the seriousness and prevalence of youth crime, and further contributes to the public’s 
general perception that such crimes “can happen to anyone”.  
 Interviewees believed Lacasse’s presence represented a face behind which those 
attending the hearing could genuinely sympathize with a grieving mother. While most noted 
her right to attend, they questioned the real need for her participation given the difficulty and 
emotionality associated with her son’s case. Almost all accounts of Lacasse’s involvement 
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were reported as being contrived by the Conservative Party to further their position in relation 
to the legislation. One participant notes, 
First of all, what on earth could one say to her or how could one 
meaningfully engage in a discussion with her? [...] The reality 
was, her son was killed by another young person, but the 
perpetrator received an adult sentence, and you know, he’s 
serving life in prison. And that kind of case would actually NOT 
in any way been affected by this legislation so I found it very 
manipulative to bring somebody – and I realize there is a place 
for victims, not only in individual cases of course to tell the court 
how the crime has impacted them but also in law reform. But 
you know, I thought it was very manipulative because not only 
was it pretty clear that she hadn’t read anything in the Bill, but 
nothing in the Bill would have pertained to her case. 
 
This sentiment regarding Lacasse’s involvement was in fact shared by many participants who 
acknowledged the role of individual victims as well as victims’ groups in the legislative 
process. Another respondent noted that “the Conservatives have rounded up, you know, in a lot 
of their press conferences you will notice, those victims who are really, really still in pain to 
talk”.  
 Undoubtedly the role of victims played a substantial role in the enactment of the Bill C-
10 (Part 4) legislation; however it is inaccurate to claim that all victims had an equal role in 
this legislative process. In particular, victims who avidly received media attention were often 
used to support the need for crime legislation, as they “tend to be pretty vengeful and have had 
a difficult experience as a victim or victims and aren’t over their victimization.” Overall, these 
findings supports the works of Habermas (2006), Hall et al. (2013), Garland (1996, 2001), 
Sacco (1995), and Wortley et al. (2008) who all discuss the complex nature of the relationship 
between the state, the victims, the media, the offenders, and the public, and the mechanisms 
through which these diverse groups influence legislation.  
266 
 
 Hansard and committee statements provide evidence to support the perspectives put 
forth by the participants with regards to how specific witnesses were used to influence the 
legislative process. On 23 March 2011, a couple was invited to share their experience as crime 
victims with others. While it is noted in her speech that the legislation should address the 
issues underlying youth crime (which is not done by the amendments), she also emphasizes the 
need for harsher legislation. Suman Virk states, 
As victims of crime, we have found that there has not been 
enough emphasis on the crimes that are being committed by 
these young people and the impact on the general public. A lot of 
children were looking up to the two individuals who took our 
daughter’s life. They have glorified violence by the video games 
and rap music, so we have to get to what is causing our children 
to be losing control. Definitely, I think if we have legislation that 
addresses this problem, maybe our children will think twice 
about harming one another. I think we have to speak up, because 
that’s what causes kids to bully. It’s because everybody keeps 
their secret. So definitely I think if a child commits a serious 
crime, society has the right to know who they are so they can 
protect themselves. Keeping their identity hidden is not helping 
the child or anyone else. I think that should be mandatory for all 
youth who commit serious crimes. What we’ve learned is that 
most of these children don’t change. What they do as teenagers 
they continue through the rest of their lives, so definitely early 
intervention is the key, starting with programs for youth 
counselling. We see more and more people with depression and 
other mental health issues. That should also be addressed for our 
youth, not just locking them up somewhere, but also giving them 
the mental help and attention they need. There’s a big spectrum 
here, but since we’re discussing the legal system, I think we do 
need harsher penalties. If I had it my way, I’d have the legal 
system go a lot faster, too, because, as my husband said, we have 
to go through three different trials for one crime. To us that 
makes no sense, so I hope that can also be addressed (House of 
Commons Debate, 23 March, 2011, at 1720). 
 
   This statement was also complemented by Mr. Manjit Virks testimony, which purports, 
But we are glad that now the government is thinking of giving 
some attention to the victims as well, not only to the offenders, 
and I share my sentiments with Bruno that the law has to treat 
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them like adults. If they are doing adult crimes, they have to be 
treated like adults. Also, when their names are published, people 
will know who they are so these young people cannot hide 
behind the law, because their slate will be clean no more (House 
of Commons Debate, 23 March, 2011, at 1720). 
 
Another victim of a serious crime notes,  
 
I support Bill C-4 because I think we need to do a better job of 
controlling young offenders so we don’t have tragedies like mine 
happening again. It is imperative to protect the public from 
repeat young offenders with a history of violent behaviour. This 
bill would serve as a useful tool for judges and police officers. It 
would make it possible to apply extrajudicial measures, which 
would give society the ability to check up on individuals whose 
records showed a progression towards violent behaviour. 
Furthermore, placing a young person whose behaviour had 
endangered others in detention would be a good thing and, in my 
view, a deterrent. Youth who commit serious crimes, such as 
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter and sexual assault, 
should be sentenced as adults. Releasing their names to the 
public would be another way to protect society [...] I do not think 
the status quo is the answer. We have to give prosecutors, judges 
and police officers tools to ensure that young offenders receive 
sentences commensurate with the severity of their crimes, not 
just a slap on the wrist. We have to send a clear message. We 
have to protect society against youth who are violent repeat 
offenders (Bruno Serre (Board Member and Group Leader of 
family meetings, Association of Families of Persons 
Assassinated or Disappeared) (House of Commons Debate, 23 
March, 2011, at 1715).160  
 
The emergent role of crime victims in policy formation suggests that victims have become a 
“favoured constituency” (Garland, 2001, p. 121), not only as a corollary of a shift in governing 
strategies, but also because their experiences are instrumental in developing “a source of 
160 Interestingly, Brigitte Serre, who was 17 years old (and the daughter of Bruno Serre above) was stabbed 72 
times and killed by two youth who were over the age of 18 at the time of the murder. The involvement of Bruno 
Serre in the Bill C-4 debates can be seen as an example of how the government handpicked victims to share their 
stories of their loss to further propagate their agenda. For more information, see “Man admits to stabbing teen to 
death in robbery” (Montgomery, 2007) and “Man gets life for brutal murder of gas bar attendant” (Banerjee, 
2007). 
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support and legitimacy” in the face of achieving consensus (Garland, 2001, p. 143). The 
underlying argument of each of these victims’ statements suggests an ongoing public desire not 
only for the amendments to control and manage youth committing such crimes, but for a 
legislation that specifically disciplines, targets and tracks a group of high-risk (potentially 
violent/potential “career criminals”) youth whose particular type of conduct is the behaviour 
being criminalized.  
 These excerpts illustrate how public consensus develops in two ways. First, the 
consensus is built on a redefinition of the problem that singles out a small group of youth 
responsible for a disproportionate number of offences, despite declining youth crime rates. The 
accord is formed on the basis of public protection, with the ability to inspect or closely observe 
youth exhibit patterns of violent behaviour. Second, the process of consent can be understood 
in terms of a perceived crisis of the seemingly illegitimate penal-welfare strategies that 
progressively call upon the need for further reformation. Together, these factors contribute to 
the complexities of building such a consensus in light of this binary, whereby the notion of 
risk-management for repeat offenders is confounded by the problematization of the penal-
welfare tactics that have advanced a new punitive and “adaptive” governance strategy. As a 
consequence of the shift in youth crime governance, the subject of punitive interventions 
becomes this high-risk group of chronic offenders as potential “career criminals” that are often 
viewed as the “underclass”, whose behaviour corresponds with that of the least powerful group. 
Much of this discussion supports the theory asserted by Habermas (1975, 1985) which focuses 
on the ways in which the involvement of the public through discourse ensures and maintains 
the state’s position of authority and legitimacy, and guarantees that the public participates in 
the formation of laws that are reflective of their alleged desires.    
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 The concept of the symbolic victim is also raised here, whereby the “the interests and 
feelings of victims – actual victims, victims’ families, potential victim, the projected figure of 
‘the victim’ – are now routinely invoked in support of measures of punitive segregation” 
(Garland, 2001, p. 11). According to Garland (2001), the presence of the symbolic victim is “a 
new and significant social fact”, given that “the symbolic figure of the victim has taken on a 
life of its own” (p. 11). The involvement of victims (or victim’s families) in the development 
of the tough-on-crime legislation collectively represents a degree of cohesion for a common 
cause. As Garland (2001) asserts, 
The victim is no longer an unfortunate citizen who has been on 
the receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose concerns are 
subsumed within the ‘public interest’ that guides the prosecution 
and penal decision of the state. The victim is now, in a certain 
sense, a much more representative character, whose experience is 
taken to be common and collective, rather than individual and 
atypical. Whoever speaks on behalf of victims speaks on behalf 
of us all – or so declared the new political wisdom of high crime 
societies. Publicized images of actual victims serve as the 
personalized, real-life, it could be you metonym for a problem of 
security that has become a defining feature of contemporary 
culture” (p. 11). 
  
What can be taken from this is that a complex relationship exists not only between the 
symbolic victim and the individual victim, but also between the political spheres which dictate, 
shape, control, and define criminal justice and the institutions through which crime is 
controlled and managed (Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013).        
 The specific involvement of victim’s groups in the development of this legislation 
raises an interesting point. It can be asserted that, typically, victims are from the most 
privileged backgrounds whose deaths or injuries often become political tools for forward, 
right-wing, law and order agendas. The other side of the coin argues that generally, a great deal 
of crime victims are also the most marginalized in society. That is, they frequently share the 
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same structural (race and class) backgrounds as offenders. 161 Further, marginalized victims do 
not always enjoy the privilege of having a voice, let alone a prominent one in the legislative 
process. An analysis of Hansard on some of the cases presented at the House of Commons by 
the victims (or witnesses of the victims) suggests that the victims came from varying 
backgrounds and race.162 While some victims came from marginalized groups, others did not.  
 The same can be said, although to a lesser degree, for the young offenders. A number 
of offenders discussed in Hansard were Black or Aboriginal, although White youth were 
included as well.163 In some instances there were racial undertones that partially compelled 
certain crimes, while in others there was no evidence to confirm these notions. In a number of 
cases included in Hansard, the victims that suffered a death or a serious injury occurred on 
account of teenage group crime. On the whole, the findings from Hansard indicated that 
victims who came from more privileged backgrounds were no more or less likely to be used as 
a political instrument in the legislative process. Thus, these results can substantiate the data 
provided by the participants who asserted that victims were hand-picked on the basis of their 
case to support the passing of the tough-on-crime legislation. In a sense, this may be 
understood in terms of a politicized class (or racial) conflict in the modern capitalist state 
which is disguised in another form of crisis (Garland, 2001; Habermas, 1975; Hall et al., 2013). 
161 To a degree, this assertion conflicts with previous statistical research on victims and youth crime, and the ways 
in which this is linked to race/ethnicity and class. However, it is likely that the findings in this dissertation are a 
result of the governments “hand-picked” process to illustrate the generalizability of violent offences amongst all 
racial and socio-economic categories. This therefore reduced or removes any potential for a reactionary response 
against racism or classism.     
162 This analysis was cross-referenced with the applicable case law to retrieve the facts (or any identifying 
information) of the case. Some of the incidents discussed in Hansard were included in the case law analysis found 
in Chapter 7, while others happened well before the date selected for case law analysis (i.e., prior to April 2003). 
It should also be noted that not all incidents become case law. Thus, aside from what is reported by the media, it is 
difficult to deduce any real conclusions about whether or not victims are/were comparable in their class/race to 
offenders, or whether these two groups were similar on other social dimensions.     
163 This finding coincides with the case law findings discussed in Chapter 7.  
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That is, the connotations of race and class are cloaked under the general pretense that 
“individuals like us” are subject to victimization if no action is taken to address the problem.         
 To a lesser degree, a number of respondents acknowledged the role of enforcers (such 
as police and Crown attorneys) as influential parties to tough-on-crime policies. According to 
most participants, police tend to support tougher penalties for young people given they serve as 
the “front-liners” and are therefore typically the first in contact with apprehended youth. In 
particular, the Chiefs of Police Associations both provincially and nationally, and a number of 
policing services were reported as having “a pretty good in to the Minister’s office for sure.”  
This is supported by a statement made at the committee on 09 December 2010 which explains,  
[...] Before becoming a Member of Parliament, I was a police 
officer, and it was my pleasure to have been chosen by the chief 
of police in Winnipeg to be one of the trainers for the YCJA 
when it became legislation. As a result, I was heavily involved 
with crown attorneys, etc., who were involved in putting forward 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act in our province. [...] I was 
pleased to have been consulted on a number of facets of the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act. I must say that as I trained the police 
officers of the Winnipeg Police Service, it became very apparent 
to me that this was a piece of legislation that was going to cause 
us an enormous number of problems with our youth. We could 
see from the beginning that our youth were about to fall through 
the cracks, that the paperwork was going to be horrendous, that 
our youth were not going to be served, and that they were going 
to be exploited by adults who saw the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act as a tool to use our children to commit serious offences for 
which they themselves would suffer serious penalties [...] 
knowing very well there were no deterrents, no denunciation, 
and no penalty. Unfortunately, our predictions came true. I have 
to say that as a police officer who had to use the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, this is probably one of the worst pieces of legislation 
I had to deal with in my tenure (Shelly Glover, Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 2010, at 1555).  
 
All chiefs of police were included in the cross-national study that was conducted after Bill C-
25 was proposed. Correspondingly, Crown prosecutors were identified by many participants as 
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having an influential voice in support of the legislation because “they basically favour anything 
that makes convictions easier and sentences longer.” Together, these findings support the 
Marxist/critical view that asserts that the degree of criminalization is likely to be highest if the 
behaviour being criminalized is found amongst those who are least likely to support the 
legislation. More specifically, on the basis in which the construction and labelling of such acts 
are shaped and defined as deviant by the “primary definers” (i.e., the powerful), there is more 
likelihood that those affected by such definitions (and thus legislation) will be criminalized 
(Hall et al., 2013). This stems from the fact that “the social and political definitions of those in 
dominant positions tend to become objectified in the major institutional orders”, which in turn 
strengthens the role of first-level enforcers relative to the rates of criminality (Hall et al., 2013, 
p. 62).   
 Outside of these influential parties, it can be argued that the public played a significant 
role in the legislative process. Since the Conservative Party was democratically elected with a 
majority of parliamentary seats, the legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4) could potentially be seen 
as a reflection of the public’s interest. Given that individuals themselves cannot shape laws, the 
political process requires that the public elect a party that most closely resembles and 
represents their values, beliefs, and interests (and is based on the notion of consensus discussed 
in Chapter 3). These findings entirely lend support to the works of Habermas (1975, 1985), 
particularly with regards to the ways in which the modern state gains legitimacy on account of 
public elections. However, according to Chambliss and Seidman (1971) it is also important to 
note that public interests are held insofar as they correspond with the interests of the dominant 
group(s).      
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 Through the works of Habermas (1975, 1985, 1996), then, it can be said that the tough-
on-crime legislation developed (to a degree) on the basis of public interest, desire, and consent 
as opposed to solely reflecting the interests of the Conservative Party as well as other interest 
groups. This statement, in part, cannot be argued given the ways in which the democratic laws 
in Canada are upheld. However, as noted above, the public’s desire to toughen responses to 
youth crime is based on a variety of misconceptions about the ways in which the youth 
criminal justice system operates (see Sprott, 1996, for a more detailed explanation). In fact, as 
Garland (2001, p. 146) notes, 
The claim tends to be that tough-on-crime policies do not 
originate in any groundswell of public demand; that the public 
are truly not committed to these policies; and that such 
commitment as does exist has been artificially aroused and 
excited by media images and campaign that misrepresent both 
crime and public sentiment. Public support for enhanced ‘law 
and order’ is, on this account, the fabricated result of 
manipulative political rhetoric and rabble-rousing popular press. 
[...] It is also true that public attitudes about crime and 
punishment are conditioned by information, and may sometimes 
be changed by educative means. 
 
Thus, the claim that the Conservative Party legislated Bill C-10 (Part 4) in response to the 
public’s interest may hold some ground, however in the larger context, the ways in which the 
public’s desire in and construction of tough-on-crime measures needs to be considered in order 
to gain a better understanding of the public’s influence on the legislative process.  
 In general, these findings build on the ways in which public interest is used to promote 
agendas that support dominant ideology, as well as the (re-)legitimating process where a 
hegemonic crisis has occurred. Further, they demonstrate the ways in which the public’s desire 
is used to develop a consensus of the need to target the high-risk potentially violent, potential 
“career criminals” (a depiction transmitted in the media as a group to be feared), and to the 
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policy reforms that enable the identification and tracking of this potential group on the basis of 
managing risk. More specifically, these findings suggest that this process is a reflection of a 
crisis that emphasizes the perceived illegitimacy of penal-welfare strategies, under the pretense 
that they are ineffective. On this basis, it supports one of Habermas’ (1975) conditions for a 
legitimation crisis where the public perceives certain policies or legislation as unsuccessful.    
 To elaborate on the works of Habermas (1975, 1985, 2006), one may see the ways in 
which the legitimation system fulfills its role by ensuring that the public freely and equally 
participates in both the formation of government and the laws under which they will be 
governed. Securing mass loyalty results in decisions made by the state that allegedly advocate 
the will of the people on the basis of consensus. Part of the argument asserted by Habermas 
(1985, 2006) stems from the state’s obligation to enact laws that uphold the interests of the 
citizens, however the interests or values held by the public is covertly manipulated by the 
administrative power yielded by the government so that they may shape, form and control such 
public consent which they then seek to confer (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Hall et al, 2013). 
This elucidates the delicacy of the state’s legitimacy both in terms of the way it is gained and 
maintained, which in turn requires the continuous process of exercising legitimate power.        
 The government’s dependency on the involvement of those outside of the criminal 
justice system suggests a “responsibilization strategy” has been employed in the development 
of this legislation. According to Garland (2001), the main purpose of this “adaptive” response 
“is to spread responsibility for crime control onto agencies, organizations and individuals that 
operate outside the criminal justice state and to persuade them to act appropriately” (pp. 124-
125). This is done in a number of different ways, but is almost always sparked with campaigns 
targeting public perception.  
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 The first step in the process begins with identifying “people or organizations which 
have the competence to reduce criminal opportunities effectively, and [...] to asses both those 
who have a responsibility to do so and whether this responsibility can be enforced” (Garland, 
2001, p. 125). Wide-ranging campaigns that originate with the public are sometimes 
“conducted through television advertising and the mass leafleting of households and businesses, 
aim to raise public consciousness, interpolate the citizen as a potential victim, create a sense of 
duty, connect the population to crime control agencies, and help change the thinking and 
practices of those involved” (Garland, 2001, p. 125). More notably, this strategy implies that it 
is not solely the state’s responsibility to prevent and control crime. Rather, the technique 
implies that governments acknowledge that one of the most crucial processes producing 
structure, organization, obedience and compliance are conventional or typical social processes, 
found “within the institutions of civil society, not the uncertain threat of legal sanctions. [...] In 
this new vision, the state’s task is to augment and support these multiple actors and informal 
processes, rather than arrogate the crime control task to a single specialist agency” (Garland, 
2001, p. 126).  
 It is suggested, therefore, that the “responsibilization strategy” is a new technique that 
essentially redefines the ways in which the government exercises control and power in this 
field. It is, what Garland (2001) calls, “governing-at-a-distance” (p. 127). In reality, it may be 
seen as a means of redistributing the burden of crime control, an approach that closely 
resembles what Foucault (2000) describes as “governmentality”. This perspective entails the 
mobilization and inclusion of others, the formation of new impetus, and the production of 
modern schemes that incorporate cooperative action (Garland, 2001).         
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 Overall, the findings from the interview data and Hansard support the Marxist/critical 
theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2. Particularly lending support to the works of 
Habermas (1975, 1985, 2006) regarding the state as a mediator of its complex interests, these 
findings coincide with the assertions made about the role of the public in the formation of 
government and legislation. The inclusion of the public in the deliberative process not only 
provides a means of legitimating power, but also confirms the ways in which the state relies on 
strategies and techniques (i.e., “resorting to emotional appeals” and the “symbolic use of 
inquiries”) to guarantee its authoritative power. 
 These findings also correspond with previous research outlined in Chapter 3. More 
specifically, the qualitative findings resembled those found in Cohen (1972), Hall et al. (2013) 
and Garland’s (2001) work on the ways in which the reactions to youth crime are constructed 
through various mechanisms, leading to definitions of behaviours that go against the ascribed 
grain. In addition, they lend support to the various concepts of victimization as discussed by 
Garland (1996, 2001) as a means of reforming legislation to emphasize the needs of the victims 
as opposed the offender as part of an “adaptive” strategy. As such, various elements of this 
data pertain to the analysis presented by Feeley and Simon (1992) and Garland (2001) on 
redefining the problem of high-risk, potentially persistent offenders which are dictated by 
society’s most dominant groups. In turn, these findings are connected with the assault on 
penal-welfare strategies by both neo-liberalists and neo-conservatives.  
 Almost all respondents who were fairly familiar with the processes involved in the 
legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4) emphasized the role of various key influential persons within 
the Conservative Party, specifically stressing the capacity in which a majority government is 
able to control, shape and enact legislation as they see fit. Interest groups such as enforcers and 
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victims’ groups also carried weight within the legislative process and were far more influential 
than most others. According to most participants, the involvement of these particular groups 
strategically augmented the Conservative Party’s position through collective action, mainly by 
attempting to discount all other empirical evidence suggesting that harsher legislation has a 
minimal deterring effect.  
 More specifically, the interest taken by victims’ groups as perceived by the respondents 
highly influenced “lawmaking” (in this case the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4)) and therefore 
influenced the rules pertaining to “lawbreaking, victimization”, and “reactions to crime” 
(Wortley et al., 2008, p. 211, see also Becker, 1963). Consistent with prior research, these 
findings suggest that an intricate exchange between the “individual (micro) and governmental 
(macro) level of phenomena” occurred during the legislation of the Bill, which not only 
encompasses “the state”, but include “young offenders, victims, and the general public” 
(Wortley et al., 2008, p. 210, see also Alvi, 2012; Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013; and 
McMurtry and Curling, 2008). There is a multifaceted interaction that took place between the 
structural forces (such as a majority government) and the social processes involved in the 
creation of this particular piece of legislation, in relation to the cultural (dominant) ideology 
thrusting it forward. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that these findings are congruent with 
those of Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (2001), Habermas (1975, 1985), Hall et al. (2013), 
and O’Malley (1999) whereby the state exercises moral and intellectual control by constructing 
alliances with a number of different social and structural forces in a way that maintains 
dominant ideology.  
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6.3 Conclusion 
 The research questions in Issue 1 examined the process through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
developed and was legislated. Despite previous research indicating that harsher sentencing 
practices have no effect on youth crime rates, legislation in Canada has now adopted a tough-
on-crime stance. The data from the interviews suggest this legislation was both instigated and 
enforced by the Conservative government with the help of the public, although evidence 
suggests that such interests support the dominant ideology advanced by society’s most 
powerful groups (see Research Question #1).  
 While respondents suggested that most evidence presented to the Conservative 
government challenged the need for tough-on-crime legislation, much of this research was 
dismissed simply because it was not in line with the Conservative agenda. From this 
perspective, the analysis of the interview data found that the change in legislation was not 
established on any social or empirical evidence, but rather was politically driven by various 
interest groups, the public, and the government in power.164 In fact, the legislative amendments 
were only enacted once the Conservative Party won a majority government, because this 
ensured a lesser degree of opposition from other political parties as well as competing interest 
groups. These findings suggest that the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) effectively represent 
the values and interests of those in the more powerful segments of society, although these 
views are naively supported by the public. 
 Moreover, the findings from the interviews suggested that the tough-on-crime 
legislation neither embodies values that address the best interests of youth in conflict with law, 
164 For a more detailed account of how “policy choices are heavily determined by the need to find popular and 
effective measures that will not be viewed as a signs of weakness or an abandonment of the state’s responsibility 
to the public”, see Garland, 2001, p. 111.  
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nor represents legislation that directly improves the safety of the public. There is evidence to 
suggest that youth crime legislation is better received when it attends to the needs of both the 
general public and young offenders in a way that is fair, balanced, and incorporates a 
rehabilitative approach. While the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) do not overtly negate the 
YCJA’s emphasis on the rehabilitation of youth, the tough-on-crime legislation has the 
potential to impose longer and harsher sentences, especially for violent repeat offenders. As 
such, the interview data implied that tough-on-crime legislation typically results in a shift from 
a focus on rehabilitation by applying more punitive sanctions that serve to control, manage or 
track young offenders, although the true effects of this remain to be seen. This shift stemmed 
from a redefinition of the problem of youth crime (that is, at-risk, potentially violent, potential 
repeat offenders) and behaviour that goes against the normative set of rules dictated by the 
most dominant groups within society.  
 These findings also suggested that legislation which implements a tough-on-crime 
approach represents a certain political ideology that upholds the values of some lawmakers, 
political elites, and powerful social groups at the cost of the underprivileged or at-risk youth, 
and thus supports the views put forth by the Marxist/critical perspective. Further, the 
respondents indicated that while the youth justice system has a role, the provisions of better 
community and mental health services for youth, increasing youth employment, providing 
youth with the necessary skills and tools to build confidence, and changes within the 
educational system collectively have a stronger impact on youth crime than legislative changes. 
More specifically, legislation that places a greater emphasis on education by embodying values 
that connect the behaviour to the consequence (even through community shaming or dealing 
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with the victim face-to-face) are suggested to have a more immediate effect of reducing youth 
crime, resulting in a more significant response to youth crime.  
 On the whole, Bill C-10 (Part 4) was found to represent a dominant political ideology 
that preserves certain values at the cost of socially, economically, and politically 
underprivileged youth, which coincides with both the findings of Hall et al. (2013) and the 
critical perspective more generally. As a result, underprivileged groups are more likely to be 
burdened and impacted by the consequences associated with laws that do not represent their 
interests. In actuality, legislation such as Bill C-10 (Part 4) may have the effect of further 
excluding underprivileged youth because their interests are marginally (at best) reflected in the 
policy.   
 Further, the analysis of the interview data found that the legislative amendments of Bill 
C-10 (Part 4) were influenced by a small range of stakeholders, primarily propelled by certain 
members of the Conservative government (see Research Question #2). These changes 
originated from various stakeholders’ conceptions of what society ought to be like in relation 
to crime and crime legislation. Not only was the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) fueled by 
conservative politicians, provincial Ministers of Justice, and some Crown attorneys, but the 
data suggests that victims’ groups played a significant role in influencing the tough-on-crime 
legislation as well. Since the conceptions of what society ought to look like closely resembled 
one another, the combined efforts of these five groups gave rise to the Conservative 
government’s position on enacting harsher legislation. The data from the interviews suggest 
that the most influential group after certain key members of the Conservative Party was that of 
victims’ groups. This provides support for the views advanced by Becker (1963), Chambliss & 
Seidman (1971), Garland (2001) and to a lesser degree Habermas (2006) and Hall et al. (2013), 
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since the involvement of particular interest groups amplified and strengthened the 
Conservative’s position. There was also evidence to suggest that the Conservative government 
manipulated the use of victims’ groups by selectively inviting specific individuals to 
participate in the parliamentary debate. This alludes to the existence of a complicated 
interaction between individual and governmental levels of phenomena that occurred during the 
development and legislation of the Bill. It also explains the ways in which mass loyalty and 
consent is achieved amongst the public, as per Habermas (1975), by “resorting to emotional 
appeals” and relying on the “use of inquiries” in order to gain legitimacy and to further crime 
policy. Overall, these findings support the critical perspective which suggests that there is a 
complex relationship that exists between the public, the state, various interest groups, and the 
media, which collectively influences “lawmaking, lawbreaking, victimization,” and “reactions 
to crime” (Wortley et al., 2008, p. 211). Elements of the findings from Issue 1 are reflected in 
the works of Alvi (2012); Becker (1963); Caputo and Vallée (2007); Chambliss and Seidman 
(1971); DeKeseredy (2011); Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001), Habermas (1975, 
1985, 1996, 2006); Hall et al. (2013), O’Malley (1999), and Wortley et al. (2008).                 
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CHAPTER 7 – INTERPRETATIONS OF YCJA LEGISLATION AND 
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN CANADA 
 The reconstruction of the ways in which youth offenders are conceptualized resulted in 
the enactment of the YCJA in 2003. In some ways, this legislation signifies a tougher, more 
punitive approach to addressing high-risk youth when compared to preceding youth justice 
philosophies and ideologies, and to an extent coincides with the conservative ideology 
described by Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001), Hall et al. (2013), and O’Malley 
(1999). With the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the YCJA effectively represents 
a modified model of crime control to further manage specific groups of youth, particularly 
those who are risky or dangerous.  
 In order to better understand the ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation is 
interpreted and applied in a court of law, this chapter focuses on the legal outcomes which 
have a bearing on the way youth are processed and sentenced across Canada. To address 
Research Question #3, this chapter provides an analysis of Canadian case law pertaining to 
violent and repeat youth in conflict with the law. This analysis provides an account of how the 
YCJA is understood to uphold various provisions of the Act in conjunction with a range of 
available sentences. These findings address the ways in which youth in Canada (particularly 
violent and repeat young offenders) have been and are currently dealt with both before and 
after the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). This chapter therefore investigates Issue 2 as outlined 
in Chapter 4.165 
165 Please refer to pages 170-171 for a full list of the Research Questions. 
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7.1 The Effects of Tough-on-Crime Policy  
 An analysis of case law between April 2003 and June 2013 indicates that the sentencing 
principles, particularly the need for “fair and proportionate” sentences as well as the 
importance of “rehabilitation and reintegration” outlined in Section 3 of the YCJA, are largely 
adhered to within the courts. Since the enactment of the YCJA, it appears that most sentencing 
judges do in fact consider the alternatives to custody when searching for the least restrictive 
approach that balances rehabilitation and accountability, despite the amendments of Bill C-10 
(Part 4). In a sense, these findings coincide with what Garland (1996) refers to as an “adaptive 
response” to the state’s failure to effectively control crime. Specifically, adapting to failure can 
be witnessed through the various responses set forth by both the state and criminal justice 
agencies by developing new techniques of “system integration and system monitoring” 
(Garland, 1996, p. 455). In effect, these responses include policy objectives which are geared 
towards decreasing the use of custody for youth offenders but more precisely signify the limits 
of the self-governing state (Garland, 1996).  
 While the legal context for responses to youth crime is discussed in Chapter 4, this 
section specifically focuses on Research Question #3 and addresses whether or not youth in 
conflict with the law have been impacted or affected by the tough-on-crime policy, either 
negatively or positively. If youth have been impacted, in what ways has this occurred? With 
the exception of years 2003 and 2013, case law analysis is divided up equally in three-year 
intervals not only to condense material, but also to track any changes in sentencing practices 
over the years. Although the legislative amendments came into effect on 23 October 2012, 
there was no case law in the remaining month and a half of 2012 that referred to Bill C-10 
(Part 4). This finding may likely be attributed to the fact that the amendments could not be 
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applied retroactively to youth who had committed an offence prior to this date. Thus, the post-
enactment analysis of Bill C-10 (Part 4) case law starts from 01 January 2013.166  
7.2 Case Law Findings From 2003  
Findings from the case law between 01 April 2003 and 31 December 2003 suggest that 
a number of issues stem from the transitional phase between offences that occurred during the 
YOA legislation, but were dealt with after the YCJA was enacted.167 In some instances, the 
consideration given to each case is unique in the sense that some youth had previously been 
convicted, charged, and sentenced to custody for an offence under the YOA, but were appealing 
the sentence because they were permitted to gain from any lesser penalties coming into effect 
between the time of sentencing and the hearing of the appeal. Similarly, some offences that had 
been committed slightly before the enactment of the YCJA were judicially determined to be a 
serious offence pursuant to the YCJA. As such, some cases in 2003 which involved offences 
that predated the YCJA’s proclamation into force were addressed accordingly under the Act, 
although this did not hold true for all cases.168  
 More notably, however, a number of cases subject to this intermediary stage apply the 
provisions of the YCJA in a new light. For instance, sentencing judges as far back as 2003 
observe that the YCJA did not include the sentencing principles of denunciation or deterrence. 
Instead, custody is used as a last resort and the focus of each case support the principles of 
rehabilitation and reintegration. In addition, some youth who had been transferred to the adult 
jurisdiction for first degree murder were transferred back to the youth court under the 
166 See pages 205-208 for additional information of case law breakdowns.  
167 See, for example, R v N.A.J. (2003).  
168 See R v W.B. (2003). See, for example, R v T.M. (2003) for the opposite ruling given that the youth was subject 
to a greater punishment under the YCJA than he would have been subject to under the YOA. Under the Charter, 
the accused had the right to a lesser sentence.  
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provisions of the YOA, but to be sentenced under the provisions of the YCJA, in order to 
benefit from the rehabilitative process outlined in the Act.169  
 These findings demonstrate that judges almost immediately applied the YCJA to each 
case in an attempt to sentence youth in a manner that upholds the principle of rehabilitation, 
even in cases where serious violent offenders were involved. Particularly relevant for youth 
who were first time offenders, efforts were made to impose sentences on youth which included 
probation, community service, restitution, counselling, and letters of apology. Depending on 
the mitigating factors, however, youth who were involved in offences such as aggravated 
assault, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, manslaughter, first degree murder, 
or second degree murder were subject to custodial sentences under the provisions of the YCJA 
(S.42(2)).      
 Overall, case law from 2003 demonstrated a shift from the ways in which youth were 
previously dealt with under the YOA. Because new options were added to encourage the use of 
non-custodial sentences under the YCJA, most case law reflected a varied sentencing approach 
to ensure rehabilitation and reintegration back into the community. This finding is 
predominately linked with the provisions of the YCJA that reserves custody for only violent or 
repeat offenders. Given that the YCJA was fairly new at the time, it is not unforeseeable that 
some youth court judges either over- or under-sanctioned youth for their offences; however in 
most instances steps were taken by the Crown or the defendant in subsequent years to ensure 
169 See R v N.T.P (2003). See also R v T.W. (2004); R v M.N.(b) (2004). See R v M.N.(b) (2004) for a case where a 
comparison is drawn between the available punishments under each of the YCJA and YOA, where the YOA 
sentencing provisions adequately addressed the dual objectives of public protection and rehabilitation of the 
young person.    
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that the correct sentence was imposed.170 Additionally, the provisions of the YCJA specifically 
determine when custody orders can be applied and when they are inappropriate. As such, 
sentencing judges are given a more detailed guideline in relation to the use of custody in 
comparison to the YOA, when there was no restriction on the use of custody.171  
7.2.1 Case Law Findings Between 2004 and 2006 
 Between 01 January 2004 and 31 December 2006, case law indicates that sentencing 
practices largely vary by province and offence, but more importantly consider the numerous 
mitigating factors (if any) present in each case. Typically, mitigating factors include age; 
extenuating circumstances; whether or not the youth is a first time offender, whereby recurrent 
or subsequent offences predominately result in additional sanctions; whether or not the youth 
suffers from mental illness such as fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, or other mental disabilities (which frequently surfaced); the willingness 
and ability of the youth participating in rehabilitation or treatment; the acceptance of guilt and 
the level of moral blameworthiness; whether or not the youth operated independently or was 
part of a gang; the youth’s home situation (i.e., absentee parents or dysfunctional home 
environments); whether or not the youth had alcohol or substance abuse problems (which 
appeared regularly in the case law);  whether the youth received a negative or positive pre-
sentence report; and of course, the seriousness and circumstances of the offence itself. Case 
law between these years range from issues pertaining to pre-trial detention (particularly in 
relation to whether or not youth are eligible for release or have committed crimes while on bail) 
170 For more information on a case where a youth court judge severely sanctioned a youth for an offence, see R v 
S.L. (2003), whereby a youth was sentenced to a custodial sentence of 6 months for aggravated assault, but 
appealed the sentence based on the grounds that the judge did not give sufficient weight to the accountability 
principles of sentencing set forth in the YCJA, especially when other alternatives to custody were available.   
171 For more information see the restrictions on custodial sentences and the four gateways into custody, S.39(1) of 
the YCJA.  
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as well as concerns arising from credit given for time served (or lack thereof), to cases 
involving the designation of an offence as a serious violent offence; repeat offenders; youth in 
breach of their probation, undertaking, or recognizance; placement within an adult or youth 
facility; and, in some instances an appeal of the sentence imposed.172  
 The majority of case law addresses sentences for youth who have either committed or 
have previously been convicted of numerous offences. The most common offences include 
breaches of youth sentences such as probation or OIC undertakings, break and enter, robbery, 
use or possession of prohibited firearms, assault (level 1), assault causing bodily harm (level 2), 
aggravated assault (level 3), sexual assault (level 3), and presumptive offences (levels 1, 2 and 
3) such as aggravated sexual assault, murder, attempted murder and manslaughter.173 The vast 
majority of youth convicted of the aforementioned offences were given a custody and 
supervision order (CSO), pending on the facts and seriousness of the case and their individual 
circumstances. The length of time served in custody varies based on the youth and the 
conditions under which the offence occurs, and frequently takes into account the length of time 
spent in pre-trial detention. Interestingly, one of the least used sentences was that of the 
deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSO),174 wherein 2004 the average in case law 
appears to identify four DCSO’s, four in 2005, and three in 2006. These findings indicate that 
deferred custody and supervision orders, although not overly popular, are used in instances 
172  For cases involving decisions pertaining to detention/release, see R. v M.N. (2004a); R v P.N.; R. v 
V.A.N.  (2004). 
173 According to S.2(1)(b) of the YCJA, a “serious violent offence” may become a “presumptive offence” if the 
young person has committed two prior serious violent offences. In addition, if a youth is over the age of 14 an 
adult sentence is possible. 
174 YCJA, S.42(5). 
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where youth are not typically involved in a serious violent offence, and less so where the 
Crown failed to make an application for a serious violent offender determination.175  
 In some cases, albeit also infrequently, sentences imposed include an intensive 
rehabilitative custody and supervision (IRCS) order for the most serious (presumptive) 
offences as an alternative to traditional custody and conditional supervision.176 In effect, these 
sentences appear to be ordered rarely given the expense and intrusiveness associated with it. 
Between 2004 and 2006, the case studies demonstrate that only four IRCS orders were 
imposed for youth who committed first and second degree murder, as well as manslaughter. 
Intensive Support and Supervision Orders (ISSO), on the other hand, are imposed as an 
alternative to custody. 177  Typically served in the community under conditions (similar to 
probation but provides closer monitoring and support to assist the youth with behaviour 
modification), approximately six orders were imposed between these years principally for 
those young offenders guilty of criminal negligence, aggravated assault and assault causing 
bodily harm. It should however be noted that this sanction is optional for provinces under the 
YCJA (pending on their availability of resources), and is therefore subject to provincial and 
territorial discretion for implementation (Bala & Anand, 2012).  
 Sentence length varies for individual cases involving manslaughter, first degree, and 
second degree murder. In 2004, the findings indicate that approximately three cases involved 
manslaughter, while in 2005 there were four, and six in 2006. Almost all of these sentences 
include a youth sentence of custody and supervision, with the exception of two. In the case of 
175 For cases involving DCSO’s between these years, see R v A.T. (2004); R v  A.W.H. (2006); R v  C.J.A. (2005); 
R v  C.N.B. (2006); R v  J.J.H. (2005); R v K.L.C. (2004); R v L.M. (2004); R v M.R.B. (2005); R v  R.C.F. (2006); 
R v R.C.W.M. (2004); R v S.J.C. (2006); and R v T.S.R. (2005).  
176 YCJA, S.42(7). 
177 YCJA, S.157. 
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R v M.D.C. (2004), for example, the youth was given a sentence of two years supervised 
probation with conditions, while in R v C.N.B (2006) a DCSO of 6 months was imposed given 
that a custodial sentence was deemed unnecessary to hold the youth accountable. These cases 
may be seen as exceptions to the rule since the majority of convictions for manslaughter 
neither result in probation nor a deferred custody and supervision order. These types of rulings, 
though, entirely depend on the nature of the circumstances and of the offender.    
 Given that first degree murder is far less common than most other offences, a review of 
the case law finds that between the years of 2004 and 2006 only about nine cases appeared. 
Cases involving youth convicted of first degree murder also vary in sentence length, but to a 
much lesser degree when compared to manslaughter. The majority of these sentences impose 
life imprisonment on youth without eligibility for parole for a given number of years (typically 
somewhere between 5 and 10 years).178 These adult sentences are mainly enforced in situations 
where youth sentences are inconsistent with the seriousness of the offence. In other words, a 
youth sentence cannot hold the youth accountable for the offence. Further, a sentence of life 
imprisonment is generally justified by the sentencing judge in each individual case after ample 
consideration is given to the sentencing principles outlined in the YCJA, the mitigating factors 
involved, the facts and seriousness of the offence, the youth’s likelihood and amenability to 
treatment/rehabilitation, and the sufficiency of time required to hold the youth accountable for 
the offence. In some instances youth were simply sentenced to life imprisonment given the 
severity of their mental condition. In other words, youth suffering from acute mental disorders 
(i.e., bi-polar mood disorder, schizophrenia, and alcohol related disabilities) are, in some cases, 
178 For youth sentenced as adults for first degree murder, see, for example, R v Ferriman (2006); R v J.M. (2004); 
R v M.M.K. (2005). See also R v J.J.M. (2006) for an example of a dangerous offender designation of a youth 
who, as a result, received an indeterminate sentence.   
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ineligible to participate in intensive rehabilitation. As such, these youth may only be 
maintained by the system as opposed to receiving treatment.179   
 A youth sentence was imposed on a minority of youth for first or second degree murder 
between these years. In R v J.C.(1) (2004), for example, the youth entered a guilty plea of 
second degree murder for killing his father (although he was charged with first degree murder), 
and was sentenced to a custody and supervision order after receiving six months’ credit for the 
four months he spent in pre-trial detention. He was not placed in an adult facility since the 
sentencing judge found some mitigating factors which involved severe physical, emotional and 
psychological abuse to the offender by his father, determined that the youth did not pose a 
danger to society because the killing was completely out of the ordinary, and operated under 
the belief that placement outside a youth facility would not assist in the youth’s rehabilitation. 
Some youth were ordered to intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision, while others 
were simply subject to a youth sentence because it permitted some allowance for mitigating 
circumstances while the adult sentence did not (albeit in some instances these youth do not 
receive pre-trial credit for time served in remand).180 
 The least common offence between the years of 2004 and 2006 is that of second degree 
murder, with only four incidents found in the case law. Youth convicted of second degree 
murder are typically eligible to receive an adult sentence; however, the findings indicate that 
two youth received a sentence of life imprisonment, while the other two were sentenced as 
youth. 181  In half of these youth sentencing cases, the offender was ordered to intensive 
179 See R v I.D.B. (2005).  
180 See R v C.K. (2006). In adult matters, the general rule is that credit for pre-trial custody is discretionary. 
(Criminal Code, S.719(3)).    
181 For youth sentenced as adults for second degree murder, see, for example, R v J.K.W. (2006); R v J.T.S. (2005). 
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rehabilitative custody and supervision program given their diminished moral capacity (unable 
to comprehend the scope of their crime) and mental limitations.182 The remaining case required 
lengthy sentences for the successful rehabilitation of the youth. Of those who received a 
sentence of life imprisonment, many had already been involved with the justice system and had 
a number of prior convictions (either violent or otherwise). Some of them appeared to display a 
pattern of success in highly structured youth programs and declined rapidly upon release into 
the community. These findings demonstrate that youth community supervision was in fact 
inadequate for some of these youth and were therefore transferred to adult facilities given their 
lack of success for rehabilitation in youth custodial environments.183   
 The case studies suggest that issues pertaining to lifting the publication ban appear to 
arise between 2004 and 2006. Under the YCJA, the publication of a youth’s name is “permitted 
if an adult sentence is imposed; or if a youth sentence is imposed for an offence that carries a 
presumption of adult sentence, unless the judge decides publication is inappropriate” (see 
Lightstone, n.d.). None of the cases found in 2004 or 2005 removed the publication ban, even 
in instances where youth were subject to adult sentences. In 2006, three cases removed the 
publication ban. R v Ferriman (2006) involved two youth who were convicted of murder and 
attempted murder and were subsequently sentenced as adults. In the case of R v Ritchie (2006), 
the youth was charged with a number of offences, including break and enter, assault causing 
bodily harm, and aggravated assault. Finally, in R v A.J.O. (2005) two offenders were 
sentenced as adults for six counts of robbery. Although the defence requested that a publication 
182 See R v A.H. (2006); R v L.A.B. (2007).  
183 See R v J.K.W (2006).  
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ban be imposed in this instance, the judge refused based on the finding that the publication of 
the offenders’ names would have a minimal effect on their rehabilitation.   
  Confusion surrounding a lack of clarity with regards to the definition of violent 
offences appears to surface intermittently throughout these years. Presumptive offences are 
typically exempt from such concerns, as the majority of these crimes are designated as serious 
violent offences. Other offences such as break and enter or possession of a weapon for a 
purpose dangerous to public safety seem to be issues of contention. In the most controversial 
case of R v C.D.; R v C.D.K. (2005), one youth (C.D.) was convicted of carrying “a weapon for 
a purpose dangerous to the public, arson to property, and a breach of recognizance”, while the 
other (C.D.K.) was convicted of “dangerous driving” and “possession of stolen property under 
$5000.00”. Both youth were sentenced to six months DCSO and probation. The case was 
appealed based on the grounds that “one of the gateways to a custodial sentence” under the 
YCJA states that youth court cannot commit a person to custody unless a violent offence has 
been committed (YCJA, S.39(1)(a)). The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of sentencing the 
youth to custody, given that arson and dangerous driving are violent offences. However, an 
offence is designated as violent if it causes bodily harm or intends to cause bodily harm. As 
such, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and determined that the custodial 
sentences were to be quashed.            
 Issues pertaining to the sentencing principles of denunciation and general deterrence 
also arise on a few occasions throughout these years. All cases consider the role of the 
sentencing principles outlined in S.38(2)(f) of the YCJA, however, some cases have been 
appealed based on the sentences imposed in relation to denunciation. In R v C.T. (2005), for 
example, a youth was sentenced to a 12 month custody and supervision order for assault with a 
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weapon, forcible confinement, possession of a firearm and assault. The sentence was appealed 
given that denunciation is not a sentencing principle under the YCJA, and the court did not give 
consideration to the rehabilitation and reintegration of the youth or look at alternatives to 
custody. As a result, a new sentence of 15 months supervised probation was substituted for the 
CSO. More notably, the case of R v D.B. (2006) argued that various sections of the YCJA, such 
as placing an onus on the youth to show why he should not be sentenced as an adult, and to 
justify maintaining a publication ban, violated the presumption of the youth’s innocence. 
Subsequently, the youth court judge imposed a youth sentence and maintained the publication 
ban.184         
 Lastly, cases revolving around pre-trial detention and/or issues pertaining to release are 
found within this three year interval. Pre-trial detention is most frequently reserved for youth 
who are eligible to receive a custodial sentence if found guilty; however case law indicates that 
there appears to be a lack of clarity about its meaning, particularly with regards to whether the 
presumption against detention can apply in cases where custody is possible under the 
“exceptional circumstances” provisions of the YCJA. 185 There are also concerns about the 
difficulty in detaining youth who have been charged with a number of non-violent offences, 
but have not yet been found guilty. The onus is generally placed on the Crown to show cause 
as to why the youth should be detained. When comparing case law, for instance, there appears 
to be some variation in Crown practices provincially when it comes to whether youth are to be 
184 In R v D. B. it was found that S.62, S.63, S.64(1) and (5), S.70, S.72(1) and (2) and S.73(1) of the YCJA 
violated the respondent's S.7 rights in the Charter to the extent that they placed an onus on him to justify a youth 
sentence rather than an adult sentence, and that S.75 and 110(2) of the YCJA violated the respondents Section 7 
rights of the Charter by imposing a burden on him to justify maintaining the publication ban. See also R v B.W.P; 
R v B.V.N (2006) for more information on whether general deterrence is a factor to be considered in sentencing 
youth.  
185 See YCJA, S.29 (2)(b)(iii). Also see R v M.D. (2006).  
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detained or released. Thus, in instances where some provinces may detain the youth, others 
may release them for a similar offence.  
 Youth may be detained pending trial when charged with a serious offence, appears to 
pose a considerable risk of reoffending or not attending court (including fleeing, known as 
UAL or the offence of Unlawfully at Large), or if there is a remote possibility that youth may 
intimidate a witness. Where safety concerns for the public can be addressed by strict 
supervision or house arrest, youth may be eligible for release pending on whether they have a 
record of previous criminal history, whether they are likely to commit an offence while on bail, 
or whether they may be released into the care of a responsible adult pending trial. In many 
cases, the Crown is more inclined to grant release of youth if the youth faces minimal current 
charges (minor charges), has no previously outstanding charges, and there is no substantial 
evidence that the youth is abusing either drugs or alcohol.186  
 For example, in R v M.N; R v H.T. (2004), two youth were jointly charged with 
robberies at jewelry stores as part of a gang related criminal activity. Both youth had 
previously been involved with the law, although H.T. did not have a criminal record yet was 
charged with a number of offences, and neither complied with previous conditions imposed 
upon them (in H.T.’s case, he was charged with breaching his recognizance condition). 
Nonetheless, H.T. was released with strict conditions, while M.N. was detained on the basis 
that it was necessary for the protection of the public. In a similar gang related case, R v P.N; R 
v V.A.N. (2004), two youth were charged with robbery, use of an imitation firearm and disguise 
with intent. P.N. was also charged with two counts of breaching probation, possession of 
marijuana, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds. 
186 For more information on Crown decisions, see Moyer and Basic (2005).  
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P.N. had previously been convicted of assault, assault causing bodily harm and failing to 
comply with probation and recognizance conditions. V.A.N. was also charged with two counts 
of failing to comply with a recognizance. V.A.N. had previously been convicted of failing to 
comply with a recognizance, was subject to a 12-month peace bond, and had five outstanding 
robbery-related charges. As a result, both youth were denied bail given their extensive pattern 
of offending behaviour.187    
7.2.2 Case Law Findings Between 2007 and 2009 
 Between the years of 2007 and 2009, there are some apparent shifts in sentencing 
practices that are readily observable in the case law. Like preceding years, the most common 
case law that appears are that of assault (level 1, which is not considered a serious violent 
offence), assault causing bodily harm, robbery, possession of firearms/weapons, possession of 
stolen property, break and enters, dangerous driving, breaches of probation or of recognizance, 
and to a much lesser extent, the presumptive offences. Interestingly, far less case law between 
these years is devoted to the nature of defining violent offences, although there appears to be 
an increase in adult sentences imposed upon youth in violation of the law. Additionally, issues 
pertaining to the publication ban have also visibly declined in contrast to previous years. 
However, like other years, there in an abundance of case law that illustrates some of the 
hardships faced by youth, such as substance and alcohol addictions, mental disorders (e.g., 
fetal alcohol spectrum disorder), gang involvement or membership, coming from dysfunctional 
families, or having absentee fathers. 
187 YCJA S.29(2)(a) and (b) outline the terms regarding justification for detention in custody. For other cases 
involving matters of judicial interim release, see R v A.A.Q. (2006); R v C.J.P (2005); R v C.P (2006); R v D.W. 
(2006); R v E.T. (2006); R v J.J.O. (2005); R v M.T.S. (2006); R v  T.L.B. (2005); R v T.S. (2006); R v V.O.E. 
(2006).  
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 On average, the number of deferred custody and supervision orders imposed upon 
youth between 2007 and 2009 are more or less the same as those imposed in the previous three 
years. For instance, there are six DCSO’s imposed in 2007, two in 2008, and four in 2009.188 
In this regard, the imposition of this sentence has neither increased nor decreased, and is still 
imposed on youth who have not been involved in serious violent offences. Deferred custody 
and supervision orders have been given to youth found guilty of assault, aggravated assault and 
robbery, but in most cases these offences do not constitute serious bodily harm. As such, the 
majority of sentences imposed on youth are custody and supervision orders, again depending 
on the nature and the extent of the offence, the youth, the principles of rehabilitation and 
reintegration, proportionality and accountability, and mitigating factors.189  
 Like previous years, the imposition of an intensive support and supervision order 
occurred minimally with only two cases taking place in 2008 as identified by case law. In both 
instances the youth received this sentence for committing robbery, although one had also 
committed aggravated assault, and the other was found guilty of six counts of forcible 
confinement, and five counts of using an imitation firearm.190 Intensive rehabilitative custody 
and supervision, on the other hand, was imposed once in 2007, and three times in 2009. In all 
instances, youth who were convicted of manslaughter, second degree murder, or attempted 
murder suffered from a range of mental disorders. 
 In terms of youth convicted of manslaughter between 2007 and 2009, the case law 
reflects an overall increase in the average number of cases presented than in previous years. In 
188 See R v A.R. (2007); R v  J.R.L. (2007); R v M.H. (2007); R v  Z.J.L. (2007); YCJA – 0744 (2007).   
189 See, for example, R v G.S.M.P. (2007), where the youth had a very promising pre-sentence report and many 
supportive letters from his family and employers which resulted in a DCSO and an18-month probation order as 
opposed to a custodial sentence.  
190 For more information, see R v G.H.L. (2008); and R v O.B. (2008). 
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2007, for example, there appears to be one incident, while in 2008 there are approximately five, 
followed by three cases in 2009. When analyzing sentences imposed, five of the nine cases 
imposed a youth sentence, while the other four imposed an adult sentence. This finding is 
consistent with the Supreme Court Ruling of R v D.B. (2008) which states that a youth who 
commits a presumptive offence ought not to automatically invite an adult sentence. In the case 
of R v D.B., an adult sentence was not imposed given that it would have negated the benefit of 
the diminished moral culpability present. The four remaining youth that were sentenced as 
adults appear to have lengthy criminal records of violent offences. As a result, the primary 
sentencing considerations were denunciation and general deterrence, as well as the protection 
of the public. 191  These sentencing principles are consistent with adult proceedings, but 
denunciation was contrary to the YCJA pre-enactment of the amendments. General deterrence 
remains inconsistent with the YCJA post-enactment of the tough-on-crime legislation.           
 Youth convicted of first degree murder represent only a small portion of the overall 
case law found between 2007 and 2009. Of the six cases noted, two of them occurred in 2007, 
one in 2008, and three in 2009. According to the case law, all but one of these youth received 
adult sentences.192 Five youth received a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for 
parole for a number of years (anywhere between 7 and 10). This was imposed either because 
youth sentences were deemed to be insufficient in the length of time to promote rehabilitation 
191 For cases involving youth sentenced as adults for manslaughter, see R v Bird (2008); R v F.M. (2008); and R v 
Kenworthy (2008). 
192 For cases involving youth sentenced as adults for first degree murder, see R v Bagshaw (2009); R v Casavant 
(2009); R v M.B.W. (2007); R v Todorovic (2009); R v Williams (2008). See also R v Van Buskirk (2007), where 
the offender received a youth sentence, but the publication ban was lifted because adult proceedings against the 
accused for conspiracy to commit murder could not be subject to the ban.  
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and reintegration into society, or because youth sentences were not seen as adequate in terms 
of holding the offender accountable for the crime.  
 In contrast to the average number of case law available between 2004 and 2006 on 
matters pertaining to youth convicted of second degree murder, there were approximately 
fifteen cases found between 2007 and 2009. The cases indicate that slightly more youth 
received adult sentences as opposed to youth sentences; however, there were some mitigating 
factors present in cases where offenders were sentenced as youth. The majority of youth 
received a sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after seven years.193 In 
some instances, youth were sentenced to serve time in an adult penitentiary based on the age of 
the offender, as well as the youth’s amenability to rehabilitation.194 In a minority of cases, 
youth were convicted of either attempted murder (one case in 2008 and one in 2009) or of 
conspiracy to commit mass murder (one case in 2009). The case law indicates that in one 
instance the youth had an imposition of youth sentence, whereas the other two were sentenced 
as adults. Two-thirds of these cases were ordered to participate in various rehabilitative 
programs for mental disorders, and thus required the maximum amount of treatment and 
supervision to ensure the public’s long-term protection. This finding was consistent with the 
YCJA prior to the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation. Currently, S.3(1)(a) of the YCJA no longer uses 
the term “long term protection”.        
193 For cases pertaining to youth sentenced as adults for second degree murder, see R v D.E. (2008); R v J.S.R. 
(2009); R v Logan (2009); R v Slippery (2007); R v Smith (2009); R v Turcotte (2008). 
194 See R v Estacio (2008).  
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 Rarely between these years was a youth’s name published, unless a youth sentence was 
imposed for an offence that carried a presumption of an adult sentence.195 Interestingly, the 
case law indicates that in eighteen cases the publication ban was removed and subsequently 
allowed identification of the youth. In some instances, however, youth had committed 
presumptive offences just days before their 18th birthday, and appeared to be more likely to 
receive an adult sentence for their crimes even if mitigating factors were involved. In practice, 
these decisions appear to be made once consideration is given to the youth’s moral culpability 
in relation to the offence, amongst various other factors presented in the case.   
 While the case law between these years does not demonstrate any significant concerns 
regarding the definition of violence, and minimally addresses the principles of deterrence and 
denunciation after the Supreme Court’s judgement of R v D.B., cases involving decisions on 
whether or not to detain or release youth prior to trial still appear to arise. The bulk of these 
cases typically pertain to applications for judicial interim release and the grounds upon which 
applications are either granted or dismissed. Detention of youth between these years largely 
depends on whether or not the youth appears to pose a threat to the public, thus youth who are 
violent in nature tend to remain in pre-trial detention. In other instances, judicial interim 
release was denied because youth failed to comply with probation orders or previous youth 
sentences imposed. These practices largely vary by province, but occasionally assumptions are 
made about whether the youth is likely to comply with release conditions. Additionally, 
195 See, for example, R. v Flaten (2009); R v James (2009); R v Lights (2007); R v Pratt (2007); R v Quintana 
(2008); R. v Quintana (2009).     
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decisions are sometimes made on whether it is necessary or reasonable to detain youth in order 
to maintain the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.196       
7.2.3 Case Law Findings Between 2010 and 2012 
 Case law between 2010 and 2012 reveals that more youth are sentenced as adults by a 
youth court judge within this time frame than in the past seven years. In addition, the case law 
indicates that numerous youth suffer from mental disorders, substance and alcohol abuse, 
poverty, dysfunctional families, have absentee parents (mainly father), and are associated with 
gangs. Like previous years, the majority of cases receive sentences of custody and supervision 
orders followed by a term of probation. However, unlike previous years, a great deal of case 
law pertains to offences involving robbery (particularly armed robbery), possession of 
prohibited firearms, discharging firearms with intent to wound, break and enter, break and 
enter to commit robbery, sexual assault and dangerous driving causing death. Further, there 
were a number of instances where decisions from previous sentences were being appealed, in 
some cases by the Crown and in others by the defendant, because sentence lengths were 
unfitting for the crime.    
 Case law indicates that deferred custody and supervision orders were imposed 
approximately fourteen times between these years; with four ordered in 2010, seven in 2011, 
and three in 2012.197 Overall, DCSO’s are utilized on average about the same in 2010 through 
2012 when compared with preceding years. In many instances, DCSO’s were imposed on 
youth who committed robbery, robbery with an imitation weapon, or possession of firearm, but 
196 See YCJA S.29 for more information on the criteria and justification for detention at a judicial interim release 
hearing.  
197 Note that in the case of R v. C.L (2010) the 6 month DSCO imposed for robbery, concealment of identity 
during the offence, and breach of undertaking was rescinded because the youth committed assault and breached 
probation orders at a later date. As a result, the remaining time of the DSCO was to be served as a custody and 
supervision order instead.  
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the remainder were comprised of youth guilty of theft, uttering threats, assault, dangerous 
driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and breaches of court 
orders.198   
 Similar to other years, case law reveals that the use of intensive rehabilitative custody 
and supervision is rare between 2010 and 2012, as are intensive support and supervision orders. 
In 2010, for example, an IRCS was ordered once, and twice in 2011. No youth were ordered to 
participate in an intensive support and supervision program during 2011, although one youth 
judge ordered a youth to attend the program in 2012. In all three cases of those ordered to 
IRCS, youth suffered from mental disabilities and were guilty of serious violent offences (i.e. 
aggravated sexual assault, second degree murder and attempted murder, and manslaughter). 
Youth ordered to participate in intensive support and supervision programs suffered from 
mental issues including substance and alcohol abuse, and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder but were willing to be treated.  
 The majority of youth convicted of manslaughter between 2010 and 2012 received 
youth sentences under the YCJA. Case law findings show that there was one incident involving 
manslaughter in 2010 where the youth received an adult sentence.199 On the other hand, in 
2011 there were four cases with youth convicted of manslaughter but in none of these instances 
did the Crown seek an adult sentence.200 In 2012, one youth was sentenced as an adult, while 
198 For cases involving youth who received a DCSO, see LSPJA – 1111 (2011); R v A.L. (2011); R v A.S.D. 
(2011); R v C.D.R. (2010); R. v C.G. (2011); R v D.W. (2011); R v G.B. (2010); R v K.D.B. (2011) (after sentence 
was appealed); R v K.T.W. (2012); R v M.P. (2010) (albeit an exceptional case); R v P.B (2011a); R v R.C. (2011); 
R v R.J.D. (2011); R v T.C. (2012). However, one DCSO order was later converted to a period of secure custody 
for the remaining portion of the sentence (see R v P.B.(b) (2011)). 
199 See R v J.B. (2010). 
200 See R v A.D. (2011); R v J.D. (2011); R v T.R.D. (2011).  
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the other was sentenced under the provisions of the YCJA.201 In a third case, however, two 
young offenders were given different sentences based on the degree of their progress while on 
remand (one made significant improvements while the other did not). In the case of R v R.L.T 
(2012), for example, two youth were co-accused of gang related criminal behaviour which 
ultimately resulted in manslaughter. Both youth were held in custody for a period of three 
years, came from abusive homes, and suffered from many issues including drugs. While F had 
a positive pre-sentence report and showed remorse, R.T.L. did not show signs of improvement. 
R.T.L. was highly violent and threatened suicide frequently. Consequently, the sentencing 
judge imposed an adult sentence on R.T.L for five years after receiving credit for the three 
years spent in custody, while F was sentenced to three years less a day in a youth facility, but 
not credited with time, given that he made large strides to be rehabilitated. 
 Between the years of 2010 and 2012, case law indicates that nine cases address youth 
convicted of first degree murder. In each of these years, two youth were sentenced as adults to 
life imprisonment without parole eligibility from anywhere between five and ten years, and one 
was sentenced as a youth. In the majority of cases, a youth sentence was deemed to be 
insufficient to hold the young person accountable for the offence.202 However, youth sentences 
imposed under the provisions of the YCJA were ordered for various reasons. In one case the 
Crown simply did not seek an adult sentence. In the next case, the youth made progress while 
in remand (pro-social behavioural changes, complied with orders and kept the peace), and the 
sentencing judge acknowledged that the youth’s best chance of continued improvement was to 
keep him in the youth system. In addition, the youth had a limited role in the offence. In the 
201 See R v A.S. (2012); R v Prince (2012).  
202 For cases involving youth sentenced as adults for first degree murder, see R v D.L.S. (2012); R v I.C. (2010); R 
v J.J.T (2010); R v M.M. (2012); R v Wellwood (2011).  
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third instance, an application to be sentenced as a young person under the YCJA was made by 
the defendant and thus allowed by the court, mainly because the youth could be held 
accountable within the terms of the youth sentence outlined in the YCJA.203       
 Between 2010 and 2012, there are very few of youth convicted for second degree 
murder. With approximately five cases addressed throughout these years, the analysis reveals 
that slightly more youth (3/5) are subject to a sentence under the YCJA than that of an adult 
sentence. In the case of R v Arrieta (2010) for example, the youth was not only convicted of 
second degree murder and discharge of a prohibited firearm, but of two counts of attempted 
murder as well. Given the seriousness of the offence, the judge determined that an adult 
sentence would be most appropriate to hold the youth accountable. In the second instance, the 
Crown made an application for an adult sentence given that the youth had been involved in 
second degree murder, but also in break and enter and robbery. Further, several risk factors 
were outlined for recidivism, such as thoughtless behaviour of a youth who failed to 
understand consequences, exhibited reduced empathy for an adolescent, was highly mature for 
his age, and surrounded himself with people significantly older than he. As a result, a youth 
sentence was insufficient.204   
 The Crown also made applications between these years for youth to be tried as adults in 
cases where the seriousness of the crime warranted more punitive sanctions. Particularly 
noticeable amongst cases involving robbery, break and enter, possession of prohibited weapons, 
and discharging weapons with intent to wound, case law appears to illustrate an increased rate 
of youth serving adult sentences for these offences in contrast to previous years. In all cases 
203 See LSJPA -1012 (2010); R v A.A. (2011); R v S.M. (2012), respectively.  
204 See R v S.L. (2012).  
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judges ruled youth sentences as insufficient in the length of time required to either promote the 
principles of rehabilitation or accountability. Further, much of the case law indicates that many 
Crown applications were allowed given the apparent gravity of the offence (in the majority of 
instances the actions were intentional and deliberate), and the high moral culpability of the 
youth. Excluding presumptive offences for which youth are sentenced to life imprisonment, a 
minimum of ten cases demonstrate the imposition of an adult sentence throughout these 
years.205 It should be noted, however, that a significant number of cases involve situations 
where the Crown sought an application for an adult sentence, but were ultimately dismissed by 
the judge on a number of grounds. 206  A review of the findings also exhibits a stronger 
emphasis on the Crown seeking adult sentences in both 2011 and 2012, as the case law 
addresses issues of this nature far more frequently than in 2010 as well as every other 
preceding year.207    
 Although the case law does not reveal any substantial issues regarding the publication 
ban between 2010 and 2012, the findings suggest that one case in 2010 appealed a decision 
refusing to grant the youth’s application for a publication ban. The youth was convicted for 
manslaughter, aggravated assault and robbery. He agreed to be sentenced as an adult but 
sought a publication ban of his name under the YCJA. The reverse onus provisions of the Act 
were subsequently declared unconstitutional on the basis that the absence of a publication ban 
was part of a youth sentence and created a more severe sentence so that the onus had to be on 
205 For cases involving adult sentences for these various offences, see, for example, R v C.F. (2011); R v C.M. 
(2010); R v D.E. (2011); R v Elie (2012); R v J.A.G. (2010); R v Massaquoi (2012); R v M.O. (2011) (where the 
youth received some adult sentences and some youth sentences); R v S.J.A. (2010).   
206 The onus is on the Crown to satisfy the court that an adult sentence is necessary. Should the Crown not satisfy 
the court that a youth sentence is insufficient for the offence; applications of this nature are dismissed.  
207 For cases involving the Crown seeking an adult sentence, but where applications were dismissed, see, for 
example, R v A.A. (2011); R v D.S. (2012); R v I.R.N. (2011); R v K.B.P. (2012).     
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the Crown to show why a ban should not be granted in each particular case. Based on these 
facts the appeal was allowed, but only because there was evidence suggesting the youth 
showed remorse and made a strong effort to change his ways. In this regard, lifting the ban was 
seen as potentially detrimental to the youth’s overall success in terms of rehabilitation and 
reintegration back into the community.208 In no other cases were there issues pertaining to the 
publication ban.          
 While issues pertaining to the definition of violent offences are rare between these 
years, some concerns regarding the designation of a serious violent offence did occur. 
Generally, the onus is on the Crown to apply for this designation when appropriate. In the case 
of R v K.I. (2011), for example, the defendant appealed the judge’s decision that the offence of 
robbery was a serious violent offence.209 Although the offence was both serious and violent, no 
one was injured during the robbery. There was no attempt or intent to cause serious bodily 
harm, yet the judge made the designation in the absence of the application for the designation 
from the Crown. Given these findings, the offence in fact did not meet the criteria for a serious 
violent offence designation. As such, the appeal was granted and the availability of custody as 
a sanction if the youth reoffended was no longer viable.  
 Case law findings suggest that the decision-making process for judicial interim release 
is relatively simple. Despite the fact that throughout each year a small percentage of cases 
pertain to decisions of pre-trial detention or release, almost all cases give ample justification 
for the grounds upon which these decisions are reached. In a few instances youth were detained 
208 See R v F.M. (2010).   
209 According to S.2 of the YCJA, a “serious violent offence” means an “offence in the commission of which a 
young person causes or attempts to cause serious bodily harm” (prior to any definitional changes brought forth by 
the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4)).  
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pending trial in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.210 In other cases, 
detention was necessary to ensure the protection and safety of the public. Rarely were youth 
detained on the primary grounds that consider the unlikelihood of youth appearing in court. If 
the grounds for detention could not be satisfied, youth were released on bail with strict 
conditions (i.e., house arrest or into the custody of a responsible person).211 Even with the 
legislative changes of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the latter part of 2012 does not display any real 
change with regards to pre-sentence detention.   
7.2.4 Case Law Findings From Early 2013 
 Case law in the first half of 2013 reflects similar trends to those found in both 2011 and 
2012. Overall, the case law responds to comparable offences with the majority pertaining to 
sexual assault, break and enter, robbery, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, and various 
presumptive offences. The bulk of the offences are dealt with by imposing a custody and 
supervision order, although in a minority of cases an order of probation is imposed. Like 
findings from case law in the two years prior, the first six months of 2013 displays a significant 
amount of Crown applications for adult sentences. Of the fifty-four available cases to date, 
approximately thirty-five of them impose a sentence on youth (both adult and youth sentences 
combined). The remaining nineteen cases deal with appeals on procedural grounds or the 
inclusion/exclusion of evidence. When considering sentencing patterns of each of the thirty-
five cases, case law suggests that in roughly one-quarter of the cases the Crown makes an 
application for the youth to be tried as an adult (8.75 cases out of 35 cases). While the decision 
to allow or deny the application rests solely on judicial discretion, it appears that the majority 
210 See, for example, R v J.W. (2010); R v W.M. (2011) (based on the tertiary grounds that the Crown’s case was 
too strong).   
211 See, for example, R v J.D.G.V. (2010); R v J.T. (2010); R v R.D. (2010).   
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of cases respond to youth crime by imposing a youth sentence (with the exception of first 
degree murder).  
 Up to June 2013, three deferred custody and supervision orders were imposed on youth. 
Two of these cases involve youth convicted of aggravated assault, whereby both sentencing 
judges determined that remand into custody at this stage neither meets the principles and 
factors that are to be considered under the YCJA, nor is best to promote rehabilitation.212 In the 
third instance, the youth was convicted of possession of cocaine for purposes of trafficking and 
had already spent approximately a month in remand. In addition, the youth’s prior sentence of 
probation did not encourage rehabilitation of any sort since he recidivated and failed to take the 
terms of the probation order seriously.213  
 Intensive rehabilitative custody and supervision are imposed twice to date. In the case 
of R v B.T. (2013) for example, the youth was convicted of manslaughter, theft, and the use of 
a rifle to commit the offence. Consequently, the youth was sentenced to a three year intensive 
rehabilitative custody and supervision order (comprised of 20 months in custody, and 16 
months under community supervision) without any credit given for remand since the time for 
rehabilitation was insufficient. The sentencing judge based the decision on meaningful 
consequences for the youth, the principle of accountability for the offence, and the principles 
of rehabilitation and reintegration.214  
 An intensive support and supervision order appears to have been imposed once in 2013. 
Interestingly, in the case of R v C.M.B. (2013), three youth were involved in a riot during the 
Stanley Cup hockey finals, causing damage to vehicles by lighting them on fire, and causing 
212 See R v A.D.W. (2013); R v M.C.P. (2013). 
213 See R v B.L. (2013a).  
214 See also R v A.A.Z. (2013) for another example of a youth receiving an IRCS sentence.  
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damage to a Canada Post building. While D and M received 18 months of probation, B was 
sentenced to 18 months intensive support and supervision given that his involvement in the 
offence was different from the other two. Like previous years, the imposition of an IRCS and 
an ISSO in the first half of 2013 appears to have occurred infrequently. By looking at previous 
use of these orders over the last ten years, one may expect both these orders to continue at a 
minimal rate throughout the remainder of 2013. These findings are not entirely unexpected; 
however an analysis of case law over the span of a decade suggests that these sanctions are 
imposed less frequently with time.215         
 Case law addressing youth charged with manslaughter represent four of the thirty-five 
cases. In all but one instance, youth were sentenced under the provisions of the YCJA 
predominately because a youth sentence was sufficient to hold the youth accountable for the 
crime, but also because a youth sentence focuses more so on rehabilitation.216 In the case of R 
v C.M. (2013), where an adult sentence was imposed, case law states the following: 
Counsel agree that the principles that apply in determining this 
matter are the same regardless of the impact of the recent 
amendments to Section 72 of the YCJA by Bill C-10. C.M. is 
presumed to have a diminished moral blameworthiness or 
culpability by reason of his age when this offence was committed. 
A youth sentence must be imposed unless this Court is satisfied 
that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold 
him accountable for his offending behaviour. 
 
Despite this principle, the court concluded that it was satisfied that the presumption that C.M. 
had a diminished moral responsibility for the offending behaviour was refuted by the Crown. 
In other words, the youth’s moral blameworthiness and culpability for the manslaughter was 
215 Case law from 2004 through 2006 appears to indicate a higher rate of IRCS and ISSO sentences when 
compared to case law from 2007 onward.    
216 For cases involving youth convicted of manslaughter under the YCJA, see, for example, R v D.W.C. (2013); R v 
P.C. (2013).  
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not diminished in any measure by reason of his age, and as such, his moral culpability was 
high. 
 Case law findings on youth convicted of first degree murder show an opposite trend 
from that of manslaughter. In contrast to the results above, three of the four cases imposed an 
adult sentence of mandatory life imprisonment on youth, while one youth received a sentence 
under the YCJA due to mitigating factors.217 Similar to findings involving manslaughter, the 
amendments of Bill C-10 have little effect on the way sentences are currently delivered, but 
may have to do with the fact that the specific amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) do not apply to 
cases in which the person was charged before the effective date of the amendment. In R v M.M. 
(2013), for example, the case law notes:  
The issue is whether M.M. should be sentenced according to the 
provisions of the Criminal Code or the provisions of the YCJA. 
The matter is determined according to the considerations set out 
in Section 72 of the YCJA. Section 72 was amended by Bill C-10. 
That amendment came into force last year [...] In any event the 
amendment does not drastically change the considerations. It 
makes clear that the onus is on the Crown to satisfy the court that 
an adult sentence should be imposed. That is not a change in the 
law but a clarification. The new provisions require the Crown to 
show that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness 
or culpability has been rebutted and that a youth sentence 
imposed in accordance with the purpose and principles of 
sentencing would not be sufficient to hold the young person 
accountable for his behaviour. The provisions that were in effect 
when M.M. was charged in this matter also refer to whether a 
youth sentence would be of sufficient length to hold the young 
person accountable. The section sets out a number of 
considerations in making that determination. They are very likely 
to be similar to those a court would consider in deciding whether 
the presumption of moral blameworthiness or culpability has 
been rebutted. 
 
217 For cases involving youth who received an adult sentence for first degree murder, see, for example, R v C.E. 
(2013) and R v T.A.R.S. (2013).  
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Similarly, all other cases involving life imprisonment for youth for first degree murder made 
comparable observations, citing nearly identical legislation for sentencing decisions made in 
each individual case in 2013. 
 Youth convicted of second degree murder in the first half of the year represent a total of 
four cases in case law. From these four cases, two of them received a youth sentence, while the 
other two received the imposition of life imprisonment. In both instances where youth were 
subject to sentences under the YCJA, not only was adequate progress made while in custody 
(pro-social behavioural changes, keeping the peace, showed signs of remorse) but the sentence 
itself was also the least restrictive sanction available. Moreover, the principles of 
accountability and rehabilitation could be properly addressed within the parameters of a youth 
sentence, although credit for time served was granted in one instance, and denied in the 
other.218  
 As an illustrative example of an occurrence where a youth is subject to the imposition 
of an adult sentence for first degree murder, the case of R v D.V.J.S. (2013) is rather interesting 
because the Crowns’ application for the youth to be sentenced as an adult takes place under the 
new statutory provisions of the YCJA (as per Bill C-10 (Part 4). The application for the adult 
sentence was said to be especially warranted since the youth was very violent and had a high 
risk of reoffending. Further, the youth neither expressed meaningful remorse, nor was found to 
have the intent and actions of a youth with diminished moral culpability. As such, the Crown 
claimed,  
The YCJA provisions governing this proceeding changed within 
a week of the guilty plea as part of an omnibus act known as the 
218 For cases of youth sentenced under the YCJA for second degree murder, see R v B.S.A. (2013) and R v M.P. 
(2013).   
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Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1. Section 195 
of that recent legislation makes new wording in YCJA, S.72 
applicable. While the YCJA is intended to operate on the 
presumption that D.V.J.S. is guilty with diminished moral 
blameworthiness or culpability, the prosecution can rebut that 
presumption with evidence satisfying the Court that his moral 
blameworthiness or culpability is undiminished. At the same 
time, the Court must consider the sentencing principles in YCJA, 
S.38 and whether the prosecution has demonstrated, on the 
evidence, that the application of those principles would lead to a 
sentence of insufficient length.  
   
While the case of R. v D.V.J.S. specifically refers to the amendments of Bill C-10, the case of R 
v Skeete (2013) addresses the viability of an adult sentence after the youth was convicted of 
second degree murder in August 2012, but does not refer to the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 
4) because the date of the charge preceded its enactment. It is important to note, however, that 
much of the discussion on the decision-making process for sentencing within each case applies 
the provisions of the YCJA as well as previous case law for similar circumstances, despite the 
amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Notwithstanding the legislative changes, both sentencing 
judges imposed the same sentence even though one case took the amendments into account and 
the other did not. 
 Adult sentences are also imposed on some youth convicted of attempted murder. 
Although case law reveals that few cases address this presumptive offence within the earlier 
part of 2013, these convictions frequently include other offences such as sexual assault. In R v 
Knelsen (2013), for example, the imposition of a term of imprisonment was necessary to 
achieve the sentencing principles of general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and 
rehabilitation for two counts of attempted murder, and one count sexual assault but did not 
include a discussion on the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4). The sentencing principles 
applied were largely considered based on rulings from other decisions involving youth 
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sentenced as adults for similar offences in past years (see R v Knelsen (2013) for further 
details).219  
 Other case law in 2013 demonstrates that a minority of youth are also sentenced as 
adults for offences such as break and enter, sexual assault with a weapon, and robbery with a 
weapon. In the approximate three cases that received an adult sentence, all youth were 
determined as having high moral culpability, were at a very high risk for reoffending (thus 
jeopardizing public safety), and required a secure and structured setting for successful 
rehabilitation. While some youth made progress while on remand, youth sentences were 
principally insufficient at holding youth responsible for their crimes because the Crown refuted 
the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness.220 Only one of these cases was dealt 
with under the new provisions of the YCJA but the end result did not differ from the other two.              
 The issue of lifting the publication ban does appear to be addressed within the case law 
in the first half of 2013. While a number of cases do remove the publication ban for youth 
sentenced as adults, a review of case law does not suggest that there is any substantial 
difference in the way the courts uphold or lift the ban considering the alleged impact of the 
YCJA amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Like previous years, the publication of a youth’s 
identity is permitted if an adult sentence is imposed. However, in terms of the facilitation of 
publishing the names of young offenders convicted of violent offences has neither surfaced nor 
appears to be an issue of contention at this juncture.  
219 For another example of a youth sentenced as an adult for attempted murder and sexual assault, see R v J.K. 
(2013). For an exceptional case where a youth convicted of attempted murder is sentenced under the YCJA, see R 
v J.C. (2013).  
220 See R v B.L. (2013a); R v K.H. (2013); R v Lucassie (2013).    
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 Concerns regarding pre-trial detention as well as the principles of denunciation and 
deterrence also appear to have very little impact in the first half of 2013. Virtually none of the 
cases specifically address the issue of pre-sentence detention to date. On the other hand, some 
cases in 2013 do explicitly attend to the principles of denunciation and deterrence, but 
sentencing practices do not appear to have changed much. In contrast to previous years, youth 
charged with various offences do not seem to be sentenced harsher in 2013. Thus, while 
denunciation and deterrence is considered, it seems to be closely tied to the principle of 
proportionality that effectively ensures a sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence.221 In 
many cases, the offences occurred prior to the enactment of the amendment, and are therefore 
subject to former provisions and their interpretation by the courts since the new amendments 
do not apply retroactively. 222 
 Overall, the case law findings with regards to how tough-on-crime legislation has been 
implemented within the courts provide mixed support for the assertions made by critical 
theorists on the social structural inequalities and various political marginalizations that exist 
within society. While youth in conflict with the law do not appear to be largely impacted either 
negatively or positively by the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), the YCJA itself 
may be seen as more punitive than the YOA in certain ways. In essence, the enactment of the 
YCJA was put forth by the government in an effort to “respond more firmly and effectively to 
the small number of the most serious, violent young offenders”223 in ways the YOA did not (e.g. 
221 See, for example, R v J.G.C. (2013). 
222 For cases that take the principles of denunciation and deterrence into account, see, for example, R v Knelsen 
(2013) and R v Lucassie (2013).  
223 Remarks in Ottawa by the federal Justice Minister at that time, Anne McLellan, in Department of Justice press 
release (12 May 1999), cited in Bala and Anand, 2012, p. 25. See also McLellan, Hansard, Senate Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Hearings on Bill C-7, September 27, 2001. 
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lowering the age limit for presumption of adult sentences and placing greater emphasis on 
accountability (see Bala & Anand, 2012)). This may be an indication of a major transformation 
in political rationale which moves away from the state as victim and places emphasis on the 
public as the symbolic victim, as discussed in Chapter 6. What this suggests then is that the 
constitution of the symbolic victim is one that forges an identity between the symbolic victim 
and the public, whereby the public becomes the symbolic victim, and plays a role in both the 
political organization of public inquiry and mass public support. It may be said that the 
enactment of the YCJA was implemented on the basis of these grounds, and is illustrative of a 
shift in youth crime governance from preceding legislation as well as political motives and 
rationale. This finding provides support for the argument made by Garland (1996, 2001) on the 
ways in which political ideology has shifted over the years. In essence, this new approach to 
penology can be explained as an “adaptive” response to compensate for the failures of the state 
to safeguard the public. Part of the implementation behind Bill C-10 (Part 4) may be explained 
by Garland’s (1996) discussion of “denial as a reaction to the predicament” of youth crime in 
modern capitalist society, whereby more punitive legislation is implemented to reaffirm state 
authority and power (p. 459).          
 Moreover, there was predominant theme in the case law which demonstrated that youth 
in conflict with the law tend to be from socially, economically and politically underprivileged 
groups who are indeed more likely to be burdened and impacted by the consequences 
associated with laws that do not represent their interests. In numerous instances, youth suffer 
from poverty, mental disorders, and substance and alcohol abuse, are products of dysfunctional 
or single-parent families, have absentee parents (particularly fathers), have difficulty attending 
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school, and are associated with gangs or other peers that do not encourage positive, pro-social 
behaviour. These factors were consistently acknowledged by youth court judges.  
 Another common theme found throughout the case law was that many of these youth 
are either Aboriginal or black, and are afflicted by a complexity of issues by virtue of their 
backgrounds, culture, and social conditions within modern capitalism. These findings lend 
support to the findings by Hall et al. (2013) on the intersection between race, class and youth 
crime. Moreover, previous research suggests that minority groups in particular are victims of 
systematic discrimination within the judicial system and sometimes subject to different, at 
times more punitive sanctions than Caucasians (Alvi, 2012; Bala & Anand, 2012; DeKeseredy, 
2011). This suggests there is an undeniable link between capitalism and the modern state 
relative to the nature of youth crime, which not only includes race/ethnicity and class, but also 
education, gang involvement, single-parent families, and socio-economic status. While post-
enactment findings are rare, it may be said that the new law has the potential to magnify 
problems for youth in conflict with the law, especially for those belonging to minority groups. 
Although case law itself cannot always attest to systematic discrimination within the context of 
each case, it certainly acknowledges the relative social conditions for youth. These findings 
tentatively support the critical perspective because of the evidence in the case law. Given that 
there is no evidence in the case law that the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) have 
had any effect on youth to date, it is too early to say with confidence that the key arguments of 
critical theory are fully supported. The findings from the case law also coincide with the data 
from the interviews with youth court judges, which asserted that no known or observable 
changes in sentencing practices had resulted as a corollary of the Bill. This, in part, was due to 
the fact that the legislation is still too new to see any significant changes or effects, and 
316 
 
partially due to the fact so few cases involving serious and violent offenders come before the 
courts.       
7.3 Conclusion 
 Issue 2 examined the ways in which Bill C-10 (Part 4) has been implemented within the 
youth courts. The case law analysis pre-enactment of the Bill indicated that the courts largely 
adhered to the YCJA by placing a great deal of emphasis on fairness, accountability, 
rehabilitation and reintegration of youth in conflict with the law. A number of recurring themes 
were found in the case law pre-enactment of Bill C-10 (Part) which included debates about 
pre-trial detention, concerns regarding lifting the publication ban, matters related to the 
definition of violent offences, and finally issues addressing deterrence and denunciation as 
sentencing principles for youth. The analysis of post-enactment case law did not demonstrate 
sentencing practices that differed from pre-enactment case law (see Research Question #3). As 
such, there was no evidence to suggest that sentencing practices were influenced by the tough-
on-crime legislation; but there was also no evidence to suggest that youth in conflict with the 
law will be unaffected by the tough-on-crime legislation in the future. These findings reveal 
that it may be too soon to determine how youth will be impacted by the legislative amendments, 
and in what ways. Overall, the case law findings provided mixed support for the critical 
theoretical perspective, but lend some support to a shift in political rationale towards one that 
emphasizes the conservative stance (Garland, 1996, 2001). On account of the dynamics of the 
modern capitalist state, this view suggests that those who belong to socially, economically, and 
politically underprivileged groups are at greater risk of being burdened and impacted by 
negative consequences associated with laws that do not represent their interests. This was 
evidenced in the pre-enactment findings, since much of the case law alluded to the various 
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social conditions that underlie the ways in which a youth’s experience may influence or 
produce criminogenic behaviour. However, because the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) are 
still too new, it is difficult to assertively conclude that the tough-on-crime legislation will 
affect the youth of today in ways that extend beyond what is currently known. Thus, the post-
enactment findings show no variances in the way youth are affected by the tough-on-crime 
legislation.    
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CHAPTER 8 – TOUGH-ON-CRIME LEGISLATION AND RESPONSES TO 
YOUTH CRIME IN TEXAS 
 To address the research questions in Issue 3, this chapter examines the tough-on-crime 
legislation in Texas to assess the ways in which it responds to youth crime.224 The analysis of 
case law in Texas not only demonstrates how laws are applied to specific juvenile delinquency 
cases, but also elucidates the ways in which court decisions reflect a tough-on-crime 
philosophy. This requires that consideration be given to case law that appears to be most 
noteworthy, influential or frequently cited in other cases. In turn, this analysis then provides a 
basis for establishing how the tough-on-crime policies and laws in Texas differ from those of 
Canada relative to the current models of crime control in each jurisdiction. Finally, it also 
sheds light on what Canadians can learn from the ways in which a more punitive model 
responds to youth crime, although there is some evidence to suggest that various ideological 
and philosophical shifts are taking place in policy formation in the state of Texas.  
 Drawing on the material discussed in Chapter 4, the examination of policies and laws in 
Texas is important for two reasons. First, it helps contextualize the tough-on-crime legislation 
that developed in Canada on the basis of similar processes and transformative movements 
stemming from an American model. Second, the findings from the case law and policy analysis 
of Texas demonstrates the ways in which their guiding philosophy of youth justice places the 
state further along the tough-on-crime continuum, therefore providing a better understanding of 
where Canada currently sits on this spectrum. This awareness can subsequently assist with 
better informing Canadians on the future development of youth justice policies more generally.   
224 The state of Texas was chosen for analysis given the highly punitive nature of its laws and underlying youth 
justice processes and mechanisms. While Canada appears to be more in line with a rehabilitative approach, Texas 
incorporates a more disciplinary and corrective strategy of crime control. Thus, the guiding principles outlined in 
the YCJA are quite different from those outlined in the Texas Family Code.   
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8.1 Responses to and Management of Youth Crime in Texas 
 Research Question #4 asks how Texas oversees and responds to youth crime relative to 
their tough-on-crime legislation, and how this legislation been implemented within youth 
courts. The ways in which Texas oversees and responds to youth crime predominately revolves 
around the principles of protection, and to a much lesser degree, rehabilitation. Historically, 
Texas has proven to have an extremely disciplinary and punitive justice system in comparison 
to almost all of the other states across America, given their model of severe punishment and 
deterrence for both youth and adults. According to Texas’ Purpose Clause, there is a strong 
emphasis on “community protection, offender accountability, crime reduction through 
deterrence, or punishment”. Furthermore, there is evidence of a more complex, multifarious 
purpose clause outlined in the Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court 
Acts.225 The Legislative Guide declares four functions:  
(a) to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and 
physical development of children; (b) to remove from children 
committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal 
behaviour, and to substitute a program of supervision, care, and 
rehabilitation; (c) to remove a child from the home only when 
necessary for his rehabilitation; and (d) to assure all parties their 
constitutional and other legal rights (Sheridan, 1969). 226  
  
In essence, the guiding philosophy of youth justice emphasizes punishment and deterrence, but 
also considers the welfare of the child and the role of rehabilitation. These findings coincide 
with a progressive movement towards a system that incorporates both a crime control model of 
youth justice and, although to a lesser degree, a child welfare approach. This development can 
be attributed to the economic, social, environmental, cultural and political shifts that have 
225 This is a publication governed by the Children’s Bureau in the late 1960s.  
226 S.51.01 of the Texas Family Code discusses the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code in similar language.  
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taken place over the last 19 years in Texas, and corresponds with the arguments of Caputo & 
Vallée (2007); Garland (2001); Tonry & Doob (2004) regarding such social structural changes 
that have occurred in the United States more generally.      
 As Texas is a decentralized state, services for delinquent youth are managed both by 
the state and counties. Traditionally, the juvenile probation departments administered by the 
local courts are given the task of performing predisposition investigations as well as organizing 
probation services, while the Texas Youth Commission was responsible for the “commitment, 
release, and aftercare of juvenile offenders” (generally restricted to the most serious and 
violent offenders). However, on 01 December 2011, the 82nd Texas Legislature passed a 
motion to abolish both the existing state agencies known as Texas Juvenile Probation 
Commission and the Texas Youth Commission in order to replace it with the Texas Juvenile 
Justice Department (TJJD) (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013a). As a result of this new 
enactment, the TJJD has successfully created a comprehensive “state juvenile justice agency 
that works together with local county governments, the courts, and communities to encourage 
public safety by providing a full spectrum of effective supports and services to youth, from 
initial contact through termination of supervision” pursuant to Senate Bill (SB) 653. In addition, 
it aims to create “a juvenile justice system that produces positive outcomes for youth, families, 
and communities” (see Senate Bill 653 for further information on the purposes and goals of the 
TJJD).227 It has been reported that this legislation focuses on the use of community-based 
alternatives, which is viewed in terms of a compassionate approach that is also more 
227 The development of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department is a result of the reform efforts put forth by the last 
three legislative sessions. This is particularly the case after an abuse scandal arose at the Texas Youth 
Commission facilities in 2007, calling for subsequent investigation. Note that the Texas Youth Commission 
(TYC) and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (TJPC) were both state agencies that addressed juvenile 
crime. The dismantling of these agencies does not interfere with the juvenile justice system at the local level.  
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economically worthwhile in comparison to before (Sanborn, Lew, Hazeltine-Shedd, & 
Kimball, 2013).   
 Juvenile justice proceedings in the state of Texas are subject to the applicable statutes 
and court rules governed by Title III of the Texas Family Code entitled the “Juvenile Justice 
Code”. While the Texas Family Code has been modified in abundance, the most noteworthy 
revisions to Texas’ youth laws and governing policies occurred in 1995. Consequently, a 
number of adjustments were made to the youth justice system, many of which explicitly 
address “violent and habitual” (repeat) youth offenders. 228 The legislation that emerged in 
January 1996 has typically been characterized as a “get tough, balanced approach that reflects 
the public’s general attitude of punishing youth in a meaningful way without abandoning 
rehabilitation as a primary goal for youth” (Texas Family Code S.51.03).229 This suggests that 
this legislation was established on similar grounds to those in Canada, given that it accounts for 
the public’s opinion and broad desire to strengthen youth justice laws on the basis that 
“nothing works”. Thus, it can be argued that public consent was used as a means of 
establishing and maintaining legitimacy in a comparable fashion, and was the vehicle through 
which the enactment of such legislation materialized. These findings support the works of Hall 
et al. (2013) and Habermas (1975, 1985), and illustrate the ways in which the legislation itself 
228 See Texas Family Code S.51.031. 
229 The specific provisions outlined by the tough-on-crime approach encompass a number of conditions discussed 
in Chapter 4. These include the “promotion of the concept of punishment for criminal acts; the lowering of the 
certification age from 15 to 14 years of age for capital and first degree felonies, and the addition of ‘once an adult, 
always an adult’; the expansion of determinate sentencing by adding about 25 more offences to the original 5 
serious offences (including some 2nd and 3rd degree felonies, some felony drug offenses, and habitual felony 
conduct); the increase of the range of possible sentences to a maximum of 40 years for first degree felonies, while 
minimum confinement periods for capital murder is 10 years; and the authorization of prosecutors to request the 
juvenile court to transfer a sentenced youth after age 16 to adult prison to complete their sentence, and all 
sentenced youth are required to complete their sentences after the age 19 on adult parole”. Refer to the Texas 
Family Code for more information.   
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took on a more law-and-order approach to reflect the systematically normalized dominant 
ideology in Texas. In addition, it lends support to the view that a new style of governance and 
thus new-fangled “adaptive” crime control strategies were established on account of the 
decline in the penal-welfare system (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996, 2001; O’Malley, 
1999; Wacquant, 2009).   
 Youth proceedings in the state of Texas are delinquent proceedings as opposed to 
criminal, unless transferred to adult jurisdiction.230 The youth Court in Texas has authority 
over all proceedings involving youth between the ages of 10-17. Presently, youth may come 
into contact with the justice system in three ways: as “non-offenders” 231 (those who have 
entered the justice system “through the independent actions of third parties, such as parents or 
guardians”, and most frequently comprise abused or neglected youth); “status offenders”232 
(non-criminal misbehaviours considered unacceptable solely due to age); and “juvenile 
delinquent offenders”233 (youth who have “committed some criminal act that would result in 
criminal prosecution if committed by an adult)”. In other words, delinquent offenders engage 
in a type of conduct that is in violation of a penal law in the state of Texas or of the United 
States punishable by a number of potential sentences, including a lengthy determinate sentence.  
8.1.1 Intake and Places of Detention for Alleged Juvenile Delinquents 
 Texas Family Code S.52.01(A) dictates that youth enter the juvenile justice system 
when a juvenile is found violating a penal law of the state, or there is reason to believe a youth 
has taken part in “delinquent conduct” or conduct signifying the “need for supervision” 
230 See Texas Family Code S.51.04. 
231 See Texas Family Code S.51.02(8). 
232 See Texas Family Code S.51.03(b)(2); S.51.03(b)(3); S.51.03(b)(1); S.51.08(b); S.51.03(b)(5); Penal Code 
S.8.07(a)(4) and (5); Texas Education Code S.25.094.  
233 See Texas Family Code S.51.03.  
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(CINS).234 Once apprehended, youth are processed at a juvenile processing office with few 
delays.235 The laws in Texas allow the courts to detain a youth while awaiting a decision 
regarding how and in what way to proceed beyond the intake stage. Apprehended youth may 
be warned and released or referred to a diversion program; however like Canada, these options 
are generally available to youth in cases where minor violations or infractions have transpired. 
Alternatively, youth may be brought before an elected representative of the juvenile board.236  
 In more severe circumstances where a youth is referred to Juvenile Court instead of 
being released, youth may be detained in a juvenile detention facility constructed by the 
juvenile board of the county237, in a secure adult detention facility, or in a medical facility if 
the youth suffers from physical or mental illness requiring immediate treatment.238 Almost 
every county in Texas uses “secure pre-adjudication detention which is administered by county 
juvenile probation departments acting under the authority of the juvenile board or a private 
234 Delinquent conduct involves fairly serious violations of the law. This includes “commission of any felony 
offence or jailable misdemeanour; violation of a lawful court order under circumstances that would constitute 
contempt of a justice or municipal court; commission of driving or boating while intoxicated, intoxication assault 
or intoxication manslaughter; or a third (or subsequent) offence of driving under the influence of alcohol” (See 
S.51.03(a) of the Texas Family Code). In very serious felony cases, “the juvenile court may have the options of 
determinate sentencing or discretionary transfer to adult criminal court” (S.53.045 and S.54.02 of the Texas 
Family Code). Conduct indicating a need for supervision, on the other hand, “is conduct other than traffic 
offences that involve fine-only offences”. These include “public intoxication, truancy, running away, inhalant 
abuse, expulsion from school or violation of a ‘child at-risk’ court order” (Texas Family Code S.51.03(b)). They 
are commonly referred to as status offences.   
235 The formation of “processing stations” was administered by the legislature after the case of Comer v. State 
(1989).  
236 A county’s juvenile board designates districts which may include both criminal and juvenile courts, and each 
county is responsible for creating its own intake system. 
237 Aside from being held in detention pre-adjudication, youth may also be held “pre-disposition and while 
awaiting placement or commitment, or transport to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department” (National Center for 
Juvenile Justice, 2012). It is not permitted for youth to be “sentenced to secure detention or severe sanctions for 
probation violations in detention. However, juveniles may be held in detention pending adjudication for probation 
violations” (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2012). 
238 Texas Family Code S.51.12(f) states that “all juvenile detention facilities must keep youth separated by sight 
and sound from adults detained in the same building. Juveniles and adults are separated by sight and sound only if 
they are unable to see and talk to one another. This separation must extend to all areas of the facility and should be 
accomplished through architectural design”. See also Texas Family Code S.52.02(a)(1)-(5).  
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vendor acting under contract with the county’s juvenile board” (National Center for Juvenile 
Justice, 2012). Currently, there are over 50 secure pre-adjudication facilities that are recorded 
under the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2012). 
  During a youth’s detainment, a preliminary investigation establishes a) if the individual 
who is being referred to the court falls within the definition of a “child” under the Texas 
Family Code; and b) if there is enough reason to believe that the youth was actually involved 
in delinquent conduct. Generally speaking, youth must be released unless,  
The child is likely to escape or be removed from the jurisdiction 
of the court; suitable supervision, care, or protection for the child 
is not being provided by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
person; the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
person able to return the child to the court when required; the 
child may be dangerous to himself or herself or the child may 
threaten the safety of the public if released; the child has 
previously been found to be a delinquent child or has previously 
been convicted of a penal offence punishable by a term in jail or 
prison and is likely to commit an offence if released; and the 
youth’s detention is required by law (S.53.02 of the Texas 
Family Code).  
 
Juveniles alleged to have “used, possessed, or exhibited a firearm while engaging in delinquent 
conduct” are legally prohibited from being released under S.53.02(f) of the Texas Family Code. 
Interestingly, the Juvenile Justice Code does not address whether a youth has access to bail. 
The Court of Appeals note that youth in Texas do not have an absolute constitutional right to 
bail under the doctrine of parens patriae, and as such, reject any arguments that claim the right 
to bail in Texas is breached when a youth is locked up and bond is denied.239     
239 See Ex parte D.W.C. (1999). A discussion on the informal responses to youth crime in the state of Texas (i.e., 
dispositions without referral to juvenile court) can be found in Appendix E.  
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8.1.2 Delinquency Adjudications 
 Youth ineligible for informal dispositions (similar to extrajudicial measures in Canada) 
or deferred prosecution (similar to extrajudicial sanctions in Canada) are faced with procedural 
circumstances involving prosecution after a preliminary investigation has been conducted.240 
Once the investigation proves that the youth is a “child” and that there are enough grounds to 
believe the youth engaged in delinquent conduct, the filing of a petition is authorized.241 
Petitions of this nature may charge a youth with either one of the two types of unlawful 
behaviour: “delinquent conduct”, or “conduct indicating a need for supervision”.242  
 Within the realm of delinquency proceedings, adjudication hearings and disposition 
hearings are held separately.243 Adjudication hearings in the juvenile court are comparable to 
criminal trials in the district court. As such, all adjudication hearings are held in front of a jury 
unless the youth “waives that right”.244 In addition, “these hearings are open to the public”, 
except when the “court determines there is good cause to exclude the public”.245 Youth who 
are younger than 14 years of age at the time of the hearing are not entitled to open hearings 
“unless the court finds that the interests of the youth or the public would be better served by 
opening the hearing to the public”.246   
240 For a discussion on deferred prosecution (i.e., an alternative to formal adjudication), please refer to Appendix 
F. 
241 See Texas Family Code S.53.01(a); S.51.012; and S.53.04. 
242 According to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (2013c), approximately a third of the youth who are 
referred to youth court are “formally charged with and prosecuted for an offence”.   
243 See Texas Family Code S.54.03. 
244 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) for more information regarding trial by jury. See also In re R.R. (2012) 
wherein the right to a jury trial provided in the Texas Constitution only applies to adults, and it is S.54.03 of the 
Texas Family Code that creates a statutory right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Thus, the right to a jury in a 
juvenile case is not a constitutional right. For additional cases refer to Cain v. State (1997); Green v. State. (2001); 
Hall v. State (1992); In re C.O.S.(1999); Johnson v. State (2002); and Texas Constitution..      
245 See Texas Family Code S.54.08(a) and S.54.08(c). 
246 See Texas Family Code S.54.08(a) and S.54.08(c).   
326 
 
                                            
 Adjudication hearings must determine whether or not the youth is guilty of committing 
the offence. Youth found not guilty of the alleged crime results in a dismissal of the petition. 
The “Rules of Evidence” that apply to “adult criminal cases” and “Chapter 38 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (dealing with evidence in criminal actions)” are germane to the ways in 
which the youth court operates.247 Should the state be capable of proving “beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the youth has engaged in the alleged conduct”, the court is obligated to proceed with 
a dispositional hearing.248 Case law indicated that youth may be adjudicated delinquent under a 
number of different circumstances, amongst which a felony offence or a violation of probation 
for a felony offence has occurred; a third misdemeanor offence or a violation of probation on 
the second misdemeanor adjudication has taken place; and the youth has been adjudicated for a 
misdemeanor offence and has previously been adjudicated for any felony offence. 
Adjudication or disposition orders in the youth court are not considered criminal convictions. 
Thus, they do not “impose any of the civil disabilities that an adult criminal conviction would 
impose” (Texas Attorney General, 2012).249 However, a judgement resulting in a guilty verdict 
for a felony offence that carries with it a commitment to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department 
is a “final felony conviction for purposes of enhancement in adult criminal court” (Texas 
Attorney General, 2012). 250 That is, prior juvenile adjudications are believed to constitute 
247 See Texas Family Code S.54.03(d).  
248 See In re F.D.M. (2012), wherein the evidence was considered sufficient to support the jury’s finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the offence of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See also 
Bearnth v. State (2011); Brooks v. State (2010); Clayton v. State (2007); Ervin v. State (2010); In re C.J. (2009); 
In re G.A.T. (2000); Laster v. State (2009).  
249 “Civil disabilities” refers to “a condition of a person who has had a legal right or privilege revoked as a result 
of a criminal conviction” (Texas Attorney General, 2012).  
250 This statement refers only to felony offences committed after January 01, 1996. Refer to S.51.13(d) of the 
Texas Family Code and S.12.42 of the Penal Code for further information. See Chappel v. State (2011) where a 
violation of a penal law is “a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail, such evidence of adjudication is 
admissible if the conduct upon which the adjudication is based occurred on or after January 1, 1996”. See also 
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felonies for subsequent conduct, thus resulting in an enhancement from a misdemeanour to a 
felony.251      
8.1.3 Dispositions  
 A disposition in the state of Texas incorporates both tough-on-crime legislation and 
rehabilitation of a young offender. Its main objective is to “protect the public” and stress the 
importance of deterrence while simultaneously “provide training, treatment and rehabilitation 
that emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both the juvenile and the juvenile’s 
parents for the juvenile’s conduct”. 252 This is an illustration of Feeley and Simon (1992), 
Garland (1996) and O’Malley’s (1999) argument regarding contradictory sentencing principles 
and rationalities (i.e., “variable detention depending upon risk assessment”, discipline, 
punishment (including deterrence), incapacitation, and reintegration), particularly with regards 
to the ways in which the neo-conservative and neo-liberal views coalesce and create 
incoherencies in logic with regards to their “adaptive” responses (or “postmodern nostalgia” as 
Feeley and Simon (1992) describe it). This, as Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996), and 
O’Malley (1999) suggest, is a by-product of the limitations of the sovereign state, a modern 
approach to political rationality, and most importantly, the development of a progressively 
dynamic yet unstable archetype of government.  
 Disposition hearings are not entitled to a jury, except in cases that involve determinate 
sentencing (see Section 8.1.4 entitled Determinate Sentencing of Violent and Habitual 
Offenders). Offences involving a CINS violation typically warrant a disposition for an initial 
Casel v. State (2012) wherein a plea of true (guilty) to the court’s question about being finally convicted of 
aggravated assault (i.e., a prior juvenile adjudication) is sufficient to prove conviction for enhancement purposes. 
For further cases see Beal v. State (2002); Ex parte Rich (2006); Menson v. State (2011); and Miles v. State 
(2011).    
251 See In the Matter of J.G. (2005). 
252 See Texas Family Code S.51.01. 
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period of one year that involves varying levels of probation, even though the behaviour is not 
contrary to the Penal Code. Case law illustrated that the conditions of probation are based on 
“such reasonable and lawful terms as the court may determine”, including “probation at home 
or with relatives”,253 “a suitable foster home, a suitable public or private residential treatment 
institution or agency (non-secure correctional facility)”, or a “suitable public or private post-
adjudication secure correctional facility”.254 The findings also indicated that probation may 
come with various conditions including school attendance, monetary conditions whereby the 
youth is required to make restitution of loss to the victim of the offence, mandatory community 
service, and parental community service. Conduct in need of supervision offenders cannot be 
committed to the Texas Department of Juvenile Justice “for engaging in conduct that would 
not be considered a crime if committed by an adult”.255  
 Dispositions regarding youth who were involved in delinquent conduct, on the other 
hand, may order that the youth be placed on progressive sanctions (usually probation) or be 
sent to the Texas Department of Juvenile Justice for an indeterminate sentence.256 Typically, 
this disposition involves some form of mandatory participation in a community-based program 
but vary from county to county since counties must have a population of at least 335,000 to 
qualify for such programs. This essentially allows the TJJD to release the youth at any time 
253 See In re T.N.T. (2011), where the juvenile was issued a dispositional order of probation wherein the youth was 
placed on six months intensive probation in the custody of her father and was ordered to undergo counselling and 
participate in drug treatment.  
254 See S.54.04(d) of the Texas Family Code for more information. Youth are only “removed from the family 
home if the juvenile cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that is needed to 
successfully complete probation” (S.54.04(c)). See In re H.V. (2012), where the court used its discretion to 
commit the youth to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department where neither of the juvenile’s parents’ homes could 
“provide the quality of care and level of support and supervision necessary to meet the conditions of probation”. 
See also In re D.P.H. (2012).  
255 See S.54.04(o) of the Texas Family Code.  
256 See S.54.04 of the Texas Family Code. 
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prior to their 19th birthday.257 The conditions of probation may include “restitution, intensive 
supervision or electronic monitoring programs; however community service is a mandatory 
condition of probation subject only to limited exceptions”.258 
 The terms of probation are typically based on the Progressive Sanctions Model found in 
Chapter 59 of the Family Code. The purpose behind this model, albeit only a guideline, is to 
ensure that young offenders receive standardized and homogenized sanctions and penalties, in 
conjunction with balancing the public’s safety and rehabilitation while holding the youth 
accountable. Essentially, this model creates equilibrium between rehabilitation and the tough-
on-crime legislation. It also permits flexibility when harmonizing decisions pertaining to the 
youth and their circumstances at the time of the offence. As such, the Progressive Sanctions 
Model is comprised of multiple “sanction levels” which includes a simple supervisory caution 
to avoid potential CINS or delinquent conduct in the future, deferred prosecution, court-
ordered probation, intensive services probation, placement in a secure correctional facility, 
indeterminate commitment to TJJD, determinate sentencing,259 and discretionary certification 
to adult court (S.59.004-59.010). Any of these sanctions may be used in response to youth 
crime. 
257 A “juvenile court sentence may extend past an offender’s 18th birthday”, however, if “the jury has previously 
approved a petition for determinate sentencing” (S.53.045). These sentences are “not to be more than 40 years if 
the conduct constitutes a capital felony, a felony of the first degree, or an aggravated controlled substance felony; 
not more than 20 years if the conduct constitutes a felony of the second degree; and not more than 10 years if the 
conduct constitutes a felony of the third degree” (S.53.045). 
258 See Texas Family Code S.54.044(a).  
259 If a youth is “placed on probation in a determinate sentencing case and transfers supervision on the youth’s 18th 
birthday to an adult district court for placement on community supervision, the district court must require the 
payment of any unpaid restitution as a condition of the community supervision. This extends the youth’s (but not 
the parent’s) responsibility to make restitution after the case is transferred to district court for community 
supervision” (see S.54.041(h) of the Texas Family Code). Pursuant to S.42.12 of the Texas Family Code and 2(2) 
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, a community service is defined as “the placement of a defendant by a court 
under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court for a specified period.” In 
other words, community supervision is the equivalent of adult probation. See Texas Family Code S.59.004 
through S.59.010 for more information.   
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8.1.4 Determinate Sentencing of Violent or Habitual Offenders 
 Texas has implemented a determinate sentencing statute “that allows for significantly 
longer sentences than are permitted under delinquency laws”.260 Determinate sentences permit 
youth to remain within the juvenile jurisdiction for reasons which include trial and detention, 
but also provide a youth court judge with a means for ordering a fairly lengthy punishment on 
a serious young offender that may inevitably result in a transfer to an adult facility. In Texas, 
there are two distinct types of determinate sentences as indicated by the case law: determinate 
sentences with a placement in the Texas Juvenile Justice Department; and “determinate 
sentence probation”.261  
 Determinate sentencing petitions must be filed in the juvenile court when charges 
against the youth are filed. Approval of the petition is required to be given by a grand jury,262 
as per Chapter 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedures and S.53.045(b) of the Texas Family 
Code. Approved petitions for determinate sentencing may be compared to a grand jury 
indictment in the adult jurisdiction. Thus, if a petition is approved by a grand jury, it 
automatically “certifies the fact of its approval to the juvenile court” under S.53.045(d) of the 
Texas Family Code.263   
 According to Texas Family Code S.54.04(q) and the reviewed case law, youth in the 
determinate sentence probation “may extend beyond the time that they reach adulthood”. At 
the outset, youth are confined at the county level under the management of a local juvenile 
260 See Texas Family Code S.54.04(d)(3).  
261 For more information on determinate sentence probation see In re J.A.B. (2010).  
262 A grand jury consists of 12 community members or residents which are selected in order to investigate the 
allegations of a crime and determine whether the facts of the case lead to an indictment. See In re B.R.H. (2012) 
wherein an amended petition was approved by the grand jury for determinate sentencing after the youth’s 18th 
birthday. 
263 The decision to “refer a petition to the grand jury is at the state's option. If the State never refers the petition, 
the trial court has no jurisdiction to order determinate sentencing”. See Bleys v. State (2010).  
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probation department, which can consider the option of placing the youth in the county’s post-
adjudication facility. 264 Upon such time as the youth turns 18 and is no longer under the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction, probation automatically expires unless a youth is transferred to the 
supervision of the adult jurisdiction. If transferred to the adult criminal court, case law 
indicated that the county’s adult probation department is typically charged with the 
responsibility of supervising “a youth for the remainder of the term of probation”.265  
 According to the case law, youth who are ordered to a determinate sentence with a 
placement in the TJJD are committed to the institution with the possibility of a transfer to the 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 266  Generally a youth judge orders a sentence that 
consists of a specified amount of time which has the ability of extending well beyond 
adulthood, but is automatically transferred to TDCJ at age 21. Pursuant to S.54.04(d)(3)(A-C) 
of the Texas Family Code, the upper limit of a determinate sentence is “40 years for a capital 
felony, 1st degree felony, or an aggravated controlled substance felony; 20 years for a 2nd 
degree felony, and 10 years for a 3rd degree felony”. The sentence starts off in the TJJD where 
264 See In re S.D.M.S. (2010), wherein The Court of Appeals held that the evidence showed that respondent was 
discharged from his placement prior to the completion of the program; therefore, the youth violated the term and 
condition of probation which required the juvenile to complete the program. After a hearing on the motion, the 
trial court modified its previous disposition and ordered that S.D.M.S. be committed to the Texas Youth 
Commission.   
265 See Texas Family Code S.54.051. See also In re T.D.S. (2011), wherein an order “transferring a juvenile’s 
determinate sentence probation to an adult district court is not an appealable order”. See also In re B.L.C. (2010); 
In re C.M.W. (2005); In re J.H. (2005); and In the Matter of W.E.H. (2011).  
266 The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ, 2013b) “manages offenders in state prisons, state jails and 
private correctional facilities that contract with TDCJ”. See In re A.M.C (2011) where the court had sufficient 
evidence showing a continuing and increasingly severe pattern of delinquent conduct, therefore resulting in the 
court’s discretion to determine that Texas Youth Commission (now TJJD) was the best place for the youth and 
was not required to first exhaust the alternatives of probation and outside placement. See also In re J.A.H. (2000); 
In re N.S. (2008); In re J.A. (2010); In re J.P. (2004); In re J.R.C. (2007); In re K.T. (2003); In re T.K.E. (1999); 
and In re T.R. (2011). In addition, see In re K.Y. (2012), wherein the trial court “did not abuse its discretion” in 
ordering the juvenile transferred to the state Department of Criminal Justice for completion of the juvenile’s 
murder sentence. For more information on cases involving discretion in determinate sentence transfer hearings, 
see In re D.T. (2007); and In re R.G. (1999).   
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the youth is eligible to participate in a vast range of available programming, such as 
rehabilitative programs and educational activities. The goal is to present youth with an 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in their rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system 
prior to their release on parole.267 Simultaneously, youth would be held accountable for their 
crime. Juveniles who do not complete the minimum length of stay by 19 years of age, or who 
do poorly in the programs may be subject to a transfer to an adult prison. In cases of capital 
murder where the minimum length of stay is extremely long, it is at the discretion of the TJJD 
to petition a juvenile court for early parole. Unless the TJJD routinely presents these cases for 
consideration by the juvenile court before the youth’s 19th birthday, there is little hope of 
release and not being transferred to adult prison. As a result, there is virtually no incentive to 
take advantage of TJJD’s rehabilitative programs. This illustrates just how punitive the crime 
control model for youth justice in Texas is, given that the system itself is designed in such a 
way that does not promote the well-being of the youth and does not emphasize or prioritize the 
importance of rehabilitation, despite their purpose clause.   
 Texas Family Code S.53.045(a) and case law identified approximately 30 offences in 
the Penal Code that are eligible for determinate sentencing, which encompass each and every 
267 The statute simply provides that the specified number of years must be “served” to enable TJJD parole without 
court approval (a petition). This is unlike the custody and supervisions orders in Canada where 2/3 of the sentence 
is served in custody while the remaining 1/3 is served under supervision in the community because it is 
determined on a case by case basis. In the Canadian context, the underlying premise of this sentence represents a 
shift in penal logic, particularly from a rehabilitative model to an opportunities model (Ekstedt & Griffiths, 1988). 
An opportunities model is said to transfer responsibility onto offenders to plan and manage their own self-
improvement, whereby the correctional system merely supplies the opportunities and programs through which the 
youth is able to achieve such betterment. This model represents a departure from the traditional 
rehabilitation/penal welfare model, where corrections bears the responsibility and accountability through 
recidivism measures in order to transform the conduct of offenders thorough the identification of needs and the 
implementation of rigorous programs of individualized normalization (i.e., discipline). The opportunities model 
suggests that one’s offending behaviour is relative to personality as opposed to any socio-economic factors. This 
shift was also noted in Canada in the post 1970s “nothing works” era, and represents a neo-liberalized strategy. 
Today, elements of the opportunity model surface in risk-management techniques.      
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one of the most violent crimes and habitual felony conduct.268 The group of offences qualified 
for determinate sentencing is significantly narrower than the category of offences enabling the 
certification of a youth as an adult. Any youth ranging from ages 10 to 17 may be charged with 
a determinate sentence, although the “maximum age can be extended to 18 years of age under 
certain circumstances”.269 It should be noted that whether youth are certified as an adult or are 
ordered to serve a determinate sentence, the case law indicated a similarity in ethnicity 
between the two categories. That is, there is a disproportionate amount of African-Americans 
and Latinos in both populations. This finding coincides with previous research which states 
that the degree of disproportionality between youth who receive determinate sentences and 
certified youth is approximately 40% in both cases (Deitch, 2011). Overall, this finding lends 
support to the views of new penological techniques that aim to respond to the growing concern 
of the “underclass” in America, since the term “is used to refer to a largely black and Hispanic 
population living in concentrated zones of poverty in central cities [...]” (Feeley & Simon, 
1992, p. 467)  
268 Habitual felony conduct “involves a felony, other than a state jail felony, committed by a juvenile who has at 
least two previous felony adjudications. The second previous adjudication must be for conduct that occurred after 
the date the first previous adjudication became final” (see S.51.031 of the Texas Family Code). An adjudication 
“is final if the juvenile is placed on probation or is committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department”. See 
Vaughns v. State (2011), wherein the “Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the punishment for a habitual 
offender, enhanced by two juvenile felony adjudications, because the Texas Legislature did not intend for juvenile 
adjudications to be final felony convictions in order to enhance a sentence for a habitual offender”. For more 
information, see Kessler and Levitt (1999) on the use of sentence enhancements.   
269 See S.51.02(2) of the Texas Family Code. These offences include “murder; capital murder; manslaughter; 
aggravated kidnapping; sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault; aggravated assault; aggravated robbery; injury 
to a child, elderly or disabled individual (if the offence is punishable as a felony, other than a state jail felony); 
felony deadly conduct (by discharging firearm); first degree or aggravated controlled substances felony; criminal 
solicitation; indecency with a child; criminal solicitation of a minor; criminal attempt (if the offence attempted 
was murder, capital murder, or an offence listed under S.3g(a)(1), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure); 
Arson (if bodily injury or death occurs); or intoxication manslaughter”. See Penal Code S.19.02; S.19.03; 
S.19.04; S.20.04; S.22.001; S.22.021; S.22.02; S.29.03; S.22.04; S.22.05(b); Chapter 481 of the Health and Safety 
Code; Penal Code S.15.03; S.22.11(a)(1); S.15.031; S.15.01; S.28.02; S.49.08, respectively. 
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8.1.5 Discretionary Transfer to Adult Criminal Court 
 According to S.54.02 of the Texas Family Code, the “juvenile court may waive its 
exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a youth to the appropriate district court or criminal 
district court for criminal proceedings via certification.” Case law showed that the age of the 
youth at the time of the offence has a bearing on whether or not a court will waive its authority 
over the youth in order to transfer the case to the adult jurisdiction. The findings suggested that 
the court’s jurisdiction may be waived under the following circumstances: First, “if the 
juvenile is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony”; second, if the youth 
was a) “14 years of age or older at the time alleged to have committed the offence (if the 
offence is a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first 
degree, and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offence)”;270 or b) “15 
years of age or older at the time the juvenile is alleged to have committed the offence (if the 
offence is a felony of the second or third degree or a state jail felony, and no adjudication 
hearing has been conducted concerning that offence)”;271 and third, “after a full investigation 
and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the 
youth before the court committed the offence alleged and that because of the seriousness of the 
offence alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal 
proceedings”.272 
 Similarly, the same statute allows a youth 18 years of age and older to be certified as an 
adult and thus transferred to adult criminal court for offences committed while under the age of 
270 See S.54.02(a)(2)(A) of the Texas Family Code.  
271 See S.54.02(a)(2)(B) of the Texas Family Code. 
272 See S.54.02(a)(3) of the Texas Family Code. See also Grant v. State (2010), where the court held that “in 
discretionary transfer proceedings, probable cause was established of the juvenile as a party, by acting with the 
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offence of murder”.  
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18. Youth, for example, who allegedly “committed murder or capital murder as a juvenile 
between the ages of 10 and 17”, and youth who allegedly “committed an eligible felony 
offence between the ages of 14 and 17 may be transferred to adult criminal court under” 
S.54.02(j)(2) of the Texas Family Code. According to the case law, this certification typically 
occurs in instances where, for reasons that fell outside of the state’s control, it was not feasible 
to pursue any proceedings before the youth’s 18th birthday. In some cases, proceeding in adult 
court prior to a youth’s 18th birthday may not have been possible (even under circumstances in 
which “due diligence” was carried out by the state), because the state “could not establish 
probable cause to proceed and new evidence was found since the juvenile’s 18th birthday” (S. 
54.02(j)-(l)).  
 Determining whether a youth may be waived to the criminal court is based on a number 
of considerations in the case law. While it should be noted that courts vary to a great degree in 
the extent to which these factors are applied (as they are relative to each county in Texas), the 
general criteria employed to establish whether a case should be waived is taken into account at 
the hearing. These factors include “whether the alleged offence was against person or property, 
with greater weight in favour of transfer given to offenses against the person; the sophistication 
and maturity of the youth; the record and previous history of the juvenile; and the prospects of 
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of 
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court”.273 As with the 
provisions set forth in several other states, there are exclusions to decisions that pertain to 
discretionary transfer in the state of Texas. Texas Family Code S.54.02(m)(1) stipulates that 
273 For cases involving the use of discretionary transfers, see Adams v. State (2005); Fajardo v. State (2007); 
Macias v. State (2007); Melendez v. State (1999); Sanchez v. State (2004).    
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any youth previously “certified as an adult must subsequently be tried as an adult for any 
felony” offence, regardless of age. If, however, the previous case was dismissed or was not 
found guilty, this mandatory legislation does not apply. This statutory provision is an exemplar 
of the tough-on-crime approach.     
 Once transferred to the adult jurisdiction, the youth is to be treated as an adult as per the 
provisions outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure.274 Youth certified as adults who are 
confined pre-trial are held in adult county jails. 275  These findings, however, are in 
contravention to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. Once found guilty and 
sentenced, youth are housed in adult prisons as per the rules outlined in the Texas Family Code 
S.54.02(h). Currently, provisions do not exist under Texas law that allow certified youth to 
carry out the terms of their sentence in a facility for juveniles either prior to trial or post-
conviction. However, it should be noted that the certification of youth as adults in Texas is not 
a frequently cited in the case law, given that it typically involves only the most serious types of 
felony offences. Nonetheless, the transferring of youth to the adult jurisdiction implies that the 
youth is to be held by the same standards as an adult and undermines any assumption of 
diminished blameworthiness on account of the youth’s mental capacity.    
 Not surprisingly, the findings from the case law indicated that there are reported 
problems with sentences following discretionary transfers. Any youth in the state of Texas 
tried and convicted as an adult following a discretionary transfer is to be sentenced as an adult. 
274 While juveniles are exempt from mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole, “a mandatory life 
sentence without the option of parole for a juvenile who commits capital murder before September 1, 2009, is 
constitutional”. The legislature in Texas chose not to “apply the parole eligibility amendment retroactively to 
juveniles who have been certified to adult court and sentenced for a capital murder” (Forcey v. State (2010)). 
Thus, it would not be appropriate for the Court of Appeals in Texas to judicially amend the statute. 
275 See Texas Family Code 51.12(h)(1).  
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Pursuing adult sentences for youth is challenging given that some punishments may violate the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the case of Diamond v. State, (2012) 
for example, the youth court waived its jurisdiction to adult court for trial. Diamond was 
initially found guilty of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; however the court deferred 
proceedings and placed the juvenile on community supervision for five years.  At a later date, 
the court found Diamond guilty of committing aggravated robbery at the age of 15, deferred 
further proceedings, and placed Diamond on community supervision for ten years with a 
$1,000 fine. Subsequently, the state revoked Diamond’s unadjudicated community supervision 
in both cases. 
 The hearing on the motion to revoke the community supervision also revealed that 
Diamond was guilty of four violations of the terms of his community supervision, in addition 
to the first two offences. As a result, the trial court assessed Diamond’s punishment at 99 years’ 
confinement for the violation of the conditions pertaining to community supervision and the 
aggravated robbery. Moreover, the trial court assessed Diamond’s punishment at 2 years’ 
confinement for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, to run consecutive to the sentence for 
the aggravated robbery charge. At this juncture, Diamond was 17 years of age.  
 Diamond appealed the imposition of the state jail sentence on a number of procedural 
grounds. In particular, he argued that his sentence for aggravated robbery is “disproportionate 
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedures” (Diamond v. 
State, 2012).276 The Court of Appeals, however, did not agree. Typically, a sentence that is 
276 Article 1.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to “Cruelty Forbidden”. It states “Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.” See Johnson v. State 
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“within the range of punishment established by the legislature” is not to be amended on 
appeal.277 According to the case law, most appellate courts do not reconsider a punishment for 
an offence within the statutory range for excessive, unconstitutionally cruel, or unusual under 
either Texas law or the United States Constitution.278 Given that aggravated robbery is a first-
degree felony which carried a punishment range of confinement from five to ninety-nine years 
under S.12.32 of the Texas Penal Code, Diamond’s sentence of ninety-nine years is within the 
statutory range authorized by the legislature for the crime of aggravated robbery. Diamond also 
failed to prove his sentence as grossly disproportionate to the offence he committed, since 
there was no evidence in the case law by which reasonable comparisons could be made.  
 Overall, court rulings and decisions in Texas are reflective of a crime control model 
that subscribes to a tough-on-crime philosophy. This is not only evidenced in the legislation 
itself, but in the ways the law is subsequently applied to juvenile delinquency cases. Although 
there is evidence to suggest that Texas courts uphold provisions that support rehabilitation, the 
case law findings indicated that there is more of an emphasis on punishment as opposed to 
rehabilitation. The most noticeable application of the tough-on-crime legislation is witnessed 
through the transferring of youth to the adult criminal justice jurisdiction, although both 
statistics and the case law indicate this occurs relatively infrequently. The more punitive nature 
of the tough-on-crime legislation in Texas not only facilitates the waiving of jurisdiction over 
youth, but in many ways encourages these transfers because of their objective to deter youth by 
(2002) for further information on claims regarding Article 1.09, with reference to its authority establishing that 
cruel and unusual provisions of the state statute are broader and offer greater protection than the Eight 
Amendment. See also Graham v. Florida (2010) whereby the United States Supreme Court held it 
unconstitutional to “sentence a juvenile in a non-homicide case to a sentence that could not be discharged in his 
lifetime”. Additionally, refer to Roper v. Simmons (2005), where it is “established that because youth have 
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments”.  
277 See Jackson v. State (1984).  
278 See Jackson v. State (1999) and Kirk v. State (1997).  
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punishment. Even in cases where youth are not transferred, the provisions of determinate 
sentencing are punitive enough that it allows judges to impose longer sentences within the 
juvenile justice system. In turn, these findings illustrate that although rehabilitation is 
considered as a sentencing principle, it is not often lucrative or worthwhile for youth to take 
advantage of such treatment given the lengthy nature of their sentence. Essentially, the 
possibility of being transferred to the adult prison system has the ability of limiting any 
motivation to participate in the rehabilitative process.   
 In conjunction with these findings, there are profuse amounts of case law that illustrate 
some of the misfortunes or calamities faced by youth. These factors encompass such things as 
substance and alcohol addictions, mental disorders such as fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, and 
emotional and behavioural illnesses. Despite the varying offences for which a youth enters into 
system and is sentenced, the case law indicated that an abundance of youth are victims of 
numerous economic perils, come from single parent families, are neglected, have little 
education, and are frequently made up of minority groups. Similar to case law findings in 
Canada, not all case law in Texas specified the youth’s race/ethnicity. Of the case law that 
provided such information, only a small amount referred to White youth. In contrast, Hispanic 
and African-American youth represented the largest amount of case law (particularly youth 
certified as adults), and most of the youth involved in serious or violent offences were male. In 
effect, it may be argued that these youth are characteristic of the “underclass”. These findings 
were echoed in Hall et al.’s (2013) analysis of the types of youth (Black, potential muggers and 
street criminals) that were targeted in the U.K. with the enactment of tough-on-crime 
legislation.    
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 On the whole, the findings from the case law correspond with the tough-on-crime 
legislation that, for the most part, adheres to neo-conservative ideology. As a result, there are a 
number of negative consequences associated with the tough-on-crime mandate that are 
witnessed through the analysis of Texas case law. These findings suggest that the legislation 
has had a significant effect on youth who are socially, economically and politically 
underprivileged and are representative of less powerful groups in society that do not reflect the 
dominant ideology (Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013). More specifically, the findings are highly 
supportive of the assertions put forth by the critical perspective with regards to the effects of 
the modern capitalist state and the ways in which class and race relations have manifested 
themselves in the normative structure and the law more generally (Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 
2013). This may be compounded with the current economic downturn in Texas (a financial 
crisis of sorts which can be linked to Garland’s (1996) belief that more punitive policies are 
allegedly needed to compensate for the failures of the state) and with the up-rise of 
immigration across the state.  
 Amongst all American states, Texas has one of the highest numbers of youth living in 
poverty and is experiencing an astonishingly large amount of growth on account of 
immigration (Ennis, Rios-Vargas & Albert, 2011). As such, there is “no single ethnicity” that 
represents the state since approximately two-thirds of their youth are “non-Anglo minorities” 
(Scharrer, 2011). This suggests that a complex relationship exists between race/ethnicity 
(including immigration patterns), class, and youth crime in the state of Texas, and that youth 
from such minority groups have a greater likelihood of being impacted by tough-on-crime 
legislation in contrast to dominant social groups (Alvi, 2012; Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013; 
Wortley et al., 2008).  
341 
 
8.2 Differing Policies in Response to Youth Crime 
 In order to adequately determine how policies in response to youth crime in Texas 
differ from those of Canada (as per Research Question #5), it is imperative to first note the 
distinctions between the principles and purpose governing the legislation. Canada’s Youth 
Criminal Justice Act generally provides for a great deal of emphasis on diversion from the 
youth court system for a broad range of less serious offences, while encouraging the use of 
various community-based dispositions in an attempt to restrict the use of custody for youth 
sentenced by the court. Due to the amendments put forth by the Conservative government in 
2012, youth who commit serious violent offences are currently subject to provisions that place 
greater importance on protection of the public and accountability for the offence. Thus, the 
youth justice system in Canada is presently two-fold. It not only attempts to rehabilitate youth 
as well as deter offending, but it also simultaneously establishes meaningful consequences for 
youth in conflict with the law. This was evidenced in the Canadian case law in Chapter 7. 
 Like policies set forth in Texas (albeit to a lesser degree), the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act upholds the belief that there should be a lesser degree of accountability for youth, in 
comparison to their adult counterparts (mainly due to a lack of mental development and lower 
level of maturity), while stressing provisions related to rehabilitative services. As such, 
sentences imposed on youth across both jurisdictions are to be proportional to the seriousness 
of the offence, and should therefore not reflect a more severe sanction than imposed on an 
adult for the same offence. In addition, both the Youth Criminal Justice Act and legislation in 
Texas equally recognizes the importance of including victims, community members, and 
parents in the justice process, and similarly maintain that youth are entitled to due process of 
law (see YCJA S.3). 
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 Texas’ purpose clause outlined in the Texas Family Code and Juvenile Justice Code 
does not reflect an entirely radical departure from the rehabilitative philosophy outlined in the 
YCJA. Texas case law indicates that the state attempts to promote the well being of youth in 
conjunction with the best interests of the public. Like Canada, Texas tends to frequently 
employ informal procedures resulting in the diversion of youth from the formal youth justice 
system for less serious offenders.279 This finding coincides with Garland’s (1996) analysis of 
the “adaptive” strategies of the state to address the problems of youth crime, particularly by 
developing new policies/techniques to encourage the reduction of custody for young offenders. 
While Texas promotes the rehabilitation of youth by substituting a program of supervision and 
care, and includes provisions such as deferred prosecution, Texas law undoubtedly places a 
greater emphasis on “community protection, offender accountability, crime reduction through 
deterrence, and punishment” (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2012). 280  Thus, while 
Canada is more inclined to look for alternatives to incarceration, Texas case law indicated that 
the state is more likely to penalize youth who have committed non-violent or less serious 
crimes even though they too have implemented informal dispositions.281 This is illustrative of a 
crime control model that is further along the tough-on-crime continuum relative to Canada.   
279  In Canada, the use of diversion and extrajudicial measures are strategies used to increase the use of 
community-based responses to youth crime. Extrajudicial sanctions in Canada may be seen as a more formal 
approach to dealing with youth in conflict with the law, and includes community-based responses and programs 
that may include restitution to a victim, an order to successfully complete community service, or some element of 
restorative justice. It should be noted that extrajudicial measures include extrajudicial sanctions and police 
warnings, cautioning, and referrals to community agencies (such as counselling or mentoring programs).    
280 The legislative amendment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) added to its objective of youth sentencing by including the 
denouncement of unlawful conduct and the deterrence of young people from committing offences (specific 
deterrence).  
281 This statement can be cross-referenced with various studies conducted on juveniles in the adult criminal justice 
system in Texas, which find that “about 15% of juveniles transferred to adult court are charged with non-violent 
felonies, including state jail offences”. See Deitch (2011) for further information.  
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 Legislation regarding pre-trial detention in Texas and Canada differ to some extent. In 
both jurisdictions, a youth may be detained pending trial in cases where a youth is charged 
with a serious violent offence, poses a substantial risk of reoffending, or is likely to fail to 
appear in court. According to Moyer and Basic (2005), the decision to detain a youth in 
Canada is typically dependent on whether the youth has some degree of current involvement 
with the youth justice system (for example, probation) or is facing other charges. However, 
while youth are generally detained in separate facilities from adults, the YCJA constructs an 
exemption which allows a youth court judge, under rare circumstances, to allow a young 
person to be detained with adults if this is necessary for the safety of the youth and for others, 
or if “no youth detention facility is available within a reasonable distance” (see S.30(3) of the 
YCJA). These provisions are contrary to those enacted in Texas, whereby youth are to be 
separated from their adult counterparts by sight and sound (although this does not always 
happen for reasons such as overcrowding). Nonetheless, the majority of the conditions 
associated with pre-trial detention in both jurisdictions are relatively similar in terms of their 
legal provisions as well as the varying range of available programs and resources to counties 
and provinces.282  
 Pre-trial detention provisions in Canada are now especially similar to those in Texas 
given the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), which stipulate that violent and repeat 
offenders may be detained prior to trial mainly to ensure public safety. The only substantive 
exception to these similarities is evidenced in the case law and are related to the bail provisions 
282 It should be noted that the YCJA had little effect on the use of pretrial detention. In fact, pretrial detention 
(remand custody) has increased to a degree under the YCJA mainly due to a lack of clarity.  
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(or lack thereof) in Texas. This ensures greater management and control over the youth in 
contrast to the Canadian system.   
 The denial of a preliminary inquiry and the right to a jury in almost all cases involving 
youth in conflict with the law is upheld by the provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code and 
the YCJA. Essentially most youth proceedings and trials are held by the judge without invoking 
a jury. In serious cases, however, youth who are facing the possibility of an adult sentence of 
more than five years may qualify as being an exception to the rule. According to Section 11(f) 
of the Charter, any individual facing a minimum sentence of five years is guaranteed the right 
to benefit from a trial by jury. Thus, youth facing sentences of this nature (for serious charges 
that may or may not include murder) are given the right to choose to have a preliminary 
inquiry as well as a trial by jury. These provisions differ slightly from those outlined in the 
Texas Family Code which state that all adjudication hearings are held before a jury unless the 
youth waives the right. In Texas, a grand jury is involved in cases regarding determinate 
sentencing of violent or habitual offenders, although these cases have not been waived to the 
adult jurisdiction.         
 While statutory statements of principle in Texas have adopted ideologies that place 
importance on the protection of the public and accountability of juvenile offenders, the 
amendments put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4) in Canada now emphasize similar principles, 
particularly for more serious and violent offenders. Although the majority of youth from both 
jurisdictions are treated in a relatively similar manner when minor or first time offences are 
involved, Bill C-10 (Part 4) has effectively implemented an approach more in line with the 
model in Texas. In effect, Bill C-10 (Part 4) represents a modified crime control model that 
brings the Canadian system closer to that of Texas. However, the single most notable 
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difference between legislation and case law in response to youth crime in Texas and Canada is 
directly related to the provisions of transferring youth to adult court.  
 As Texas has enacted laws to make it easier for youth to be dealt with in adult court 
(particularly those charged with violent offences), a number of provisions are enforced in the 
United States that are simply not available in Canada. Moreover, the enactment of the YCJA in 
2003 prohibited the possibility of referring youth to adult courts. Since the onset of the YCJA 
in 2003, all legal proceedings involving youth, ranging from the least serious to the most 
serious of offences, are handled in youth court without exception. The provisions allowing 
youth to be transferred to adult court implies that youth are to be treated with the same level of 
accountability as adults. This was evidenced in the case law from Texas. In Canada, however, 
it is recognized in case law that in most instances youth sentences are governed by the 
principle of limited accountability in order to reflect the lesser maturity of young offenders. 
Thus, the amendments put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4) specifically articulate the principle of 
diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability. In Canada it is the youth court judge which 
may sentence a youth as though an adult.283 As such, Canada does not have provisions that 
support waiving jurisdiction to the adult criminal justice system by means of a judicial waiver, 
presumptive waiver, mandatory waiver, or direct file.  
 Adult sentences in Canada may only be imposed on youth in the following case: 
“where a young person aged 14 or older at the time of the offence is found guilty of an offence 
for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years”. 
Furthermore, “a Crown prosecutor may ask a youth court to impose an adult sentence in cases 
283 To a degree, this is similar to determinate sentencing of violent or habitual offenders in Texas, whereby youth 
may remain in the juvenile justice system for trial and initial detainment; but also provide judges with a means for 
imposing longer sentences on serious juvenile offenders.   
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where the youth is at least 14 years of age at the time of the offence (although the provinces 
reserve the right to increase the limit to 15 or 16 years of age), and the offence is a presumptive 
offence (i.e., murder, attempted murder, manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault)” (Library 
of Parliament, 2011, p. 136). In these instances, the Crown attorney is obligated to establish 
whether an application of an adult sentence for the youth should be filed (similar to a petition 
in the United States). In both Texas and Canada, the ultimate decision regarding whether or not 
a youth will be charged with an adult sentence is a matter of judicial discretion. It should be 
noted however that the list of crimes for which a youth may be charged with an adult sentence 
in Canada differs from those crimes listed in Texas, although there is no evidence to suggest 
that the certification of youth occurs on the basis that such offenders are more violent than 
those who receive a determinate sentence (Deitch, 2011).284 Additionally, not all youth who 
are certified are considered violent (Deitch, 2011). While approximately 85% of certified youth 
have committed a violent offence, the remaining portion is non-violent (Deitch, 2011). This 
implies that non-violent youth are also subject to being tried and incarcerated as an adult in the 
state of Texas (Deitch, 2011). 
 With regards to the principles governing youth sentencing in Canada, Section 38(2) of 
the YCJA explicitly outlines the proportionality of the sentence “to the seriousness of the 
offence”, and “the degree of responsibility of the young offender for the offence” (Library of 
Parliament, 2011, p. 129). In addition, it specifies that all existing sanctions other than custody 
that are logical or sensible in the circumstance should be taken into account for all offenders, 
284 According to the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (2010), the ten most common offences for which a 
youth is typically certified are: aggravated robbery, sexual assault, homicide, aggravated assault, burglary, other 
felonies, felony drug offences, robbery, attempted homicide, felony weapons, motor vehicle theft, and felony 
theft.  
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and that sentences must be “the least restrictive that is capable” of achieving meaningful 
consequences for the youth and is most likely to promote successful rehabilitation and 
reintegration into society (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 133). These principles are adhered to 
in almost all Canadian case law. As such, a youth sentence under the YCJA must “first consider 
the many options that do not involve custody”, except in cases of murder (Library of 
Parliament, 2011, p. 134). Incarceration or custodial sentences specific to youth (committal to 
custody), as evidenced in the findings, are therefore limited to violent youth or those “who 
otherwise present a danger” to society at large (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 134). Under the 
current provisions of the YCJA, incarceration may only be chosen in cases where the youth has,  
committed a violent offence; has failed to comply with two or 
more non-custodial sentences; the case is an exceptional one, 
where the aggravating circumstances warrant a custodial 
sentence; the young person has committed an indictable offence 
for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of 
more than two years and has several findings of guilt under the 
YCJA or YOA (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 134-135; see also 
S.39(1)). 
 
However, even if one or more of these conditions are met, youth court judges are not obligated 
to impose a custodial sentence, let alone an adult sentence.285 Given this fact, the maximum 
sentence that a court may impose on a youth not sentenced as an adult is ten years for first 
degree murder, with a continuous custodial period of up to six years, followed by a conditional 
supervision in the community; and a maximum of seven years of custody and supervision in 
cases of second degree murder, with a custodial period of up to four years, followed by 
285 Country-wide data on adult sentencing under the YCJA does not exist in Canada; however these cases are 
typically rare in nature and often involve serious, very brutal offences. The imposition of adult sentences on youth 
rarely occurs, but does so only when the provisions of the YCJA appear to represent an inadequate response to the 
offence committed. If the maximum sentence under the YCJA is incapable of holding a youth accountable for their 
offence, an adult sentence must be imposed (with consideration given to their age and limited level of maturity, as 
well as their amenability to rehabilitation which takes into account the personal history and character of the youth 
and the nature of the offence).      
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conditional supervision in the community (see S.42(2)(q)(i)-(ii) of the YCJA). As is evident, 
these provisions vary considerably from those outlined in Texas legislation, but coincide with 
the case law findings.    
 The imposition of an adult sentence in Texas allows for a portion to be served in a 
youth custody facility, although this is not always the case. Youth who are subject to adult 
sentences are permitted, in some instances, to remain in youth custody facilities until the court 
loses jurisdiction over the youth. Beyond this point, the youth is transferred to an adult 
correctional institution to serve the remainder of their sentence (National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service, 2012). Prior to the transfer however, youth custody facilities continuously 
provide access to the appropriate rehabilitative services. In Canada, an adult sentence imposed 
upon youth under the age of 18 must be sentenced to a youth detention facility. Before Bill C-
10 (Part 4), the courts could decide where the youth would serve time. Thus, provisions of this 
nature under the YCJA mirror, to a degree, those found in the case law from Texas that focus 
on both rehabilitation within the youth facility and punishment in the adult facility. However, 
with the new legislative amendments, these findings may change over time.   
 In addition, youth sentenced as an adult in Canada are subject to the adult rules 
governing parole and release. If, for example, a youth is convicted of murder for which there is 
a mandatory life sentence, the provisions of the Criminal Code dictate the rules governing ones 
eligibility for parole. As such, a person who was a youth at the time of the offence will be 
eligible to be considered for released by the parole board earlier than their adult counterpart.286 
286 Youth who are 14 or 15 years of age when they commit murder and are sentenced as an adult are entitled to a 
set parole eligibility date of 5 to 7 years by the sentencing judge. Youth who are 16 or 17 years of age when they 
commit a second degree murder are eligible for parole in 7 years. If the offence is a first degree murder then a 16 
or 17 year old will be eligible for parole in 10 years. The determination of parole eligibility, regardless of age, 
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However, the release of an individual is only granted by the parole board in instances where 
the person is not considered to be a serious risk to public safety. Moreover, the case law 
indicates that an individual released on parole is subject to lifelong supervision as well as the 
possibility of returning to jail for parole violations. The legislation governing these procedures 
in Texas are similar to those set forth in Canada, however as mentioned above, there is case 
law that attends to issues regarding the eligibility of parole for youth for those serving 
mandatory life sentences.   
 Placement of youth sentenced as adults differs to some extent between Texas and 
Canada. While youth in Texas tend to serve their adult sentences in adult facilities, Bill C-10 
(Part 4) now removes the courts ability to determine whether the youth will be placed in a 
youth custody facility, an adult provincial correctional facility, or a federal penitentiary to 
serve the sentence in Canada. 287 Youth who fall under the age of 18 at the time of sentencing, 
in all cases, will serve the full portion of their sentence in a youth custody facility. In situations 
where, at the time of sentencing the youth is over 18 years of age, the court may seek 
placement of the youth in an adult provincial correctional facility, or for sentences that surpass 
two years, in a federal penitentiary for adults.  
 The transfer to an adult facility mainly applies to cases where the youth has reached the 
age of 20 (the court’s upper age of jurisdiction over youth) or the court is unsatisfied that 
continued placement in the youth facility would be “in the best interests of the young person 
and not jeopardize the safety of others” (S.76(9) of the YCJA). Interestingly, and similar to the 
depends largely on the youth’s age, prior record, the degree of involvement in the offence, and the nature of the 
offence as outlined by S.743.3 and 745.5 of the Criminal Code. Note that youth sentenced for murder as an adult 
is eligible for parole in 5-10 years while adults are eligible for parole in 10-25 years.   
287 Provincial correctional facilities are intended for adult offenders who have sentences of less than two years and 
for less serious offences, while federal penitentiaries are for adults who have sentences for two years or longer and 
have committed serious offences.  
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provisions found in Texas, youth who do not receive adult sentences in Canada may 
nonetheless be transferred to an adult facility after reaching the age of 18 to serve the balance 
of their sentence; but must only be done so when deemed to be in the best interests of the youth 
(because youth facilities are no longer able to manage the offender) and the public. As is 
evidenced in the case law from Texas, concerns about a lack of access to appropriate 
rehabilitative services for youth once admitted into an adult correctional facility is a topic of 
contention. 
 Overall, the similarities and variances between the youth justice legislation in Canada 
and Texas illustrate the level of diversity between the two models. The analysis above provides 
evidence for the fact that Bill C-10 (Part 4) has moved Canada closer towards a model of crime 
control, although it is not nearly as punitive as Texas. This offers support for the argument that 
the crime control model in Texas is further along the tough-on-crime continuum when 
compared to Canada.  
 Both the amendments to the YCJA and the legislation in Texas are examples of the 
ways in which the problem of youth crime has been conceptualized and defined. The 
legislation in both jurisdictions is indicative of a shift in the focus on how youth were viewed 
prior to any change in law (Garland, 1996, 2001). This has resulted in a decline in the 
commitment to the penal-welfare strategies that place emphasis on rehabilitation as opposed to 
deterrence and punishment. Interestingly, the concept of rehabilitation in both Canada and 
Texas appears to be largely neo-liberalized. That is, the philosophy underlying rehabilitation 
appears to be indicative of post-disciplinary strategies that have little in common with 
traditional disciplinary logics (i.e., as Garland (1996, p. 451) explains, a “poorly socialized 
misfit in need of assistance”) and practices. In other words, the onus of responsibility is placed 
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on the youth to correct, treat and discipline themselves in order to transform their offending 
behaviour through the implementation of available correctional programs given that this new 
approach views youth as “an illicit, opportunistic consumer, whose access to social goods must 
be barred” (Garland, 1996, p. 451). To a degree, this new style of penal logic is a result of “late 
modernity”, a concept which supports the opportunities model in an attempt to self-change the 
undesirable behaviour leading to further risk. As Fraser (2003) argues,  
Neither the Victorian subject of individualizing normalization 
nor the fordist subject of collective welfare, the new subject of 
governmentality is the actively responsible agent. A subject of 
(market) choice and a consumer of services, this individual is 
obligated to enhance her quality of life through her own 
decisions. In this new “care of self,” everyone is an expert on 
herself, responsible for managing her own human capital to 
maximal effect (p. 168).  
 
Thus, a youth’s acceptance of responsibility and voluntary participation of such rehabilitative 
programs in both Texas and Canada not only implies that offenders are active consumers of 
penal services, but that they must manage their self-betterment. The assumption, however, is 
that the causes of crime are related to environmental issues (i.e., substance abuse, problems 
with school or home life) or personality disorders (i.e., antisocial attitudes and behaviours) as 
opposed to any social structural factors. These findings are indicative of a shift in penal logic, 
and are generally supportive of the argument made about the deterioration of the penal-welfare 
model towards a culture that emphasizes the importance of managing risk.      
 On the whole, the various economic and social changes that have occurred have led to a 
lack of adherence to penal-welfarism. This is witnessed in the youth justice legislation in both 
Canada and Texas, although it is clear that there is less loyalty to this structure in the latter 
jurisdiction. These findings are indicative of crime control initiatives that reconstruct a 
“complex of interlocking structures and strategies that are themselves composed of old and 
352 
 
new elements, the old revised and reoriented by a new operation context” (Garland, 2001, p. 
23). On the whole, these findings not only coincide with Garland’s (2001) view that the 
political state of affairs (and especially the campaigning of crime control), is structured both 
culturally and socially, but that it is a result of a modified approach that is supported by both 
the public (on the basis of a consensus) and the state that emphasizes the importance of 
offender control. These findings strongly support the critical view discussed in the works of 
Hall et al. (2013), Feeley and Simon (1992), Fraser (2003), Garland (1996, 2001), and 
O’Malley (1999), although it is clear that this phenomenon is more sophisticated and 
pronounced in the American context. 
 The emergence of punitive sanctions and communicative justice that is embodied in the 
tough-on-crime legislation has a number of ancillary effects on youth, particularly those of 
minority populations. The legislation enveloping modern penalty effectively target those who 
are visible minorities, “the underclass”, and those who are otherwise politically, socially and 
economically powerless within the structural system. The analysis above offers support for the 
argument that youth who belong to such underprivileged groups are more likely to be burdened 
and impacted by the consequences associated with the tough-on-crime legislation on account 
of their social, political, and economic condition (Alvi, 2012; DeKeseredy, 2011; Garland, 
2001; Hall et al., 2013; Wortley et al., 2008). This is observed in light of the decline in youth 
welfare which is not able to uphold the interests of this class of offender. This suggests the 
legislation enacted in both jurisdictions is more concerned with the reorganization of the ways 
in which these youth are controlled and supervised within the justice system, and coincides 
with the works of DeMichele (2014), Feeley and Simon (1992) and Garland (2001). In addition, 
both jurisdictions show signs of the need to further manage risk, particularly by targeting a 
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high-risk group of persistent repeat offenders who have potential to become “career criminals”. 
This is seen in both the Canadian and American context, whereby the newly enacted legislation 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is geared towards violent and repeat offenders, and the Texas legislation 
has integrated provisions for habitual and violent offenders. These provisions legally allow for 
better tracking and identification of potentially violent youth and potential “career criminals”, 
whose behaviour is frequently associated with the least powerful group or the “underclass” 
(Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001).  
 In Texas, the enacted legislation appears to be extremely good at what it is meant to do. 
More specifically, the tough-on-crime mandate appears to have the most bearing on youth who 
are either certified as adults or transferred to the adult jurisdiction. These youth are comprised 
of the most violent or the most routine offenders whose behaviour requires management and 
control. There is no evidence in the Texas case law or otherwise that indicate such legislation 
acts as a deterrent. This particularly lends support to the works of Feeley and Simon (1992) 
who suggest that this type of legislation is enacted on the basis of a style of governance that 
places less emphasis on the importance of recidivism. While there has been a noticeable 
decrease in crime rates in Texas, it can be argued that the enacted tough-on-crime laws have 
little to do with this. In fact, the case law showed that youth who have had prior contact with 
the justice system in Texas are subject to receiving harsher sentences than before. This furthers 
the state’s need to intervene in order to control and manage youth who are simply impervious 
to rehabilitation. However, the tough-on-crime legislation itself has had little effect on the 
ways on which youth perceive the laws, because violent crime rates rose in the late 1990s in 
Texas when this legislation was in force.  
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 In Canada, the newly enacted legislation has not yet revealed the ways in which it will 
affect youth in conflict with the law. While previous research suggests that such legislation is 
enacted on account of new attitudes and perceptions on violent youth (Feeley & Simon, 1992; 
Garland, 1996, 2001), there is no present way of knowing if and to what extent these 
provisions will translate into the long-term tracking and managing of what is thought to be a 
dangerous class of offenders. By analyzing legislation from Texas, one may reasonably deduce 
that these tough-on-crime policies are not overly useful for those who are in need of treatment, 
rehabilitation, or community-based services that provide youth with both the skills and the 
assistance needed to become successful, law-abiding citizens. However, the perceived 
illegitimacy of penal-welfare strategies has led Canada in a direction that has modified its 
views on juvenile justice to coincide with policy that now controls crime (as part of the 
“adaptive” and “non-adaptive” strategies employed by the state to address youth crime). 
Although Canada places a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration than its U.S. 
counterpart, only time will determine how the legislative changes of Bill C-10 (Part 4) will be 
interpreted by the courts and thus how youth may be affected by the amendments. Whether or 
not the “underclass” or marginal population will be further deprecated remains to be seen.            
8.3 Learning from Other Responses to Youth Crime  
 The first part of Research Question #6 asks what can be learned from the way Texas 
responds to youth crime in terms of their policies and legislation. Based on the differences 
outlined above, it is clear that there a number of things that can be taken from a model that is 
consistent with a philosophy of crime control. The first of these findings is directly related to 
the transfer provisions enacted in Texas. Although it was determined in the case law that Texas 
has not abandoned the role of rehabilitation, it would seem that their purpose clause 
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emphasizes the importance of accountability and deterrence far more than the YCJA governing 
Canadian youth justice. This suggests that the transition from the YOA to the YCJA, which 
currently prohibits youth from being transferred to the adult jurisdiction, was a step in the right 
direction.  
 The shift in legislation towards transferring young offenders to the adult jurisdiction in 
Texas is predominately established on the supposition that harsher (adult) sentences will 
function in a way that hinders, curbs, or discourages youth crime. However, research has 
shown that offenders whose cases are transferred are rearrested more frequently upon release 
than similar young offenders handled by the juvenile court (Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop 
and Frazier, 1997). In relation to specific deterrence (that is, fitting an adult sentence to a 
specific offender in an attempt to curb their likelihood of reoffending), and general deterrence 
(whether transfer laws deter potential young offenders), there is little evidence to suggest these 
provisions have any real overall effects on deterrence (Lane, Lanza-Kaduce, Frazier & Bishop, 
2002; Myers, 2003; Reiman, 1996; Steiner, Hemmens & Bell, 2006; Steiner & Wright, 2006). 
In fact, prior research suggests that most youth are unaware of the transfer laws that exist in the 
state. In cases where youth have some knowledge of the governing policies, many do not 
believe these laws will be enforced against them (Winner et al., 1997). These findings suggest 
a need to assess and apply movements that create awareness at the state level which could 
inform youth about the potential ramifications of committing very serious crimes. In a similar 
vein, the recent changes in the Canadian youth justice legislation do not appear to be 
articulated in a manner that generates awareness amongst youth. In turn, there may be a level 
of naivety or vulnerability on the part of the youth who may engage in offending behaviour 
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without knowing or understanding the full extent of the consequences associated with the 
crime.   
 The emphasis on the rehabilitation of youth in Canada is paramount. The significance 
of this sentencing principle is most noticeable when compared to a judicial system like Texas 
that, at times, prematurely concludes that rehabilitative measures do not work for high-risk 
youth. This is particularly the case when youth are transferred to the adult system, although 
there is evidence to suggest that youth who receive extremely long youth sentences are also 
less likely to engage in treatment. While the Canadian system genuinely values the role of 
rehabilitation, research in the American context reports that in numerous cases there have been 
no attempts to provide treatment through rehabilitative programs or through programs 
available at the county’s youth probation level (Redding, 1999). Thus, youth who are removed 
from the juvenile system are not eligible to participate in these types of programs; a reality that 
is especially problematic for youth who are first time offenders, have committed non-violent 
offences, or have no prior violent criminal history.  
 Bill C-10 (Part 4) can be commended for its provision which removes the possibility 
for a youth under the age of 18 to serve their sentence in an adult correctional facility (Clause 
186). This provision is an example of what has been learned from other jurisdictions that do 
not follow this approach. Research shows that adult facilities in Texas are unfit for youth under 
the maximum age of jurisdiction because they are incapable of addressing the particular needs 
of youth (Deitch, 2011). Detaining youth in adult facilities essentially jeopardizes the personal 
and public safety of the youth. Not only does a youth’s placement in an adult facility have 
bearing on their overall well-being, but it has very little to offer in terms of deterrence from 
future offences. Instead, there is evidence to suggest that this practice increases their likelihood 
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of recidivism and violence in the future.288 Moreover, youth placed in adult institutions have a 
greater threat of developing a mental illness, being subject to physical and sexual assault, and 
attempting suicide. In general, these less favourable results are more prone to transpire in adult 
institutions because youth are usually exempt from valuable restorative interventions, 
educational programs, personnel with very comprehensive knowledge, and services that meet 
the individualized needs for youth. In many circumstances, youth are co-mingled with adults or 
are secluded for lengthy periods of time which furthers the likelihood of physical risk 
(Redding, 1999). This suggests that Canada is currently better situated to address the needs of 
youth through youth facilities, although respondents suggested that improvements to programs 
can and should be made (e.g., better funding, continuous evaluation and assessment of program 
success, and implementation of programs that are specifically tailored to youth based on 
individual needs).                      
 Penn, Pirtle and Jones (2010) find that there are a number of programs and provisions 
in Texas law that are “ineffective in reducing juvenile delinquency and crime” (p. 1). These 
range from “curfew laws, scared straight programs, boot camps, punishment in adult facilities, 
out of home placement, drug abuse resistance education, confinement in large correctional 
faculties, and zero tolerance policies” (Penn, Pirtle, & Jones, 2010, p. 1). Moreover, Penn, 
Pirtle and Jones note that in general, “ineffective programs are those that use general 
deterrence with a “one size fits all” approach” (p. 2). 289 These authors suggest that these 
programs or provisions are typically defined under a “‘get tough’ philosophy” that supports 
288 According to a study that was conducted across the United States, youth have a 100% greater likelihood of 
violent recidivism when they are transferred and spend at minimum of a year in an adult facility. See Bazemore 
and Umbreit (1995); Bishop and Frazier (2000); Myers (2003); and Thomas and Bishop (1984) for further details.    
289 Bill C-10 (Part 4) does not include general deterrence as one of its amendments, however earlier versions of 
the Bill (such as Bill C-25 and Bill C-4) did include this provision. 
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“punishment rather than identifying, addressing and correcting risk factors found in the 
individual, family, peer group, school and neighbourhood” (Penn, Pirtle & Jones, 2010, p. 2) 
Thus, prevention and deterrence may be better accomplished by developing protective factors 
to mitigate the impact of risk factors in a youth’s life (Penn, Pirtle & Jones, 2010; Krisberg, 
2005).  
 Like Krisberg (2005), both Texas and Canada recognize that youth are greatly affected 
by four major categories of which many risk factors fall under. Krisberg (2005) suggests these 
include the family, community, school, and individual/peer groups. Krisberg (2005) explains 
that “extreme economic deprivation, family management problems, family conflict, early and 
persistent antisocial behaviour and early academic failure are power risk factors for virtually 
all types of adolescent problem behaviour” (p. 130). In essence, the protective factors (or as 
Krisberg (2005) refers to them, the “positive factors”) that may “combat the risk factors fall 
into a social development strategy” that is beginning to be implemented (Penn, Pirtle & Jones, 
2010, p. 2).290 This strategy promotes the insulation of youth from risk factors by “fostering 
pro-social behaviours and being around individuals, community institutions, and peer groups” 
that cultivate these attitudes (Penn, Pirtle & Jones, 2010, p. 2).  
 Penn, Pirtle, and Jones (2010) suggest this is especially true for youth in certain 
“socially disorganized areas” in Texas in which protective factors (amongst which adequate 
financial and social resources) are deficient (p. 2). In Texas, for example, African-Americans 
and Latinos are disproportionately represented in vicinities where there are “constant barriers” 
that prohibit any “positive relations” with other individuals or community institutions (Penn, 
290 Elements of this discussion can also be found in the “Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for 
Serious, violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders” (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995). 
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Pirtle & Jones, 2010, p. 2). In Canada, the immigration patterns have changed in a way that 
sometimes draw out an extended “state of social marginality” because many newcomers are 
subject to exclusion from active participation in the work force and the community on account 
of numerous social and economic obstacles (Petersen and Mortimer, 1994). This is particularly 
the case given the current changes in demography in both jurisdictions.     
 Not surprisingly, many community-based programs have been shown to be triumphant 
in Texas in holding youth responsible for their offences and directing them towards a more 
positive path. For example, Texas acknowledges that optimistic results can be derived from 
well-constructed programs that focus more so on the needs of all parties involved (e.g., young 
offenders, citizens, victims, etc.) instead of adopting more punitive measures that are very 
costly and yet do little to rectify the problem. This acceptance indicates a newly disclosed, 
state-wide change in the perceptions of effectiveness when it comes to tough-on-crime 
legislation. As such, these alternative approaches frequently stress remedial interventions to 
alter the youth’s behaviours, safeguard and conserve family values by strengthening its ability 
to regain control, promote compensation and sympathy towards injured parties, and assess 
youth to pair them with a fairly specific program that has demonstrated success for comparable 
youth. In addition, Texas is beginning to focus on avoiding the unnecessary placement of youth 
in facilities that encourage detention, and ensuring that low-risk youth are not placed in 
rigorous residential and non-residential programs since they are more likely to succeed on 
probation. In many ways, Canada has already implemented these approaches through the 
enactment of the YCJA. The emphasis on community-based measures effectively reinforces the 
Canadian position on both youth rehabilitation and reintegration, and illustrates how the 
360 
 
Canadian model has served as a counterpoint to the philosophy of justice in Texas for the last 
twelve years.   
8.3.1 Informing the Development of Canadian Youth Justice Policies  
  The second half of Research Question #6 asks in what ways these differences can help 
inform the future development of youth justice policies in Canada. While there is no doubt that 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act has significantly lowered Canada’s rate of incarceration for 
youth in comparison with the preceding Young Offenders Act, Canada should take into account 
the potential for increasing incarceration given the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 
4). Due to the fact that the rate of diversion in Canada rose dramatically with the enactment of 
the YCJA, it is hoped that Bill C-10 (Part 4) has few significant changes in the way the youth 
justice systems deals with youth in conflict with the law. In other words, making regular use of 
available (and appropriate) diversionary measures in response to youth crime will continue to 
be beneficial to Canadians in the long run. This would suggest the ongoing reliance on penal-
welfare strategies that take into account the best interests of the youth as opposed to enforcing 
more austere sentences.     
 More importantly, Canada may be better informed in the development of youth justice 
policy from the responses to youth crime in Texas given the long-standing enactment of tough-
on-crime legislation. This implies that Canada is in a position to learn from the shortcomings 
and failures of an American juvenile justice system that is in line with a fairly punitive crime 
control model, in an attempt to refine current provisions in Canada. What cannot be disputed is 
the lack of any evidence suggesting that establishing specific deterrence and denunciation as 
sentencing principles similar to those provided in the adult criminal jurisdiction will have any 
positive effect on youth. Learning from policies and legislation in Texas, it does not appear 
that Canadians will benefit from these particular amendments. Moreover, “requiring the Crown 
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to consider the possibility of an adult sentence for young offenders 14 to 17 years of age 
convicted of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault” may have 
adverse effects on both youth and the justice system as a whole, depending on how these 
provisions are subsequently interpreted and used (Library of Parliament, 2011, p. 123). If, in 
fact, the Crown makes substantial use of this provision, a noticeable decrease in the use of 
extrajudicial measures could be observed over time.  
 The push for greater community-based programs in Texas illustrates an ideological 
change in terms of what responses are most successful in relation to youth crime. Texas 
recently noted that more punitive measures are equally costly and ineffective, and are presently 
advocating for programs that assist youth in turning their lives around. Community-based 
programs not only address the rehabilitative needs of youth in conflict with the law, but also 
serve as a means for implementing preventative measures that help divert youth away from a 
path of crime. Thus, when fairly punitive jurisdictions like Texas recognize that community- 
based programs have the potential to deliver better results than enacting harsher legislation, 
there is evidence that suggests there are more suitable alternatives to tougher sentencing 
practices. These findings could also be indicative of how the state is adapting to social and 
cultural changes as a means of providing substitution to incarceration. At the very least, there 
are signs that the state is deliberating the need for change.   
 While community-based programs are not new to Canada, it is somewhat surprising to 
note the change in legislation. Canada’s YCJA currently uses community-based programs and 
diversion measures far more frequently than it did under the YOA. Thus, legislation supporting 
more punitive sanctions which may have the effect of broadening the crimes for which youth 
can be incarcerated as well as increase the length of time for which they may spend in custody 
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seems contradictory with the overall goals of the YCJA. Canadians have already benefitted 
from knowing that responses to youth crime are better addressed through means other than 
getting tough on crime, yet some of the provisions in Bill C-10 (Part 4) suggest otherwise. An 
increase in incarceration, for example, may lead to a need for more facilities and prisons that 
house youth, and since the Conservative government came into power in 2006, Canada has 
observed an 86% increase in its prison budget (“Texas conservatives reject Harper’s crime 
plan”, 2011).   
 When conservative Republican Jerry Madden, head of Texas House Committee on 
Corrections spoke out against the amendments of Bill C-10 overall, he publicly announced that 
Texas had “been there; done that; it didn’t work” (“Texas conservatives reject Harper’s crime 
plan”, 2011). Madden claimed that the costs associated with incarceration are atrocious and 
ineffective. As a result, the legislation in Texas began to change as far back as 2005 given the 
state-wide budget crisis that occurred. Madden concluded that not all prisoners need to be 
incarcerated, and that “Texas had diverted money from treatment and probation services in 
order to build prisons”, but that placing people on probation, parole, under community 
supervision, or in treatment programs was ten times less costly and far more effective than 
placing people in prison (“Texas conservative reject Harper’s crime plan”, 2011). As a result, 
Texas noted a “double digit decline in the last years”, both in the rate of prison incarceration 
and in the crime rate (“Texas conservative reject Harper’s crime plan”, 2011). More notably, 
Madden attributes this decrease to “strengthening some of the alternatives to prison” (“Texas 
conservatives reject Harper’s crime plan”, 2011). These findings may be explained by 
DeMichele (2014), who suggests that “the community corrections field is positioning itself as 
the primary location for the supervision of convicted individuals as a response to mass 
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incarceration” (p. 559). This is done as a means of gaining legitimacy in a field that is 
attempting to justify its place in the justice system and its success in reducing recidivism rates 
(DeMichele, 2014).     
 In contrast to the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4), Texas appears to be moving in a 
different direction. In fact, it has been suggested that hard-line conservatives south of the 
border such as Florida Governor Jeb Bush, former Speaker Newt Gingrich, the tax-fighter 
Grover Norquist, and the former Attorney General for President Ronald Regan, Ed Meese, 
disagree with the legislation put forth by the Conservative Party in Canada. Instead, what has 
been learned in the United States is that “if you deal with those underlying issues with the 
proper assessments up front, doing that before you make a sentencing decision... and you fund 
programs that will deal with that on a long-term basis, you avoid sending thousands of people 
to prison” (“Texas conservatives reject Harper’s crime plan”, 2011). This acknowledgement is 
indicative that the current legislation in Texas has failed at adequately dealing with crime. As 
such, there are legislative reforms on the way, particularly with regards to youth. Thus, while 
Texas recognizes that the “underclass” and the otherwise socially, politically and economically 
marginalized youth respond better to community-based approaches given the need for greater 
assistance, Canadian justice policies have taken a “180 turn in the wrong direction” (“Texas 
conservatives reject Harper’s crime plan”, 2011). Although testimonies from conservative 
expert witnesses from Texas were presented before parliament with regards to the legislative 
amendments of Bill C-10, the Conservative government chose to discard their advice.  
 Interestingly, the interview data indicate similar findings. Question #14 on the 
interview schedule asks participants whether the Canadian government considered how other 
jurisdictions respond to youth crime prior to presenting any of the Bills in Parliament. While 
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all participants agreed that looking beyond Canadian youth justice legislation to the ways in 
which other countries respond to youth crime is extremely valuable to policy formation, not a 
single participant was convinced that the Conservative government seriously contemplated 
which strategies were most successful and which were least. When asked whether the 
government considered responses from other jurisdictions, one participant asserts, 
I’d say no [...] I don’t think there was enough time in between 
the introduction of the Bill when it started and the passing of the 
Bill, even though, you know, at each stage we thought maybe 
it’ll die, and it didn’t. It just got slightly reworked. But there was 
not any consultation that I am aware of. I mean, the only 
consultation I’m aware of is the one where [he] went and talked 
to his own, basically his own people, and they didn’t say what he 
wanted them to say [...] But it is extremely important [to learn 
from other jurisdictions].  
 
Another participant states, 
In the past, they would have [considered other jurisdictional 
responses]. I would think that, you know, in this case it’s 
possible they looked at; I mean the biggest substantive change in 
the bill has to do with pre-trial release, and they may have looked 
at other jurisdictions on that one. I can’t imagine they would 
have looked at other jurisdictions on sentencing principles, or on 
the definition of violence, or things of that sort [...] You certainly 
can [look at other jurisdictions for responses on youth crime] I 
mean I think if you look at the research, most of the research on 
the impact of imprisonment on kids comes from other 
jurisdictions, and so most of the work in a sense, on general and 
individual deterrence comes from elsewhere. It’s fairly 
consistent, and I think it’s probably information that is pretty 
well known to the people who at least used to work in the 
Department of Justice, but my guess is that that’s pretty 
irrelevant and that it’d be useful for them if they were interested 
in crafting careful youth justice legislation. Then I think they’d 
be interested in what’s going on elsewhere. I don’t think they 
are. 
   
In essence, there appears to be a sort of disjuncture between what Canadians could have 
learned from responses to youth crime in other jurisdictions and what the current Canadian 
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policies have actually taken from these models. It is not that Canada is unable to learn from 
other jurisdictional responses to youth crime, but instead, it is that whatever was learned was 
largely ignored when drafting the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) on the basis of gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy and restoring confidence in the eyes of the public.   
 Overall, these findings suggest that the enactment of the tough-on-crime legislation in 
Canada places a reliance on the law as an instrument to manage youth when other strategies 
have been exhausted. The sentiments expressed in the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 
(Part 4) make clear that the current style of governance has taken a turn towards a more 
punitive approach that is, to a degree, associated with rationalities that were discarded some 
time ago (Feeley & Simon, 1992). This legislation then brings to the forefront Garland’s 
(2001) concept of the “dangerous other” which focuses on the “underclass” and other 
marginalized groups whose behaviour coincides with a class of offenders requiring 
management and control. The findings from Texas illustrate the ways in which their legislation 
affects socially, politically and economically deprived youth. What Canada should have 
learned from tough-on-crime measures is that these policies are ineffective at doing anything 
other than targeting and identifying dispossessed youth who merely suffer from the conditions 
inherent in the larger social structure.  
 There are a number of economic and social factors that affect youth in Canada which 
could be addressed by adopting a more equitable youth justice system. The data suggest that 
the development of future policy in Canada requires an emphasis on the larger social structure 
itself, the nature of youth within that structure, and the connection between the micro and 
macro social processes that lead to youth transgression. Policy analysis of this nature would 
therefore take into account the responses to youth crime from other jurisdictions as well as our 
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own, in an attempt to refine the Canadian system towards one that advocates for social justice. 
Rather than placing greater emphasis on targeting offending behaviour through tough-on-crime 
legislation, it may prove more beneficial to implement better preventative measures that 
address some of the underlying factors that make youth more vulnerable to committing crime. 
This assertion highly supports the critical criminological view (and more specifically the left 
realist approach) that campaigns for either a modified or entirely updated/renewed angle to 
youth justice policies (Alvi, 2012; DeKeseredy, 2011).       
8.4 Conclusion 
 The research questions in Issue 3 investigated the ways in which Texas differs in its 
legislation in response to youth crime. In line with findings from the literature and the case 
law, the legislation governing Texas’ juvenile justice systems is relatively punitive compared 
to Canada, although the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) appears to have brought 
some aspects of the two systems closer together (see Research Question #4). Regardless of the 
jurisdiction, the tough-on-crime movement may be viewed as an approach which redirects the 
public’s focus onto youth as socially deprecated political subjects that are responsible for a 
series of social problems (particularly crime). This exercise reveals the state’s ability to 
intervene and enact specific legislation by mobilizing the state’s political power in an attempt 
to publicly demonstrate that the issues are being addressed. Part of the findings from both 
Canada and Texas exhibit elements of what Garland (1996) refers to as “adaptive” strategies 
employed by the state to respond to youth crime, however there are also signs of “denial” as a 
reactionary response whereby tough-on-crime policies are associated with an “authoritative 
intervention to deal with a serious, anxiety-ridden problem” (p. 460).   
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 The significance of the findings from the case law is that while Canada has taken a 
tough-on-crime approach in response to youth crime, Texas is demonstrably less likely to focus 
on rehabilitation for serious and violent offenders in comparison. Since the enactment of 
tough-on-crime legislation in Texas, a review of the case law suggested that that the number of 
cases transferred has increased dramatically. However, waived cases still represent 
approximately one to two percent of cases adjudicated as delinquent. On the whole, these 
findings are illustrative of a crime control model that is arguably further along the tough-on-
crime spectrum.   
  Noting the transfer laws and mechanisms in Texas as the greatest difference between 
legislation that oversees youth crime in both jurisdictions, the data from the case law is 
consistent with the tough-on-crime philosophy (see Research Question #5). From this 
perspective, an analysis of the legislation and the case law suggested that Canada is relatively 
better equipped with laws that support alternatives to incarceration despite the enactment of 
Bill C-10 (Part 4), given that they do not transfer youth to the adult jurisdiction. Instead, 
Canada allows youth to remain under the jurisdiction of the youth court for adult sentences. 
This is also supported by findings from the Canadian case law in Chapter 7 that place a great 
deal of emphasis on the limited accountability and rehabilitation of youth when compared to 
adults who commit similar offences.  
 In contrast, the case law from Texas indicated that a youth’s rashness, short 
forethought, and limited moral maturity is not accounted for to the same extent as in Canada, 
since youth who commit very violent crimes frequently get transferred to the adult jurisdiction. 
Instead of holding youth less responsible than adults who commit similar offences, the tough-
on-crime legislation in Texas at times forgoes the possibility of a youth’s limited moral and 
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psychological development. As such, the justice system in Texas holds youth at the same level 
of accountability as their adult counterparts.          
 On the whole, learning from other (more punitive) jurisdictional responses to youth 
crime can help inform the development of youth justice policy in countries attempting to 
amend their youth justice legislation (see Research Question #6). Given the long list of 
shortcomings associated with tougher legislation, Canada stood to be better informed by 
analyzing tough-on-crime legislation from other similar jurisdictions prior to the parliamentary 
debates. While the findings from the interview data showed that greater consideration of the 
failures associated with the tough-on-crime mandate in the United States may have resulted in 
legislation that differed from Bill C-10 (Part 4), participants suggested there is little chance to 
amend the law while the Conservative Party is still in power. Nonetheless, the findings from 
the case law and legislation in Texas have potential to provide Canadian legislators with a 
better understanding of which laws and strategies work best when responding to youth crime, 
even though any outside information pertaining to the tough-on-crime legislation appears to 
have had little influence on drafting, ratifying, enacting and implementing the Canadian 
amendments.  
 Future policy development, however, stands to benefit from a restructuring of both the 
legislation and the youth justice system to provide more impartial and effective responses to 
youth crime. These policies would consider the ways in which the conditions imposed upon 
marginalized youth stem from the larger social structural system, in an attempt to reduce the 
social problems that are most often associated with youth crime. In effect, the reorganization of 
criminal justice policy should theoretically have little to do with restoring or maintaining state 
authority. Instead, it should safeguard the interests of both the youth and the public by 
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engaging in public discourse to develop useful alternatives to curb the social conditions that 
systematically disenfranchise youth.    
 Overall, the findings pertaining to Issue 3 indicated that there is an element of 
incongruence with regards to the social welfare and crime control models implemented in 
Texas. These findings support the works of Feeley and Simon (1992), Garland (1996, 2001), 
Hall et al. (2013), and O’Malley (1999) which discuss the ways in which a shift in the style of 
governance has led to contradictory rationalities and conflicting sentencing principles. There is 
evidence to suggest that the push towards legislation that targets high-risk, potentially violent 
youth in Texas was established on the basis of the perceived illegitimacy of the penal-welfare 
model. The tough-on-crime policies that are enacted to appease public desire have the effect of 
systematically pathologizing the “underclass” (i.e., youth who are racially, socially, 
economically, and politically underprivileged and therefore do not belong to the dominant 
class) (Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013). This is particularly evidenced in Texas’ legislation 
which facilitates the transfer of youth to adult state prisons and is disproportionately used 
against disadvantaged African-American and Hispanic youth (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2003, p. 1). As such, these measures have a tendency to tactically situate the disenfranchised 
on a path that encourages crimes for the powerless, because there is a greater likelihood of 
transferred youth to recidivate upon release when compared to other similar offenders 
processed by the youth court (Winner et al., 1997).   
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION 
 The tough-on-crime campaign set forth by the Conservative government is questionable 
within the Canadian context for three reasons. First, in much research the underlying goals and 
principles of tough-on-crime legislation have been rejected by experts in the field as well as 
opposition parties in parliament. Second, although the research on aspects of tough-on-crime 
legislation in varying countries is quite extensive, Canadian research on the processes through 
which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was developed and implemented is noticeably limited in scope. Third, 
a general lack of evidence for harsher legislation suggests that majority governments are in a 
position to propose public policy and legislative changes with minimal supporting research or 
reference to empirical data. Thus, the overall goal of the dissertation was to provide a better 
understanding of the individual (micro) and governmental (macro) processes associated with 
the tough-on-crime approach in Canada, with a specific focus on the responses to youth crime.  
 In effect, the tough-on-crime movement in Canada is a way of diverting attention 
towards youth as marginal political subjects, by means of deflecting a set of unspecified social 
problems onto them. This phenomenon occurs in an effort to mobilize the political power of 
the state, and subsequently demonstrates the state’s ability to intervene and enact specific 
legislation as a means of showing that something is being done to address such social problems. 
Thus, the consideration of whose values are embodied within the law was investigated, 
particularly with regards to how these values are reflected in the tough-on-crime legislation in 
reference to youth crime, how these values are conveyed to the public, and on what basis these 
values are transmitted to and supported by the public to facilitate and legitimize such 
legislation. The mobilization of state power, therefore, is achieved through processes that are 
typical amongst democratic nations (by mean of elections), and are centred on winning mass 
public support in order to reaffirm the political legitimacy of the authorities.   
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 The multi-method analysis of the tough-on-crime approach used two data sources to 
address the research questions. First, twenty-two interviews were conducted with individuals 
who could provide an informed perspective on how and in what ways politicians make 
meaningful decisions about youth crime and the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
developed and was legislated. When applicable, the data from the interviews were 
substantiated by analyzing text from Hansard to support respondent perspectives. Hansard was 
also used to fill in some of the gaps left behind by the pool of respondents in order to reflect 
some perspectives that were not captured during the interviews. The analysis of the interviews 
and Hansard consisted of textual coding for salient and emerging themes. Second, a Canadian 
case law analysis was conducted in order to determine whether the tough-on-crime mandate 
was implemented within youth courts, and if so in what ways. Similarly, a case law analysis of 
Texas was carried out in order to identify the ways in which the tough-on-crime legislation is 
implemented within this highly punitive American state. Texas, therefore, was used as an 
illustration of the ways in which the state currently operates under laws that are consistent with 
a model of crime control. Finally, a legal analysis of legislation in Canada and Texas was 
performed to establish how each jurisdiction oversees and responds to youth crime, while 
examining how Texas’ tough-on-crime legislation differs from that of Canada. In this sense, it 
was possible to assess where Canada currently sits on the tough-on-crime continuum.    
 The dissertation research investigated three central questions: 1) What are the 
processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was legislated? 2) In what way(s) 
has tough-on-crime legislation been implemented in youth courts? 3) How does Texas differ in 
their policies and legislation in response to youth crime, relative to their crime control model 
and placement on the tough-on-crime spectrum? Based on what remained unanswered or 
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unexplored by prior research, these three central questions formed the basis of six research 
questions requiring investigation. 
 The objectives of this chapter are three-fold: to review the conservative ideology and 
the “adaptive” and “non-adaptive” strategies of the state, to summarize significant findings, 
and to reflect on their implications. First, a brief discussion on the conservative ideology and 
the neo-conservative stance with regards to its role on crime control is provided in light of 
Garland’s (1996, 2001) analysis of “adaptive” strategies and “non-adaptive” responses to the 
problem of youth crime. Second, an overview of the significant findings is provided by the six 
research questions in the context of current research and the applicable theoretical perspectives. 
Third, the implications of these findings for future research are discussed in light of data 
limitations that may potentially be better explained by an alternative theoretical perspective or 
interpretation. 
9.1 Conservative Ideology, “Adaptive” Strategies of the State, and “Non-Adaptive” 
Responses 
 In order to understand the state’s role in crime control, it is important to briefly review 
the conservative ideology and the ways in which the neo-conservative stance has impacted a 
new (“adaptive”) style of governance. It may be argued that tough-on-crime legislation 
upholds the conservative ideology by promoting moral discipline through models of crime 
control while simultaneously maintaining well-established values. At the very least, this style 
of governance invokes “nostalgic” elements of crime control strategies (Simon & Feeley, 1992) 
that typically target the “underclass” or the politically, socially and economically marginalized 
groups in society (Garland, 2001). This summary, therefore, helps to position the perspectives 
of the participants, and sheds light on the views expressed (either through Hansard or the 
interviews) by the detractors of the Bill.   
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The conservative ideology of modern capitalist society can be characterized as a 
reactionary response to welfarism on account of the social and economic shortcomings (i.e., 
post-war crises) that were ineffectively prevented by the state (Garland, 2001). Although often 
cited as contradictory or incoherent rationalities, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative views 
aligned to dismantle much of the success brought about by the welfare state (Feeley & Simon, 
1992; Garland, 2001; O’Malley, 1999). In an attempt to overturn and correct perceived state 
leniency, the general disregard for authority, and the economic ails fueled by welfarism, the 
modern state has become one that supports, encourages and practices social control/regulation 
and intervention as a means of exercising legitimate power. Owen (2007) explains this 
phenomenon as a culture of control that matches with “a new economic style of decision-
making, a new criminology of social control, and a new conception of penal-welfarism” that is 
in line with conservative ideology (p. 3). Thus, this new strategy of governance plays a 
significant role in the way the state views its responsibility towards crime control. As such, 
several of the findings discussed in the sections below suggest there is great emphasis on a 
state-centric approach to addressing the social problem of crime. 
 According to Garland (2001), the conservative ideology seeped into the political sphere 
with “a strikingly anti-modern concern for the themes of tradition, order, hierarchy, and 
authority” (p. 99). Frequently advocating for a tough law-and-order approach, this ideology 
supports the claim that penal-welfare measures have failed miserably at dealing with the 
problem of crime. Instead, as Garland (1996) suggests, “attention is being shifted to dealing 
with the effects of crime - costs and victims and fearful citizens - rather than its causes. Above 
all there is an explicit acknowledgement of the need to rethink the problem of crime and the 
strategies for managing it” (p. 447). The growing desire to implement so-called innovative 
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strategies to address crime has led to a number of policy objectives and developments with a 
conservative undertone; many of which may be considered as an “adaptive” response of the 
state. The “adaptive” strategies discussed by Garland (1996) are partially attributed to the ways 
in which the state has had to conform and adjust to the “crisis of penal modernism” and the 
“dominant political currents” (neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism) that surfaced over time (p. 
448). In effect, this has exposed the limits of both the state vis-à-vis its role in crime control 
(i.e., what Garland (1996, p. 448) refers to as “the myth of sovereign crime control”) as well as 
the criminal justice system more generally. These “adaptive” responses and policy objectives 
have led to “modest improvements at the margin, the better management of risks and resources, 
reduction of the fear of crime, reduction of criminal justice expenditure and greater support for 
crime’s victims [...]” (Garland, 1996, p. 448). Overall, this suggests the conservative ideology 
is one that preserves and maintains the notion of state discipline and encourages individual 
responsibility, punishment and self-control. 
  Coupled with the normalcy of high crime rates and the limits of the criminal justice 
state, Garland (1996) suggests that the “adaptive” responses to the problem of crime can be 
understood in terms a “criminology of the self” as an ongoing need to rationalize justice, 
particularly because it views the criminal as a rational actor and “consumer”. This notion is 
associated with the growing concern about a loss of public confidence in the state and the 
criminal justice system, and therefore calls upon the need to include experts and other 
professionals in the deliberative process of policy debate in support of new crime control 
strategies. This was witnessed in the deliberative process of Bill C-25, Bill C-4, and to a lesser 
degree, Bill C-10 (Part 4). Other “adaptive” responses, as discussed in this dissertation, not 
only include the “responsibilization strategy” (whereby the state extends beyond its confines to 
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encompass the community (i.e., civil society) as well as the private sector), but also involve 
“adaptive” strategies that introduce “new strategies of system integration and system 
monitoring, which seek to implement a level of process and information management which 
was previously lacking” (Garland, 1996, p. 455). One example of this may be seen in the 
overall decrease in the use of custody for youth offenders, as stipulated by the YCJA. This 
strategy may also be linked to what Garland (1996) explains as “defining deviance down”, 
whereby the youth courts in both the Canadian and American context encourage the use of 
community sentences and the “widespread use of cautioning and diversion from prosecution, 
and the development of fixed penalties and summary hearings for offences that were 
previously prosecuted at more serious levels” (p. 456). In turn, this has led to yet another 
“adaptive” strategy which effectively redefines the public’s understanding and perception of 
the successes and failures of the state and the criminal justice system. Altogether, these 
“adaptive” strategies are examples of the limitations of the sovereign state given that they 
contradict, to a degree, with a state-centric approach which has claim to a monopoly over 
modern crime control (Garland, 2001).   
 The drastic changes in both crime control and the criminal justice system more 
generally have also led to “non-adaptive responses” such as “denial” and “acting out”, which 
form incongruous responses to the “adaptive” strategies listed above. These responses are said 
to appeal to conservative ideology by denying the spike in crime rates as well as the ways in 
which the state and prisons have been unsuccessful at preventing recidivism and encouraging 
rehabilitation (Garland, 2001). Garland (2001) suggests that “the state’s political machine has 
repeatedly indulged in a form of evasion and denial that is almost hysterical in the clinical 
sense of that term” (p. 131). Accordingly, the neo-conservative ideology has imposed upon the 
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public the ways in which the state would and should respond to the social problem of crime, by 
implementing agendas that,  
Restore public confidence in criminal justice while asserting the 
values of moral discipline, individual responsibility, and respect 
for authority. In penal policy as in welfare policy, the imperative 
was the re-imposition of control, usually by punitive means. In 
both cases, the population singled out as being most in need of 
control was composed of the welfare poor, urban blacks, and 
marginalized working-class youth (Garland, 2001, p. 132). 
  
These neo-conservative policies, then, tend not only to support a law-and-order position that 
“seeks to deny conditions which are elsewhere acknowledged”, but also attempt “to reassert 
the state’s power to govern by force of command” (Garland, 1996, p. 460). Acting out, 
according to Garland (2001), therefore, constitutes legislation that is comprised of spontaneous 
and “unreflective action, avoiding realistic recognition of underlying problems [...]” on account 
of the ongoing practice of denial (Garland, 2001, p. 133). These tactics, which are used to 
bolster the state’s position against its tolerance for crime, are meant to restore confidence 
amidst the public by offering an immediate response to the problem. Given that electoral 
campaigns call upon a consensus against crime, there is strong reliance of the state on the 
public to provide mass loyalty and support for the enactment of such law-and-order policies.    
 The importance of reviewing the conservative ideology, the neo-conservative stance, 
and the “non-adaptive” strategies of “denial” and “acting out” stem from a need to emphasize 
the complexities of tough-on-crime policies and their adherence to punitiveness (Garland, 1996, 
2001). According to Garland (1996), the concept of denial is deeply rooted in “the willingness 
to deliver harsh punishments to convicted offenders” by means of substituting tough-on-crime 
policies for the shortcomings and breakdowns of the state, and its “failure to deliver security to 
the population at large” (p. 460). These policies, therefore, fulfill a primary role of 
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compensating for the limitations and inadequacies of the state by tying together the concept of 
punitiveness and efficient methods of crime control (Garland, 1996). However, as Garland 
(1996) suggests,  
[...] these ‘law and order’ policies frequently involve a knowing 
and cynical manipulation of the symbols of state power and of 
the emotions of fear and insecurity which give these symbols 
their potency. Such policies become particularly salient where a 
more general insecurity – deriving from tenuous employment 
and fragile social relations – is widely experienced and where the 
state is deemed to have failed in its efforts to deliver economic 
security to key social groups (p. 460).  
 
Given the American and Canadian economic crisis of 2008 (Bank of Canada, 2011), it may be 
that the tough-on-crime legislation in Canada is linked to Garland’s (1996) analysis of “non-
adaptive” strategies such as “denial” and “acting out” on account of the “general insecurity” 
experienced by the nation. While no specific mention of such crises were expressed through 
the opinions of the participants in this research, their perspectives do touch upon the public’s 
growing anxieties and fears of youth crime and the ways in which the government manipulated 
state power to implement Bill C-10 (Part 4).  
Overall, these policies demonstrate the ways in which the state attempts to address the 
problem of youth crime (i.e., the “threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the excluded and 
the embittered” or the “criminology of the other” (Garland, 1996, p. 461)) in an expedient 
fashion. As a result, those most affected by the policies and legislation that ensue are groups 
that “lack political power and are widely regarded as dangerous and undeserving; because the 
groups least affected could be assured that something is being done and lawlessness is not 
tolerated; and because few politicians are willing to oppose a policy when there is so little 
political advantage to be gained by doing so” (Garland, 2001, p. 132). The conservative 
ideology in modern capitalist society is one that supports the movement of more punitive 
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punishment in a way that illustrates the supreme power of the state and emphasizes the need to 
“get back to basics”, to “restore family values” and to reassert “individual responsibility” 
(Garland, 2001, p. 99). As Garland (1996) states, there is “no need for co-operation, no 
negotiation, no question of whether or not it might ‘work’” (p. 461). While the significant 
findings of the research data discussed below show this to be partially true, there are signs that 
a degree of negotiation took place (i.e., during the deliberative process of the Bill C-25 and Bill 
C-4 proposals). However, any question regarding the feasibility and (in)effectiveness of Bill C-
10 (Part 4) did not appear to have been carefully considered by the state, although such aspects 
were publicly deliberated per proper protocol.  
Much of the problem with the conservative/neo-conservative stance in this regard can 
be linked to the fact that tough-on-crime policies embody a state-centric approach to crime 
control (where emphasis is placed on state institutions of justice – law, police, courts, and 
prisons) that essentially undermine other forms of social control by civil society/community 
groups (i.e., the “responsibilization strategy” that calls upon those outside of the criminal 
justice system to participate in and take accountability for the problem in a manner that is less 
formal than the criminal justice state). The latter are often seen as far more effective as agents 
of social control as expressed through the views of both the participants of this study as well as 
previous research. However, the interview data showed that the newly enacted tough-on-crime 
legislation moves Canada further away from a reliance on various collaborative approaches 
and community based programs, and therefore supports a strong state approach to crime 
control (see Sections 9.2 and 9.3 for further details). 
Nonetheless, these conflicting and contradictory responses are demonstrative of the 
sovereign power of the state as described by Garland (1996), and provide evidence for the 
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ways in which the concept of punishment is linked to “an act of sovereign might” (p. 461). 
That is, it is “a performative action which exemplifies what absolute power is all about. 
Moreover, it is a sovereign act which tends to command widespread popular support [...]” 
(Garland, 1996, p. 461). Thus, both the “adaptive” and “non-adaptive” strategies employed by 
the state may be understood in terms of a symbolic exercise that relies on the public as 
symbolic victims to build a consensus for mass loyalty and support. As noted elsewhere in this 
dissertation, consensus is heavily dependent on the institutionalization and 
compartmentalization of crime consciousness given that it is embedded in modern culture, is 
dispersed through the media, and is structurally entrenched in the capitalist state (Hall et al. 
2013).  
Many of the elements outlined in this section have a bearing on the positions and 
perspectives articulated by the research participants on the processes of the development of 
Bill C-10 (Part 4), the values embodied in the tough-on-crime legislation, and the impact of 
such policies. Further, some of the “adaptive” and “non-adaptive” strategies asserted by 
Garland (1996, 2001) are illustrated in the key findings presented in subsequent sections. Of 
particular concern is the concept of “denial” which not only demonstrates a complete disregard 
for statistics and other evidence that suggest youth crimes rates have declined, but also serves 
as a symbolic exercise of building consensus and reaffirming public faith and confidence in the 
state and the criminal justice system. Above all, the act of “denial” brings the crime victim to 
the forefront as a “representative character whose experience is assumed to be common and 
collective, rather than individual and atypical” (Garland, 2001, p. 144). This strategy, therefore, 
can be directly linked to the construction of the symbolic victim often portrayed in the media 
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and conveyed to and by the public. In effect, such techniques are instrumental in facilitating 
legislation as they are found to have great political use (Garland, 2001).  
9.2 Processes of the Development and Legislation of Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
 Notwithstanding that prior research indicates that enacting tougher sentencing practices 
have minimal effects on youth crime rates, the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
developed had little to do with the overall lack of supporting research or reference to empirical 
data (i.e., statistics). The complete disregard for statistics was exemplary of the underlying 
crisis of penal-welfare strategies that are discussed primarily in the works of Garland (1996, 
2001) and O’Malley (1992) with regards to state denial, and appeared to surface in much of the 
interview data. In accordance with the Marxist/critical theoretical perspective, Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
was created on account of a number of forces within the social structural system that combined 
to produce a consensus on tougher legislative provisions. There was in fact evidence to suggest 
that lawmakers, interest groups, the media, law enforcement agencies, the public, and other 
social organizations had a direct influence on the ways in which the interests of the dominant 
group successfully became almost everyone’s interest. Although theoretically there is no 
reason to believe, as the instrumentalist perspective suggests, that all forms of legislation are 
passed in favour of society’s most dominant groups, the evidence provided by the interview 
participants and Hansard implies that within this particular political context, the interests of the 
dominant group were transformed into public policy by means of consensus, as a source of re-
legitimation in an attempt to avert a full-scale crisis of legitimacy.  
 Bill C-10 (Part 4) was born out of two preceding Bills that failed to come into fruition, 
but was nonetheless part of the Conservative Party’s political agenda from the moment of 
election into office in 2006. Much of the findings demonstrate that the public was used as an 
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intermediary for gaining consent for state intervention, even though there was evidence to 
suggest that the public was likely misinformed about the seriousness and prevalence of violent 
youth crime. The ways in which the criminal justice system has been regarded by the public 
often characterizes notions of its limitations and likelihood for failure instead of considering 
any hope for future success. Typically, such fragmented information is disseminated through 
the media, which often reproduces the dominant ideology. Public perceptions on the 
ineffectiveness of the YCJA were used by the state to advance crime policy, and serve as 
examples of the alleged illegitimacy of penal-welfarism, state denial, and the need to react. 
Similar findings were also reported by Garland (2001), Hall et al. (2013), Feeley and Simon 
(1992), and O’Malley (1999), albeit these accounts were established within different 
jurisdictions from Canada.       
 Despite a general consensus of cross-national roundtable discussions suggesting that (1) 
a more punitive approach resulting in sending more youth into custody for longer periods of 
time will not result in a safer society, (2) the YCJA worked well prior to any legislative 
amendments, (3) such decisions result in both significant financial and social costs as opposed 
to producing the desired effects the Bill is meant to achieve, and (4) the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
amendments to the YCJA are inconsistent with some of the rights of a young person, efforts by 
opposing politicians, academics, and other experts in the field to curb the tough-on-crime 
mandate were dismissed by the Conservative government. Since nominal consideration was 
given to the reports generated from these discussions, there is evidence to suggest that the 
interests embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation reflect the values of individuals from 
the most powerful and dominant segments of society as opposed to those in less powerful 
segments. The legitimacy gained herein was formed on the basis of public inquiry, a concept 
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which Habermas (1975) considers imperative when proposing new legislation which is to 
include the active participation of the public during the deliberative process. In effect, the ways 
in which evidence (such as public inquiries) are used by the state have a direct influence on the 
problematization of certain activities (i.e., framing and defining the problem of youth crime), 
and is therefore connected to how the public is expected to think about the problem.     
 The results from the thematic coding of the interview data do suggest that winning a 
majority government was pivotal to legislating Bill C-10 (Part 4) without much debate. Despite 
the preceding crime Bills that failed to pass in the House of Commons, the Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
agenda continued to be propelled by the Conservatives regardless of resistance. Overall, the 
processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed were on the basis of an ideological 
philosophy. There is evidence from the interview data to suggest that the enactment of the Bill 
itself was not founded on any social or empirical evidence demonstrating its need, had nothing 
to do with good policy choices or intuitive crime policy, and was more politically driven rather 
than having anything to do with strategies that better keep Canadians safe (Interview 
Participant #2). In fact, much of the interview data corresponded with previous research on 
policies which aims to systematically identify, target and manage potentially violent youth, by 
enacting legislation that serves as a mechanism and “adaptive” strategy to control conceivably 
dangerous populations (Feeley & Simon, 1992, Garland, 2001). This shift in youth crime 
governance is not exclusive to Canada, but is illustrative of the types of transformations that 
have occurred in many Western Nations on account of an altered political ideology, neo-liberal 
rationalities, and paradigmatic metamorphoses’ of the state (O’Malley, 1999).        
 Evidence also suggested that the need for tougher legislation was a rather symbolic 
exercise whereby the public was made to believe that a change in policy would lead to a safer 
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society by protecting victims and “getting tough” on young criminals (particularly violent 
young offenders). The safeguarding of society against potentially violent “career criminals” 
adds to the notion that the symbolic victim can, more generally, be understood as the public 
itself. This is strongly connected with Garland’s (1996, 2001) analysis of both the “adaptive” 
and “non-adaptive” strategies of the state in order to build consensus for mass loyalty and 
support by invoking images of the emblematic persona. As a result, the Conservative’s gained 
popularity and used the tough-on-crime approach as a political strategy to secure votes all the 
while veiled as legislation that would improve Canada’s youth crime policy. Theoretically, this 
finding demonstrates elements of both the conflict perspective and the Marxist/critical 
approach. This is first illustrated through Vold’s (1958) assertion that a group’s success within 
the law making process to promote one’s interests is dependent upon gaining the maximum 
number of votes in a democratic society. It then serves as an example of Habermas’ (1975, 
1985) argument that legitimacy is gained via the process of electing government (through mass 
support) so that the public plays a role in the decision making process. This latter claim has 
come to fruition on account of the modern capitalist, democratic state, and is an example of the 
processes through which state power is marshalled to maintain political legitimacy. On the 
whole, this finding therefore provides evidence for the ways in which the state exercises its 
sovereign power by relying on the public for widespread support to enact tough-on-crime 
measures.       
 The interview findings suggested that the legislative amendments effectively represent 
the dominant ideology instilled in society. This ideology, which is characterized by the 
capitalist, ruling class philosophy, spans across all facets of the superstructure. It is inherently 
reproduced through the public so that most classes within society come to uphold similar 
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values and beliefs, particularly against crime (Habermas, 1985; Hall et al., 2013). Given that 
the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation expresses the dominant ideology, by definition, it addresses 
very little of the needs and interests of youth in conflict with the law. This suggested that the 
values embodied in the legislation were those of the politicians, lawmakers, various interest 
groups (including victims), the public, the police, Crown attorneys, and to a degree, the media. 
Presently, the ways in which crime is viewed appears to be aligned with the conservative 
ideology that emphasizes the importance of punishment as a means of responding to the 
problem. This finding lends support to Garland’s (2001) discussion on the neo-conservative 
stance and the position taken against violent youth crime.    
 The current structure of government in modern, democratic societies also contributes to 
the ways in which majority governments can suggest, shape and implement legislation that 
advance the dominant ideology. Given the Conservative Party’s ultimate position of legitimate 
power and authority, opposition arguing against the legislative amendments was rejected. Thus, 
the promotion of dominant values and interests in policy are best accomplished when the 
initiating party is arranged in such a way that it commands the utmost authority and control. 
These findings not only suggested that hegemony was exercised over subordinate groups, but 
that public opinion was used as a proxy for consent for maintaining support of state 
intervention for responding to potentially violent youth.  
 Overall, the findings reflected some of the complexities of building a consensus on the 
problem of high-risk youth, and illustrated elements of a process which revealed that a state of 
crisis on the misbegotten penal-welfare strategies was in effect (Feeley & Simon, 1992; 
Garland, 2001; O’Malley, 1999). It was also evident that the legislative process (i.e., the 
state/formal political sphere) is not at all value-neutral when responding to outside interests, 
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but instead has interests of its own (e.g., gaining and maintaining legitimacy) (Habermas, 1975; 
Hall et al., 2013). In the process of gaining the consent and support of the public for its 
mediation in various social and economical fields, politicians do in fact have an interest in 
enacting legislation that is supported by the public. This was witnessed in the legislative 
process of Bill C-10 (Part 4), and has been noted in other (albeit less frequent) instances where 
the legislative process is taken up in support of the least powerful groups in an attempt to 
appease the public (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). What this suggested then, is that it is not 
always a question of the law itself, but likely has more to do with the willingness to enforce 
certain legislation over others. In effect, this phenomenon is part of the state’s responsibility to 
successfully “steer” the economy and thus society in a certain direction in an attempt to avoid 
crises (Habermas, 1975).        
 When discussing values that should be embodied in the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation, 
the findings suggested that factors that take into account the rehabilitation of a youth is of 
utmost importance. These include greater emphasis on the swiftness of responses, legislation 
that corresponds with various elements of education, solutions that enable youth to understand 
the impact of their offence by connecting the behaviour to the consequences, and providing 
youth with the necessary skills and tools to build confidence. These findings were more in line 
with the traditional penal-welfare strategies as opposed to “late modernity” and the neo-
liberalized scheme, which currently places responsibility and accountability on youth to 
discipline themselves through available correctional programs. In effect, these new tactics and 
strategies of personal liability and punishment are examples of what Garland (1996) refers to 
as the validation or justification of the criminal as a rational-minded individual and consumer.    
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 While prior research shows that there are numerous factors that contribute to youth 
being at risk of criminal involvement, the findings suggested that Bill C-10 (Part 4) most 
typically represents a political ideology that upholds certain values at the cost of minority or 
“underclass” youth (see Alvi, 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006; Osgood & 
Anderson, 2004). These findings coincide with the critical theoretical perspective in that it 
considers the historical, cultural, social, political and economic circumstances which come 
together to create structural inequality for various groups of marginalized people. It is these 
underprivileged youth who are more likely to be burdened and impacted by the consequences 
associated with the tough-on-crime legislation, since these laws are targeted towards high-risk, 
potentially violent youth. More notably, the enactment of Bill C-10 (part 4) strategically 
situates many marginalized youth on a course that not only propels some youth towards further 
crime, but also advances conservative ideology. These findings were congruent with those of 
Alvi (2012), DeKeseredy (2011), Simon and Feeley (1992), Garland (2001), Hall et al. (2013), 
O’Malley (1999) and Muncie (2006), and were demonstrative of the shift in youth crime 
governance.   
 The findings further suggested that Bill C-10 (Part 4) is a youth justice policy that is 
predominately unilateral in that it erroneously implies more punitive sanctions better respond 
to crime. In general, this illustrated the prevalence of the conservative ideology relative to both 
the state’s failures and the ways in which it stresses punishment as part of the state’s role in 
crime control (Garland, 1996). Since youth crime is a social phenomenon that broadly affects 
society in vast array of ways, the findings concluded that youth justice legislation is better 
received only when it accounts for the needs of the general public and youth in conflict with 
the law. Instead of implementing legislation which, at times, consists of contradictory 
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sentencing principles and incoherent neo-liberal/neo-conservative rationalities (Feeley & 
Simon, 1992; O’Malley, 1999), the approach should be one that balances fairness, 
accountability, and rehabilitation. Notwithstanding the legislative amendments put forth by Bill 
C-10 (Part 4), the general position of the interviewees was one that maintained that youth 
crime legislation has a limited role to play when responding to youth crime. This suggested 
that most participants were not in favour of the conservative ideology that underlies tough-on-
crime measures. Overall, provisions of better community and mental health services for youth, 
changes within the educational system, increasing youth employment, development of better 
neighbourhood support systems, and injecting more resources into the community or other 
social institutions (schools) have a stronger impact on youth crime than any substantive change 
to the legislation. These findings suggested that there is a greater need for implementing 
welfare strategies as opposed to the modern crime control techniques currently put into 
practice.   
 While certain members of the federal Conservative government were the most 
instrumental in influencing the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), policy ideas leading to 
legislative change originated from various stakeholders and ideals of what society ought to 
look like in relation to crime and crime policy. Although there was evidence to suggest that a 
few key members of the Conservative Party fueled these policy changes (group 1), the shift 
towards a new style of governance was also influenced by provincial Ministers of Justice 
(group 2) and American youth crime models (which may be linked to the beliefs of the Reform 
Party of Canada suggesting that youth cannot be rehabilitated). In addition, enforcers such as 
police and Crown attorneys (group 3), the media (group 4), and most notably victims’ groups 
(group 5) were prominent figures in the legislative process. While these influential groups gave 
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rise to a process of public consensus on the issue of youth crime, they were also illustrative of 
the allegiance between neo-liberal and neo-conservative rationalities which currently place 
greater emphasis on the tracking and surveillance of high-risk youth. This allegiance has not 
only led to a shift in youth crime governance based on a redefinition of the problem, but lie 
beneath the ways in which policies and legislation are developed. The results from the thematic 
coding of the interview data suggested that the collaborative efforts of these five groups 
collectively (but not equally) influenced the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), as their 
conceptions of what society ought to look like closely resembled one another. In addition, 
these groups not only provided backing for the Conservative government’s position on Bill C-
10 (Part 4), but also augmented the wide-ranging desire for more punitive sanctions.  
 The unequal distribution of power amongst interest groups (particularly amidst victims’ 
groups) heavily influenced the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). This included influence over 
the legislation itself as well as input on notions of victimization, and various reactions to crime. 
Interestingly, there was evidence to suggest that these interest groups were deliberately 
manipulated and used by the Conservative Party by selectively choosing which groups or 
individuals to include in the parliamentary debates. This supports the assertion that the ways in 
which other evidence such as public inquiries are used has an effect on the response to the 
problem of youth crime (including previous attempts at governing, such as the YOA), and 
places accountability for the problem onto youth (typically marginal youth). This, as 
interviewees suggested, was done in order to further the Conservative position on the 
legislation and can be linked to Garland’s (1996, 2001) discussion on the “adaptive” strategies 
of the state. In this sense, there appeared to be an intricate relationship that developed between 
the individual (micro) and governmental (macro) processes during the enactment of the Bill, 
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which not only encompassed the government but also accounted for some victims and the 
general public (Hall et al., 2013; McMurtry & Roy, 2008). The inclusion of victims is part of 
the new governance strategy which helps legitimate the need for additional legislation (Garland, 
2001). This suggested then, that the public was used to forward the state’s agenda by achieving 
a consensus on the basis of a perceived problem. Congruent with the Marxist/critical 
theoretical perspective, the involvement of these various key influential persons within the 
political sphere necessarily controlled, shaped and enacted the legislation in a manner that was 
most compatible with the dominant ideology. Contrary to the instrumentalist view however, 
enacting laws in favour of society’s most dominant groups is not always a successful 
endeavour given the nature of the social structural complexities and institutional relationships 
that exist in modern society.  
 Despite a lack of Canadian literature regarding the processes through which Bill C-10 
(Part 4) was legislated and developed, these findings generally concur with prior research using 
data from the United States that illustrate the ways in which tough-on-crime policies are 
legislated and enforced (Bishop & Decker, 2006; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; Hall 
et al, 2013; Krisberg, 2006; O’Malley, 1999; Snyder, 2002; Tonry & Doob, 2004). Even 
though Bill C-10 (Part 4) was subject to numerous revisions in its earlier forms (Bill C-4 and 
Bill C-25), the third and final version of the Bill was passed relatively effortlessly. This 
provides evidence to suggest that majority governments are in a position to propose public 
policy that reflects the dominant values as well as legislative changes to the law with limited 
supporting research. As a result of gaining a majority government, these findings indicate that 
the public does not appear to be adequately safeguarded against judgements passed on public 
policy or legislation, especially since this particular Bill was not presented on the basis of 
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impartial policy views. Although the public actively participates in the formation of 
government and legislation on the basis of public deliberation and inquiry, the public merely 
reproduces the views, values, and ideology embedded within the social superstructure. 
Moreover, a general disregard for developing a policy that better addresses youth crime by 
accounting for the needs of youth illustrate not only partisan views, but the work of a typical 
myopic bureaucracy. As such, these findings are congruent with previous research which 
suggests that Canada (and most of the Western world) has been subjected to a neo-political 
trend that appears to advance, through various mechanisms, “adaptive” strategies, “non-
adaptive” responses and legislation in support of controlling risk and managing crime (Feeley 
& Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996, 2001; O’Malley, 1999). The law, therefore, is used as an 
instrument of power and legitimacy.  
9.3 Impact of the Tough-on-Crime Policy 
 Investigations into Canadian case law between the years of 2003 and 2013 found that 
slight differences do exist from one province to the next in the way youth are formally dealt 
with in court, but that none of these disparities were linked to the new amendments. An 
analysis of findings concluded that the sentencing principles (accountability, rehabilitation and 
proportionality) outlined in the Section 3 of the YCJA were largely adhered to across all 
provinces in every year, given that the majority of judges placed a great deal of emphasis on 
the alternatives to custody when searching for the least restrictive approach.291 These findings 
291 The sentencing provisions in the YCJA place specific restriction on the use of custody and in lieu create 
alternatives which have successfully reduced the use of custody (in comparison to the YOA). The additional 
alternatives introduced by the YCJA (along with the sentencing principles) have reduced the use of custody, and 
by the very fact are in direct contradiction with the provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Community sanctions are seen 
as less punitive than custodial sentences given the direction provided by the legislation (proportionality). For more 
information, see the YCJA, S.3(1)(a)(iii); S.4(a); and S.38(2)(d); and Bala, Carrington & Robert (2009). These 
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indicated that the YCJA does in fact reflect a balance between rehabilitation and accountability, 
even amongst cases judged after the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4).   
 While there was some degree of variation in the number of case law published within 
each year, there was very little difference that surfaced with regards to the most common 
offences that appeared over the ten year time frame. The main focus of the case law analysis, 
however, predominately pertained to the presumptive offences as these were the ones most 
likely subject to the imposition of an adult sentence. Whether youth were sentenced as youth or 
adults varied on a number of considerations that included (but were not limited to) the severity 
of the crime, age, feelings or remorse (or lack thereof), prior criminal record, and other 
mitigating circumstantial factors, such as mental illness or the level of involvement in a crime 
(partners and accomplices).       
 In some instances adult sentences were imposed on youth where youth sentences were 
inconsistent with the seriousness of the offence; that is, a youth sentence would have been 
unable to hold the youth accountable for the offending behaviour. There is evidence that shows 
youth sentences were imposed only on a minority of youth for many of the presumptive 
offences. This finding suggests that prior to the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
the YCJA was already quite punitive in nature, without requiring the Crown to consider the 
possibility of seeking an adult sentence for youth convicted of these crimes. Further, the case 
law analysis concluded that there was an increase in adult sentences imposed upon youth in 
violation of the law from 2007 onward, even in instances where a presumptive offence was not 
involved but was one that warranted more punitive sanctions. While presumption applied to 
cases involving a third conviction for a serious violent offence, in 2008 the Supreme Court of 
findings differ from what research finds for adults in many ways due to the focus of the YCJA on meaningful 
consequences and the least restrictive alternative.    
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Canada held that a presumption that a youth would receive an adult sentence is 
unconstitutional (see R v D.B. (2008)). While in theory, under the YCJA courts are generally 
asked to consider the imposition of an adult sentence only for youth who have committed the 
most serious offence, in practice however the YCJA continues to allow for the possibility for an 
adult sentence to be imposed on a young offender for a broad range of offences, both violent 
and non-violent.     
 A number of recurring themes were found in the case law pre-enactment of Bill C-10 
(Part 4). First, the case law addressed issues pertaining to pre-trial detention, most notably in 
relation to whether or not youth were eligible for release or had committed crimes while on 
bail. This finding suggests that in a small fraction of cases, there was in fact confusion when it 
came to the rules regarding the release or detention of youth. Frequently, this confusion 
stemmed from the fact that pretrial detention is a denial of freedom of a person not yet found 
guilty of an offence, and in some sense is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. 
 Additionally, there are potentially harmful effects of pretrial detention on youth 
because it interferes with the youth’s development, particularly in relation to family, peers, and 
school. A second theme is connected to lifting the publication ban, especially in instances 
where a youth sentence was imposed for an offence that carried a presumption of an adult 
sentence. As time progressed, however, the issue of lifting the publication ban decreased, 
because some youth court judges commonly believed that publication of offenders’ names 
have minimal effect on rehabilitation. Third, the case law indicated that there was a lack of 
clarity with regards to the definition of violent offences, although this occurred minimally. 
While presumptive offences were exempt from this category, cases pertaining to endangering 
public safety were contentious.  
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 Given the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), it is expected that case law commencing in 
the latter part of 2013 and onward will demonstrate that offences will be designated as violent 
if it causes bodily harm or intends to do so. Finally, an analysis of the case law concluded that 
prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) the sentencing principles of denunciation and 
deterrence were somewhat controversial. While the YCJA at that time did not include these 
sentencing principles, the case law indicated that previously some youth were given sentences 
that reflected denunciation without considering rehabilitation and reintegration. These findings 
suggest that even before Bill C-10 (Part 4) came into effect, some sentences mirrored 
sentencing principles similar to those provided in the adult criminal justice system, albeit they 
were appealed because they were inconsistent with the YCJA principles.     
 Whether or not the amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) will adequately address these 
issues is unknown at this time. While the first half of the case law from 2013 demonstrated 
similarities in sentencing trends to previous years (especially 2011-2012), only one case 
referred to the new sentencing provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Although the YCJA provisions 
governing the proceedings had changed, the court still operated on the presumption that the 
youth was guilty with diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability. Thus, there is 
evidence to suggest that, at least for the time being, youth in conflict with the law remain 
unaffected by the provisions of Bill C-10 (Part 4).  
 The findings here provided tentative support for the Marxist/critical theoretical 
perspective on the various circumstances, conditions, barriers, social and economic structural 
inequalities, and political marginalization that afflict certain groups of youth in modern 
capitalist society. While there was no evidence in the case law suggesting youth are currently 
impacted by the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation, there were indications that youth had been 
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affected by tough-on-crime legislation prior to the amendments. The effects of the tough-on-
crime legislation were two-fold. First, the enactment of the YCJA was put forth by the 
government in an effort to get tough on crime in ways the YOA did not (Bala & Anand, 2012). 
For example, the case law concluded that the YCJA is in some ways more punitive than the 
YOA, especially with regards to lowering the age limit from 16 to 14 years of age for the 
presumption of adult sentences for the most serious offences. In addition, “the most serious 
offences that carry a presumption of an adult sentence are extended” under the YCJA to 
“include patterns of serious, repeat, and violent offences” (see Lightstone, n.d.). These findings 
can be linked to Garland’s (1996, 2001) analysis of the neo-conservative stance given that, to 
some degree, the YCJA represents a greater commitment towards punishing those charged with 
a presumptive offence. It should, however, be noted that other “adaptive” strategies of the state 
(such as Garland’s (1996) interpretation of “defining defiance down” and “system integration 
and system monitoring”) also presented themselves in the case law.     
Second, there was sufficient evidence in the case law that showed that a very large 
proportion of youth in conflict with the law are negatively affected by more punitive measures, 
especially since a significant number of them are from groups that may be viewed as the 
“underclass” (i.e., socially, politically, culturally and economically underprivileged). 
Consequently, they are afflicted by a complexity of issues by virtue of their racial/ethnic and 
cultural background, which at times contributes to systematic discrimination within the judicial 
system (Alvi, 2012; Bala, 1997; Calverley, Cotter & Halla, 2010; Caputo & Vallée, 2007; 
Feeley & Simon, 1992; Hall et al., 2013; McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Mosher, 1996; Wortley 
et al., 2008). Together, these findings were indicative of a shift in political rationale on youth 
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crime governance when compared to preceding legislation, and lends support to Garland’s 
(2001) argument on new penological ideologies that underlie current youth crime policies.     
 The implication of these findings is that, up until June 2013, youth in conflict with the 
law had not been directly affected by the Bill C-10 (Part 4) legislation. Since the genuine 
effects of the legislation may not readily surface for some time, it is difficult to project if and 
how youth may specifically be affected by the provisions of the Bill in the future. Within this 
context, it may be argued that any negative impact forecasted by empirical studies from other 
jurisdictions is speculation. Accordingly, the precise consequences of enacting such legislation 
remain to be determined through the case law. This in itself provides mixed support for the 
critical theoretical view put forth by Alvi (2012); DeKeseredy (2011); Garland (2001); Hall et 
al. (2013); Wortley et al. (2008). 
9.4 Responses to Youth Crime in Texas 
 An analysis of case law and legislation from Texas concluded that the ways in which 
this state responds to youth crime coincides with a model of crime control that is further along 
the tough-on-crime continuum, relative to Canada. Evidence of this is first witnessed in Texas’ 
purpose clause which places a great degree of emphasis on punishment and deterrence, 
although rehabilitation and reintegration are also considered after “providing safety for the 
public”, “promoting the concept of punishment”, and “removing the taint of criminality from 
children” (Section 51.01 Texas Family Code). There are, however, further signs of the tough-
on-crime ideology given the principles on which Texas’ juvenile justice laws are formed. Prior 
research showed that Texas was subject to a number of revisions to its legislation in the mid-
late 90s in order to reflect the tough-on-crime mandate after noting a spike in crime rates 
(Krisberg, 2006; Snyder, 2002). In the Canadian context, similar revisions occurred during the 
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same time frame resulting in a number of amendments to the YOA (Caputo & Vallée, 2007). 
This finding suggested that both Canada and Texas have undergone similar youth justice 
transformations and shifts in youth crime governance/political ideology, though the tough-on-
crime legislation in Texas is far more sophisticated and advanced. While the analysis of case 
law and legislation in Texas served as a counterpoint to the philosophy of justice in Canada 
given its highly punitive nature, there was evidence to suggest that the legislative amendments 
of Bill C-10 (Part 4) is a modified model of crime control that brings the two systems of youth 
justice closer together. Thus, the analysis not only shed light on where Canada presently sits on 
the tough-on-crime continuum, but also developed a more comprehensive understanding of the 
political and legislative choices that have been made with regards to the current youth justice 
approach in Canada.  
 While Canada oversees and responds to youth crime by taking into account the 
principles of rehabilitation and reintegration, Texas responds on the basis of protection, and to 
a much lesser degree rehabilitation. Consistent with previous research, the findings suggested 
that Canada is more inclined to informally proceed with diversion than Texas. However, where 
a serious, violent offender is concerned, there is much less emphasis on diversion in Texas 
because priority is given to offender accountability and reduction of crime via deterrence and 
punishment. Some of these elements have presently manifested themselves in the Canadian 
youth justice legislation. 
 Texas addresses youth proceedings as delinquent as opposed to criminal unless 
transferred to adult court. The case law in Texas indicated that it relies heavily on determinate 
sentencing of violent or habitual offenders for youth who remain under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, but waives jurisdiction by means of discretionary transfer to the adult criminal 
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court for certain offences. Both previous research and the case law findings indicated that 
youth transferred to the adult criminal jurisdiction were no more likely to have committed a 
violent offence than those who received a determinate sentence (Dietch, 2011). This suggested 
a degree of disproportionality of youth being transferred to the adult courts for offences of 
similar nature, although the overall number of cases waived is less than one percent. The 
legislation allowing the transfer of youth to the adult court jurisdiction in Texas is similar to 
the provisions previously outlined in Canada’s YOA, but because the Canadian court’s made 
significantly greater use of custodial sentences for adolescent offenders as opposed to diversion 
and informal programs, the YOA legislation was rescinded. This finding, in effect, coincides 
with Garland’s (1996) analysis of “defining deviance down” as part of the state’s response to 
youth crime.  
 The analysis of Texas’ legislation lends support to the argument put forth by Garland 
(2001) on the genealogy of youth justice and the ways in which North America (or Texas, 
more specifically) has experienced a number of transformations, particularly on the discourse 
of youth justice. The shift towards a more punitive style of youth crime governance in Texas 
can be attributed to a great deal of changes not only to the welfare approach of crime control, 
but to the superstructure itself, spanning over the economic, political, social and cultural 
systems (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; O’Malley, 1999). The enactment of the tough-
on-crime legislation originated in a similar fashion to that of Canada by sparking fear across 
Texas about youth crime (see Chapter 4), and echoes the findings of Hall et al. (2013) on the 
need for tougher laws typically summoned by conservative governments for seemingly out-of-
control youth. The tough-on-crime legislation in Texas was proposed and implemented by the 
Republican Party, pushing for anti-crime laws that closely resembled the sentencing principles 
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found in the adult justice system. The desire to implement harsher punishments is illustrative 
of the conservative ideology that demands respect for authority and discipline (Garland, 1996). 
These views were not only supported by the public, but acted as the catalyst which gave rise to 
the state’s authority and ability to exercise legitimate power (Habermas, 1985).  
 The findings from the case law, however, are particularly congruent with the work of 
Hall et al. (2013) with regards to policies that aim to track, control and manage problematic 
(potential “career criminals”, or the “dangerous other”) youth, and support the critical 
theoretical perspective. The tough-on-crime philosophy outlined in Texas’ case law shed light 
on the ways in which such legislation is meant to target high-risk, potentially violent youth. 
The tough-on-crime policy that has been enacted for nearly twenty years has translated into the 
systematic mistreatment of youth who represent the “underclass”, therefore belonging to a 
socially, economically, politically, and ethnically undesirable group of youth (Garland, 2001; 
Hall et al., 2013). This is particularly evidenced in Texas’ legislation which facilitates the 
transfer of youth to adult state prisons, but has also been observed through the procedural 
mechanisms that rely on the imposition of a determinate sentence. Both sentencing options 
were repeatedly noted in the case law as being excessively used against underprivileged 
African-American and Hispanic youth (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003), and lends supports 
to the ways in which the youth justice system in Texas further contributes to the 
marginalization of these youth.292 As a result, there is a greater likelihood for tough-on-crime 
292 There is evidence to suggest that the tough-on-crime policies and legislation enacted in the state of Texas 
unintentionally target youth of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds (see the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974; Center for Children’s Law and Policy, 2013, specifically “Fact Sheet: Disproportionate 
Minority Contact”). This assertion is made in conjunction with the statewide youth crime statistics organized by 
offence type, age and race which acknowledge that certain groups who do not represent the dominant class are 
disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. 
399 
 
                                            
measures to produce adverse effects on the disenfranchised, simply because it perpetuates the 
social conditions that act as barriers for youth to pursue normal, productive lives.     
 The tough-on-crime legislation in Texas differs from that of Canada in three major 
ways. First, unlike in Texas where the minimum age of responsibility is 10 years of age, 
Canada’s minimum age of jurisdiction is 12 years of age. In contrast, while the maximum age 
of responsibly in Canada is up to a young person’s 18th birthday, Texas limits their juvenile 
jurisdiction to those who are 16 years of age or younger. This establishes that youth over the 
age of 17 that come into contact with the justice system are treated as though an adult. While 
there is evidence to suggest that Canadian adolescents between the ages of 16 and 17 are 
mostly likely to engage in serious violent behaviour (Brennan, 2012), these findings imply that 
Canadian youth are governed by youth justice legislation that consider the principle of limited 
accountability for an additional year beyond Texas.  
 Second, the procedural mechanisms through which a youth may be tried and sentenced 
as an adult varies significantly in Canada and Texas. Most notably, youth in Texas may be 
transferred to the adult criminal court jurisdiction while provisions in the YCJA exclude this 
possibility. This finding concluded that youth in Texas are treated with the same level of 
accountability as adults, and are therefore governed by the same legislation and sentencing 
principles designed for adults. Decisions regarding whether or not a youth will be waived to 
the adult jurisdiction rests solely at the discretion of the judge in Texas. In contrast, judicial 
discretion in the Canadian context can result in the imposition of an adult sentence within the 
youth court.  
 Third, the placement of a youth sentenced as an adult in Texas and Canada differ to 
some extent. While youth in Texas typically serve their adult sentences in adult facilities, youth 
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under the age of 18 in Canada are not permitted to serve their adult sentence in an institutional 
designed for adults. These findings showed that there is a greater degree of discretion in the 
Canadian judicial system on the placement of youth, and also considers the best interests of the 
child with respect to the needs and circumstances of the individual youth (YCJA, S.3 (1)(c)). In 
comparison, youth in Texas are less likely to receive rehabilitative services in the adult 
facilities and are therefore more likely to recidivate (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; Deitch, 2009a).  
 Although there are some differences in the legislation amongst both jurisdictions, the 
findings support the critical theoretical perspective and particularly the works of Feeley and 
Simon (1992), Garland (2001), Hall et al. (2013), and O’Malley (1999). More specifically, 
there is evidence to suggest that the tough-on-crime legislation enacted in both Texas and 
Canada was done so on the basis of an ideological shift that altered the ways in which youth 
crime is perceived and defined. Both jurisdictions are illustrative of a decline in the loyalty to 
penal-welfare strategies, although the case law in Texas indicated that the state generally holds 
less faith in the welfare model than does Canada. The findings from both Canada and Texas 
are examples of jurisdictions that have been affected by the various social, economic, political, 
cultural, and structural changes that have influenced governing techniques. As a result, the 
organization and structuring of the current governmental paradigm is characterized by a 
reconceptualized understanding of crime control, including rehabilitation. This shift in political 
rationale not only embodies a modified approach to youth crime control, but calls upon the 
public for mass support of dominant ideology in order to legitimate state authority and power 
(Garland, 2001; Habermas, 1975, 1985).   
 Further, while the enactment of the tough-on-crime legislation in both jurisdictions are 
perceived as being good at what they were meant to do, the consequences associated with them 
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have the most bearing on underprivileged minority groups, particularly affecting the 
“underclass” youth found within the social structure. These findings suggested that tough-on-
crime legislation does not represent the interests of these youth, but reflect the dominant 
ideology that promotes policies that often attempt to control and manage risk, and encourage 
greater supervision of persistent offenders who exhibit tendencies of violence. The most 
important implication of these findings is the distinction made between the tough-on-crime 
legislation in both Canada and Texas, with regards to the ramifications they have for youth 
(particularly as marginal political subjects least capable of mobilizing political power) in each 
jurisdiction. Evidence from Texas indicated that their youth justice legislation is more punitive 
in nature when compared to that of Canada. This finding stood despite the enactment of Bill C-
10 (Part 4), although these amendments mirror some aspects of Texas’ youth crime policy. 
 Overall, however, the YCJA is still far more prone to adhering to the principles of 
rehabilitation and reintegration of youth in conflict with the law. This finding, therefore, 
substantiates the assertion that Texas is further along the tough-on-crime continuum relative to 
Canada, although it does not diminish the ways in which accountability for the problem of 
youth crime is delegated onto youth and acted upon through various punitive measures (i.e., 
adult penalties, long sentences, etc.). Both jurisdictions, however, have displayed elements of 
“denial” and “acting out” as a non-“adaptive” response to the issue of youth crime, particularly 
on account of the various failures and shortcomings of the state and its perceived inability to 
control crime effectively (Garland, 1996).  
 In terms of what can be learned from the legislation responding to youth crime in Texas, 
the most substantial characteristic has to do with the ability to waive youth to the adult criminal 
jurisdiction. The transfer provision in Texas was found to be consistent with a crime control 
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philosophy, and is reflective of the purpose clause stipulated in the legislation. The shift in 
legislation towards transferring youth to the adult jurisdiction is based on the belief that harsher 
sanctions will act as a deterrent for youth. There is ample evidence that not only suggests that 
these measures are ineffective at achieving this goal, but that the right to waive jurisdiction 
over youth when appropriate diminishes any policy provisions of rehabilitation and 
reintegration, particularly when used disproportionately (Tonry & Doob, 2004). Overall, these 
findings showed that the YCJA better addresses youth crime because it protects youth from 
being prematurely sentenced as an adult, and prohibits them entirely from being adjudicated in 
the adult criminal justice system.  
 Another important factor to be considered is that youth who are sentenced as adults are 
subject to a number of adverse effects when placed in an adult institution. Most notably, they 
do not have any chance of taking advantage of valuable rehabilitative services and treatment 
available in the juvenile justice system, even if the programs are neo-liberalized and deviate 
from traditional disciplinary practices (Bentham, 2008; Foucault, 2008). In addition, adult 
facilities are not suitable for youth who fall below the maximum age of jurisdiction because it 
neither meets their specialized age-appropriate needs nor provides personal safety. In fact, 
adult correctional facilities are largely ineffective in reducing youth crime in the long run 
because it does not address or correct risk factors that make youth vulnerable to crime 
(Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995; Bishop & Frazier, 2000; Deitch, 2009a; Myers, 2003; Thomas & 
Bishop, 1984). 
 Learning about the failures or shortcomings of other, more punitive jurisdictions 
provides an awareness of which legislative strategies fall short and which succeed when 
responding to youth crime. There is evidence to suggest that both community based programs 
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and collaborative approaches between prosecutors, defence counsels, judges, probation officers, 
victims, and service providers that educate and mentor youth are far more effective and 
beneficial than amending legislation to enact more punitive measures. Dealing with the 
underlying issues of youth crime on a long-term basis (via continuous comprehensive 
programmatic evaluation) may help avoid the financial and social costs associated with 
incarcerating youth. In fact, Texas is beginning to move towards more holistic approaches that 
implement measures which help divert youth away from youth court. Yet, when considering 
the legislative amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) which may have the effect of expanding the 
category of crimes for which youth can be tried and sentenced to a term of custody (broadened 
definition of “violent offence”), and may increase the length of time for which youth can spend 
in custody (increased detention), there is some evidence to suggest there may be a degree of 
contradiction in Canadian youth justice legislation between these amendments and the efforts 
to enhance public safety. In addition, increasing the amount of time youth may spend in 
custody could have a negative effect on rehabilitation, because “for some vulnerable youth, 
placement in custody can lead to a downward spiral of dropping out of school, recruitment into 
gangs and further offending” (Bala, 2011, p. 1).   
 The implication of these findings is that governments attempting to enact tough-on-
crime legislation should place a greater emphasis on the ways in which such agendas have both 
failed and prevailed. Like Canada, Texas has experienced a similar attack on penal-welfare 
strategies, and perhaps to an even greater degree. However, there are signs that maintaining 
confidence in penal-welfarism better accounts for both the interests and needs of youth in 
conflict with the law, because it places greater emphasis on traditional styles of rehabilitation 
as opposed to focussing on tougher measures. What is clear is that both jurisdictions have 
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taken a very strong state approach to dealing with youth crime, although Texas is arguably 
more state-centric in its responsibility for crime control than Canada. While there are 
significant variations in approaches to youth justice between these two jurisdictions, a better 
understanding of tough-on-crime legislation from Texas has the potential to provide insight on 
a range of techniques and strategies of varying crime control models that have proven to be 
ineffective in response to youth crime. Moreover, the case law from Texas indicated that youth 
most frequently impacted by the tough-on-crime legislation are those that are politically 
marginalized and face many financial, educational, familial, social and sometimes mental 
obstacles. These findings, therefore, support the Marxist/critical theoretical view on the ways 
in which the modern capitalist state is linked to youth transgression (Alvi, 2012; DeKeseredy, 
2011; Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013).    
9.5 What Have We Learned About Tough-on-Crime Policies and Legislation? 
 In an attempt to explain why such phenomena occur, the results suggested that the 
tough-on-crime approach is a product of a multifaceted interaction between interest groups, 
politicians, lawmakers, the offender, the victim, the public, the media, the police, the judiciary, 
and the Crown (Wortley et al., 2008). This new concept of penology (which includes the 
redefinition of the problem of youth crime) and the shift in youth crime governance occurred 
on account of various economic and social changes. These changes in political rationale are 
perpetuated by the media and gain legitimacy through the public by means of mass support and 
consent (Habermas, 1975). As such, the tough-on-crime legislation is not only reflective of the 
dominant values and ideology held by society’s most powerful groups (Chambliss & Seidman, 
1971; Garland, 2001; Hall et al., 2013), but of the state’s incessant act of “denial” (Garland, 
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1996). Together, these elements reaffirm the state’s need to implement tougher legislation as a 
means of addressing and making up for its insufficiencies and shortfalls.  
 Based on prior research, the data from the interviews, and the case law findings from 
Texas, tough-on-crime legislation is ineffective at deterring youth crime both on an individual 
level and one that is more widespread. The current results showed many similarities in the 
processes (and the basis upon which) the tough-on-crime approach developed in Canada and 
Texas, although Canadian legislation includes some sentencing principles that represent 
somewhat of a departure from their American counterpart (i.e., strong emphasis on 
rehabilitation, reintegration and diminished blameworthiness). While the newly enacted 
amendments of Bill C-10 (Part 4) resemble Texas’ legislation in certain ways, the findings 
suggest that Canadian youth justice policy is generally better designed to respond to youth 
crime. In effect, Texas is much further along the tough-on-crime continuum, although both 
jurisdictions reflect a definitive shift from the penal-welfare model to one that is consistent 
with a model of crime control. This can be linked to Garland’s (1996) concept of denial and the 
limitations of the state more generally.    
 Currently, the legislative amendments have not translated to any substantive changes in 
practice. As such, the findings from the Canadian case law analysis were unable to determine 
whether or not any substantial changes will occur in the way youth are sentenced over time. 
However, these findings do not suggest that changes will not occur in the future, but only that 
it is too premature to reach a conclusion on the ways in which youth may be impacted by the 
amendments in Bill C-10 (Part 4). Nonetheless, if we are to learn from responses to youth 
crime from more punitive jurisdictions, it may very well be that an increase in the proportion 
of sentenced youth for longer periods of time may be observed.  
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 Rather than enacting tougher legislation, the findings from both Canada and Texas 
reveal that long-term crime prevention strategies and early intervention programs are much 
more valuable and effective at reducing the risk of violence, increasing public safety and 
improving youth justice overall. These strategies and programs are also more likely to assist 
underprivileged youth as well as and those who exhibit early signs of criminal involvement or 
behaviour. Further, in line with prior research, apprehended youth already in conflict with the 
law have a greater likelihood of benefitting from restorative justice, community-based 
sentencing and circle sentencing as opposed to harsher and longer sentences (Bala & Anand, 
2012; Doob & Cesaroni, 2004; Krisberg, 2006; McCord, 2002). Generally speaking, there is 
evidence to suggest that youth benefit from these programs in Canada, but these findings 
showed that in many instances provincial resources are either scarce or mismanaged 
(McMurtry & Curling, 2008).  
 Additionally, the availability for such services in some provinces for youth appears 
minimal. This latter finding leads to two broad questions within the Canadian context. First, 
instead of enacting more punitive legislation that reflects the dominant ideology, why has the 
federal government not invited provinces to enhance or employ all aspects of the YCJA equally 
through the provision of more resources, especially if rehabilitation is a main concern? Second, 
why have some provinces not prioritized the delivery of youth criminal justice (for youth 
already in conflict with the law) within a reasonable period of time in order to ensure that 
youth profit from these programs more expediently? Virtually none of the limited Canadian 
research that has broadly investigated the benefits and effectiveness of youth programs has 
addressed these questions.     
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9.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research provides a better understanding of the individual and governmental 
processes associated with the tough-on-crime approach in Canada, with a specific focus on 
youth crime. The results provide a current picture of the ways in which the tough-on-crime 
policy has come to fruition within the Canadian context. However, further research is required 
to pick up where this study leaves off.  
 First, the interview data were collected not only to explore the processes through which 
Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed, but also on the perceptions of youth crime from a very broad 
perspective. While all of the participants were able to comment on their perceptions of youth 
crime, not all were familiar with the specific processes associated with the tough-on-crime 
legislation. While three-quarters of the interviewees had some general knowledge of the 
politics behind the enactment of the Bill, only a few were directly involved in the 
parliamentary debates. In other words, none of the participants were active politicians at the 
time of the Bill’s legislation, and very few were involved in providing expert testimony, 
drafting the legislative amendments, and producing reports for the Minister of Justice.  
 On the one hand, the data collected from all twenty-two interviews provided enough 
information to conclude that participants agreed about the ways in which Bill C-10 (Part 4) had 
developed and been legislated. On the other hand, none of the participants approved of Bill C-
10 (Part 4) and they questioned the need for amendments. In addition, none of the participants 
identified themselves as Conservative Party supporters. This was due to the general 
composition of the sample and a lack of diversity of participants. Thus, a larger sample size is 
needed in order to include the perspectives of those in agreement with the legislation. To help 
fill in some of these gaps, Hansard was used to substantiate the data provided by the 
respondents. In addition, it shed light on the Conservative Party’s perspective, even when they 
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were reluctant to participant in the interviews. In effect, a more comprehensive understanding 
of the processes associated with the development of the Bill can be gained with interviewing 
those in agreement with the legislation. These perspectives may include aspects of the 
deliberation process that were not made available to the public (e.g., Privy Council), and were 
therefore not found in Hansard.   
 Second, because the research questions intended to better understand the processes 
through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) was enacted, the specific processes associated with the 
dynamics between politicians and interest groups other than victim’s groups fell outside the 
scope of this study. While the findings in this research illustrated a perfect example of a 
symbiotic relationship, where some interest groups such as victims fueled the tough-on-crime 
cause and the government used this to support their legislation, further research and analysis is 
required to investigate four main questions. First, what is the actual degree of influence had by 
interest groups within the political realm? Second, what are the conditions under which interest 
groups surface? Third, what is the basis upon which some interest groups are able to push 
forward their agendas within the political sphere more so than others? Finally, what role do the 
media play in relation to augmenting specific interest group positions? These research 
questions may be guided by a governmentality approach that examines the exercise of power in 
terms of the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 2000, p. 341; Foucault, 2008, p. 186). That is, it 
is a framework for analysis that begins with the observation that governance is a very 
widespread phenomenon that occurs whenever individuals and groups seeks to shape their own 
conduct or the conduct of others.     
 Third, additional research is required to better explain the criminal justice policy-
making process. While there is some evidence to suggest that American criminologists have 
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attempted to explain why certain policies attract the attention of policy-makers and move onto 
the legislative agenda (a process known as agenda-setting), scant empirical research has 
examined this issue (Ismaili, 2006). Within the Canadian context, further investigation is 
required to better understand how members of the government conceptualize the spread of 
policies in light of the shift of youth crime governance. However, accurately probing the 
numerous twists in policy-making processes and determining the myriad of concerns that affect 
policy-makers’ decisions are foreseeable challenges. The lack of previous Canadian research 
may be due to the mammoth methodological difficulties posed by this issue, although 
modification of the current theoretical perspectives to reflect Kingdon’s (2003) influential 
theory of policy agenda-setting, Windlesham’s (1998) theory of populist criminal justice 
policy-making, and the policy diffusion research tradition (Karch, 2007; Mintrom, 1997) may 
resolve some of these problems.          
 Fourth, the data collected from the case law post-enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4) was 
inconclusive in providing information on whether or not youth are affected or impacted by the 
newly enacted amendments to the YCJA. Given that case law typically involves cases that are 
felt to be potentially precedent setting, it was expected that pivotal cases were most likely to 
have occurred after enactment of the Bill. However, case law is a dynamic and constantly 
developing body of law; thus, it may take years before any evidence surfaces on the impact or 
consequences associated with the tough-on-crime legislation. This may explain why none of 
the post-enactment case law could provide enough evidence on the effects of the enactment, 
although the time limitation for the analysis may have played a role in this finding (only eight 
months of post-enactment case law was analyzed). Further, only a small fraction of the cases 
heard in youth court involve seriously violent offenders. Thus, the frequency with which these 
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types of cases actually make case law is relatively low when compared to other crimes 
committed by youth.   
 Finally, and most importantly, the results from this study suggest that more research is 
required in the Canadian context that incorporates dimensions of decision-making in the realm 
of politics using data from active politicians and lawmakers that have insight into information 
that is not publicly available (e.g., Privy Council). In order to fully appreciate how and in what 
ways meaningful decisions are made about tough-on-crime legislation in Canada, 
consideration must be given to various federal and provincial level politicians of all parties, as 
well as other individuals involved in these behind-the-scenes processes. In effect, this 
argument extends to some degree to any type of youth justice related policy and legislative 
amendments, not just to tough-on-crime legislation.  
 Although one limitation of this study is that it does not include insight from active 
politicians, gaining the perspectives of various politicians and lawmakers is important for two 
reasons. First, it offers a multi-dimensional aspect on the current legislation that goes beyond 
what is known by those who gave expert testimony. Second, it provides a basis of 
understanding for the enactment of future youth crime legislation. There are numerous 
complexities connected with evidence-based policy making in Canada, but much of this 
revolves around statistical deficiencies which do not properly present data on violence 
(including the harm associated with it, and its causes, consequences and prevention). In order 
for legislation to be effective, the evidence used to develop policies should be based on 
research that not only includes trustworthy data, but information that is well-founded. 
Although the information collected through Hansard suggested that “other” data aside from the 
report generated by the roundtable discussion was considered, there is no mention of what 
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other input really went into this legislation. Additional research is required to investigate what 
types of evidence is in fact used (if any) to develop any future youth crime legislation, and how 
these are influenced by the various cultural and social circumstances or structures that 
currently exist.  
 Undeniably, such research may be difficult to conduct considering that much of the 
youth crime legislation is based on a reactive mentality that does not necessarily consider 
evidence regarding what prompts youth to become “career criminals”, or what life experiences 
increase the likelihood of becoming persistent offenders. To an extent, this questions the ways 
in which evidence itself is constituted or discounted (i.e., how the problem of youth crime is 
defined or how declining youth crime statistics are dismissed) so that responsibility for the 
problem is displaced onto youth, therefore motivating certain types of legislation. Further, 
much research does not consider the ways in which the larger superstructure affect youth, and 
the implications imposed on them on account of the economic, political, social and cultural 
systems. In this sense, the problem is two-fold because reliable data is lacking both on the 
evidence-based decision-making process itself and the fundamental research that focuses on 
the aforementioned factors. Without this information, an effective and efficient response to 
youth crime is doubtful.  
 Despite these limitations, however, this research contributes to the overall 
understanding of youth crime legislation with regards to the micro and macro processes 
associated with the tough-on-crime legislation, not only by expanding our knowledge within a 
Canadian perspective but also by addressing the shortfalls in the literature as a whole. What is 
clear is that these crime control strategies are harmonious with the constitution of modern 
capitalism, and are characterized by specific problems, reactions, responses (including 
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“adaptive” and “non-adaptive” responses) and transformations of the state. These techniques, 
therefore, coincide with a new style of youth governance that makes inferences and 
assumptions about class structure on account of the political, economic, social and cultural 
policy decisions made by the state, and provides evidence for the ways in which the tough-on-
crime movement is predicated on maintaining state power and political legitimacy in today’s 
complex democratic society. In the end, it is the youth who are least capable of mobilizing 
political power that are adversely affected by these policy choices.      
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
Preamble 
-Are there any questions regarding the project? 
 - Briefly summarize Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
 - Sign Informed Consent Form 
 - Provide participant with a copy of the signed Informed Consent Form 
 - Reiterate Consent and discuss audio recording of the interview 
 - The respondents may turn the recorder off at any time during the interview if they 
would prefer to answer the questions off the record 
 - Restate that participants may decline to answer a question or withdraw their 
participation in the study at any time without penalty 
 - Confidentially is ensured as no statements will be directly quoted  (referenced to their 
names) 
 - Exchange business cards or confirm rank and spelling of last name 
 
Background Information 
 
1) How long have you been your current position? (If applicable) 
2) How long have you been involved in politics? (If applicable) 
3) What was your motivation to enter into politics? (If applicable) 
  
Bill C-10 (Part 4) 
 
4) What can you tell me about the Omnibus Crime Bill C-10, particularly in reference to Part 4? 
 
5) In your opinion, why was there so much opposition to passing the Bill? 
 
6) Which political party was least in favour of passing this Bill? Why? 
 
7) What were the overall concerns brought forth by politicians (including yourself, if any) that 
were associated with the “get tough on crime” legislation? 
 
8) Where do you think some of the most influential policy ideas have come from with regards 
to tough-on-crime legislation? Who are the major players?  
 
9) Can you tell me about the specific processes involved in the passing of Bill C-10 (Part 4)? 
 - How did it happen despite opposition/criticism? 
 
10) How was the enactment of the bill rationalized when Statistics Canada concluded that 
youth crime rates were steadily declining? (Assuming participants are aware of this fact). 
 
11) In your opinion, what is the purpose of Bill C-10 (Part 4)? 
 
12) Prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), was there any evidence suggesting that tough-
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on-crime legislation can deter youth from committing crime (either as a first offence or repeat 
offences)?   
 
13) In what way did the government consider the expense of tough sentencing practices when 
it is claimed that the provinces do not have enough money for adequate treatment programs for 
youth in conflict with the law?  
 
14) Prior to the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4), did the government consider how other 
jurisdictions respond to youth crime in an effort to assess which strategies work and which do 
not? 
 - Do you feel it is important to learn from responses to youth crime in other 
jurisdictions? Why or why not? 
 
15) To your knowledge, did the government rely on reports or studies that were produced 
outside the government agencies such as Statistics Canada?  
 - Did these exist at the time of the enactment of the statute? 
 - Which reports/studies are these specifically? 
 
16) To your knowledge, were there any testimonies of expert witnesses presented before the 
Parliamentary committee responsible for studying the Bill? 
 - Do you recall what information was presented and by whom? 
 
Perceptions of Youth Crime 
 
17) How do you feel people acquire their knowledge on youth crime in Canada? 
 
18) In your opinion, how much of a role would you say the media has in constructing general 
 views on youth crime (types of crime and rates of crime)? 
 
19) How accurate do you think media reports are about youth crime? 
 
20) In your opinion, does the public’s general view of youth crime influence the government’s 
decision to enact crime legislation?  
 - Why or why not? 
 
21) From your perspective, what are some of the factors that are related to youth at risk of 
criminal involvement? (Prompts will be used if required) 
 a) Systemic factors such as culture, family, socio-economic 
 b) Inter-generational factors  
 c) Age 
 d) Race and racism 
 e) Relational factors 
 f) Risk assessments 
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22) In your opinion, was the Youth Criminal Justice Act adequate in dealing with youth crime 
(prior to any legislative amendments presented by Bill C-10 (Part 4))? 
 - Why or why not? 
 - If yes, in what ways was it inadequate? 
 
Summary Questions 
 
23) Hypothetically speaking, how do you think we as a society should deal with young 
offenders? 
 
24) What types of responses would you say have “meaningful consequences” for youth?  
 
25) Do you believe there are adequate resources available to the province when responding to 
youth crime in general?  
 
26) Do you believe the amendments put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4) will effectively address 
youth crime? 
 - Will harsher sentencing practices deter youth from committing crime? 
  
Reflection 
 
27) Are there any additional comments you would like to add that we have not talked about 
concerning the enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4)? 
 
28) Because one of my methods for attaining interviews is respondent driven, is there anyone 
else you suggest I contact for interviewing? 
 
29) Now that the interview is complete, do you have any questions that I can answer for you? 
 
THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY! 
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APPENDIX B: RECRUITMENT LETTER 
Responses to Youth Crime in Canada: An Examination of the Micro & Macro Processes 
Associated with Tough-on-Crime Legislation 
 
[Date] 
 
Dear [insert name], 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study I am conducting as part of my 
doctoral degree in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of 
Waterloo under the supervision of Professor Jennifer L. Schulenberg. I would like to provide 
you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you 
decide to take part. 
As you may know, the Omnibus Crime Bill (Bill C-10) was set in motion earlier this year by 
the Canadian Conservative government, and covers a wide range of justice and public safety 
measures. Particularly relevant to this study is the assessment of the underlying premises of 
Bill C-10 (Part 4), known as “An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to Make 
Consequential and Related Amendments to Other Acts”, which may expand the crimes for 
which youth can be incarcerated and the amount of time they can spend in custody. The 
purpose of this study, therefore, is to better understand the individual and governmental 
processes associated with the “get tough on crime” approach in Canada, with a specific focus 
on responses to youth crime.   
I am conducting interviews with interested participants in order to examine the processes 
through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was legislated. When faced with legislative 
changes such as those put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4), it is important to consider how and in 
what ways politicians make meaningful decisions about youth crime laws in Canada. Therefore, 
this study will rely on the inclusion of various responses from Members of Parliament, 
Members of Provincial Parliament and Federal civil servants, as they are best suited to speak 
on issues pertaining to the provisions of Bill C-4 and the specific processes involved in this 
particular piece of legislation.   
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 45-60 
minutes in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. Alternatively, the option of 
a telephone interview or an interview via Skype can be arranged if you are unable to provide 
an in-person interview. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so 
wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative 
consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio 
recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All 
information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in 
any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission anonymous 
quotations may be used. 
460 
 
If you are interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this study, or if you 
have any questions or concerns, please contact me at either the phone number or email address 
listed below. If you would like an executive summary or a copy of the full report, please let me 
know by providing me with your email address.  
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist 
you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at 416-409-1644 or by email 
at tmkassab@uwaterloo.ca. You can also contact my supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg at 
(519) 888-4567 ext. 38639 or email at jlschule@uwaterloo.ca. I would like to assure you that 
this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research 
Ethics at the University of Waterloo. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from 
your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin, the Director, Office of 
Research Ethics. 
Your opinions and perspective are valuable to ensure everyone’s voice is included. Please let 
me know by email or phone if you continue to be interested in participating in an interview. I 
look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Taline Kassabian BAH, MA, PhD Candidate 
Department of Sociology & Legal Studies 
University of Waterloo 
200 University Avenue West 
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 
Tel: (416) 409-1644 
Email: tmkassab@uwaterloo.ca 
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APPENDIX C: LETTER OF INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT 
Responses to Youth Crime in Canada: An Examination of the Micro & Macro Processes 
Associated with Tough-on-Crime Legislation 
 
Researcher:             Taline Kassabian BAH, MA, PhD Candidate 
            Department of Sociology & Legal Studies 
                                  University of Waterloo 
                                  200 University Avenue West 
                                  Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 
                                   Email: tmkassab@uwaterloo.ca 
 
Dear [Participants name],   
As you may know, the Omnibus Crime Bill (Bill C-10) was set in motion earlier this year by 
the Canadian Conservative government, and covers a wide range of justice and public safety 
measures. Particularly relevant to this study is the assessment of the underlying premises of 
Bill C-10 (Part 4), known as “An Act to Amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to Make 
Consequential and Related Amendments to Other Acts”, which may expand the crimes for 
which youth can be incarcerated and the amount of time they can spend in custody. The 
purpose of this study, therefore, is to better understand the individual and governmental 
processes associated with the “get tough on crime” approach in Canada, with a specific focus 
on responses to youth crime.   
Purpose of the Study 
This study will examine the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was 
legislated. When faced with legislative changes such as those put forth by Bill C-10 (Part 4), it 
is important to consider how and in what ways politicians make meaningful decisions about 
youth crime laws in Canada. Therefore, this study will rely on the inclusion of various 
responses from Members of Parliament, Members of Provincial Parliament and Federal civil 
servants, as they are best suited to speak on issues pertaining to the provisions of Bill C-10 
(Part 4) and the specific processes involved in this particular piece of legislation.   
Procedures involved in the research 
I am requesting your participation in an interview on a day and time convenient to you. To 
minimize any personal or organizational disruptions, the interviews will last no longer than 45-
60. I will invite your open ended responses to several questions about your experiences in 
relation to Bill C-10 (Part 4). You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you 
so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative 
consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio 
recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All 
information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in 
any thesis or report resulting from this study, however, with your permission anonymous 
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quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained for no more than 10 
years in a locked filing cabinet in my home.  
Potential harms, risks, or discomforts 
There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study. While the 
interview questions directly ask about personal opinions, controversial topics, and decisions or 
situations that have previously been dealt with in legislative assembly, the interviews are 
concerned with the varying perceptions of each participant regarding the newly enacted 
legislation that affect both youth and society as a whole. The goal of conducting interviews is 
to obtain a better understanding of the perceptions of effectiveness in relation to the responses 
to youth crime. In addition, they strive to uncover the underlying processes behind the 
enactment of Bill C-10 (Part 4). Given the public nature of policy implementation, these 
questions do not pose risks, harms or discomforts to you by taking part in this study. Further, 
the information collected and your identity will remain confidential due to various sensitivities 
associated with occupational positions.   
Potential benefits 
Upon request, you will be provided with a copy of the final dissertation. The results from this 
study will be of direct benefit to academics, law enforcement, government officials, and policy 
experts on matters related to youth crime. By participating in this project you have the ability 
to promptly access the findings that pertain to the perceived effectiveness of various responses 
to youth crime, particularly in relation to responses that work best when dealing with youth 
crime. It is expected that the results from this study will contribute to the collective search for 
the most effective and appropriate ways to respond to youth crime based on data collected 
from Canada as well as other jurisdictions that have implemented similar tactics. It is 
anticipated that this study will add to the overall understanding of youth crime in Canada, 
predominantly with regards to the micro and macro processes associated with the “get tough on 
crime” legislation. It is hoped that this research will foster dialogue between various social 
welfare agencies and encourage a collaborative approach to addressing youth crime. 
Confidentiality 
The interview will be audio taped to ensure accuracy and to facilitate data analysis. I would 
like to emphasize agreement to participate in the interview does not require you to answer any 
of the questions if you do not want to and you can end your participation at any time without 
any negative repercussions. If you decide to withdraw from the study before, during, or after 
the interview, you can request that any, or all, of your data recorded on audio, paper, or 
electronically be destroyed immediately. I am assigning a number to each participant rather 
than your name, and all of your answers to questions. I will keep your responses in strict 
confidence in several ways. 
First, the informed consent form will be kept separate from the audio, paper, and electronic 
focus group data and destroyed ten years after study completion. Second, your taped recorded 
responses will be assigned an alphanumeric code and this will not be identifiable in any 
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presentations or publications. Third, the audio recording will be kept secure in a locked cabinet. 
Once the accuracy of the transcript is verified, the audio file will be erased when the study is 
complete. Once again, if you choose to withdraw from the interview at any time you can 
choose to have your recorded responses destroyed immediately. Fourth, anonymity will be 
maintained for research participants through the use of anonymous quotations in the executive 
summary, the final report, and in all presentations and publications. If the situation arises 
where there is any possibility that a quotation will not protect your right to anonymity (as 
stated above), I will contact you prior to the use of the quotation so you can review the quote 
and I can obtain your express informed consent for its use. 
You will receive a signed copy of this consent form for your records. If you have any questions 
regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision 
about participation, please contact me at 416-409-1644 or by email at tmkassab@uwaterloo.ca. 
You can also contact my supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg at (519) 888-4567 ext. 38639 or 
email at jlschule@uwaterloo.ca. I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed 
and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin, the Director, Office of Research Ethics, at 1-
519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or at maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.  
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in 
this project. 
Sincerely, 
Taline Kassabian 
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Please mark the “Yes” and “No” boxes with your initials to indicate whether you are providing 
consent to each of the consent and privacy options outlined below.  
  Consent and Privacy Options Yes No 
1 I understand and willingly agree to participate in a face-to-face interview to 
be scheduled and conducted at my convenience. 
2 I agree to have the interview tape recorded. 
3 I would like to review a copy of my transcript. 
4 I am willing to allow the researcher to use quotations from the interview 
providing they are cited anonymously (the quote does not identify me). 
5 I am willing to allow the researcher to use quotations from the interview that 
are not completely anonymous as long as I am contacted by the researcher 
so I can review the quotation and give my consent to use it. 
6 I would like to receive a copy of the final dissertation. 
7 I agree to be contacted at a future date if the researcher would like 
clarification on my answers to any of the interview questions. 
I have read the information presented in the attached Letter of Information about a study being 
conducted by Taline Kassabian of the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to 
ask questions about my involvement in the study and to receive additional details I wanted to 
know about the study. I understand I can choose to withdraw from the study at any time and I 
voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. I understand that if I have any comments or 
concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact your supervisor, Dr. 
Jennifer Schulenberg at (519) 888-4567 ext. 38639 or email at jlschule@uwaterloo.ca, or the 
Director, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or at 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca .  
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Responses to Youth Crime in Canada: An Examination of the Micro & Macro Processes 
Associated with Tough-on-Crime Legislation
By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigator 
or involved institution from their legal and professional responsibilities.
________________________________________________       
Name of the Participant (please print) – Date (dd/mm/yyyy) 
________________________________________________                     
Signature of the Participant 
________________________________________________ 
Email address 
In my opinion, the 
person who has signed 
this informed consent is 
agreeing to participate in 
this study voluntary, 
understands the nature of 
the study, and any 
consequences of 
participation. 
____________________ 
Signature of Researcher 
or Witness 
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APPENDIX D: THANK YOU LETTER 
Responses to Youth Crime in Canada: An Examination of the Micro & Macro Processes 
Associated with Tough-on-Crime Legislation 
[Date] 
Dear (Insert Name of Participant), 
I would like to thank you for your participation in this study entitled “Responses to Youth 
Crime in Canada: An Examination of the Micro & Macro Processes Associated with Tough- 
on-Crime Legislation”. As a reminder, the purpose of this research is to better understand the 
individual and governmental processes associated with the tough-on-crime approach in Canada, 
more accurately known as Bill C-10 (Part 4), with a specific focus on responses to youth crime.  
The data collected during interviews will contribute to an overall improvement in our 
comprehension of how politicians make meaningful decisions about youth crime laws in 
Canada. In particular, the processes through which Bill C-10 (Part 4) developed and was 
legislated is examined, especially with reference to the specific processes encountered through 
which these decisions are reached.   
Please remember that any data pertaining to you as an individual participant will be kept 
confidential. Once all the data are collected and analyzed for this project, I plan on sharing this 
information with the research community through my dissertation, as well as in seminars, 
conferences, presentations, and journal articles. If you are interested in receiving more 
information regarding the results of this study, or would like a summary of the results, please 
provide your email address, and when the study is completed, anticipated by fall 2013, I will 
send you the information. In the meantime, if you have any questions about the study, please 
do not hesitate to contact me by email or telephone as noted below.  
As with all University of Waterloo projects involving human participants, this project was 
reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo. Should you have any comments or concerns resulting from your 
participation in this study, please contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin, the Director, Office of 
Research Ethics, at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or at maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.You can 
also contact my supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg at (519) 888-4567 ext. 38639 or email at 
jlschule@uwaterloo.ca. 
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Sincerely, 
 
 
Taline Kassabian 
University of Waterloo 
Department of Sociology & Legal Studies 
200 University Avenue West 
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 
Tel: (416) 409-1644 
Email: tmkassab@uwaterloo.ca  
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APPENDIX E: INFORMAL RESPONSES TO YOUTH CRIME IN TEXAS 
Youth taken into custody may be disposed of informally without a referral to the youth 
court only in cases where these arrangements have been previously agreed upon by the juvenile 
board. These types of dispositions usually involve very minor cases and are not subject to 
further legal action. According to Texas Family Code S.52.03(c), a referral to an organization 
other than the youth court typically entails a “conference with the juvenile and the juvenile’s 
parents”, although a referral to a family services agency or a Department of Family and 
Protective Services (DFPS) program for youth in at-risk situation are not uncommon.  
 A First Offender Program, on the other hand, is for youth “who have not been 
previously adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct. That is, youth must not have a 
prior record”.293 Pursuant to S.52.032 of the Texas Family Code, all juvenile boards in Texas 
are “required to adopt guidelines for informal dispositions of First Offender Programs to 
encourage more law enforcement agencies to implement such programs”, however these 
“guidelines are not considered mandatory”. Youth taken into custody for a third degree felony 
or higher are not eligible for First Offender Programs, nor are youth who have committed 
misdemeanors or state jail felonies involving violence or weapons. 294  Similar to the 
extrajudicial sanctions found in Canada, a youth who has formerly been referred to a First 
Offender Program without referral to a youth court upon discharge may be referred to this 
program on a subsequent account. Contrary to the tough-on-crime approach, participation in a 
First Offender Program may “involve voluntary restitution to a victim; voluntary community 
service; vocational training, education, counseling, or other rehabilitative services; anger 
management and conflict resolution programs; cognitive-behaviour therapy; boot camps; gang 
prevention/intervention; substance abuse prevention, intervention and treatment; and periodic 
reporting by the youth to the designated agency”.295 Youth who successfully complete these 
programs are not referred to juvenile court, although failure to comply with the terms of 
successful completion (either due to voluntary withdrawal or because the youth has been taken 
into custody within 90 days of completion of the program) results in such referrals.296     
  
293 Texas Family Code S.52.032. 
294 See S.52.031(a) of the Texas Family Code. 
295 See In re Expunction of D.R.R. (2010), where the Court of Appeals held that minors have the capacity to enter 
into contracts for pre-trial diversion programs, and as a result are bound by their conditions. 
296 See Texas Family Code S.52.031(f), (g), and (j); and S.58.001(f).  
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APPENDIX F: DEFERRED PROSECUTION IN THE STATE OF TEXAS 
 According to S.53.03(a) of the Texas Family Code, deferred prosecution is deemed as 
“an alternative to seeking a formal adjudication of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a 
need for supervision” (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013b). In other words, deferred 
prosecution may be seen as a period of probation not exceeding 6 months. Most frequently 
kept for youth who engage in less serious offences and those who are not “habitual offenders”, 
deferred prosecution is a “voluntary alternative” in which all parties involved agree to certain 
probation conditions (Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013b). Texas Family Code 
stipulates that youth who opt for this approach are not to be detained as a result of the process, 
especially since the terms of this method involve counselling and recommendations to outside 
organizations for rehabilitation (e.g. a twelve week teen dating violence court program). In 
addition, restitution and community service are both obligatory stipulations in all programs that 
entail probation. Successful completion of deferred prosecution results in a discharge from 
probation; however violation(s) of the terms are reported to the juvenile court which may lead 
to taking the original case back to court since the effort at informal probation failed. It should 
be noted that the “type and availability of deferred prosecution programs vary from county to 
county in the state of Texas”.297 Deferred prosecution in Texas is quite similar to a deferred 
custody and supervision order in Canada. In both instances, this alternative to custody is meant 
to permit youth who would otherwise have an imposition of a custodial sentence to serve their 
sentence in the community under stringent a set of conditions. Thus, the threat of immediate 
incarceration if any of those terms are violated is present. Successful completion of a deferred 
prosecution program can be expunged from the record immediately via petition with no chance 
of it being used against the person in the future. In Canada, however, extrajudicial sanctions 
remain on a youth’s record for two years before being sealed, but can carry over into the adult 
record if convicted for a new offence.   
 
  
297 See the National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2012. These programs may include “referring a child to a social 
agency, contacting parents to inform them of their child’s activities, or simply warning the youth about their 
activities” (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2012).  
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